DEMOCRACIES AND "WORLD WAR H" ⟩ Estonia's Active Involvement in the Western-Russian Hybrid War Raises Inconvenient Questions about Civilian Control over Hybrid Operations

A year earlier, the CIA and British intelligence MI6 orchestrated Operation Ajax in Iran to overthrow democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, who had nationalized the oil industry. Mossadegh's overthrow and the restoration of Shah Reza Pahlavi's rule led to decades of authoritarian governance and growing dissatisfaction, culminating in the 1979 revolution.

In 1973, the CIA supported and financed Chilean opposition forces to overthrow the democratically elected president Salvador Allende. After Allende's fall and death, General Augusto Pinochet took power, establishing a repressive military dictatorship.

These and other questionable episodes of Western hybrid warfare mostly date back to the Cold War era. However, as recently as 1994, France faced criticism for its involvement in Rwanda's internal politics leading up to a genocide. France has a history of controversial influence operations in Africa.

In more recent history, there have been less contentious hybrid operations, such as those by Israel and the United States against Iran's nuclear program (the Stuxnet virus). Overall, while the West rightly focuses on the Soviet Union and its successor Russia's hybrid aggression, democracies also engage in hybrid warfare and can sometimes overreach. Therefore, it is important not to shy away from public debate on this topic and to critically evaluate both our own and our allies' tactics alongside those of our adversaries.

Hybrid warfare became a popular term again in 2014 due to the "little green men" who occupied Crimea. However, in a broader sense, hybrid warfare has used various elements (political and economic pressure, diplomatic isolation, information manipulation, deception, espionage, threats of force, foreign funding of political parties, arms support, etc.) for millennia.

Ancient Tactics, Modern Tools

Cyberattacks, social media, and artificial intelligence have added new dimensions to this ancient form of warfare, but the methods remain largely the same. In cyberattacks, too, tactics such as masking, deception, simulation, attrition, and enticement are employed. One country's government uses indirect methods and avoids direct military confrontation to influence another government's decisions, potentially replacing it with a more favorable one. This is the essence of hybrid warfare.

Secrecy and covert actions are not necessarily integral to hybrid warfare; it can also be a completely open and official phenomenon. In the United States, hybrid warfare encompasses both public and covert activities. The transparency and legality of actions can be seen as characteristics that distinguish Estonia's hybrid warfare approach from Russia's.

In Estonian history, there have been horrific incidents of hybrid warfare even before the birth of the Republic of Estonia. For instance, the killing of four Estonian kings on May 4, 1343, in Paide was a classic hybrid operation (a deception operation culminating in the murder of leaders). However, the most gruesome and extensive use of this warfare method hit Estonia in 1939. The diplomatic, economic, and military pressure leading to the Bases Treaty was, from Estonia's perspective, a capitulation to Soviet hybrid aggression.

One Nation, Two Defense Strategies

Based on discussions with various sources, it can be concluded that the current Estonian security elite is broadly divided into two schools of thought regarding the defense of Estonia's independence in the coming decades. Both schools agree that the current period resembles 1939, but they draw different conclusions. The "hybrid warfare" school believes that Russia's hybrid warfare against Estonia and the other Baltic states is expected to expand significantly. If Estonia can succeed in hybrid (defense warfare), then a full-scale war might be averted.

The other, more conventional part of the security elite believes that Russia will decide to militarily attack its neighbors regardless of the outcomes of hybrid warfare or precisely if they fail in it. They cite February 24, 2022, as an example.

In 2014, Russia was in a much better position in hybrid warfare compared to 2022, and its situation subsequently visibly worsened on every front, especially in the information war. Nevertheless, Russia decided for a full-scale military invasion of a neighboring country.

Throughout the period of Estonia's re-independence, our government and intelligence services have conducted hybrid warfare against Russia based on clear defensive needs and as a reaction to Russian attacks. In recent years, Estonia's stance has somewhat changed, and in addition to purely reactive hybrid operations, proactive initiatives shaping the conditions of the adversary's actions have entered the government's repertoire. Estonia does not implement these initiatives alone but sets an example and takes the initiative to encourage the European Union and its external allies to increase international pressure on Russia.

Estonia's Hybrid Defense

With regard to Estonia's domestic hybrid warfare operations of a purely defensive nature, nine measures have been implemented since early 2022: restricting within Estonian territory the broadcast of Russian media channels that justify acts of aggression; holding accountable or expelling individuals engaged in anti-Estonian activities; the "monument war," which involved removing Soviet time war memorials from public spaces; banning symbols of aggression and the justification of aggression; confiscating weapons from Russian citizens; prohibiting the use of Russian license plates on vehicles; significantly enhancing the counteraction of cyber-attacks; closing Estonia-Russia border checkpoints; and declaring the Russian Orthodox Church as a supporter of aggression.

These measures would not be necessary if Russia did not act as an aggressor or attempt to persuade the Estonian population to support its aggression in Ukraine. For example, the decision to transition to Estonian-language education and to accelerate this process is not a measure of hybrid warfare but a regular educational policy decision that became more urgent because of Russian aggression and the extreme political ideology of the Kremlin regime, but was not directly caused by it. This political aim has been represented in Estonia's party landscape for decades.

Estonia's "hybrid defense force" comprises not only the Government Office, the Justice Ministry and Interior Ministry, Information System Authority, Police and Border Guard Board, Tax and Customs Board, and the special services, but also a voluntary element—the cyber defense unit of the Kaitseliit (Defense League) volunteer corps and Propastop, which fights against Russian disinformation. Both operate under voluntary defense organization Kaitseliit. Additionally, creative unions and sports associations have imposed so-called voluntary sanctions on presenting Russian authors' works, limited cooperation with Russian creators or athletes, and restricted participation in events in Russia or involving Russian participation.

Some journalists and newsrooms have voluntarily advocated for the enforcement or tightening of sanctions and other measures. They do not always limit themselves to objective coverage or investigative purposes but call on the government to tighten or better enforce the measures, or call out companies serving Russian economic interests, even if these do not violate sanctions or laws. The eastward transport scandal is one of such cases. At the same time, the media's political activism is nothing new or unique in the context of the ongoing hybrid war.

The more active part of the hybrid war against Russia, which is not solely based on Estonia's immediate defense needs, is directed by our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Justice. It is important to highlight the role of the Riigikogu, as various notable resolutions (such as opening a NATO air defense mission in Ukraine, recognizing Russia's aggression as genocide, etc.) have been adopted on the initiative of the Riigikogu itself.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs oversees operations that require the assistance of allies and have a strategic impact on the opponent's operational conditions. These include the imposition of economic sanctions, the diplomatic isolation of Russia, and, in collaboration with the Ministry of Justice, the planning of "legal warfare" to prosecute Russian war crimes. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also spearheaded the initiative to utilize Russia's frozen assets, another active hybrid warfare measure.

The Estonian Ministry of Defense has led the provision of military aid to Ukraine on a material level. Military aid is a classic hybrid warfare measure, and Estonia has been a pioneer in this regard: we were the first to send Western arms to Ukraine a few weeks before Russia's full-scale aggression and pressured other countries, such as Germany, to approve arms deliveries. The ministry also oversees foreign and military intelligence, which has significantly assisted Ukraine. Western intelligence has played a crucial role in supporting Ukraine, and Estonian intelligence has been no exception.

Estonia has been a leader in countering Russian aggression also on a strategic and conceptual level. Last December, our Ministry of Defense developed the so-called "Estonian Plan" to assist Ukraine in achieving victory. This plan has garnered widespread attention and recently inspired the British government to commit to long-term military support for Ukraine. The ice is starting to break.

Labeling Estonia's and the free world's efforts to support Ukraine against Russian aggression as hybrid warfare might seem provocative and combative, given that this defense is being forced on us and is shamefully costly. However, the hybrid warfare framework has clear advantages.

The Advantages of the Hybrid Warfare Framework

Firstly, it makes it easier to distinguish hybrid warfare from regular socio-political processes. Measures are implemented to limit the opponent's aggressive actions, which, due to their nature of infringing on basic rights, should be clearly separated from mainstream politics. The enforced militarism should not permanently infect Estonia's mainstream political parties.

Secondly, like any war, the current hybrid defense war against Russia requires a democratic civilian control framework. Primarily, the government needs oversight, and in hybrid warfare, this oversight is carried out by the chancellor of justice, the political opposition, and the media. Hence, all debates regarding the proportionality, legality, and effectiveness of various measures (such as the issue of stripping Russian citizens of voting rights) are crucial for the health of democracy.

The suppression of such debates weakens the quality of hybrid defense warfare. In military planning, using devil's advocates (known as Red Teams) is a standard method. Besides the opposition, the media must also play this role actively, methodically questioning the effectiveness of existing hybrid warfare measures. This has been done partially. The debate continues. However, during wartime, media self-censorship increases.

Thirdly, treating hybrid warfare as hybrid warfare allows us to assess it against the long history of this mode of warfare, highlighting areas that may be overlooked today. For instance, since the end of the Cold War, the West has been poor at creating and disseminating messages to ordinary people living beyond the new Iron Curtain. There are undoubtedly other blind spots and unrecognized impacts.

Neither Estonia nor the European Union and NATO have a well-thought-out concept for hybrid attacks. Cyberattacks have been discussed as deterrent or punitive measures for the countless misdeeds perpetrated by Russia, but not very effectively.

Fourthly, we must always ensure that our hybrid warfare measures—even those of a predominantly defensive nature—do not inadvertently provide advantages to the adversary or excessively restrict the freedoms of Estonian citizens. We need to consider possible retaliatory actions by Russia and question whether our measures might end up giving the adversary an edge or making us similar to them.

Reckless militancy could diminish Estonia's resilience as a society and a state, potentially allowing Russia to exploit this weakness. Therefore, it is crucial to listen to and highlight opposing voices.

Since 2014, both the European Union and NATO have made progress in conceptualizing hybrid warfare and adopting a more proactive stance. They have developed "playbooks" that help in comprehending the adversary's actions more comprehensively and responding more thoughtfully and collaboratively. However, the West still has much work to do to articulate more precisely in both secret meeting rooms and public forums what is happening in hybrid warfare and how we can influence developments, using smart power when necessary.