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NATO-RUSSIA BORDER TENSIONS ⟩ "Firefight Between Estonian and Russian Border Guards on Narva River Would Serve Russia's Interests", Top Official Says

Estonian Ministry of Interior believes that Estonian border guard acted wisely when refraining from using force against the Russian border guard illegally removing navigation buoys from the Narva river. Photo: Tairo Lutter
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When the Russian Border Guard began removing navigational buoys in Estonian waters on the Narva River in the early hours of May 23, the Police and Border Guard Board had both the opportunity and the capability to intervene, according to Tarmo Miilits, Secretary General of the Ministry of the Interior. Currently, Estonia’s border guard is bolstered by additional EU Frontex forces.

What conclusions have the Ministry of the Interior and the Police and Border Guard Board drawn from the recent removal of buoys on the Narva River?

The primary conclusion is a reaffirmation of a long-known fact: the Russian Federation uses border provocations to create fear and confusion in Western societies. We will not succumb to such provocations. While this was a provocative border incident, Estonia is taking a measured approach to the situation.

Have criminal proceedings been initiated regarding the Narva River buoys, and if not, why?

The incident has been documented, and the border guard service has formally approached the Russian Federation through official channels for an explanation. Diplomatic channels have also been engaged.

When will the buoys be reinstalled by the Estonian authorities?

We are awaiting explanations from the Russian side before proceeding. The Police and Border Guard Board has suspended the installation of the remaining buoys until an official response is received.

Could there be any treaty-based grounds for Russia to dispute the demarcated boundary line in the Narva river, such as changes in the riverbed?

The last agreement on buoy locations was made at the border guard representatives level in 2022, and Russia has not updated their position since then. From our perspective, the previous agreement remains valid. Russia has not provided any evidence or reasons suggesting that the navigation channel has changed.

In the broader context, whether the riverbed has changed is insignificant. If it had, the standard procedure would be to propose a joint survey of the riverbed and, based on the results, agree on new buoy locations if necessary.

Estonian Border Guard filmed Russian officials stealing Estonian navigation buoys at the Narva River in the night of 23 May 2024.
Estonian Border Guard filmed Russian officials stealing Estonian navigation buoys at the Narva River in the night of 23 May 2024. Photo: Politsei- ja piirivalveamet

Was the decision not to escalate made by the Police and Border Guard Board or directed by politicians?

The decision was made by the Police and Border Guard Board and has been supported by politicians in hindsight.

Did the Police and Border Guard Board have the capacity to intervene in the Narva River incident?

Yes, the Police and Border Guard Board had the capacity to intervene. However, they chose not to after assessing the situation. The actions were documented, and further communication will occur both at the level of border guard representatives and through other inter-state channels. A physical confrontation over buoys, or worse, an exchange of fire, would have had unpredictable consequences and would have served Russia’s interests, not Estonia’s.

Has the Police and Border Guard Board adjusted its border surveillance and protection strategy due migration attack operations in the region that we have witnessed since 2021?

We have analyzed various migration attack scenarios and practiced our responses both independently and with partners. Our border guard service has gained relevant experience from assisting other countries. At the Estonian-Russian border, migration attacks have been limited to minor incidents, with our forces stopping and returning groups of illegal migrants.

We must remain vigilant and continue building border infrastructure and installing necessary equipment. Our eastern border needs modern solutions and enhanced surveillance capabilities.

Border crossing point in Narva from Estonia to Russia has become under increased stress since Finland decided to close its Eastern border with Russia altogether in response to Moscow weaponizing illegal immigration against Finland.
Border crossing point in Narva from Estonia to Russia has become under increased stress since Finland decided to close its Eastern border with Russia altogether in response to Moscow weaponizing illegal immigration against Finland. Photo: Ilja Smirnov / Põhjarannik

How many border guards does Estonia have now compared to ten years ago?

We cannot disclose specific capabilities, as this information is monitored by a neighboring country. We maintain close cooperation with domestic and international partners, including Frontex. In a major crisis, the Police and Border Guard Board will utilize all available resources, regardless of their ordinary daily duties.

Estonia initiated the drone wall project involving six NATO countries. What is it, and when will Estonia have the planned capability?

The “drone wall” aims to establish stationary drone detection and interception capabilities on the eastern border and in major cities. The system will combine different solutions to prevent unnoticed drone flights to any destination and allow us to react in real time. The Police and Border Guard Board is soon opening a public tender for installing drone surveillance equipment on the first completed land border section, with work continuing as funding becomes available.

What are the risks associated with unidentified cross-border drone traffic?

Drones present numerous risks, including criminal use for information gathering or assassinations, and potential terrorist attacks due to their affordability. In Estonia, while most drone users are law-abiding, there have been dangerous situations caused by careless drone use, posing threats to aircraft and critical infrastructure. Unidentified cross-border drone traffic amplifies these hazards.

What is the current state of the West-Russia hybrid war?

It is crucial not to underestimate or overestimate the Russian threat. Russia is exploiting every opportunity to weaken Western unity on sanctions and international isolation. Covert actions and information operations are organized to sow discord.

NATO recently highlighted various Russian hybrid activities in Europe, reaffirming our collective readiness to counter these threats and support Ukraine.

Was Russia’s recent alleged intention to unilaterally change the boundaries of internal waters in the Gulf of Finland a real threat or an information operation?

Given the security situation, we must be prepared for continued Russian hybrid activities. The announcement about changing maritime borders with Finland might have been an attempt to cause confusion. Whether the two border incidents are related or not, Estonia will respond appropriately, potentially involving unilateral or international measures. We can expect continuation of hybrid hostility from Russia.

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