ZELENSKY'S SECOND FRONT ⟩ Decoding Dismissals of Ukraine’s Key Anti-Corruption Figures with Volodymyr Fesenko

Interviewer: Are there any general negative trends worth pointing out currently?

Volodymyr Fesenko: Yes, there is a general negative trend. It is the growing influence of law enforcement employees (siloviki) during the war, which manifests in their regular interference in business and attempts to retaliate against investigative journalists and anti-corruption activists. Some siloviki have already been removed from their positions for this, including for pressuring journalists.

There is no confirmed information about Vitaliy Shabunin's [a Ukrainian anti-corruption activist who is currently subjected to criminal investigation - ed.] case yet, only his own claims. Even Western diplomats in Kyiv are aware of Shabunin's controversial working style. It's just his stylistic feature. Additionally, Shabunin seems to be involved in conflicts within NABU. I don't have a clear stance on all this noise around the anti-corruption fight.

Interviewer: Is corruption a growing problem in war-torn Ukraine?

Volodymyr Fesenko: Corruption hasn't increased, but it hasn't disappeared either, and of course, it causes more negative reactions during the war. There is significantly more noise and hype around corruption now. It feels like both corrupt siloviki and some anti-corruption fighters have forgotten that we are in a very tough war. The former are trying to take advantage of the moment, as they have been given more powers and oversight over their actions is weaker, while for the latter, their personal internal political war has become more important than the war with Russia.

The total war against corruption has, among other things, led to the paralysis of state procurement in the Ministry of Defense and several other state agencies. Many officials are simply afraid to sign official procurement documents and spend state funds. We need to find an optimal balance between these two interests: fighting corruption and ensuring the normal operation of state institutions and business during the war.

The problem is not just with a few bad and corrupt leaders but with the fact that Ukrainian business has been closely intertwined with various law enforcement agencies over the past 25–30 years—they were their protection—and other power structures. In state procurement, this means a very close relationship between businessmen and middle-level officials in ministries, state agencies, and government institutions.

Many business plans, especially in construction and land allocation, were almost entirely based on corruption and circumventing land-related regulations. This is related to the criminal case initiated against former Agriculture Minister Mykola Solskyi and the accusations against the leaders of Dragon Capital.

Here lies the dilemma: should we imprison tens of thousands of businessmen and officials, or declare amnesty for these cases? This problem cannot be solved by individual scandalous cases highlighted by investigative journalists and law enforcement agencies. A systematic approach is needed. As far as I know, this is happening and has even intensified over the past year and a half.

Interviewer: What role has the President's Office played in these events and dismissals?

Volodymyr Fesenko: Indirect role. In my opinion, the wave of scandals is rather a consequence of the President's Office not dealing with domestic politics at all during the war and letting it get out of control. These domestic political problems started accumulating and escalating since last fall. Conflicts between law enforcement and business circles intensified at the end of last year and the beginning of this year. (A particularly significant event was the arrest of investment banker Ihor Mazepa, who had criticized the arbitrariness of Ukrainian law enforcement agencies — ed.).

Partly, they have managed to neutralize them, thanks to some ministers, but not completely. Partly because no one in the President's Office is systematically dealing with these issues. Of course, there is also the Tatarov factor. (Reference to Oleh Tatarov, an official in the President's Office overseeing all law enforcement agencies — ed.).

There are different assessments of his role in these conflicts. Several informed sources say Tatarov's role is exaggerated. Others, on the contrary, talk about the "Tatarovization" and the re-legalization of past negative practices. I mean the practices of law enforcement agencies from the Kuchma and Yanukovych eras. (Leonid Kuchma was President of Ukraine from 1996–2004 and Viktor Yanukovych from 2010–2014. Both times saw rampant high-level corruption and law enforcement arbitrariness in Ukraine — ed.).

Interviewer: How do you assess the actions of Zelensky's close associates in anti-corruption efforts and politics?

Volodymyr Fesenko: Unfortunately, I don't see any significant actions in this area. President Zelensky is focused on defense and foreign policy issues. [Head of the President's Office] Andriy Yermak is also focused on specific areas, such as peace summits and relations with the USA. They currently don't even have time for personnel policies.

I don't know who in the President's Office is systematically dealing with anti-corruption policy. And this is actually a problem in itself. At the same time, the leadership in the renewed anti-corruption agencies has changed, and internal power struggles have begun, distracting them from their primary tasks. (Over the past two years, three key anti-corruption agencies have received new leaders: NABU, SAP, and NAPK — ed.). Several journalists and anti-corruption activists are also involved in the internal power struggle within NABU. This has only increased the scandalousness of the whole situation.

Interviewer: Does Zelensky's inner circle have reason to fear NABU corruption investigations, particularly the investigation into the Great Construction project? If so, why? (Before the full-scale war, the Great Construction was President Zelensky's most expensive initiative, aimed at renewing Ukraine's infrastructure with billions of euros. In just a couple of years, 14,000 km of roads were built and repaired — ed.).

Volodymyr Fesenko: The Great Construction investigation currently only concerns the Dnipropetrovsk region. Potentially, former governor [Valentyn] Reznichenko and the project's former business curator Yuri Holyk, who many commentators associate with the President's Office, are currently at risk. If the investigation expands, then primarily Oleksandr Kubrakov, who directly managed the project as the head of the state company Avtodor (similar to the road administration in Estonia—J. P.), might be at risk.

Even if a larger investigation [into the Great Construction] starts, I strongly doubt there will be any threat to anyone in the President's Office. No office official had to sign any financial documents for this project. To compare, I'll give an example of another highly publicized criminal investigation.

During the 2019 presidential elections (Zelensky won the elections—J. P.), the then-head of NABU told me that he dreamed of holding Poroshenko and Akhmetov accountable for their joint business scheme, Rotterdam+. (Petro Poroshenko was President of Ukraine from 2014–2019, and Rinat Akhmetov has been Ukraine's richest and most influential businessman for decades. Rotterdam+ was a scheme for purchasing coal abroad for Ukrainian power plants during Poroshenko's term, which allegedly brought Akhmetov great profits at the state's expense — ed.).

I expressed my doubts about this because neither of them signed any documents in this scheme. Hired managers did. Unfortunately, I was right later. Moreover, the entire criminal case eventually fell apart, even though some of Akhmetov's managers were initially arrested. The case collapsed in courts, including in the special anti-corruption court.

Interviewer: The dismissal of Deputy Prime Minister Oleksandr Kubrakov and his subordinate Mustafa Nayyem is particularly painful for me —they have a reputation for honesty in the West. I don't know Kubrakov well, but I do know Nayyem. There is already a lot of aid money from Ukraine's allies moving through their field, and even more money will flow in the future. It is vital for Ukraine that these agencies are led by men with good reputations. The money is given to those who are trusted. What are the consequences and impact of Kubrakov and Nayyem's dismissal on Western partners' trust in Zelensky and his inner circle?

Volodymyr Fesenko: Kubrakov's dismissal is not related to corruption or whether he was honest or not. The reasons lie elsewhere. Kubrakov became too influential a political figure as a strong leader of a very large ministry. He established direct and very close contact with the US Embassy in Kyiv, bypassing the President's Office.

Many sources say that this was the reason for his dismissal. Additionally, Kubrakov lost Zelensky's trust and sympathy, even though he was one of his favorites not long ago. Nayyem's dismissal was a direct consequence of Kubrakov's removal, as Kubrakov appointed him as the head of the state agency. He was already on his way out. It should also be noted that Mustafa had many adversaries in parliament and the government.

After Russia's strike on the Trypillya Thermal Power Plant (one of Ukraine's largest thermal power plants destroyed by a Russian missile strike on April 11 —ed.) and other power plants, Kubrakov and Nayyem faced many accusations of failing the power plant protection program. Experts consider these accusations exaggerated, but their mere emergence shows that there was a ground for conflict around Kubrakov and Nayyem.

The West does not give money directly to Ukraine, except for funds to pay salaries, pensions, and social benefits, but for specific projects and under strict control. The money is not given to Kubrakov or Nayyem but for Ukraine's recovery. The problem was not their dismissal but the fact that new people had not been appointed to replace them by the time of the Berlin conference on Ukraine's recovery.

Despite this, hundreds of projects worth tens of billions of dollars for recovery work in Ukraine were agreed upon in Berlin. By the way, this was more than at previous similar conferences. So your skepticism is unfounded. There are other strong managers in the government whom our international partners trust: Yulia Svyrydenko (Deputy Prime Minister responsible for the economy), Olha Stefanishyna (Deputy Prime Minister responsible for European integration), Mykhailo Fedorov (Deputy Prime Minister responsible for digital development), and many others.