BEHIND THE BATTLE LINES ⟩ Interview with Sir Lawrence Freedman on the Evolving Role of Military Command

Sir Lawrence Freedman: Commands can be issued in quite different settings, so I am focusing on military operations. In democratic countries, there is a tradition of military accountability to civilian authority, which is generally a healthy tradition. This is different from military dictatorships, where political and military decision-making are intertwined, or historical periods when the sovereign would lead the army in war and make political judgments.

Even Russia has a view of military accountability to civilian authority. In authoritarian regimes, however, there is a problem of sycophancy and a reluctance to challenge the supreme leader, resulting in less interaction between civilian and military authorities than in democratic societies.

One of the main issues that got me into this topic was the view, quite strong in the US and to a degree in the UK, that there is a clear division of labor. That it is up to the civilians to decide who you fight and why, and whether to go to war at all. At that point, the military should take over, working out the campaign plans and implementing them. I've always thought that was a difficult distinction to sustain. While they clearly have different responsibilities, political leaders need good military advice.

They need to be told if something is a foolish thing to do, or if it can be done with no trouble, or if there are alternative options. Equally, it's unrealistic to expect politics to be indifferent to how the campaign is being waged. Political leaders will care about success, casualties, and alliances. So, I always thought the division was unrealistic, and so it proved when I did the research. Even in democratic countries, there are enormous variations in how politicians and the military interact, depending on personalities, issues, and campaign duration.

Interviewer: Would you say there are some recognizable milestones in Western civil-military relations in the 20th century?

Sir Lawrence Freedman: In some ways the model I'm talking about in the US and Western countries was set by Eisenhower at the end of the Second World War. He managed a large coalition of forces, requiring political skills as much as military skills. That was recognized at the time and since. If you're going to have people at the top, they need to understand the political context in which they're operating.

Another milestone would be the Inchon landing in 1950 with General Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur was a gifted campaigner with a high reputation, having been a Pacific commander in the Second World War. However, his hubris led him to provoke the Chinese into the war, resulting in a famous argument with President Truman and his subsequent dismissal. This incident affirmed civilian authority over the military, regardless of prestige or reputation.

Since then, it’s been difficult to find similar campaigns, but Vietnam raised the issue of how much the military should challenge civilians if they think limitations are unrealistic. This issue reappeared in Iraq and Afghanistan. Counterinsurgency campaigns require political skill and judgment from military leaders, even if the results aren’t always as desired. The role of the commander involves political tact and awareness, but political conditions can limit what can be achieved.

Interviewer: How do the conclusions at the end of your book apply to the Ukraine war post-2022? 

Sir Lawrence Freedman: Yes, I looked at Ukraine just as the book “Command” was almost ready to go to press. The Ukraine war was beginning. I already had a chapter on Ukraine, focusing on 2014 and the role of Russians stirring up trouble in Crimea and Donbas. I included the first few months of the 2022 war. This conflict doesn’t show the Russian military at its best. I was interested in why Putin made the basic error of judgment about the ease of suppressing Ukraine and why the military went along with it.

The errors the military made were significant. We now know more about that period, and I would write some of it differently now, but the main arguments hold. On the other side, President Zelensky demonstrated effective political leadership, using the opportunity from his forces blunting the initial Russian offensive to rally support both within Ukraine and internationally. This highlights the role of political leadership in creating conditions for effective resistance, contrasting with Putin’s delusional leadership leading to a prolonged war with enormous loss of life and little to show for it.

Interviewer: How would you diagnose the evolution of Zaluzhnyi and Zelensky’s relationship? What happened there?

Sir Lawrence Freedman: Zaluzhnyi was a capable and modern commander who did an excellent job early on. However, personality issues and concerns within Zelensky’s camp about Zaluzhnyi’s popularity, combined with a disappointing 2023 offensive, led Zelensky to seek a fresher approach. The new commander provided a fresh perspective, but that’s another issue.

Zaluzhnyi’s role as ambassador to the UK shows he remains an important player. In Western approaches to command, civilian authorities must have a military commander they feel comfortable with. Whether it’s Truman with MacArthur or Lincoln experimenting with generals, at times of war, the political commander must have a good relationship with the military commander. If there’s tension, the military commander usually goes.

Interviewer: There have been discussions about the effectiveness and truthfulness of Russian military doctrines - Gerasimov doctrine etc. Are they just a genre of patriotic poems or is there an utter failure in execution?

Sir Lawrence Freedman: The Gerasimov doctrine was never truly a doctrine but a reading of a particular speech. Modern conflicts involve regular and irregular forces, cyber, and information domains. These elements are harder to control than direct armed force. The information campaigns remain relevant but are less important than brute force in war.

Cyber attacks and information campaigns are easier to recover from compared to physical attacks. The Russians tried to disrupt Ukrainian systems in February 2022, and while they came close to succeeding, support from big tech companies and government agencies helped Ukraine resist. Hitting physical infrastructure is often more effective than cyber attacks, which is what the Russians have done. So, while information campaigns are not irrelevant, they’re not as important as physical force.

Interviewer: We currently have civil-military tensions in Estonia, and we see the same in Europe, some Chiefs of Defense say we need to invest more in ammunition stocks etc. These vocal generals come under attack for being so loud about their concerns. What advice would you have for the mouthy generals of Europe?

Sir Lawrence Freedman: Military leaders have a duty to highlight risks, but they must communicate carefully. Public denunciations can be less effective than private conversations. Constant alarms can be dismissed as special pleading. We need to build up defenses given current threats, but military leaders should avoid dismissive attitudes towards politicians and engage in meaningful discussions.

European democracies have suffered a big shock seeing the lengths Russia will go to defeat Ukraine. Helping Ukraine has drained our stocks, and we need to build them up. There’s a consensus in the defense community about this need. However, asking for more money without wise past spending requires care. A proper conversation between the military and politicians is necessary. Politicians shouldn’t be afraid to ask hard questions. Military views are important but not infallible. Better answers come from better questions.

Interviewer: Is there a standard fallacy for civilian leaders in dealing with the military during a crisis?

Sir Lawrence Freedman: Civilian leaders should not be afraid to ask hard questions, which is different from saying they know better. They need to work out what they want from the military and ensure objectives are realistic. Politicians should engage directly with the military, respect their competence, and avoid making decisions for them. Military professionals must show competence and avoid trying to make political decisions. They can say what can or can't be done, but not what should be done.

Interviewer: Have you seen any war that has stopped the party politics of a country in war? Doesn’t party politics always continue during war?

Sir Lawrence Freedman: Politics always continues. For example, during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, one of Israel’s leading commanders, Ariel Sharon, was a leader of an opposition political party, complicating decision-making. Israel still won, but personal tensions were intense. In Ukraine, politics is at work, but there’s genuine unity in resisting the invasion. Opposition parties may be subdued to avoid appearing unpatriotic, but there will always be critics, and there should be. Healthy scrutiny is essential for big undertakings.

Interviewer: Regarding the ongoing Israeli-Gaza war, wouldn’t you say the ferocity of Israel is linked to their history rather than religion?

Sir Lawrence Freedman: Israel’s determination stems from historical experiences, not religion. The state was formed after immense suffering, creating a resolve to fight back effectively. Constant conflict has forged a culture prioritizing strength. However, without a political strategy, continuous fighting is unsustainable and unhealthy.