BIZARRE FREEZE ⟩ Russia's 2024 Gains in Ukraine Equal the Size of Madeira

Minimal Risk of A Breakthrough

A Ukrainian army staff officer, who requested anonymity, said that the Russian army is unlikely to launch such wide-scale offensives with their current strength in the second half of the year. "It’s not impossible – I’ll say this cautiously – that soon the Russian army may no longer be able to attack with their current tactics of simply pushing our units out of positions and will need to revise their strategy," said the Ukrainian officer. "They might even announce a new mobilization," he added.

Ukrainians have not been able to stop the Russian army's creeping advance, but they have managed to organize their defense effectively enough, so that the Russian army has not been able to execute any significant breakthroughs that would cause a rapid Ukrainian retreat across a wider front. Currently, there is no sign of such a breakthrough. Ukrainian units have begun to organize counterattacks in the last few weeks (in the northern part of the Kharkiv region, in the forests of Kreminna), but overall, the situation is not favorable for the Ukrainians either.

"Currently and until the end of the year, [the Ukrainian] armed forces are capable of containing the enemy's offensive and reducing its combat potential, even carrying out local counterattacks in selected directions, but they will not be able to achieve a turning point in the war," retired colonel Viktor Kevlyuk told us.

The focus of the summer battles appears to remain in Donetsk Oblast. From the Russian army’s attack directions, it’s evident that their goal is to reach the last major urbanized area of the region – the Kramatorsk-Sloviansk-Druzhkivka-Kostiantynivka cluster. Before the full-scale war, this cluster had over 400,000 residents, now about half of that. Kramatorsk is the de facto capital of the Ukrainian-controlled part of Donetsk Oblast.

Why Chasiv Yar Matters

The months-long battles around Chasiv Yar and Siversk, and the new Russian offensive direction towards Toretsk and New York towns, are all preludes to reaching the Kramatorsk-Sloviansk urban cluster.

The greatest threat to the Kramatorsk cluster is the potential fall of Chasiv Yar, as it is situated on a strategic elevation preceding the cluster. "This is currently the most dangerous situation on the entire front," said Yevhen Dikiy, former company commander of the Aidar Battalion and a well-known war expert in Kyiv. He stated that the capture of Chasiv Yar and the loss of its dominant heights would necessitate the extensive evacuation of residents from the Kramatorsk cluster, as the Russian army would begin shelling these cities with artillery and air bombs, similar to what they did in Bakhmut and Avdiivka.

Given the current pace of the Russian army's advance under Chasiv Yar, capturing the town could take months, possibly even until the end of the year. Similarly, capturing the Toretsk-New York urban area might also take months. A few hundred civilians still live in Chasiv Yar, but at least 10,000 civilians remain in the Toretsk and New York area.

The risk of encirclement further complicates the situation for Ukrainian forces under Toretsk, if Russian forces manage to break through to the important highway connecting the city of Kostiantynivka with Pokrovske, a key logistical base for the Ukrainian army.

Manpower Shortages A Critical Challenge

The main problem for the Ukrainian army remains manpower. Severe personnel shortages have persisted for over six months. Mobilized soldiers primarily reinforce already active brigades. New brigades have practically not reached the front.

Essentially, the Ukrainian armed forces have only a few brigades with good leadership capable of quickly moving to a new front and being ready to fight there. When the Russian army opened a new front in the northern part of Kharkiv Oblast two months ago, the Ukrainian army directed five to seven brigades there, according to various estimates, but these were not full brigades, rather individual battalions from different brigades.

"If the problem of staffing the defense forces is not solved, no amount of military aid will change the situation," noted retired colonel Viktor Kevlyuk. At the same time, it is clear that the Russian army currently also has nothing to boast about regarding reserves.

Last week, President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that the Ukrainian armed forces had supposedly formed 14 new brigades. Fourteen brigades mean at least 60,000-70,000 men. Zelensky added that these brigades have nothing to arm them with because Western allies are not sending weapons.

Stocks Are Depleting

The reason may lie in the fact that Ukraine's allies in Europe no longer have much heavy equipment to send quickly to Ukraine. Among Ukraine's main weapons sponsors, only the US has a significant amount of heavy equipment needed by Ukraine. At best, these new brigades could be armed by early next year. If they cannot be armed, there is no possibility for any counteroffensive.

The supply of artillery shells to the Ukrainian army has visibly improved, but they still fall short compared to the Russian army. However, the situation is no longer as critical for the Ukrainian army as it was in the winter and spring.

Ukrainian officers now say that with the current amount of shells, they can fight more or less normally again. However, this talk is only about 155-millimeter, so-called NATO-caliber shells. There is a total shortage of 152-millimeter shells, which are used by Soviet-era artillery systems still forming the majority of the Ukrainian army's weaponry.

Ukrainians have so few 152mm shells that, roughly speaking, they fire as many in a month as the Russian army fires at them in a day. Essentially, the Ukrainian army is currently fighting mainly with artillery systems provided by allies. As these also get destroyed, allies need to maintain a good pace of delivering new artillery systems.

In terms of armament, the biggest problem for the Ukrainian army at the moment is air defense. Across the front, Russian bombers are quite freely hitting Ukrainian positions and cities with powerful glide bombs.

These bombs are currently the main weapon for the Russian army to force Ukrainians to retreat. The Ukrainian army has no remedy against them. If Russia could significantly increase the conversion of regular bombs into gliding bombs and use more bombers to deploy them, it would be very bad news for the Ukrainian army.

Both Sides Have Major Issues

The glide bombs used most against Ukrainian forces carry 115-215 kilograms of explosives, and no army in the world can shoot them down in the air. The most effective way to counter glide bombs is to destroy the aircraft carrying them – either in the air or on runways – or to prevent Russian bombers from getting close enough to the frontline for the glide bombs to reach the Ukrainians.

For this, Ukraine needs either long-range air defense systems, such as significantly more Patriot systems with adequate missile supplies, or sufficiently well-armed F-16 aircraft. The timeline for the arrival of the latter in Ukraine and their potential use at the front is still unknown to the public.

If the Ukrainian army manages to significantly reduce the Russian army's ability to use glide bombs, it will greatly increase the chance to halt the Russian army's creeping advance everywhere along the fronts.

Retired Colonel Kevlyuk estimates that the Ukrainian army could attempt to change the course of the war at best in the first half of next year, but a series of crucial conditions must be met for this. "Provided that the combat capability of all engaged infantry and tank brigades is restored, fire and air superiority is achieved, and corridors are created in the enemy's air defenses for our aircraft to operate in the enemy's operational depth," said Kevlyuk. As of today, this does not seem very realistic.

Estonian military expert Leo Kunnas believes that both the Ukrainian and Russian armies need a significant increase in both quality and quantity to break through the enemy's strong defensive lines. "Neither side can currently create the conditions necessary for an operational-level breakthrough, let alone a strategic one," said Kunnas.

"Broadly speaking, the contingents are equal. Training and technical level are also roughly equal. Theoretically, Ukraine could compensate for this with the best leadership and training, but quantity also matters. Ukraine's reserves are simply not sufficient to achieve decisive success."

Soon it will be half a year since Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi took office as the new commander of the Ukrainian armed forces. He took over command when the Ukrainian armed forces were in the most severe crisis in February-March, excluding the first weeks of the full-scale war.

Syrskyi has managed to at least partially stabilize the situation at the front. However, there has never been as much criticism of the military leadership in Ukraine during the full-scale war as there has been in recent months.

Criticism of the army generates mixed reactions in Ukraine, but on the other hand, it demonstrates the strength of Ukraine as a state. Despite the state of war, freedom of speech still prevails.