STEPPING INTO A NEW ERA ⟩ Interview: Sylvie Kauffmann Discusses the Complex Political Landscape Awaiting Kaja Kallas

Interviewer: Could you please compare the German so-called blindness towards Russia with French blindness? What stands out?

Sylvie Kauffmann: They differ a lot, even though Germany and France acted in harmony due to their close relationship and determination to work together in Europe. Our interests in Russia were quite different. The German motivations were much deeper and more complex than the French ones due to history, the strength of the German-Russian relationship, the economic dimension, and energy dependency with Nord Stream 1 and 2. Germany's entire economic success and prosperity were built on cheap Russian gas, which was crucial for them. France, on the other hand, didn't have this incentive due to our reliance on nuclear energy. Although there were business relationships and investments, they were not as significant as Germany's, and we didn't build an economic dependency on Russia.

Beyond the economic interests, Germany had a sense of destiny linked to Russia's destiny, intertwined with feelings of guilt from World War II, gratitude towards Gorbachev for “allowing reunification”, and a belief that they knew how to deal with Russia due to their long, complex relationship. There was even an element of arrogance in their approach, as some German officials admitted to me. For the French, the business interests were there, but the major factor was the idea of France's responsibility in building a security architecture for Europe. France, as a nuclear power with reasonably strong armed forces, saw itself as having a role in European security that required dealing with Russia.

There was also a fascination with Russia as a grand country, which impressed and fascinated French politicians, particularly on the right. Figures like Sarkozy and François Fillon were notably captivated by Putin’s projection of strength and traditional values, which resonated with their conservative views. Some politicians dealt with Russia for private financial interests as well.

Interviewer: You depict in your book how many European male politicians like German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and French Prime Minister Fillon personally admired Putin. Why did French and German politicians develop "a man crush" on Putin?

Sylvie Kauffmann: Schröder is a special case. He arrived in office a year before Putin, who saw him as an ideal target. Putin wanted to connect with Europe through Germany. Schröder's personality, past, and interests made him an easy prey. They connected over their shared backgrounds, and both loved money. Schröder was very interested in the financial benefits from the relationship with Nord Stream. Fillon, on the other hand, was more of an envious figure. As Sarkozy's Prime Minister, he was not treated well, and Putin represented the power figure he aspired to be. Sarkozy was also attracted to Putin, likely due to his love of power.

Interviewer: How would you diagnose Merkel in these terms? What made Merkel continue making deals with Putin's Russia?

Sylvie Kauffmann: Merkel is very interesting because, unlike Schröder, she didn’t fall into the trap. Having lived in a communist country, she was fully aware of the system and what it meant to deal with someone like Putin. She disliked Putin personally but continued and even deepened Schröder’s policy towards Russia. She prioritised the German economy and the prosperity of her fellow citizens, with cheap Russian gas being key to this. The pressure from the German industrial lobby also played a significant role.

Despite knowing the risks, she believed that nothing would go wrong. This sentiment was prevalent among Germans, who thought they knew how to deal with Russians and couldn’t imagine the weaponisation of gas against them. From 2014 onwards, after the annexation of Crimea, Merkel chose the path of negotiations with the Normandy format. She wanted to avoid war and was convinced that negotiation was the best way to achieve this. She believed, and still does, that the Minsk agreements gave Ukraine time to strengthen its armed forces, though this interpretation might be more convenient in retrospect.

Interviewer: Did France and Germany get anything right on their Russia policy before 2022? Were there any successes attributable to Merkel or Sarkozy?

Sylvie Kauffmann: Since Putin has been in office, it's hard to pinpoint significant successes. There were economic successes and good business done for some time. The enlargement of the European Union, despite Russia, was a positive move. Integrating the Baltic States into the EU and NATO was quite an achievement. However, on issues like Georgia and Armenia, there was no significant progress. Georgia, from my point of view, is a big failure.

Interviewer: Your book focuses on state leaders. What about the French and German media? Do you think the media raised viable questions?

Sylvie Kauffmann: I can't speak too much for the German media, but for the French media, I think we did our job. On issues like Chechnya, we were very aggressive and critical of Putin, to the point that he avoided France for a few years. Intellectuals, philosophers, and writers also took strong stances. However, our influence on political power was limited.

Interviewer: Can we currently say that either France or Germany, or both, have turned a new page in their Russia policy?

Sylvie Kauffmann: Both countries have turned the page of naivety and complacency. The shock of February 2022 was a wake-up call. Germany made a significant policy shift with Scholz’s “Zeitenwende” speech, although implementation has been challenging due to economic and political factors. France, under Macron, has also made a U-turn, especially in recognising the importance of Central and Eastern Europe. However, economic constraints and political uncertainties pose challenges. Macron's proposed military instructors’ operation in Ukraine is an example of a sincere yet politically and economically challenging commitment.

Interviewer: But let’s say if Marine Le Pen actually takes control in Parliament as well, not only winning the elections but forming a coalition, how much would that alter French Ukraine policy?

Sylvie Kauffmann: Constitutionally, the president is in charge of foreign and defence policy, but the government controls the budget. If the far-right gains power, it could complicate things for Macron. Marine Le Pen has a history of close ties with Putin, which she downplays now due to public opinion, but it remains part of her party's DNA. It would make it more difficult for Macron to be as bold in his Ukraine policy.

Interviewer: Estonians are currently wondering whether Macron is serious with this military instructor operation in Ukraine or not. What should we make of it?

Sylvie Kauffmann: I think he was serious when he mentioned it. The Ukrainians might need it more for political reasons than technical ones. It boosts morale and shows Western commitment. Macron's intention was sincere, but he needed support from other countries, and it became politically sensitive domestically, especially with upcoming elections. It's currently on hold.

Interviewer: We’ve already tired ourselves in Estonia talking about Donald Trump and the possibility of his return. What’s your take on it?

Sylvie Kauffmann: It would be worse than the first time. Trump would be more organised, with more hardline Republicans in his team. On the other hand Europeans wouldn’t be caught by surprise this time; there’s already work being done in the EU and NATO to prepare. It would be particularly difficult for Germany, given their dependence on the US for security.

Interviewer: What about the EU Ukraine policy after the major success of the right-wing in the EU parliamentary elections? Do you think it will affect the overall EU Ukraine policy?

Sylvie Kauffmann: It remains to be seen. The shift to the far-right is mostly in Western Europe. While there is a wave of right-wing success, the overall seats in the European Parliament haven’t changed drastically. If the top jobs are filled by figures like Ursula von der Leyen and Kaja Kallas, the policy might not change significantly. However, national public opinions could influence the policy, and far-right parties might have other priorities.

Interviewer: Since you mentioned Kaja Kallas, do you have any suggestions for her as she probably takes up the EU High Representative role?

Sylvie Kauffmann: I think it's very good that we have somebody from your part of Europe, self-confident and charismatic. Of course her role will be much bigger than Russia and Ukraine, because now she's going to deal with the whole world. So she has to have a very good team that she can rely on. And she has to watch her back.

Interviewer: What do you mean when you say she has to watch her back?

Sylvie Kauffmann: Well, she's a woman and she's young, so there will be a lot of old men who will be happy to see her slip. I guess she knows this, so she's probably prepared. And as Joseph Borrell’s experience tells, this job is full of traps. Just like any powerful job.

Interview: Can I ask you to be more specific on the traps that haunted Borrell?

Sylvie Kauffmann: There was the disastrous Moscow visit in 2021 when Lavrov humiliated him by expelling European diplomats during a joint press conference. His remarks about "Europe as a garden and the rest of the world as a jungle" were deemed offensive in the global South. He also faced the difficult task of navigating EU divisions during the Israel-Gaza conflict, which proved to be highly challenging.