VERDICT OF A 'VATNIK HUNTER' ⟩ "Western Policymakers Don’t Understand the Scale of the Disinformation Problem"

When the full-scale war erupted in 2022, I had already amassed considerable data on Russian disinformation and their information operations. I started analyzing this data, gathering more insights on the narratives they propagated and identifying their disseminators. This work culminated in the launch of the Vatnik Soup project in October 2022. I am now approaching 300 “Vatnik Soup” threads, and a book bearing the same name is about to be published.

Interview: What or who constitutes a 'Vatnik'?

Pekka Kallioniemi: 'Vatnik' is a term simply used to refer to a person who believes and/or spreads the Kremlin’s narratives one way or another. While some of the Vatniks catalogued in my book work directly for the Kremlin, others are genuinely unaware of their complicity in furthering the Kremlin’s agenda and have little to no connection to other Vatniks.

Interviewer: Is there a team or an organization supporting you?

Pekka Kallioniemi: It’s my personal project. While I have some assistance with proofreading and other tasks, all the Vatnik Soup threads are authored solely by me.

Interviewer: We have an Estonian journalist, Martin Laine from Delfi.ee, who has launched a local franchise of Vatnik Soup here in Estonia. Are you familiar with his work?

Pekka Kallioniemi: Yes, I’ve read most of his threads and they’re amazing. Martin Laine is doing an incredible job.

Interviewer: Are there any other counter-disinformation operations you're involved in, or any other initiatives that the readers of this interview or your book should know about?

Pekka Kallioniemi: We have a YouTube channel with a Lithuanian colleague where we create videos together—he’s the producer. We might also start conducting workshops in the future. Our goal is to raise awareness of Russian disinformation and social media in general. It's not only Russia; other malign actors, like the CCP of China and Iran, also spread propaganda and disinformation online.

Interviewer: How did a Finn end up working with a Lithuanian on a YouTube show?

Pekka Kallioniemi: We met at an event in Vilnius. He used to make videos for Saint Javelin, an online store that sells pro-Ukraine merchandise. He liked my work, and we started talking about collaboration. It’s been going great so far.

Interviewer: Will you continue functioning as a scientist to some extent, or have you now transitioned into a full-time political activist? For instance, when you gather evidence on Vatniks, do you take notes as a scientist for a potential future dissertation?

Pekka Kallioniemi: Not really. However, I believe the book could be seen as a form of research, compiling cases into a comprehensive study of vatniks and their strategies. While I previously focused on quantitative research, over the past 2.5 years, I have been engaging more in qualitative work. My aspiration is to merge these approaches into mixed-method research, combining network analysis with qualitative insights into individuals and their online activities.

Interviewer: Could you give us a scientific definition of what it is that you do?

Pekka Kallioniemi: I conduct qualitative research focusing on personas—understanding who spreads Kremlin narratives and what motivates them. It’s a form of persona-based research aimed at comprehending these individuals and their actions.

Interviewer: How scholarly is your research behind these Vatnik profiles?

Pekka Kallioniemi: I always try to refer to a source. I do add a bit of personal analysis, which would probably be excluded in actual scientific work, but I always cite sources. If I don’t have a source, I don’t make the claim. Truthfulness is the essence of what I do. In a Stoic way, we should always strive for the truth.

Interviewer: Can we also say that you partially engage in defaming people, or is it just exposing what they are saying and doing in support of Putin’s Russia?

Pekka Kallioniemi: If you ask the people I write about or their supporters, they’ll probably say it’s defamation. I add humor to my posts, some of it dark. It’s easy to be offended by what I write, but I’m just echoing what’s been written elsewhere or what these people have said themselves. For example, the Malaysian social media influencer Ian Miles Cheong was anti-Putin in 2014 but is now a columnist for Russia Today. We need to ask how such changes happen.

Interviewer: Who is your audience? Are you a preacher preaching to the choir, or a missionary trying to convert people?

Pekka Kallioniemi: My audience primarily consists of those who already support Ukraine. Changing minds, especially online, is exceedingly challenging and seldom occurs. In two and half years I've seen it happen maybe twice.

My efforts are more focused on raising awareness and enhancing cognitive resilience. I aim to fortify mental defenses against Kremlin propaganda. When people understand the main narratives and the individuals promoting them, they can recognize new campaigns at their inception.

To be honest, I don't yet have the volume or audience to change minds effectively, as that requires a long-term commitment and is very challenging. This kind of work should be undertaken at a societal level, particularly through the education system. If I could be involved in such a project in the future, it would be fantastic. We need to incorporate media literacy and critical thinking into our educational curricula.

Interviewer: You also seem to be a citizen journalist, practicing evidence-based journalism. Is that accurate?

Pekka Kallioniemi: I don’t consider myself a journalist because I haven’t studied journalism and I have a clear agenda.

Interviewer: What’s wrong with having an agenda, if your Vatnik profiles are well based on the evidence they mainly have themselves provided through their earlier media engagements?

Pekka Kallioniemi: I rarely publish anything critical of Ukraine, it’s a conscious choice and part of the information war. Good investigative journalists report without an agenda. However, real investigative journalists, who uncover high level corruption are definitely my role models. They undertake truly high-risk investigations, often putting their lives on the line.

Interviewer: How many 'Vatnik Hunters' are there in the West? Do you have an overview?

Pekka Kallioniemi: It's difficult to say. I know Martin Laine, and his work is outstanding. There are others who identify Kremlin narratives early and inform me about them, but I don’t have an exact number.

Interviewer: Can I ask about your home country, Finland? In Estonia, many defense commentators have entered mainstream media and even politics in the last two years. How prominent are defense commentators in Finland, and what influence do they wield?

Pekka Kallioniemi: We have a few experts who are frequently featured in the media, some from the open-source intelligence community or military history. For example, Emil Kastehelmi is a well-known analyst whose work often appears in newspapers. He isn’t overly optimistic about Ukrainian success and discusses the challenges. Non-biased, critical views are important to avoid an information bubble.

Interviewer: How many Finnish Vatniks have you exposed so far?

Pekka Kallioniemi: I started profiling with Finland; my first ten or so soups were about Finnish individuals. In total, I've probably featured about 15. The good news is that Finnish Vatniks have lost their influence. Nobody listens to them anymore. Their audience shrank dramatically after February 2022. Some have moved to Russia or the occupied areas of Ukraine, and those still in Finland no longer talk about Russia or Ukraine.

Interviewer: Having completed these 300 Vatnik profiles, have you developed a typology?

Pekka Kallioniemi: The typology I use is based on the MICE system from Western counterintelligence, where the acronym stands for Money, Ideology, Compromise (kompromat), and Ego. It’s a simplified categorization of individuals by their motivations. Uncovering the money trail is the trickiest part, as there is limited information on how these individuals are compensated by malign actors such as Russia, China, or Iran.

Interviewer: What percentage of the Vatniks you have cataloged are ideological, truly believing they are working for a good cause?

Pekka Kallioniemi: True believers are quite rare. While some are driven by nostalgia for the Communist system, most Vatniks are motivated by greed. They tend to fight against something rather than for a cause. There is a common ideology that unites almost all of them: strong anti-Western and anti-establishment sentiments. They are vehemently opposed to the democratic systems of Western countries, particularly targeting the United States and NATO. Although NATO is a military organization, their anti-NATO and anti-US stance is a consistent thread among 99% of these individuals.

There has been a significant effort to connect various conspiracy theories and align them with the Russian agenda. For instance, the notion that global elites are attempting to enslave the world is often linked to entities like the World Economic Forum.

This narrative then positions Russia as the opposition to this agenda, portraying Putin as an anti-globalist champion of traditional conservative values. Figures like Viktor Orbán and Donald Trump are also woven into this narrative, making it easy for believers of one conspiracy theory to accept others. This trend of merging different conspiracy theories into a master narrative, where Russia is depicted as the hero and the US or the West as the villain, is something I quite frequently observe.

Interviewer: In Estonia, we have a high-profile Vatnik case involving a member of parliament Varro Vooglaid. He is an ethnic Estonian and an active catholic, who has been airing Kremlin press statements unfiltered. What course of action would you recommend for Estonians in response to this?

Pekka Kallioniemi: Transparency should be our key weapon against individuals on the fringes who promote Kremlin propaganda. For instance, if there's someone in the Estonian Parliament spreading such propaganda, it's crucial to discuss their background and motivations. In Finland, we have a similar situation with a member of the left party advocating for lifting sanctions against Russia. Highlighting and discussing these issues openly can help.

Raising awareness about individuals spreading Kremlin propaganda, especially those in positions of power, is vital. Most countries, even those strongly opposed to the Kremlin, will have one or two such pro-Kremlin voices. It's important to acknowledge that in a democracy, everyone has a voice, even if it's frustrating to hear Kremlin propaganda.

This underscores the importance of education. If people are equipped with cognitive resilience against such misinformation, it loses its impact on society as a whole. Building cognitive resilience through education is crucial. It’s a long-term investment, but it’s an essential competence also for our children's future well-being and security.

Interviewer: Which Western country do you find most “messed-up” or concerning in terms of cognitive resilience? Could you please rank the top three most problematic countries?

Pekka Kallioniemi: The United States would be at the top of the list due to its extreme polarization. The two-party system has created a deeply divided nation, and this division is likely to become even more apparent in the months leading up to the election.

Germany also worries me, especially the eastern part, where conspiracy theories and disinformation seem to be gaining traction.

Hungary would be the third. While it's not entirely the same issue, under Orbán’s control, there's a significant spread of hate campaigns, such as those against George Soros. So, my top three would be the US, Germany, and Hungary.

Interviewer: I'm a bit baffled that you ranked Germany ahead of Hungary. Could you elaborate on why that is?

Pekka Kallioniemi: We already know what Hungary has become, but there's a high risk of Germany going in the same direction with more severe consequences. For example, the AfD has become very popular and they are extremely pro-Putin, pro-Kremlin, and they've even received money to start lawsuits against aid to Ukraine. It's really worrying what's going on there. Germany is a big country and a big supporter of Ukraine, and losing that support could have devastating effects. Whereas Hungary has been consistently anti-Ukraine under Orbán, so there won’t be any change there.

Interviewer: Can we discuss Russian disinformation operations and any changes you've observed over the last two to three years, or even longer? Is it still the same old Cold War tactics, or has it evolved over time?

Pekka Kallioniemi: Russian messaging is pretty much the same KGB-style messaging—claiming corruption, conspiracy theories, anti-Semitism. But the biggest change in recent years has been the use of AI. Even in the last six months of 2024, the use of AI on a massive scale is something we are now figuring out, but we still have no clue about the full scale of it. That’s what’s changing and what we need to investigate and understand in the West—the large-scale use of AI in all this.

Interviewer: Can AI also be used in countering disinformation?

Pekka Kallioniemi: That’s the tricky part. It can be. I often talk about asymmetrical warfare in information war. In conventional warfare, one side might have tanks and the other only infantry. In information warfare, Russia has been doing this for a long time, they have the resources, and they don’t have to tell the truth.

Lying is easier than telling the truth and it does not cost them anything. As long as they can throw out their lies on a massive scale, it's difficult to counter it because debunking and fact-checking are too slow. For example, the story that Olena Zelenska bought a $5 million Bugatti spread through AI-generated fake news blogs and quickly gained millions of impressions. Debunking it took about 5-6 hours, which is very long on social media.

The initial lie often sticks in people's minds. So, AI can be used, but right now, we don’t have the mechanisms to counter it effectively. We need tools to detect false narratives early and raise awareness around them. My theory is we will have a battle between producing disinformation and detecting disinformation similar to the battle of algorithms in conventional warfare with drones. The side with the smarter system will win.

Interviewer: How do you think Western counter disinformation practices have been influenced by what Putin did to Ukraine?

Pekka Kallioniemi: Well, there weren’t many efforts before 2022. Ukrainians have taught us a lot. There's a great research paper published by Hybrid Center of Excellence in Finland called “Ten Things You Can Learn from Countering Russian Disinformation from Ukrainians.” But we started way too late. Russians started their large-scale online operations around 2012-2013, and we reacted in 2022.

There were some projects like EU vs DISINFO, but they were small compared to the thousands of people Russia has used for troll farms. Even now, the West isn't using the necessary resources to counter this effectively. The response to Russian disinformation warfare has been quite pathetic, to be honest.

Interviewer: The overall consensus seems to state that Ukraine has demolished Russia online post-2022, but you call the Western response pathetic. Can you elaborate?

Pekka Kallioniemi: Some narratives still break into the mainstream and we aren’t learning from our previous mistakes. The Digital Services Act in the EU is trying to make platforms responsible for spreading disinformation, but it’s vague and the fines are small. We have think tanks identifying small-scale operations, but that’s about it. For example, the FBI found and closed around 100 bot accounts on X, but if there are millions of troll accounts, closing 100 does nothing. We are fighting a losing war in information warfare against Russia, China, and Iran.

Interviewer: What narratives still come through unharmed?

Pekka Kallioniemi: In the US, narratives about sanctions being ineffective, the aid to Ukraine, and corruption in Ukraine are actually big. Of course, there’s corruption in Ukraine, but they exaggerate it and pin it all on Ukraine’s leaders. Conspiracy theories about global elites and claims that George Soros funded a Trump assassination are also spreading. There’s fertile ground for these stories on social media, and we don’t know how to respond. Many policymakers don’t understand the scale of the problem.

Interviewer: How much of the US culture war is being incited from outside? Is there any basis to believe that Russians and Chinese are inflating it online?

Pekka Kallioniemi: Definitely. There’s research showing Russian-funded outlets spreading both pro and anti-Black Lives Matter narratives to polarize society. China has been campaigning around Palestine protests on US campuses, spreading narratives that the US isn’t a free country. They are using culture wars and identity debates as weapons against the West.

Interviewer: Could you evaluate the hypothesis that Western alt-right movements are particularly susceptible to Russian influence?

Pekka Kallioniemi: I would argue that both far-left and far-right extremes are vulnerable to Russian influence. In Germany, both far-left pro-Kremlin candidates and the far-right AfD achieved significant wins in the European Parliament elections. Ex.tremes at both ends of the spectrum can be highly susceptible to such influence. There’s even a theory suggesting that these extremes converge at a certain point, as seen in the US when far-left and far-right elements collaborated at an anti-war rally in Washington, DC.

Interviewer: Do you think the West sometimes overdoes it when countering disinformation? Have you seen any actions that seemed like overreactions?

Pekka Kallioniemi: I don’t believe in censorship, it’s an authoritarian weapon. I believe in education and transparency. Banning RT and Sputnik, for example, I don’t think had a real effect because they weren’t very popular. In extreme times, preventive measures can be understandable, like Ukraine banning pro-Russia channels. But in general, censorship is not the way to go. Blocking RT and Sputnik in the West might harm us because it makes investigations more difficult.

Interviewer: So for your taste, we have already overdone it somewhat?

Pekka Kallioniemi: When it comes to censorship, yes. Blocking RT and Sputnik might actually harm us by making it harder for scientists, researchers, and journalists to investigate these narratives.

Interviewer: Have you faced any personal threats while profiling Vatniks, and if so, how have you managed the stress?

Pekka Kallioniemi: Naturally, there is stress, particularly concerning lawsuits and threats against me personally. More distressing, though, are the threats directed at my family, close friends, and loved ones. However, these threats also signal that my work has value and impact. The opposition wouldn't resort to such measures if it weren't effective. Many individuals who have exposed Russia's lies have faced threats and targeting. For instance, oligarchs often use SLAPP lawsuits as a tactic to silence critics. While this strategy sometimes works, it often doesn't.

Interviewer: What’s your new book about, why did you decide to write it, and who should read it?

Pekka Kallioniemi: The book is called “The Ultimate Guide to Russian Disinformation,” and it’s basically my research from the last four or five years compiled into one book. It’s in two parts: the first part covers the history and machinery of Russian disinformation, and the second part introduces the people who spread it. By reading the book, you’ll understand the system better and the types of people drawn to these stories. Anyone interested in the truth and understanding the disinformation machinery should read it. I had the honor of having Kyrylo Budanov, the Chief of Defense Intelligence of Ukraine, write the foreword for the book.

Interviewer: How on earth did you pull that off?

Pekka Kallioniemi: It took me half a year of talking to people and communicating.

Interviewer: That’s quite the endorsement. If I may, one more question popped into mind about Russian information operations. How much does The Kremline domestic info ops playbook differ from what they do abroad? Are they even comparable?

Pekka Kallioniemi: The difference is that domestically they don’t have conflicting or competing narratives. The main narrative is always pro-Putin. The early research on domestic operations showed that you don’t criticize Putin. You can criticize the Duma or the country, but never Putin. So domestically, the propaganda is about uniting people under Putin. Abroad, they use a lot of conflicting narratives to polarize societies. So, they are different genres altogether.