JONATAN VSEVIOV'S PANORAMIC ESSAY ⟩ Putin is Determined to Derail the West in 2024

Ukraine holds a particularly crucial role in reversing this 'catastrophe.' In Putin's perspective, without Ukraine, Russia cannot reclaim its former imperial stature.

But it's not just about geopolitics. It's also about the idea of Russia.

Blinding Imperial Messianism

As the 'Third Rome,' Putin believes Russia has a unique global role, justifying and explaining why Russia is the way it is and acts as it does.

Russia is neither the first nor the only great power to perceive itself as having a global mission. Throughout history, all world powers have experienced this sentiment. However, Putin's Russia faces a unique problem: its historic roots lie elsewhere, in Ukraine. Consequently, Ukrainians are not viewed as "others," but rather as part of the same nation, akin to a slightly lesser, smaller brother.

Thus, if Ukrainians succeed in establishing democratic governance and integrating into major European political and economic organizations, what becomes of Putin's vision of Russia's uniqueness? And if Ukraine is after all "the other," then who are "we"?

These questions pose a significant danger for Putin.

A man of small stature who grew up in the backyards of Leningrad, learned judo, and chose a KGB career is not known for frontal attacks. To the contrary - Putin has tried to turn his opponents' strengths against them and act covertly, best exemplified by the 'little green men' he sent to Crimea in 2014 to avoid public declaration of war.

Aging Dictators Tend to Hurry

Ukraine was eluding Moscow's grasp, and both the war in Donbas and the annexation of Crimea failed to change this trajectory. On the contrary, the conflict bolstered Ukrainian national identity and self-confidence.

By 2022, Ukraine was drifting away, taking with it the notion of a great and globally unique Russia, and more immediately, Putin's self-image as a successful leader who revived Russia´s greatness. Like other aging dictators before him, he began to hurry. And that led to mistakes.

Kyiv was supposed to fall within days. The 'pacification' of Ukraine was to be quick, enforced by brutal repression. Negotiations with the West, particularly with major Western nations, were intended to be conducted from a position of strength to consolidate the new reality and pursue broader objectives.

Kyiv did not fall. The West, expected to make only weak condemnations and then hypocritically crawl back to Moscow with a reset button, proved unexpectedly united and persistent.

Despite more than two years of war and significant setbacks, Putin remains steadfast in his goals. He still desires control over all of Ukraine. Even if an outright military conquest proves unattainable, he anticipates that a blend of military, political, and economic measures will ultimately enable him to achieve this aim.

His vision is of a Ukraine that may be nominally independent but, lacking both territorial integrity and sovereignty, is controlled by undemocratic forces under Moscow's de facto authority.

It Was Never Just About Ukraine

Putin’s second major objective is to establish a buffer zone along Russia’s borders. This ambition is hardly novel; land-based empires have historically sought 'security zones' on their peripheries, ideally composed of weak, fragmented states under the empire’s control.

The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the disappearance of this buffer zone in Europe, while the expansion of the European Union and NATO introduced a new reality to Russia’s borders: a united democratic Europe that, despite its flaws, has increasingly managed to act as a cohesive force.

While Moscow failed to maintain a buffer zone to the west, it found greater success elsewhere. This was achieved primarily through a combination of frozen conflicts and intervention in neighboring countries' internal affairs, leveraging energy dependencies and corruption to control and manipulate local elites.

It would be a mistake to assume that Putin's desire for a buffer zone is motivated by military matters alone: if that were the case, Russia wouldn't have left its border with NATO unprotected while invading Ukraine. The issue is much deeper: a united, successful, and democratic Europe is dangerous to Putin because of what it is, not because of what it does.

Idea of Freedom Terrifies Tyrants

A united Europe is, above all, an idea—one fundamentally different from the vision Putin cultivates for Russia. The inherent challenge with ideas is their tendency to spread, as Putin's predecessors in the Kremlin learned firsthand.

Thus, Russia has tried to keep the borders of a democratic and united Europe as far away from them as possible while working hard to undermine these democracies internally. Moscow couldn't prevent Central and Eastern European countries from joining NATO and the EU, but as its strength and self-confidence increased, it intervened militarily when Georgia and Ukraine set upon a European path a few years later.

The methods for undermining Western democracies and the assumptions underpinning this strategy remain unchanged since the Soviet era. The Kremlin believes that despite their outward strength, democracies harbor internal weaknesses that can be exploited.

Notwithstanding setbacks, Putin hasn't abandoned his goal of creating a buffer zone to the west. The most vivid proof of this is the proposals Moscow made to the US and NATO in December 2021, on the eve of its full-scale aggression against Ukraine. Among other things, Russia demanded the withdrawal of NATO's military activities to pre-1997 levels, which would effectively eliminate collective defense for all allies who joined NATO after the Cold War, destroying the current security architecture in Europe.

The Kremlin's Global Zero-Sum Game

The ambition to dismantle Europe's current security architecture is directly tied to Putin's third major objective: gaining recognition for Russia as a global superpower. In Putin's view, Russia must either be among those setting the global rules or be relegated to having its fate determined by others. In other words, Russia is either seated at the table or on the menu, destined to be devoured by others.

In the aftermath of World War II, Moscow secured influential positions within the organizations established by the victorious powers. However, the world is changing. Unfortunately for Russia, there are diminishing reasons to justify Moscow's place at the table: Russia lacks the economic and demographic size and vitality, and the two trump cards still in Putin's hands—strategic nuclear weapons and energy exports—are losing their relative significance.

This is especially evident with energy exports. Europe's swift detachment from dependence on Russian energy vividly demonstrated that energy exports no longer wield the strategic leverage they once did. This shift is not solely attributable to the green transition; new methods of transporting gas have rendered the politics of handcuffing governments to pipelines less effective. Even if the world’s ambitious green goals are somewhat delayed, the trends remain unmistakably clear.

Chaos Comes Cheap

Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent remains a powerful asset, but for how long? Technological advancements continually create new possibilities in both defense and offense, inevitably diminishing the relative significance of older weapons systems. The likelihood of Russia being able to compete in a global technological race is slim, thus likely diminishing the relative strength of this card in Putin's hand.

So what is to be done when the post-WWII seating plan no longer holds, seats are being redistributed, and you need to secure a place at the table but the arguments for claiming that seat are of decreasing value? Exactly what Putin has been doing: undermining the current order as best he can so that it would end as soon as possible.​

Sowing chaos is cheaper than maintaining order. Consequently, after being compelled to withdraw from many parts of the world, Moscow has reemerged, supporting strongmen around the globe. This serves the dual purpose of bolstering its own relevance while simultaneously undermining order to the greatest extent possible.

None of this can obscure the reality that the cards in Putin's hand are weakening. Playing for high stakes with a weak hand necessitates taking significant risks. The aggression in Ukraine represents Putin's most substantial gamble to date, one on which he has staked everything.

The War over Europe's Future

Since the outset of the war, Estonia has recognized it as existential for us and, more broadly, for European security. This is not solely because Putin, despite setbacks, has not altered his goals. The war in Ukraine is vitally important because its outcome will determine the validity of the principles upon which European security has long depended.

The war in Ukraine, like all wars before it, will eventually come to an end. Peace will prevail, but the nature of that peace will depend entirely on how the war concludes.

Depending on the result of this war, it will either become the norm, that a larger state can change its smaller neighbor’s borders with force, or not.

It will either become the norm, that a larger state can decide whether its smaller neighbor gets to exist, not just as a state, but as a nation, or not.

Aggression as a tool of statecraft will either be discredited, or it will become accepted that, under certain circumstances, a major global power can commit aggression with impunity.

Where Do We Draw the Line?

If we allow territorial integrity to be reduced to mere empty phrases in outdated treaties, then which borders can truly remain secure?

If we permit the concept of spheres of influence to reemerge from the dustbin of history, with great powers dividing countries among themselves, then which nation in Europe can feel safe?

And if we accept the notion that Russia has 'legitimate security interests' that condemn Ukraine to limited sovereignty, without the freedom to choose its own alliances, then where do we draw the line? Russia’s interests in Europe extend beyond Ukraine, and its appetite would only grow if it succeeds in this war.

If we consign Ukraine to limited sovereignty out of fear of a major war, how can we convincingly argue that we wouldn’t similarly sacrifice the next victims of 'Russia’s legitimate interests' out of fear of an even greater conflict?

None of this is new. We’ve seen all of it before. We know how these stories begin and end. And hopefully, we haven't forgotten history’s lesson that attempts to buy oneself stability by feeding an aggressor the freedom of others leads to catastrophe for all.

Time for Clear Messages

Estonia has been unequivocal about what’s at stake and what our goals are in this war. The futures of both Ukraine and Europe hang in the balance.

Our objectives are threefold: first, to restore territorial integrity and sovereignty as valid principles of international relations; second, to fully discredit aggression as a tool of statecraft; and third, to ensure the EU and NATO remain fundamental pillars of European security, welcoming all who meet the requirements and express the desire to join. This approach aims to eliminate the 'gray zones' and security vacuums in Europe that have historically led to chaos and instability.

Some have criticized our message for its boldness and labeled our goals as overly ambitious. However, we see no alternative: for people to be willing to support the difficult choices any war demands, the cost of inaction must be made abundantly clear.

In recent months, Western leaders have improved the clarity of their messages about what is at stake, yet the articulation of their goals remains fairly vague. Many limit their statements to the well-known slogan: "it’s up to the Ukrainians to decide the terms of peace,” as if the Ukrainians haven't been perfectly clear about their desire for full sovereignty and territorial integrity.

While this ambiguity is understandable, it is unwise; it causes confusion and implies that despite everything we’ve said and done, we’re leaving room for a fundamental shift in our policy.

Defeatism Masked as Realism

As for the criticism that our goals are too maximalist, our demands are simple: we want Russia to withdraw to its internationally recognized borders and remain there. The days when the West imagined itself shaping Russia's internal developments are over, and Estonia has never harbored such ambitions. We only seek for Russia to cease its attacks on its neighbors.

If this goal is deemed too maximalist, then what would constitute a 'realistic' ambition? Let those who criticize our stance state it openly and see if imitating Chamberlain's attempts last century yields better results in this one.

Thus, Estonia has consistently reiterated: nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine, and nothing about Europe without Europe. This war will shape Europe’s future, and as long as Estonia's voice is part of Europe's chorus, we will ensure it is heard.

Raising the Cost of Aggression

Goals without strategy are mere wishful thinking. Estonia has advocated a strategy aimed at influencing Russia's cost-benefit analysis, with the ultimate goal of persuading it to change course. After all, this is how wars end—when one side determines it can no longer afford to continue on its current path.

Consequently, the first pillar of our strategy has been to raise the cost of aggression, primarily with sanctions, but also through Russia's international isolation.

The case with sanctions is straightforward: the more extensive they are, the better. Turning away from aggression would certainly be costly for Russia; therefore, the cost of continuing aggression must be even higher.

To date, the EU has approved fourteen sanction packages, not because we’ve had fourteen rounds of new ideas on what to sanction. Building consensus takes time: for an EU sanction, all 27 member states need to agree, often requiring complex internal political deliberations. Additionally, for real impact, we must find agreement with like-minded partners in the G7—the US, UK, Canada, and Japan. All of this is obviously time-consuming.

Time Bleeds Away

Unfortunately, in war, time is measured not only in hours or days but also in lives. In an ideal world, we would have imposed all the current sanctions—and more—immediately and simultaneously. Gradual progress lacks the power of a single decisive action. Like in the boxing ring, fourteen punches at one-fourteenth strength do not have the same impact as one full-strength punch.

Moreover, gradual progress allows the opponent time to adapt, and Russia has done so, finding new and often clever ways to circumvent our sanctions. Therefore, alongside imposing new sanctions, countering evasion has become crucial.

Regarding Russia’s international isolation, most of our success stories occurred last year and the year before: we managed to have Russia leave the Council of Europe, the UN General Assembly approved several resolutions condemning Russia's aggression with a resounding majority, and Russia was voted out of the UN Human Rights Council.

However, the Russians have adapted here as well, using messages from the Soviet era to lure the so-called “Global South” and framing the war against Ukraine as a struggle against Western hegemony.

These attempts require an active push-back, with a message as clear as possible: while many around the world may feel indifferent about European security, most are not willing to publicly abandon their support for the UN Charter and the centrality of territorial integrity and sovereignty as key principles of international life.

Empowering Ukraine's Success

Most notably, the cost of aggression is heightened by Ukraine's own actions, resulting in about a thousand Russian casualties each day. However, Ukraine cannot achieve this without our support, which is why the second pillar of Estonia's strategy has been providing both material and immaterial assistance to Ukraine.

Western military aid has followed the same gradualist approach as sanctions: initial taboos become disputes, are then resolved, only for new taboos to emerge, leading to further disputes, and eventually being resolved. This cycle has applied to everything from the general acceptance of lethal assistance to the provision of specific Western weapons systems, including tanks, fighter planes, and long-range strike capabilities.

Estonia has sought to break these taboos by offering assistance that others were not yet prepared to provide, thereby attempting to shape the debate. Estonia's early deliveries of Javelins and artillery systems are prime examples of this effort.

Silver Bullet Fallacy

However, it’s not just the loss of time that makes this dynamic perilous; it also perpetuates the misconception that there are silver bullets capable of changing the war's course. After protracted debates on whether to provide specific weapons systems, followed by the decision to do so, and then observing that the tide of battle does not immediately shift, we create artificial expectations. This, in turn, leads to self-doubt, ultimately undermining the sustainability of our entire policy.

One of the major waves of pessimism began in the spring-summer 2023 with the much-hyped Ukrainian counteroffensive that achieved only modest success, leading many observers to conclude that it’s impossible for Ukraine to win the war, as it supposedly lacks the capability to drive Russia out militarily.

But most wars are won or lost not in the trenches, but in capitals. While developments on the battlefield certainly influence decisions made in capitals, they are not the sole determinants. After all, the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Afghanistan, and Russia from Estonia, not because they were 'driven out,' but because Moscow recognized that continuing on their chosen course had become unsustainable. This realization was driven by a combination of economic, political, and military factors.

Enemy Has a Vote

In wars, the enemy has a vote, and just as we strive to create a perception of unsustainability for Russia, Russia is attempting to do the same to Ukraine. The systematic destruction of civilian infrastructure, the relentless barrage of propagandist messages, and the ongoing operation 'Meat Grinder' on the front lines are all designed to achieve this: to destroy hope and undermine the perceived viability of Ukraine’s strategy to become a normal European state.

Hope, after all, is a resource. As Russia endeavors to extinguish it, we must equally be committed to fostering it. Therefore, beyond material and technical assistance, supporting Ukraine involves instilling hope in the Ukrainian people that the European path they’ve chosen remains viable and that, despite all challenges, Ukraine is progressing.

In practical terms, this hinges on making credible the notion that Ukraine, too, can one day enjoy the same level of prosperity, opportunity, and security as other European nations, and become a member of both the European Union and NATO – aspirations Ukraine has clearly expressed.

Both NATO and the EU have committed to Ukraine’s eventual membership. However, as Russia continues to undermine hope, we must replenish it, ensuring there is consistent reinforcement of the message that Ukraine is not only on an irreversible path but also making tangible progress.

Europe Stronger With Ukraine

While NATO and EU membership is undoubtedly essential for Ukraine, its inclusion in these organizations will also strengthen the rest of democratic Europe. It would extend the zone of stability and security that previous enlargements brought to one hundred million Central and Eastern Europeans, fostering a more united Europe.

Finally, to provide Ukraine with hope, our reconstruction efforts must commence now, even as the war continues. Like NATO and EU membership, rebuilding Ukraine is not a one-way street benefiting only Ukraine. On the contrary, Ukraine's reconstruction will be one of the largest economic projects in Europe, and if successfully implemented, it will benefit the entire continent.

The question is not whether Ukraine will be rebuilt—it will be, just as Dresden and Grozny were. The real question is who will rebuild Ukraine and under what rules. Europe has a vested interest in this process.

Ukraine’s reconstruction is not merely a material and technical challenge. The society that emerges from this war will be deeply scarred, and having just saved Europe, the Ukrainian people will be impatient in demanding European living standards. The ability of democratic institutions to meet these demands without succumbing to extremist populism will be a major challenge.

It is safe to assume that winning peace will not be much easier than winning the war. Therefore, it is essential to begin preparations today by undertaking reconstruction projects that bring Ukraine closer to meeting European standards, and by doing our homework as we help Ukraine do theirs.

The notion that we can simply revert to resting on our laurels once this war ends is nothing but an illusion.

Putin Running on Fumes

Wars are costly and painful. The Ukrainians feel it acutely, and so do their fellow Europeans. But so does Putin, despite his propaganda efforts to claim otherwise. His failure to achieve the swift victory he anticipated has put all the key arguments he has used to justify his power under immense pressure.

The argument that he is making Russia great again—feared and respected as a global power—is losing credibility in light of his inability to defeat the Ukrainians, who, it should be remembered, were expected to offer only token resistance before welcoming their reintegration into the so-called Russian world.

The claim that he is providing the Russian people with a better tomorrow is no longer convincing, as all optimism has drained from Russia. The elites can no longer sustain the lifestyles they once enjoyed, from sending their children to school in England, to vacationing in the south of Spain, to shopping in Paris.

Most importantly, his promise to guarantee both individual and collective security to the Russian people, provided they don't engage in politics, is clearly no longer valid. Hundreds of thousands of Russians have died in the war, the fear of mobilization has forced thousands more to flee, and the regions bordering Ukraine are in a constant state of war-like conditions.

To compensate for his inability to guarantee security, Putin has had to ramp up repression and walk a thin line regarding mobilization. With the war dragging on and no clear victory in sight, this line becomes ever thinner.

In light of all this, Putin is compelled to base his entire theory of victory on the assumption that time is on his side, and that sooner rather than later, the West will run out of political will. This hinges on the belief that Europe cannot sustain its course without American support, and that the United States, due to its Presidential elections, will either choose to change direction or become so consumed with internal deliberations that it can no longer maintain its current stance.

Time Is on Our Side

Disproving Putin's remaining argument—that time is on his side—must be the focal point of our policy. Achieving this will set us on the path to success.

Therefore, in addition to continuing our efforts to raise the cost of aggression and support Ukraine, we must implement policies that inherently communicate continuity. We must convince Moscow that in our resistance to aggression, we have indeed reached a point of no return.

Estonia has advocated for two policies that are unlikely to change with elections.

First, regarding accountability: investigations by independent courts of law are independent of executive branch actions. Thus, the investigation of war crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and establishing a special tribunal to investigate the crime of aggression must be crucial elements of our war policy.

While we may never succeed in bringing Putin personally to justice, we cannot ignore the fact that he is wanted for war crimes. This reduces the likelihood of any future European government striking a Munich-like deal with him.

The crime of aggression presents a more complex situation, as the ICC does not have jurisdiction over it. Therefore, a separate tribunal is needed. Estonia was among the first to advocate for this, and now a group of nations is actively discussing it.

Hopefully, we´ll find a way to establish it before the end of the year, in a way that reinforces the rules-based world order, and addresses aggression as a leadership crime that it is.

Point of No Return

Secondly, Estonia has advocated for the confiscation and use of Russia’s frozen assets for Ukraine’s reconstruction and self-defense needs. Approximately 300 billion euros of Russian state assets are frozen in the West, most of it in the EU. While this sum is significant, the primary strategic motivation for seizing these funds is to send a message that we have indeed reached a point of no return.

Even the most optimistic Kremlin operatives must understand that the likelihood of any future Western government reimbursing the aggressor for these funds is low.

When Estonia first proposed this possibility, we were dismissed as if we’d suggested a fairy tale. Some warned of the damage such an infringement of sovereignty would inflict on the international system. Others fretted over potential reactions from financial markets. Some feared Russia would retaliate by confiscating Western companies’ assets within its borders.

One by one, these counter-arguments have been dismantled. The international system suffers greater harm if the crime of aggression is met with impunity. Markets have already factored in the risk of the aggressor losing its assets. Furthermore, Russia has long signaled that Western companies' assets in Russia are potential targets for confiscation, irrespective of our actions.

With the G7 having reached a compromise that in principle grants access to the frozen assets, the EU will hopefully finalize all practicalities and take action within the next few months.

Beware of Putin's Traps

Of course, Putin is not resting on his laurels. He understands our strategy and realizes that if the West and Ukraine manage to endure the difficult year of 2024 and stay the course, his argument that time works in Russia's favor will collapse by 2025. Thus, he is trying to derail this year, using both a stick and a carrot—in this case, fear and false hope—to divert us from our path.

His irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and hybrid attacks against the West aim to paralyze us with fear. To his credit, he has achieved some success—part of the gradual approach to Western weapons deliveries stems from concerns about escalation.

Our ill-advised public discussions about these fears have signaled to Putin that our progress can be slowed, encouraging him to continue. This is precisely what he has been doing through covert activities on NATO territory, targeting European nationals.

But fear alone doesn't work; it needs to be paired with an 'off-ramp,' a way out. The Kremlin’s occasional signals on their readiness for “peace talks” is just that – a carrot, meant to work together with the stick of fear.

These proposals are, of course, mere traps, designed to unravel Western unity, derail our policies, and undermine Ukraine’s government both domestically and internationally. We have seen how these traps operate—in the failed Minsk II process, which was meant to bring peace but instead paved the way for escalation, and in Russian offers to "remove chemical weapons from Syria," to name just a few examples.

Accepting Moscow's proposals as relevant would entangle us in protracted negotiations. Once our war policy is derailed, Russia would start to violate any agreements reached, initially on the periphery and eventually with full force, assuming we would be unable to regroup and refocus in time.

Here too, the Russians are likely to escalate in the coming months, pushing 'peace narratives' with increasing intensity, both directly and through intermediaries. Avoiding these traps will be as crucial as managing our fears.

Towards the Kremlin's Withdrawal

Estonia’s history starkly illustrates the difference between genuine peace and so-called 'peace.' The former is our true aspiration, while the latter merely serves as a guise for our defeat. We understand this distinction well. If small states can offer anything to the advancement of international security, it is our ability to call a spade a spade and a shovel a shovel.

Speaking out demands courage, particularly for smaller countries. If Estonia continues to demonstrate this courage, there is no doubt we will prevent another Munich or Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact from occurring. There is no reason why we should not.

As we steadfastly stay the course and dismantle Putin's fallacy that time is on his side, we will witness Russia's eventual retreat, just as we did three decades ago when Moscow's withdrawal allowed Estonia and many other nations to regain their freedom and rejoin the rest of Europe in building our shared future.