RESILIENCE OF RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM Ambassador Jüri Luik Reflects on Estonia's 30-Year Diplomatic "Battle" with Moscow

President of Estonia Lennart Meri and President of Russia Boris Yeltsin signed an agreement in Moscow on July 26, 1994, regarding the withdrawal of Russian troops. Standing behind President Lennart Meri is Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Jüri Luik. Photo: Toomas Volmer/ETA
Copy

"If Estonia sought to join NATO today, it would be utterly hopeless—no one would accept us," says the esteemed figure of Estonian diplomacy, Ambassador to NATO Jüri Luik, in a recent extensive interview with Postimees journalist Teet Korsten. Ambassador Luik believes one true skill of a small state is to seize strategic opportunities when they arise.

Interviewer: NATO elected a new Secretary General, Mark Rutte. Is he a good choice for Estonia?

Ambassador Jüri Luik: Yes. Under Rutte’s leadership, the Netherlands has done a lot for Ukraine, contributing Patriot missiles, F-16 aircrafts, and more. His attitude towards Russia is similar to Estonia's. He is also undoubtedly a strong custodian of transatlantic ties.

Interviewer: 2024 marks several significant anniversaries: the 75th anniversary of NATO, the 20th anniversary of Estonia’s NATO membership, and the 30th anniversary of your first historic "battle" with Moscow on the diplomatic front. You negotiated the withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia in Moscow with President Lennart Meri. If that 1994 "battle" had not been successful, perhaps Estonians would also be privately grumbling about our boys being forced to fight "Ukrainian fascists" in Ukraine?

Ambassador Jüri Luik: During the negotiations for the withdrawal of the troops, the first Boris Yeltsin government was in power and was still considered quite democratic in the West. Despite this, the Russians had no intention of withdrawing their troops from the Baltic States. They tried to place us in a special status: not quite a Soviet republic, but also not a fully independent state. Moscow attempted to distinguish us from former Warsaw Pact members, like Poland or Czechoslovakia.

The process was quite long and provided valuable insight into the resilience of Russian imperialism. I met numerous Russian diplomats and military figures in Moscow, who didn’t seem to understand that times had changed. For example, the late Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaly Churkin, who later became Putin's ambassador to the UN, still represented a completely imperial direction.

Jüri Luik has served as Minister of Defense three times across four different decades. Minister Luik (second from left) and the Chief of Defense, Brigadier General Märt Tiru (right), waiting for NATO Secretary General George Robertson at Tallinn Airport in May 2000.
Jüri Luik has served as Minister of Defense three times across four different decades. Minister Luik (second from left) and the Chief of Defense, Brigadier General Märt Tiru (right), waiting for NATO Secretary General George Robertson at Tallinn Airport in May 2000. Photo: Toomas Huik

It really is a time of anniversaries, as you say. For Estonia, 20 years in NATO and the EU is quite a long time. Our republic before World War II lasted only a few more years. If we wanted to join NATO today, it would be completely hopeless—no one would accept us.

The window of opportunity for joining NATO was brief. In 2002, when we received the invitation to join, Putin had only recently come to power. Although Yeltsin had selected him from among other candidates, Putin still had to consider the interests of the oligarchs and politicians from the Yeltsin era.

At the time, Russia's Prime Minister was Mikhail Kasyanov, who would later emerge as a prominent figure in the opposition. Putin navigated these dynamics carefully, aiming to uphold a facade of democratic rhetoric that he perceived as strategically advantageous. Meanwhile, in the United States, a new president [George W. Bush - ed.] had assumed office, whom Putin believed he could sway with his narratives. This belief was initially validated by President Bush's famous remark about seeing into Putin's soul during their early meetings.

The atmosphere created by Russia's opposition to our membership was not dramatically intense. It was comparable to Putin's rhetoric towards Finland and Sweden's accession, included phrases like "we don't like it," "very bad," and "we must ensure our security." Nevertheless, the favorable moment for accession was very brief. I believe one true skill of a small state is to seize these opportunities when they arise.

From left: Ghana President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Swiss President Viola Amherd, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Chilean President Gabriel Boric, and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau at the Ukraine Peace Conference in Switzerland on June 16, 2024.
From left: Ghana President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Swiss President Viola Amherd, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Chilean President Gabriel Boric, and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau at the Ukraine Peace Conference in Switzerland on June 16, 2024. Photo: URS FLUEELER / AP

Interviewer: How significant, in terms of hope for Ukraine, was the recent peace conference in Switzerland?

Ambassador Jüri Luik: The Swiss peace conference aimed to bring as many members of the so-called global south into the Ukraine discussion as possible. While not represented at the highest level, countries such as Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Brazil (as an observer) were present. Although they did not sign the final declaration, their participation in the discussions was significant. It was also noteworthy that several unexpected countries, like Serbia, signed the declaration.

The declaration was created with difficulty, and the text was softened to gain broader support. It contains two crucial elements: the most important for Ukrainians being the emphasis that peace can only come when Ukraine's territorial integrity is guaranteed and implemented.

On the other hand, the Ukrainians made a few concessions. One was that President Volodymyr Zelensky had stated he would not negotiate with Putin, but the declaration mentions that peace can only come through dialogue with the other side. It supports Zelensky's peace plan but also refers to other peace proposals, with the stipulation that only those complying with the principles of the UN Charter can be used—excluding Chinese proposals. Clearly, significant effort went into finding suitable wording.

Before the peace conference, Putin proposed his "peace plan," ostensibly for dialogue with those gathered in Switzerland. However, he confirmed he would not agree to return conquered territories and demanded a much larger piece, undermining Western peacemakers advocating for Ukraine to cede territories already held by Putin.

Putin also reiterated that NATO membership for Ukraine is "unacceptable." This dialogue continues with the upcoming NATO summit in Washington, where NATO's task is to demonstrate that the decision to take Ukraine into NATO is irreversible and will continue on that path.

Swedish Foreign Minister Ann Linde and Finnish Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto attended a press conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg after signing their countries' accession protocols at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, on July 5, 2022.
Swedish Foreign Minister Ann Linde and Finnish Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto attended a press conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg after signing their countries' accession protocols at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, on July 5, 2022. Photo: REUTERS/Yves Herman/File Photo/Scanpix

Interviewer: Putin has worked hard to drastically change the security landscape of the Baltic Sea area. Our northern neighbors are no longer neutral. How are Sweden and Finland doing in NATO?

Ambassador Jüri Luik: The security landscape in Northern Europe has changed radically. On the one hand, I would be cautious with optimistic expressions like "the Baltic Sea has become a NATO lake," because there is still a lot to be done. Problems such as the depth of defense for the Baltic States have not disappeared.

Transporting military reinforcements over the Baltic sea is still challenging. However, the overall picture and defense capabilities of the Baltic States have dramatically improved.

Finland and Sweden joining NATO also brings our region into better political focus in various discussions. These are influential countries with significant armed forces: the Finns have a very large army, which is rare in Europe, and the Swedes have an extremely strong air force, comparable to the air forces of major European countries. Naturally, NATO is a complicated mechanism; it takes time to tie all ends together and smoothly integrate Finland and Sweden into all NATO systems. But this is purely technical—it is neither a political nor a strategic issue.

Interviewer: Finland has chosen to be under the headquarters in Norfolk, USA, while Estonia's division reports through the Northeast Corps to Brunssum in the Netherlands. Why don't both countries report to the same headquarters?

Ambassador Jüri Luik: The issue of headquarters is somewhat overrated. Peacetime chains of command can be arranged in various ways, and debates are natural. However, the crucial point is ensuring that the needs of the new NATO regional defense plans are met in terms of joint operations command. That, I can say, is guaranteed.

Russian Border Guard (part of the FSB) stole navigation buoys on the Narva River during the night of May 23, 2024.
Russian Border Guard (part of the FSB) stole navigation buoys on the Narva River during the night of May 23, 2024. Photo: Politsei- ja piirivalveamet

Interviewer: Would you not agree that Russian hybrid warfare is nothing new for Estonia, that we have been subjected to it throughout our history?

Ambassador Jüri Luik: That is most certainly true. Hybrid warfare is not a new concept; the only recent invention is the term "hybrid," reflecting its use not only in botany but also in war studies. Weakening the enemy from within is a classic war tactic. It has always been tried and done; we can recall the fifth column during the Spanish Civil War.

It is clear that the main strategic assistance for the Ukrainians, without which they absolutely could not survive, is still Western weapons. The Kremlin clearly wants to obstruct Western military aid programs to Ukraine in various ways. To that end, they have escalated their hybrid tactics to a higher level, planning kinetic operations that can lead to the destruction of infrastructure, including civilian infrastructure, or even deaths.

Understanding these incidents in various countries as part of a coordinated effort directed from Moscow is crucial. These are not isolated events occurring randomly; they represent clearly coordinated activity. The North Atlantic Council issued a sharp statement directed at Russia, calling these actions a direct threat to the security of the allies.

Our main challenge with hybrid warfare is identifying the enemy, preventing their actions, and interpreting their goals. They try to target factories producing weapons or warehouses storing arms destined for Ukraine, which are easier for us to protect.

Russia-hired individuals attempted to burn down an entire IKEA store in Lithuania.
Russia-hired individuals attempted to burn down an entire IKEA store in Lithuania. Photo: пресс-фото Ikea

However, the Kremlin also employs a strategy aimed at scaring and dividing Western societies by targeting civilian objects. For example, the Lithuanian government has publicly announced that Russia-hired individuals attempted to burn down an entire IKEA store. The greatest risk with such targets is mass casualties and a general increase in societal insecurity.

Generally, Moscow does not try to hide its tracks too much. This is part of their modus operandi: "We do it, and what can you do about it?" This is an element of power politics. The pressing question for Western countries is: how should we respond? As democratic nations governed by the rule of law, our options are constrained. Nonetheless, we have achieved considerable success, detaining numerous individuals before they could carry out their plans—both in Estonia and in other nations such as Germany, where there were genuine plots for military sabotage, and the United Kingdom. Ensuring internal security is of utmost importance; the military typically refrains from domestic intervention, except in extraordinary circumstances.

Interviewer: Has the biggest incident occurred in the Czech Republic so far?

Ambassador Jüri Luik: Yes, the Czechs have been very effective in making this public, and this is crucial. We must not keep these Russian methods to ourselves; we need to expose them. The Czechs have done this very clearly. First, there was the explosion a few years ago, an attempt to burn down ammunition depots. Now, Prague has revealed an entire network dedicated to spreading Russian disinformation. The Czechs are definitely on the right track and serve as an example for many countries.

Interviewer: We have also heard recognition from foreigners for Estonia in this matter.

Ambassador Jüri Luik: It is justified. Much has been done preventively in Estonia, major risks have been averted. Estonia has strongly emphasized that these incidents are deliberate hybrid attacks. Yes, Estonia can be praised.

Interviewer: In Estonian politics, there are a few "peace fighters" who stand out as vocal exceptions to our mainstream support for Ukraine. One member of parliament, known for spreading unfiltered Kremlin narratives, is particularly active on social media. Another individual, currently imprisoned and charged with treason, even managed to run for the European Parliament. What are your thoughts on their actions and influence?

Ambassador Jüri Luik: In my opinion, neither of them has a broader societal impact in Estonia. During the Soviet Union, there was a massive so-called peace movement in the West, mostly left-wing—now it practically does not exist. The debate on how exactly to resolve this conflict certainly exists, but the understanding that Russia is the culprit in the conflict is still very unequivocal in Europe.

Butcha victims' memorial day on March 31, 2024.
Butcha victims' memorial day on March 31, 2024. Photo: HANDOUT/AFP

Regarding Gaza, it is evident that Western societies have been profoundly divided. However, in the case of Ukraine, I have not observed such a pronounced peace movement, which is a positive indication that we have effectively communicated the situation. Additionally, Putin's immense brutality has contributed to this clarity. Beginning with the atrocities in Bucha and the abduction and deportation of children to Russia—crimes for which Putin has been charged by the International Criminal Court. Ukrainians now report that 19,000 children have been taken to Russia—an unimaginably grim statistic.

Interviewer: On October 7 last year—by the way, it is also Putin's birthday—a terrorist attack was carried out against Israel. Did it benefit Russia?

Ambassador Jüri Luik: Undoubtedly, it did. Iran played a pivotal role, but we must remember that Iran is a close ally of Russia. The attack diverted attention from the ongoing aggression in Ukraine and exacerbated political tensions, complicating efforts to assist Ukraine. Ultimately, the US Congress passed a comprehensive aid package that includes support for Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan.

From the perspective of US congressmen, these conflicts are interconnected, forming part of a broader geopolitical landscape. There is no doubt that it would be highly beneficial for Ukrainians if the Palestinian conflict—while unlikely to be fully resolved—could be de-escalated, with its military aspects brought to an end.

Interviewer: How do you currently see the Ukrainian people and their chances in the fight against the aggressor? Recently, far-right expert Anton Shekhovtsov said that there will never be 40 million Ukrainians again. At the same time—probably never before has the national identity of Ukrainians been so genuine.

Ambassador Jüri Luik: The sense of national identity is now forged in war. Like in the Estonian War of Independence, where only the direct pressure of the enemy on the survival of the nation created a sense of unity on which the Estonian state could later develop and withstand attacks, such as on December 1, 1924 [when Soviet Russia tried to execute an armed coup d'état in Estonia—ed.].

The same has happened with Ukraine: Ukrainians have become a united nation that knows how to appreciate their country. Ukraine's relationship with the West is now also forged in blood; they are shedding blood for us too, they are also our heroes. Everything that is being done to help Ukraine shows that the West considers Ukraine part of itself. Like this: we will not go to war for you, but we will do a lot to ensure your success in the war. The fate of the Ukrainian people has been to be the battleground of great powers. Now they finally have their own country, but they have to keep the former colonial master far away at the cost of blood.

Speaker of the House Mike Johnson speaking in front of the White House on January 17, 2024, after meeting with Biden and congressional leaders regarding aid to Ukraine.
Speaker of the House Mike Johnson speaking in front of the White House on January 17, 2024, after meeting with Biden and congressional leaders regarding aid to Ukraine. Photo: SAMUEL CORUM / GETTY IMAGES

Interviewer: How worried were you when the issue of aid to Ukraine was on hold for so long in the US Congress?

Ambassador Jüri Luik: I was profoundly concerned because it was evident that Russia would exploit the situation. The shortage of ammunition for the Ukrainians was no secret; it was reported daily in the newspapers and, of course, felt acutely on the front lines. It does not take a strategist to understand that the Russians sought to capitalize on the West’s stringent restrictions on targeting Russian territory, making a significant breakthrough attempt toward Kharkiv.

Sometimes, democratic societies require a dramatic moment of decision to galvanize themselves. The Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Mike Johnson, emphatically stated that we cannot allow Putin to march through Europe. This realization resonated widely—even Donald Trump eventually endorsed financial support. Europe is now contributing significantly more than before—the resolve has returned. The Germans, for instance, have provided several Patriot air defense systems, and the list of armaments is extensive.

Interviewer: How much does our and Ukraine's future depend on who is elected on November 11?

Ambassador Jüri Luik: The stance of each US president undoubtedly influences us, but we do not have a vote in the US presidential elections. We must be adept at working with every president, recognizing that each brings their own style and their own team. We can certainly find common ground.

The paramount consideration is to understand and appreciate the issues facing the US, rather than dismissing them as insignificant. NATO comprises 32 members, and each must feel that their concerns are acknowledged, not merely that they are constantly being solicited for support.

Some issues present significant challenges for Europe, such as China. Crafting a unified China policy in Europe is exceedingly difficult. However, it is worth noting that 95 percent of the US security policy community views China as a far more significant threat than Russia, due to China's formidable military power and, more importantly, the vast potential within its immense population.

Vladimir Putin (R) and China's President Xi Jinping review an honour guard in Asia (CICA) summit, in Shanghai May 20, 2014.
Vladimir Putin (R) and China's President Xi Jinping review an honour guard in Asia (CICA) summit, in Shanghai May 20, 2014. Photo: Carlos Barria

Interviewer: What about the Russia-China alliance—is it even appropriate to use such a word?

Ambassador Jüri Luik: The term "alliance" can certainly be applied to Russia's relations with North Korea and Iran, as remarkable as it may seem given their differing cultural backgrounds. Putin recently visited North Korea, where they agreed to defend each other in case of aggression. Putin also expressed his gratitude for their support of the Russian armed forces. It is unequivocally clear that Russia will no longer permit sanctions against North Korea or Iran in the UN. This constitutes a serious alliance.

China, on the other hand, has determined that the war serves their interests by weakening the West, and by extension, Russia, thereby undermining international law and the Western-centric world order. For China, this situation is advantageous. China is too substantial a nation to fully align itself with Russia, which may eventually falter; thus, they naturally maintain a certain distance.

At the same time, China does not want Russia to lose outright. As Russia grows weaker, China is compelled to provide increasing assistance. The distinction between their support is diminishing: China is now supplying arms, various components, machine tools, electronics, and purchasing Russian oil, thereby significantly contributing to Russia's war effort. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg remarked in his speech in Washington that this is the current state of affairs.

Article photo
Photo: Eero Vabamägi

Ambassador Jüri Luik

Born in 1966 in Tallinn, Jüri Luik graduated from the University of Tartu in 1989 with a degree in Journalism. His political career began in 1992 when he was elected to the Estonian Parliament.

Luik's ministerial career started in the first government of Prime Minister Mart Laar, where he served as a minister without portfolio from 1992 to 1993, leading the delegation for negotiating the withdrawal of Russian troops. He has held the position of Minister of Defense three times across four different decades and also served as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1994 to 1995.

His extensive diplomatic service includes being the Ambassador to NATO and Belgium from 1996 to 1999. From 2003 to 2007, he served as the Ambassador to the United States. Jüri Luik then became the Permanent Representative to NATO from 2007 to 2012 and later the Ambassador to Russia from 2012 to 2015.

In addition to his diplomatic roles, Luik served as the Director of the International Centre for Defence and Security from 2015 to 2017.

Since August 2021, Jüri Luik has been serving once again as Estonia's Permanent Representative to NATO, continuing his distinguished career in both political and diplomatic arenas.

Copy

Terms

Top