FACING NATO'S NUCLEAR REALITY ⟩ Interview with Fabian Hoffmann on Missile Intensity of the War in Ukraine and the Lessons the West Should Learn from It

This war has shown that missile defense, while expensive, is effective. Interceptors are often pricier than the incoming munitions, but Ukraine can shoot down 9 out of 10 cruise missiles and 6 to 8 out of 10 short-range ballistic missiles. Effectiveness depends on coverage and the systems in place, but overall, missile defense has proven more effective than many analysts, including myself, expected before the war.

Interviewer: I suppose the April 2024 Iranian attack on Israel proved the same point. Did you notice any differences compared to the missile war in Ukraine?

Fabian Hoffmann: No, it reinforced the same lesson. Ukraine has faced multi-vector, time-coordinated missile attacks, involving various systems like long-range drones, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and repurposed S-300 surface-to-air missiles. These come from different angles and trajectories, arriving simultaneously to overwhelm Ukraine’s missile defense.

Parts of Ukraine’s missile defense, especially around Kyiv, have performed exceptionally well. This is similar to the missile attack on Israel, which also faced a coordinated, multi-vector assault with drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles arriving simultaneously. Israel achieved extremely high intercept numbers.

We must be cautious with the Israeli case, as it's unique due to its dense air defense network and small geographic size. This isn't comparable to Ukraine or most European countries. However, the idea that missile defense is technically feasible and effective was confirmed in Israel as well.

Interviewer: If Western allies committed to protecting Ukrainian skies using a model similar to Israel's defense system, what impact would it have on Ukrainians?

Fabian Hoffmann: Initially, in terms of missile defense effectiveness, it would likely make a difference. NATO could declare that any missile entering the range of its defense assets in Poland or Romania will be shot down. While this wouldn't cover a large radius unless NATO enters Ukraine, it could protect border cities like Lviv.

Russia might stop targeting these regions, knowing NATO systems would intercept most missiles. However, this could escalate the conflict, crossing a Russian red line and leading to a broader confrontation with NATO, and this prospect has deterred NATO directly assisting Ukraine in missile defense. Additionally, it could deplete NATO's interceptor stockpiles.

That said, NATO assisting Ukraine in missile defense would be beneficial. While the coordination might not be as seamless as with Israel, which is heavily integrated into NATO systems through Link 16 [a military tactical data exchange network used by NATO and other allied forces to share real-time situational awareness and command and control information - ed.], it would still help. If NATO sees cruise missiles heading towards Western Ukraine and can engage them from NATO territory, it would allow Ukraine to focus its assets on other threats and save its critically low interceptor ammunition.

Interviewer: One concern with missile defense is the cost. For instance, intercepting a barrage of Iranian missiles reportedly cost 1 billion euros. Is there an inherent cost problem with missile defense? Considering Ukraine, is it still too costly to intercept even the Shahed drones?

Fabian Hoffmann: Yes, interceptors are often more expensive to produce than missiles. For example, interceptors like the IRIS-T used in the IRIS-T SLM defense system or the AIM-120 used in the NASAMS system cost significantly more than a Shahed drone.

However, one-on-one comparisons are not always appropriate. You must consider the damage a missile would cause if it reached its target. For instance, if an intercepted drone was heading to destroy an electricity substation or power plant, costing tens of millions to repair, the interception was cost-effective. It's important to keep this perspective in mind when evaluating the cost of missile defense.

Another important point is that Ukraine is in a unique position. It faces constant missile barrages from an adversary but is unable to attack the launchers and production sites in Russia with its own systems or those provided by the West.

NATO would never simply watch missile barrages on its territory without targeting the launchers and production sites of the attacker, and the same applies to Israel.

Initially, Israel used interceptors to defend against attacks from Iran, assuming it was a one-time event. However, if multiple attacks occurred, Israel would eventually take full-scale action against missile production sites and launchers to prevent further threats.

Interviewer: Do you see drones taking over some of the functions that missiles provide today?

Fabian Hoffmann: Not really, because long-range drones like the Shahed are much less costly but also less capable. They are slower, taking longer to reach their targets, giving more time for interception. Their low speed means they can't target time-sensitive, quickly relocating targets. Shaheds are bigger, less stealthy, and carry smaller warheads than cruise missiles. They are also less resistant to electronic warfare and often lack terminal guidance seekers, reducing their accuracy compared to cruise missiles.

For example, the Shahed relies solely on an inertial navigation unit and a GPS seeker, while a cruise missile typically also includes an imaging infrared or electro-optical seeker to achieve pinpoint accuracy.

Overall, you get a less expensive but less capable system. You can invest in improvements, as Iran has done with an upgraded Shahed featuring a turbojet engine for increased speed. Enhancements to payload capacity and electronic warfare resistance are possible, but these would also increase costs, making the drone more like a cruise missile. Thus, there isn't a substitution effect; these are distinct weapon systems with different uses.

If I want something cheap and easy to manufacture or acquire, I might choose a drone. Drones are also useful for saturating an adversary’s missile defenses, forcing them to use interceptor ammunition on both drones and missiles. For these purposes, drones are effective. However, to maximize the effectiveness of individual weapons, it's better to use cruise or ballistic missiles, as they are much more likely to cause significant damage.

Interviewer: You recently published a paper on the strategic effects of long-range fires, a very relevant topic in Estonia as our departing Chief of Defense has advocated for acquiring such capabilities. Could you summarize the key points? What strategic benefits can a country expect from acquiring long-range indirect fire capabilities?

Fabian Hoffmann: Sure. Let's first define "strategic level effects." It's a term that can vary in meaning. For me, it means creating effects at the strategic level of warfare, distinct from the tactical, operational, and sometimes theatre levels. At the strategic level, you target the sources of a state's national power. By undermining these, you can critically weaken the adversary's will and capacity to resist. Defeating a state at this level can make victory at the tactical and operational levels either guaranteed or unnecessary.

A weapon system that provides strategic-level effects targets the enemy's national power directly, bypassing the tactical and operational levels where warfare is costly and attritional. This approach can potentially save troops and equipment. As seen in Ukraine, modern wars are incredibly costly in terms of manpower and equipment when focused solely on the frontline.

Both Ukraine and Russia use long-range strike weapons to achieve strategic-level effects. Russia targets Ukraine’s critical civilian infrastructure, especially electricity production, aiming to undermine the will of the Ukrainian population by making their lives uncomfortable. The goal is to demoralize the population and pressure the government into negotiating for peace.

What the Ukrainians do with their long-range strikes and drone strikes is to focus less on Russian morale and more on the Russian capacity to fight. Ukraine is targeting Russia’s oil infrastructure, which is crucial for generating revenue for the war. This strategy has proven effective; reports indicate that Russian oil refining capacity has decreased by approximately 17% compared to pre-war levels.

It's important to note that when people discuss strategic weapons, they often think of something decisive and war-ending, primarily because we've primarily associated strategic weapons with nuclear arms since the Cold War. Nuclear weapons are indeed the most decisive, capable of destroying a city instantaneously. However, this is not the case for conventional weapons.

In the realm of conventional weaponry, strategic effects are often latent and slow to materialize. Ukraine's approach reflects this, aiming to gradually undermine critical Russian assets rather than delivering a decisive blow. Their strategy focuses on disrupting Russia's war efforts during the deployment and pre-deployment stages, weakening their capabilities before equipment reaches the front lines. This approach is reminiscent of the American strategic bombing campaign against Nazi Germany in World War Two.

Interviewer: Are Western governments restricting Ukraine from using long-range systems deep in Russia due to fears of strategic consequences for Russia and potential Russian reactions?

Fabian Hoffmann: Western governments, particularly Germany and the United States, are deeply concerned that allowing Ukraine to strike deeper inside Russia might cross a Russian red line, escalating the Russia-NATO conflict and potentially leading to nuclear war. Without Russia's nuclear capabilities, such strikes would likely already be happening.

Cold War strategist Thomas Schelling suggested the idea of "the threat that leaves something to chance," implying that the potential for uncontrolled escalation can be a strategic tool. Scholz and Biden understand that launching ATACMS into Russia doesn’t automatically mean World War III, but they fear that continued escalation could eventually spiral into a full-scale, possibly nuclear, war.

If you ask me, this is a risk we have to be willing to take because there are no risk-free decisions, and we must accept that residual risk. However, it seems that Biden and Scholz are incredibly risk-averse and pain-intolerant. They aim to shield their own populations from pain at all costs, which is why they are not willing to take that residual risk.

Interviewer: Don't these restrictions also stem from the need to proactively maintain the long-term domestic legitimacy of their countries' policies on Ukraine?

Fabian Hoffmann: It's more about the security of their own countries. For Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Romania, the situation in Ukraine is existential. If Russia wins, they could be the next targets, bringing the war to their doorsteps.

These governments have a clear incentive to prevent a Russian victory, even if it means accepting short-term risks. For Germany and the United States, the calculation is different, but I believe it's a fallacy. The stakes are existential for all of Europe at this point.

Decision makers in Berlin and Washington DC do not perceive an existential threat in a Russian victory in Ukraine. Instead, for them the existential risk emerges through the fact that the war might escalate into a nuclear confrontation between NATO and Russia, which would severely impact their populations.

This is why they are unwilling to take the necessary residual risks to help Ukraine win, such as allowing the use of Western weapons to strike deeper inside Russia. In contrast, governments in Estonia and other frontline states are willing to assume these risks.

Interviewer: Before we delve into the nuclear issue, let's discuss the conventional missile war, as missile systems are crucial to Russia’s nuclear posture. What is the current power balance between Russia and NATO in terms of conventional missile capabilities?

Fabian Hoffmann: Russia is likely producing around 100-120 cruise missiles per month, along with an estimated 10 to 30 ballistic missiles, though the exact numbers are uncertain. Additionally, they have an increasing number of long-range drones like the Shahed, produced domestically and possibly imported from Iran, potentially amounting to several hundred per month.

Quantitatively, Russia has ramped up missile production despite Western sanctions, initially causing a drop but later overcoming it with new suppliers. Now, their production exceeds pre-war levels. While sanctions haven't cut off production entirely, they have significantly lowered the quality of Russian weapon systems and increased costs. Russia is currently paying premium prices for sub-premium products.

In contrast, Ukraine can probably produce only a handful of cruise missiles and long-range drone systems per month. These are made artisanally, often put together by hand in garages, repurposing Cessna planes for long-range drones or building small numbers of Neptun cruise missiles. Unlike Russia, Ukraine likely does not have a real production line for either long-range drones or cruise missiles.

That's why Ukraine relies heavily on Western supplies. Currently, Storm Shadow and SCALP-EG stocks in France, Italy, and the UK are likely depleted, so not much more can be expected from them. The largest reserve arsenal of long-range strike weapons available to Ukraine now are ATACMS quasi-ballistic missiles. The key question is how many of these will be provided and how Ukraine is permitted to use them.

Interviewer: Europe has been discussing increasing its howitzer ammunition production. Have you observed similar efforts to boost the production of missiles, whether attack or interceptor types?

Fabian Hoffmann: We have significantly increased missile defense production. In Germany, Diehl Defense has ramped up production of the IRIS-T SLM, including launchers, radars, and interceptors. Similarly, the Norwegian-American NASAMS and Italian-French SAMP-T systems have seen increased production of interceptors and fire units. Raytheon has collaborated with European manufacturers to establish domestic production lines for Patriot interceptors. Overall, missile defense production is progressing well.

Unfortunately, Europe is falling short in the production of long-range strike weapons. This is one of the greatest shortcomings of European states since the beginning of the war, as they have not restarted their missile production. Europe once had a formidable missile industry, with German Taurus cruise missiles being among the best in their category. The Storm Shadow/SCALP land attack cruise missiles have proven extremely capable in Ukraine, despite being decades old.

Since the war started, France, the UK, and Germany have not resumed production of these missile systems, and no significant progress has been made. Currently, a few countries are in talks to restart missile production for long-range assets. For example, the European Long Range Strike Approach (ELSA) involves Italy, Poland, the UK, and Germany cooperating to build a 2,000+ kilometer ground-launched land attack cruise missile.

Norway and Germany are working on a next-generation anti-ship and land attack cruise missile, and France, the UK, and Italy are collaborating on a next-generation air-launched cruise missile. However, these projects are aimed at future availability around 2030, not addressing immediate needs.

We should have restarted missile production at the beginning of the war, or ideally, never stopped, given the strategic importance of these weapon systems. It's crucial to keep this industry running. When the war began, we should have placed large orders to revive the European missile industry. Currently, we are entirely reliant on the United States, South Korea, and Israel for long-range strike weapons, which undermines our defense autonomy. This reliance is a significant oversight by European governments since the war started.

Interviewer: Have you seen anything like the homegrown missile industry model that Ukraine has been forced to adopt, or is this something entirely new?HAMAS reportedly used homegrown missiles to attack Israel on October 7. What does this mean for the future of missile technology proliferation?

Fabian Hoffmann: What's new is the increasing number of non-state actors, like the Houthis and Hamas, gaining access to sophisticated missile technology. This shift is unprecedented. The rise of improvised missile designs is also a new development, reflecting the specific conditions of these conflicts. Ukraine, for instance, likely prefers a proper missile industry but lacks access, forcing them to improvise.

Non-state actors face financial and organizational constraints, leading to more improvised designs despite potential funding from sources like Iran. Nonetheless, groups like the Houthis have used very sophisticated missile systems as well.

Interviewer: Are we entering a new era of missile technology hyper-proliferation? Is this technology now accessible to all kinds of rogue actors?

Fabian Hoffmann: To some extent, definitely. We've seen a dramatic horizontalization of missile production capacity. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a voluntary export control regime for missile non-proliferation, started in 1987 with seven countries from North America and Europe. Since then, the number of states capable of producing missiles or related technology has increased significantly.

Even countries without traditionally sophisticated defense industries, like the UAE, are now producing missile systems. This proliferation will continue steadily, with more states and non-state actors acquiring sophisticated long-range strike weapons. However, the most advanced systems will likely remain limited to a few states, such as the U.S., some European countries, and China. Russia is already falling behind, with outdated missile systems and little chance of catching up soon.

Interviewer: Is the Ukraine war the most missile-intensive conflict humanity has witnessed?

Fabian Hoffmann: Yes, it is unprecedented across all metrics, including missiles per day and overall missiles fired, whether cruise or ballistic. In the first Gulf War, Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. used between 100 to 200 cruise missiles. Operation Iraqi Freedom saw several hundred more. However, no conflict has ever approached 1,000 missile launches. The war in Ukraine will likely end with over 10,000 missiles used, primarily by Russia but with an increasing number by Ukraine.

Interviewer: What is the interception capability and missile defense situation in Scandinavia and the Baltics?

Fabian Hoffmann: The Baltic States are part of the European Sky Shield initiative, with Estonia and Latvia cooperating to acquire IRIS-T missile defense systems. This system is effective against low-flying threats like cruise missiles and long-range drones. Currently, there are no projects in the Baltics for ballistic missile defense, making them reliant on other states. Germany is acquiring substantial ballistic missile defense capabilities, and Poland is also building up this capability, which may help defend the Baltics to some extent.

Estonia and Latvia are procuring German-made IRIS-T systems, which provide both advanced air defense and limited missile defense capabilities.

Germany's Arrow 3 system could potentially cover all of Europe, though it currently addresses limited threats, not specifically from Russia. Missile defense is costly and requires different systems for various missile threats, posing a challenge for smaller states like Estonia. They cannot afford to acquire all necessary systems.

Interviewer: What about new NATO allies Sweden and Finland? Are they in the "green zone" regarding the Russian missile threat?

Fabian Hoffmann: Sweden has acquired three Patriot fire units, which is a start, but not enough to protect the entire country. Germany gave three complete Patriot fire units and some Patriot launchers to Ukraine and is acquiring eight more complete systems, bringing their total to around 16-17 Patriot fire units.

Even this is insufficient to provide comprehensive coverage for Germany, which is geographically smaller than Sweden. Finland has chosen a different approach, purchasing the Israeli David’s Sling missile defense system. Finland traditionally emphasizes acquiring long-range strike weapons and clearly states they won't rely on missile defense, instead targeting enemy launchers directly.

Interviewer: To be sure I understood you correctly, are you saying that in the event of a real ballistic missile threat, German capabilities could also cover the Baltic states?

Fabian Hoffmann: It depends on the deployment scenario. Germany could forward deploy one or several Patriot fire units to Lithuania, for example, where they plan to station a combat-ready brigade from 2027 onward. Depending on the configuration of the Patriot fire unit, the deployment scenario, and the interceptors used, a Patriot launcher unit can engage threats at a range of 40-60 km.

If the launcher is close to a border, it might protect a neighboring state. However, even for longer-range missile defense assets like Patriot, the range is limited, and one or even several fire units will not cover all of the Baltic states. Comprehensive coverage is generally not feasible, so states must prioritize protecting key targets, such as large population centers or important military infrastructure, over less critical areas.

Interviewer: In sake of clarity, could you distinguish between ballistic and cruise missiles?

Fabian Hoffmann: A ballistic missile follows a ballistic trajectory: it's launched to a high altitude during the launch phase, then descends in a parabolic path toward its target. These missiles are propelled by a rocket booster only during the launch phase, then glide unpowered toward the target, reaching very high speeds.

Unlike ballistic missiles, cruise missiles are propelled throughout their flight, from start to finish. They often fly low to the ground in ground-skimming trajectories, sometimes just three to five meters above the surface. Cruise missiles can also maneuver horizontally, allowing them to fly curves and perform maneuvers.

Interviewer: Does that mean cruise missiles are easier to intercept as well?

Fabian Hoffmann: The challenge with cruise missiles is that they fly so low they can sometimes avoid radar detection. However, if you can lock onto them with radar, their slower speed makes them easier to shoot down. In contrast, ballistic missiles approach their targets from very high altitudes, making them easy to detect with the right radar.

The difficulty lies in accurately guiding an interceptor to hit the fast-descending ballistic missile warhead. This is often compared to "shooting a bullet with a bullet," which, while possible with today's technology, remains very challenging and requires specialized, expensive systems like the Patriot. The war in Ukraine has shown that intercepting ballistic missiles is doable but still complex and costly.

Interviewer: Let’s discuss nuclear missiles. Is there any difference when intercepting a missile with a nuclear warhead versus a conventional warhead? Is the interception process identical?

Fabian Hoffmann: It depends. The logic behind intercepting a missile with a nuclear warhead is similar to intercepting one with a conventional warhead. For example, a Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptor uses a kinetic kill vehicle to collide with the incoming warhead, destroying both upon impact. At high supersonic or hypersonic velocities, the collision turns both into dust, neutralizing the threat, regardless of the warhead type.

However, intercepting nuclear warheads can be more challenging. Strategic nuclear warheads often come from intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which are released far outside the atmosphere and re-enter at extremely high speeds, much faster than short-range ballistic missiles. Ideally, these ICBM warheads should be intercepted outside the atmosphere, a challenging but possible task. Exo-atmospheric interceptors, primarily deployed by the United States and Israel, are required for this, and their interception rates are generally lower.

Another issue is that ICBMs often deploy countermeasures, such as decoy warheads or increased maneuverability, making interception more difficult. Discriminating between decoys and real warheads and overcoming maneuvers is possible, but these countermeasures introduce additional challenges.

Interviewer: Germany has claimed that its Arrow 3 missile defense system can intercept ICBMs. Is that accurate?

Fabian Hoffmann: Missile defense is about optimization. While various missile systems claim to intercept different threats, they are usually optimized for specific scenarios. Arrow 3, for example, is optimized for medium-range ballistic missiles.

In theory, it might intercept an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) under certain conditions, but it is not designed for that purpose. The only country deploying optimized conventional systems for ICBM defense is the United States, with 44 interceptors stationed in California and Alaska to defend its homeland against limited ICBM threats.

This limited number is intended to avoid incentivizing Russia or China to build more nuclear warheads to overcome American defenses, a concern that dates back to the Cold War and remains relevant today. Russia also deploys a dedicated strategic ballistic missile defense capability around Moscow, although these interceptors are equipped with nuclear warheads, rather than sophisticated conventional interceptor technology.

To prevent an arms race spiral, the United States has limited itself to a small number of interceptors designed to defend against a limited number of strategic nuclear warheads launched from ICBMs. This highlights that ballistic missile defense isn't just about technical feasibility but also political considerations. The Cold War consensus, which remains today, is to voluntarily limit strategic ballistic missile defense to avoid provoking adversaries into expanding their nuclear arsenals.

Interviewer: Is the approach different when it comes to tactical nuclear weapons?

Fabian Hoffmann: Tactical nuclear weapons are not intended to destroy cities but to discriminate specific types of targets even with nuclear weapons to create military or signaling effects. For example, they might target a military base in Estonia rather than the city of Tallinn. These warheads are typically lower in yield and launched from shorter-range delivery vehicles, allowing for flexible use closer to the theater of operations.

In Russia's case, tactical nuclear warheads are deployed on the same short- and medium-range missile systems currently being intercepted in large numbers in Ukraine. For instance, an Iskander-M missile system can be equipped with either nuclear or conventional warheads. The Russian 9M720 short-range ballistic missile system, which has proven vulnerable to Patriot interceptors, remains so even when equipped with nuclear warheads.

Interviewer: So, if a nuclear warhead is intercepted, there won't be a nuclear blast?

Fabian Hoffmann: No, because an intercepted nuclear warhead will cease to function and be unable to deploy its effects. A successful intercept means the warhead is neutralized. For example, a Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptor uses a kinetic kill vehicle to collide with the incoming projectile, like a 9M720 short-range ballistic missile, for example. Upon collision, both will be completely destroyed

Some interceptors use a fragmentation warhead instead of a kinetic kill. The IRIS-T interceptor, for instance, explodes near the target missile, releasing a fragmentation blast that shreds the missile and its warhead. Even if the nuclear warhead isn't completely destroyed, damaging the fuse or missile system will prevent it from reaching its target or arming.

Nuclear warheads are designed to detonate at a predetermined altitude, distance, or coordinates. If the fuse or missile system is destroyed before it can arm, the warhead is rendered unusable.

Interviewer: Why is the nuclear warhead detonation process so rigid? Is it to prevent premature explosions or mistargeting when the missile is shot down?

Fabian Hoffmann: Nuclear warheads have an optimal burst altitude because most of the damage comes from the shock wave created during the fission or fusion process, not just the fireball. When a nuclear warhead explodes above a city, the shock wave propagates to the surface, reflects off the ground, and merges with the direct wave. This "constructive interference" forms a reinforced shock wave known as the "Mach stem," maximizing damage over a larger area.

Generally, the higher the yield of the warhead, the higher the optimal burst altitude. However, if the target is hardened or buried, like a command-and-control bunker or a missile silo, the warhead should detonate close to the ground to ensure the shock wave penetrates and destroys the reinforced structures.

Interviewer: How has the West’s nuclear deterrence evolved since February 2022?

Fabian Hoffmann: I'm concerned about our current capabilities and the pace at which we are improving them. To effectively deter Russia, we need more capabilities, and we need them faster. We must be ready to defend ourselves and launch counterattacks if necessary. We're lagging, especially considering the possibility that the United States might not always be willing to defend Europe. This puts us in a precarious position, emphasizing the urgent need to ramp up arms production.

Deterrence also involves resolve, showing Russia that we possess the necessary capabilities and are willing to use them. The actions of the United States, Germany, and other European leaders in Ukraine reinforce an image of risk aversion and low pain tolerance. This could make Putin question whether we would defend Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania.

As a German, I believe Germany would support its eastern European allies if necessary. However, if Putin doubts this, he might challenge NATO Article 5 sooner, potentially leading to a full-scale war with Russia that could escalate to nuclear conflict. To prevent this, we must convince Russia that challenging Article 5 isn't worth it by demonstrating both capability and resolve. This includes showing steadfastness in Ukraine despite rising risks, which we're not currently doing as effectively as we should.

Interviewer: I'm not sure I fully follow the logic of an automatic spillover from Ukraine to Article 5. Wouldn't the political cost of letting NATO fail be too high for Germany in the case of a Russian attack against a Baltic nation? Wouldn't the Russians understand that difference?

Fabian Hoffmann: I agree with that. But our task isn't to convince ourselves; we need to clearly demonstrate to Putin that challenging Article 5 isn't worth it. If you look at Germany's prolonged discussions about aid to Ukraine, including the Taurus debate and other weapons-related issues over the past two and a half years, I don’t think Germany and some other allies are doing a very good job at this.

After listening to these inefficient and painful debates about what type of assistance we can provide to Ukraine without getting drawn into the conflict, it's not far-fetched to suggest that Kremlin decision-makers might conclude the West is inherently weak and could falter in a NATO Article 5 scenario. They might be proven wrong, and there's a high chance they will be, but if they challenge Article 5, even if we push back, the best-case scenario is still a full-scale war.

Interviewer: Given the significant political cost attached to NATO, wouldn't attacking such a target provide strategic leverage to the attacker, especially if they believe the response will not be overwhelming?

Fabian Hoffmann: I agree.

Interviewer: In October 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron stated that France would not retaliate with a nuclear strike if Russia used nuclear weapons in Ukraine. This remark was widely criticized. What should we make of that?

Fabian Hoffmann: NATO has likely communicated to Russian decision-makers that there could be a significant military response, but it wouldn’t be nuclear.

With the Americans involved, NATO can rely on their powerful conventional missile arsenal. Instead of launching a single nuclear weapon, NATO could threaten a cruise missile strike with 100 to 300 missiles attacking from different angles, devastating Russian infrastructure in Ukraine and possibly within Russia.

This approach is more credible because it doesn't involve nuclear weapons and can cause more damage than a single tactical nuclear strike. The confidence in a non-nuclear response stems from NATO, particularly the U.S., having robust conventional options. However, if the U.S. were to leave NATO, this capability would diminish since European missile arsenals are largely depleted.

Interviewer: Has the West, especially Joe Biden’s administration, not overly emphasized the Russian nuclear threat since the early weeks of the full-scale aggression? Has this been an excuse for Washington not to intervene because they don't see it as in their interests, or are they truly scared? What happened to Herman Kahn's classical escalation ladder?

Fabian Hoffmann: While I can't peer into the minds of American decision-makers, it's clear that Washington has been genuinely fearful of the nuclear threat. This ties back to the concept of the "threat that leaves something to chance." I don't believe they've completely discarded the escalation ladder. Each successive step brings the risk of unintended escalation, potentially leading to a nuclear confrontation. So, their concern about nuclear escalation appears genuine.

However, this doesn't mean we should ignore these nuclear risks. Decision-makers, especially in the U.S. and Berlin, must realize that risk is inherent in the game we're playing. Europe and NATO can't expect Ukraine to win the war without taking on some risks themselves. During the Cold War, this was understood intuitively during events like the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Berlin Crisis, where Western states took significant risks to ensure their security.

We are at a similar juncture now. Ensuring Ukraine's victory and Russia's defeat is crucial, and this requires accepting some level of risk. Paris and London are starting to understand this, but Berlin and Washington D.C. are still lagging. I don't think they are making excuses; they are genuinely concerned but need to adapt to the current realities.

Interviewer: There's an argument that NATO cannot intervene because nuclear powers don't fight each other directly. How does this hold up in an Article 5 situation? Do you foresee any "nuclear hesitation" in responding to an Article 5 scenario?

Fabian Hoffmann: I would hope that both Russia and NATO have some level of nuclear hesitation, because in a large-scale nuclear war, everyone loses. The paradox of the nuclear age is that both sides have arsenals capable of total annihilation.

Yet, each must convince the other they are absolutely willing to use them if necessary, even if it means mutual destruction. This makes nuclear threats less credible than conventional ones. That's why we dismiss Russian propagandists who talk about bombing NATO cities. While there is natural hesitation, effective nuclear deterrence requires convincing your adversary that, if push comes to shove, you will press the button.