ROBUST STRATEGIC GROWTH ⟩ General Martin Herem Reflects on His Tenure's Key Developments

Interviewer: What kind of bumps?

General Martin Herem: The broader issue is that not every sensor in the Estonian Defense Forces, including air and naval sensors, is currently part of a sequence of actions that ultimately impacts the aggressor. I’ve emphasized that for every sensor or capability we develop, there must be a clear plan for how it will result in lethal consequences for the enemy. If this sequence can’t be described or is too abstract, we shouldn’t develop that capability. Not everyone thinks that way yet, but we’re getting there.

Interviewer: The Estonian Defense Forces also gained a new command level—a division. Previously, Latvia and Estonia shared the Northern Division headquarters, located in Latvia. Why did Estonia need its own division?

General Martin Herem: A single division couldn’t cover operations across Latvian and Estonian territory. The Northern Division continues in Latvia. Germany has promised to move their 10th Division headquarters to Lithuania, which also has its own national division. Estonia's division headquarters is already operating, with 70 personnel assigned. Division headquarters have participated in exercises, and the first operational order was issued on June 10, based on NATO's new regional defense plan.

Interviewer: The Estonian Defense Forces have long faced criticism for being overly focused on land forces. Interestingly, we haven't touched on any Army developments in this conversation.

General Martin Herem: Our land forces have experienced significant growth in both size and capability over the past five years, particularly in our indirect firepower. Thanks to our government’s timely decisions in 2022, we have already acquired 12 K9 self-propelled howitzers, loitering munitions, short-range air defense systems, and a robust array of anti-tank weaponry.

The decision to purchase HIMARS has also been pivotal. With these enhancements, we can now target enemies up to 300 kilometers away. Naturally, this kind of expansion has increased our ammunition needs, and we have already secured a third of the critical ammunition required.

Interviewer: How has the landscape of collective defense transformed since 2022?

General Martin Herem: The changes have been transformative. Before 2022, our collective defense plans were rather vague, with the idea that a battalion or brigade might assist Estonia. The only concrete element was the forward land forces battle group. Now, things are much more defined—a specific UK brigade is assigned to our division, and a clear command chain from Brunssum to the Northeast Corps to our Division is in place.

Within this new framework, we can build powerful long-range indirect fire units in collaboration with our allies. Our goal is to create an entire brigade dedicated to indirect fire, equipped with HIMARS, loitering munitions, K9 self-propelled howitzers, and other artillery. Our targets are no longer just enemy soldiers on our borders but can be struck tens or even hundreds of kilometers away.

This division structure also enhances our collaboration with allies like the British, Americans, and Swedes on ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance), which helps us identify targets more effectively. While we’re still working towards a full long-range indirect fire brigade, we’ve already made significant strides with HIMARS and loitering munitions units. Plus, we’re adding a third artillery battalion with wheeled howitzers capable of firing smart munitions up to 70 kilometers.

Interviewer: NATO's collective defense discussion is now more transparent and detailed than ever before. Prime minister Kaja Kallas broke the ice in the summer of 2022 by highlighting shortfalls in the previous NATO Baltic defense plan. You've also taken an unusually open approach in discussing defense details. What prompted this shift?

General Martin Herem: NATO's regional planning has brought a new level of clarity to collective defense. Imagine having a team of top football players but not knowing their positions or strategies. That's how it used to be. Now, we have a clear game plan—we know exactly who the attackers and defenders are, and we can drill down on our tactics, communication, and warfighting culture to ensure seamless cooperation among allies.

At a broader operational level, this involves having a clear playbook for the collective defense operations of Estonia. How assertive should our defense posture be? Which targets should we prioritize and where? Our shared understanding of these issues is deepening, facilitating a faster collective defense response.

In the past, when an early warning signal was issued and allies arrived, they'd start with introductions and inquiries about our radio systems, followed by a barrage of questions. Now, when an ally arrives, we simply shake hands and get straight to executing the plan.

Interviewer: Has the UK brigade had a chance to participate in exercises in Estonia yet?

General Martin Herem: The full brigade is set to arrive in 2025, but we’ve already had some of their units join us for exercises this year. Exciting things are happening at sea as well. In the air, we’ve always had strong military cooperation with our allies, but with the introduction of medium-range air defense, we’ll need to step up coordination to ensure we don’t accidentally target allied aircraft. Our shoulder-launched Piorun missiles, assigned to the division, will need precise air force data to avoid friendly fire, especially when allied Apache helicopters, which are part of our division, are flying overhead.

Interviewer: What shifts have you witnessed in Estonian military thinking and culture during your tenure?

General Martin Herem: I hope we've instilled a more genuine sense of urgency and awareness of threats among our military personnel. Currently, 17% of our military still think war is unlikely, but organizational theory tells us that 10-20% of any group will resist the leader’s vision and may even slow down progress. I’ve emphasized the need to act swiftly and ramp up our efforts. Changing entrenched habits and culture is tough, especially with technical aspects like communication systems.

The reality of war looms closer, and we understand that we must be ready. This means making tough decisions to boost our readiness, even if it requires cutting back on some activities.

Interviewer: How does the 2021 reform of the defense forces orchestra fit into this picture? It caused quite a media stir in Estonia.

General Martin Herem: It’s a prime example of these kinds of tough choices. By slashing the orchestra's budget by two-thirds, we saved a million euros annually. But more importantly, it allowed me to show other units that we had already made significant cuts and that they too needed to trim the fat and get fitter.

The real cultural shift isn’t about the orchestra; it’s about changing the mindset of our defense personnel towards training reservists and conscripts. Now, we focus on preparing them for real wartime scenarios, not just keeping them busy with unimportant tasks.

Interviewer: What do you mean by "unimportant tasks"?

General Martin Herem: I’m talking about "busywork"—things like fire hazard drills where everyone hauls all the furniture out of the barracks. These activities keep people occupied but don't truly prepare them for real combat situations.

Interviewer: Your successor, Major General Andrus Merilo, plans to make changes to conscript training. Will he undo the culture you've worked so hard to establish?

General Martin Herem: When I took over as Chief of Defense, the dropout rate for conscripts was a staggering 15-20%. Now, it's down to 4%. This might be a bit too low, as some units might keep those unfit for service to maintain the numbers. My philosophy was not to dismiss conscripts too hastily.

If a conscript has an issue that will be resolved in five months but service ends in three, maybe we shouldn’t discharge them. It’s often better for them to complete their service, even if they're limping, and become a reservist who can recover and hone their skills later. Major General Merilo believes that those with hostile attitudes towards Estonia or those clearly struggling should be discharged. I agree with him; it’s time to find the right balance.

Interviewer: In the past six months, you've publicly advocated for moving defensive operations beyond Estonia's borders and requested an additional €1.6 billion from politicians for munitions, including long-range munitions. Some politicians say you brought this up just before leaving office. Why now?

General Martin Herem: I've been pushing for long-range capabilities since the start of my term. This isn't a new idea. Acquiring HIMARS, loitering munitions, and anti-ship missiles has always been part of our strategy.

I've taken inspiration from Finland and Poland. Finland's former defense chief, General Jarmo Lindberg, and Poland's former defense chief, General Rajmund Andrzejczak, were pivotal examples. Poland’s long-range strategy initially focused on maritime threats. General Andrzejczak posed a simple question: why let the Russians cause trouble in the Baltic Sea when we can destroy their ships from a distance or trap them in their home ports?

We calculated the number of missiles needed to neutralize the Russian Baltic Fleet and concluded that the Baltic Sea countries should invest a collective billion euros to significantly limit the fleet's activities. This led to my earlier recommendation to acquire anti-ship missiles.

The Finns, with their impressive long-range capabilities—rocket artillery, aircraft-launched missiles, howitzers—have long held the stance that any enemy daring to invade their territory should expect devastation in their rear. Incidentally, training for Estonian HIMARS units and reservists is already underway with US support.

Interviewer: Have NATO Baltic Sea countries pooled together that billion euros to neutralize the Baltic Fleet if necessary?

General Martin Herem: Not quite a billion, but with Sweden and Finland joining, our military capabilities have surged, closing much of the maritime gap. This shift has been a game-changer in the Baltic Sea.

Interviewer: Why hasn’t Estonia's political elite shared your sense of urgency about acquiring necessary ammunition stocks?

General Martin Herem: I think there's a psychological barrier, much like a smoker’s denial about cancer—we believe it won’t happen to us. Politicians argue that we don’t need to spend on munitions because NATO will protect us. But the moment we say Estonia’s defense is mainly up to our allies, we start to surrender a bit of our own security.

The same flawed logic applies to deterrence. Some believe we can deter the enemy and avoid war, so preparation isn’t necessary. The thought process should be the opposite—we prepare for war, and that preparation deters the enemy. The shortfall in ammunition is a critical issue for our deterrence strategy.

Interviewer: Critics have mentioned that your advice on defense funding has evolved over time. They question why you didn't push for more funding earlier. In 2021, during the Riigikogu discussions on military defense funding, you mentioned you'd work with the resources given. Did you have a different perspective then?

General Martin Herem: Even back then, I laid out the military capabilities achievable at various funding levels to the parliament. It's natural that as the situation deteriorates, especially with war in Europe, discussions about our warfighting capabilities intensify. As fears of conflict rise, people seek more detailed explanations on how they are protected and defended. I've also engaged with diverse audiences, from hipsters to academics, many of whom are reservists. The interest in national defense has broadened significantly. This has been a mutual growth process.

Interviewer: What role does hybrid warfare play in Estonia's defense? Some critics argue that Estonian military leaders, including yourself, might be overlooking the hybrid warfare "forest" for the conventional war "trees."

General Martin Herem: The Ukraine war clearly demonstrates that if Russia can’t achieve its objectives through hybrid warfare, it will resort to conventional war. Winning a hybrid war against Russia doesn’t stop Moscow from launching conventional attacks. Thus, our own hybrid capabilities might not matter much in terms of military defense.

The military threat is just one element of Russia's hybrid strategy. They might engage in information warfare, diplomatic manipulation, corruption, and simultaneous military threats. If we are weak and unprepared militarily, we are more likely to be intimidated and give in to other forms of pressure.

In hybrid warfare—like cyber warfare—Russians have shown their weaknesses. We've seen acts of vandalism targeting cars in Estonia, social media information operations, and efforts to stir up dissatisfaction with the Nursipalu training ground.

These actions aim to create uncertainty so that when they flex their military muscle, we might capitulate. However, if we are strong militarily, hybrid tactics will not succeed. That’s why I emphasize loudly and clearly that Estonia has more anti-tank weapons than Russia has tanks. Of course, anti-tank weapons alone aren’t enough to defend us, but they make a strong statement.

Interviewer: One tactic of Russian hybrid warfare has been provoking incidents at state borders. In May, the FSB stole Estonian navigation buoys from the Narva River under cover of darkness. What do you make of this?

General Martin Herem: Sometimes we confuse typical Russian chaos with strategic hybrid operations. Often, their actions at our borders are just bravado and macho posturing rather than sophisticated hybrid tactics. For instance, Russian planes used to frequently veer into Estonian airspace near Vaindloo Island. Two years ago, our Air Force started warning them on the radio, and they adjusted their course. Until then, they didn’t care about violating our airspace. Today, they still fly close by, even more often, but they no longer cross the line.

Interviewer: Could Estonia have taken a stronger stance in May on the Narva River? What do you say to those criticizing the state for not confronting the FSB agents who stole the buoys?

General Martin Herem: The issue was debated among ministry secretaries-general. I suggested that if we wanted to assert ourselves on the Narva River, we should send heavy machine guns to the border. They laughed, saying, "Herem is talking nonsense." But Foreign Ministry Secretary-General Jonatan Vseviov confirmed that this would indeed be our only viable option.

So, if we’re not prepared to escalate to that level, we should let the border guards handle such incidents peacefully and make their own risk assessments. The Russian border guards embarrassed themselves by sneaking in like apple thieves at night. Of course, if the situation at the border becomes genuinely dangerous, then our defense forces, equipped with their weapon systems, will take over, and the border guards will become part of the territorial defense.

Interviewer: Can you explain to our readers what "defending every inch of NATO territory" means—is it just a political slogan or an operational directive?

General Martin Herem: It’s both a political slogan and a fundamental principle of our defense strategy. We don't relinquish any territory just to buy time for a counterattack. The only reason we’d allow an aggressor onto our land is if it makes their destruction easier. In reality, we might not engage the enemy at every border point during a major attack; strategic choices will dictate where it’s most effective to fight.

Interviewer: Would you say that Latvia and Lithuania have also experienced a similar awakening and accelerated pace in their military defense development as Estonia?

General Martin Herem: Absolutely, our good neighbors have indeed awakened. For several years, Latvia and Lithuania's defense budgets have been larger than Estonia’s in absolute terms. However, since they didn't consistently maintain the 2% of GDP defense spending earlier, they now face the challenge of renovating and building their defense infrastructure.

We've been ahead in this area. For example, we've already built significant ammunition depots and are now constructing additional ones, having previously invested more in them than our southern neighbors.

Latvia and Lithuania now need to invest heavily in training center infrastructure, an area previously underfunded. They are expanding their personnel, which means increased spending on all fronts—training, equipment, and more. Lithuania is progressing faster than Latvia. Estonia will receive HIMARS in 2025, while Latvia expects them in 2028.

We might not have the luxury to wait that long. In Estonia, there is some recognition of this urgency at the governmental level. Our government deserves credit for making early and decisive decisions. Even if not every government member fully shares my sense of urgency, they have acted as if they believe to some extent the threat is real.

Interviewer: How has bilateral cooperation with Finland evolved since they joined NATO?

General Martin Herem: Just five days after Finland became a NATO member, I visited Helsinki. We jumped straight into discussions about joint military planning. While I can’t reveal all the details, I can say that [former Finnish defense chief] General Timo Kivinen’s proposals for military cooperation were impressively ambitious and aligned perfectly with our strategic goals.

Interviewer: Have you noticed any notable changes in the discussions within the NATO Military Committee over the past five years?

General Martin Herem: Absolutely. In the past, the focus of the Military Committee was primarily on recognizing Russia as a threat. Now, the emphasis has clearly shifted to practical responses if this threat materializes—essentially, preparing for actual combat. Previously, NATO military leaders often played diplomatic roles. Now, they’re putting their uniforms back on and diving into the warfighting strategies they learned in military schools.

A prime example is NATO Military Committee Chair Admiral Rob Bauer. Early on, he emphasized that if governments don’t adequately fund military defense, they need to openly communicate what sacrifices will be made. When he was the Dutch defense chief, Admiral Bauer even wrote to SACEUR, highlighting that the Netherlands could only deliver half of the capabilities they had pledged to NATO due to funding shortfalls. Admiral Bauer urged also other defense chiefs to be transparent about issues like ammunition shortages. Estonia took his advice.

Interviewer: Can you please pinpoint the main issue the West is currently facing in the Ukraine war?

General Martin Herem: Our biggest problem is that we're not prepared for a decisive, overwhelming victory against Russia. When Ukraine eventually wins and regains its territory, the cost in terms of lives lost and homes destroyed will be immense. Why are we allowing this conflict to drag on?

Interviewer: Should the Estonian Defense Forces send their instructors to Ukraine?

General Martin Herem: In principle, we’re already involved. Our personnel frequently go on short-term missions to both learn from and teach the Ukrainians. The line between support and direct involvement is often blurred. However, we could certainly increase our presence by sending more permanent instructors. For instance, Estonia excels at training deminers from scratch, and we could expand this effort. Conducting basic fighter courses on a large scale is complex, but handling smaller, focused tasks is well within our reach.

Our donated FH70 howitzers often need repairs, and we could train mechanics in Ukraine to handle these. Similarly, the French and Swedes could train local forces on maintaining Caesar howitzers or CV90 infantry fighting vehicles. Even a small unit of five instructors could make a significant impact.

We could go further still—providing medical training and enhancing air defense for civilian infrastructure. Most of the Shaheds and some of the cruise missiles are intercepted by shoulder-launched short-range air defense systems. This is something within our capabilities. We could deploy 20 short-range air defense rockets and three air defense guns. This would give us valuable practical experience. What could Russia do if we effectively protect civilian infrastructure? This is a hypothetical scenario for now.

Interviewer: If you had to rank NATO defense chiefs by their freedom of speech, where would you place yourself? Have you been one of the more vocal defense chiefs?

General Martin Herem: Probably.

Interviewer: Can you name other defense chiefs who are as publicly vocal as you?

General Martin Herem: Swedish defense chief General Micael Bydén is a great example; he's consistently open and communicative. In Japan, the defense chief appears on television weekly due to the heightened security situation and public demand, much like Estonia’s "Ukraine Studio" on public broadcasting.

My outspokenness often stems from the frequent public criticisms from retired or reserve officers. In Finland, you won't see retired generals criticizing the defense chief. It's similar in Latvia. In Lithuania, while retired generals remain silent, some captains and majors have become vocal critics in their roles as politicians.

Interviewer: You’re set to represent Estonia in the NATO Reserve Forces Committee, meaning you'll stay actively involved. What are your objectives in this NATO reserve committee?

General Martin Herem: In NATO countries, reserve forces serve different purposes. For us, reserves are the main force, with 90% of our fighters coming from civilian life during wartime, similar to Finland. In other countries like France or Poland, reserves act as additional units reinforcing the main forces. They also serve as personnel replacements for those killed or wounded in existing units.

NATO nations are now all re-evaluating their reserve strategies, with even Belgium considering conscription. Estonia has studied this for a decade and found that reservists retain their skills well. Now, we are examining collective unit cooperation with the British. My role in this committee is to share Estonia’s experiences and explore improved preparation and deployment of reservists with our allies.