STRATEGIC OUTBRIEF ⟩ Former Polish Defense Chief Advocates for Proactive Self-Defense in the Baltic Region

In this environment a more proactive approach is essential. We need to send a clear message to Russia that any concentration of forces near the Polish or Estonian border will be met with swift military response, targeting their logistics and critical infrastructure.

Some may view my stance as aggressive, but it is crucial to continue translating military strategy into political terms.

Interviewer: How did your NATO colleagues respond to the idea of proactive defense?

Rajmund Andrzejczak: Naturally, everyone was quite nervous and tense because proactive defense approach inevitably raises the possibility of escalation. We need to pause and reflect on the past 20 to 40 years. NATO's strategic mindset shifted after the Cold War, transitioning into an era of prosperity, peacetime, and low-intensity conflicts. Each NATO member state must now integrate the new reality into their political agendas, which vary significantly across Europe.

There is a strategic delay in how we think about war. Military leaders in NATO need to continue pushing politicians to adopt a more proactive strategy. Russia respects only hard power. Being too reactive and passive only encourages their next steps. In the military domain, discussions with our NATO counterparts have proceeded smoothly, and progress is being made.

Interviewer: What is currently happening on a global scale and how does it affect NATO?

Rajmund Andrzejczak: NATO faces a systematic challenge originating from three countries: China, Iran, and Russia. In the military, we use the term ‘centers of gravity’, meaning crucial points that, when engaged, influence the entire system.

With China, the center of gravity has become Taiwan. The West, including the United States, cannot afford to lose Taiwan politically, economically, technologically, or militarily. While Taiwan may not seem directly relevant to NATO, its importance was highlighted in the last NATO summit in Washington, where China was frequently mentioned.

Our traditional focus has been on European territory, but losing Taiwan would have far-reaching global repercussions, disrupting production lines for missiles and other defense technologies interconnected with the US, Israel, Poland, and Ukraine. The globalized nature of these security dependencies starkly contrasts with our outdated, localized mindsets.

In relation to Iran, the center of gravity is Israel. While NATO may not officially prioritize Israel, the conflict's global impact diverts resources from other critical areas, such as Ukraine. In our region, the center of gravity for Russia is Poland and Ukraine. Losing either would seriously damage NATO's cohesion. Protecting these centers of gravity is vital for maintaining NATO's stability and unity.

Interviewer: Former commanding general of US Army Europe, Ben Hodges, recently also linked the defense of Ukraine and Poland in a single statement. He speculated that if the Ukrainian front collapses, Polish forces would intervene on Ukrainian territory. Do you believe this scenario is feasible??

Rajmund Andrzejczak: Poland is a sovereign country, and every nation has the right to self-defense. Should the front collapse in Ukraine, Poland will make a strategic assessment to determine the implications and necessary decisions. That said, we are a credible member of NATO and the European Union, and we aim to ensure our allies are not caught off guard by our actions.

Consider when President Macron remarked that NATO is brain dead and suggested not pushing Russia too hard, only to later discuss potential operations in Ukraine. Poland is not France in this sense. However, Poland is a sovereign country and will make its own decisions.

During my past tenure as Chief of Defense, I emphasized to politicians that losing Ukraine would be a far more costly alternative than supporting Ukraine to win. If we lose Ukraine, we could end up spending 10% to 15% of our GDP on defense. In this context, Bed Hodges made a valid point.

Interviewer: NATO now has, for the first time ever, standing defense plans for the Baltic and Nordic states. How significant has the leap in military capability been to execute the plans approved at the Vilnius Summit last summer?

Rajmund Andrzejczak: NATO’s regional plans are now much more pragmatic and practical. However, there is one critical point I always emphasize. Heads of state have signed these regional plans, agreeing on the need for 300,000 troops in 30 days, 100 brigades, and so forth. They feel their mission is accomplished.

But when it comes to the military, we have to say: wait a moment. Mobilizing 300,000 troops and ensuring their readiness within 30 days, along with assembling 100 brigades, requires significant funding and a realistic timeline.

Admiral Rob Bauer [Chairman of NATO Military Committee and former Dutch Chief of Defense] has been vocal about the need to address the insufficient funding of defense. The real challenge is translating this into language politicians understand.

Interviewer: What has caused this mismatch between official plans and resource decisions? And is 300 000 troops enough?

Rajmund Andrzejczak: I often propose an intellectual exercise to illustrate a planning mindset that could help us overcome this problem. Imagine a three-dimensional matrix.

Its first axis represents Russia, with projections for one year, two years, three years, and five years into the future. Consider how many tanks Russia will have, the amount of ammunition, the impact of sanctions, and the influence of supplies from China, North Korea, or Iran.

The second axis represents Ukraine, we should be assessing for how long military aid, funding, and losses can be sustained over similar timeframes.

The third axis is NATO, and with NATO we also need to consider the replenishment of combat platforms and the impact of military aid to Ukraine on our own military readiness. For example, if Estonia sends air defense systems or anti-tank equipment.

We must consider these three planning dimensions holistically. No one in NATO is currently taking this comprehensive approach, comparing these three processes side by side. We often consider Ukraine, the US, or Russia in isolation. We need to sit down honestly, draw out these three timelines, and evaluate whether our regional plan will be effective in five years.

In the process we must agree on our assessment of Russia’s position in five years. This comprehensive approach is what’s missing, as each country has a different perspective. I apologize if this seems overly pragmatic, but as a soldier, that is my approach.

We also need to address another issue—if one member state is not investing in defense and is delaying its military capability development, the entire NATO alliance is slowed down. We can talk about how quickly Estonia or Poland have increased their defense budgets, but what matters more is how slowly certain NATO countries are correcting their defense expenditures. I don’t hear that discussion often enough.

Interviewer: From what I have observed, the NATO force generation process is not directly based on threats. It involves a mixture of military advice, complex equality algorithms, and political negotiations.

Rajmund Andrzejczak: NATO is a political-military alliance, requiring us to consider both aspects, not just the military. Our perspective tends to be somewhat narrow. What we need is a better interface between politicians and the military on a global scale.

Interviewer: Could you briefly describe for our readers what the US has been providing Poland in terms of military support, and why this special US-Poland military relationship has developed the way it has?

Rajmund Andrzejczak: The Polish-US relationship has deep historical roots, beginning with President Wilson in 1918 and continuing through Reagan's efforts during the Cold War. Historically, our relations have always been strong. People often ask me about our relationship under different US administrations, like Trump or Biden.

I always emphasize that Poland’s relationship is with the United States as a nation, not with individual leaders. These are state-to-state relations, and the choice of leader is a sovereign US decision.

Our military ties are particularly close due to our shared history in conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan. For instance, Mark Milley, the former US Defense Chief, and I served together in Afghanistan; he was a divisional deputy, and I was a brigade planner. Such connections, forged in combat, strengthen our ties beyond formal alliances.

From Poland’s perspective, we see the US approach as credible and effective. After President Obama reduced the US military presence in Europe, there were widespread concerns. However, the US later decided to bolster its troop presence in Europe, and Poland has been one of the primary beneficiaries, hosting over 10,000 US troops, second only to Germany.

We have an Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) that rotates based on the unit type—heavy, medium, or light forces. Additionally, the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in Poland, which is US-led, holds strategic significance due to its proximity to the Suwalki corridor. Our relations with the eFP and the 15th Brigade are very strong.

Interviewer: Is the NATO efP element still only battalion-sized?

Rajmund Andrzejczak: It's actually a battalion plus-sized element, integrated into the higher command structures. For example, in Elbląg, we have the Multinational Division Northeast, which is connected to the NATO command chain along with the eFP. Besides the eFP, we also have an Aviation Brigade detachment near key airfields.

Poland's capacity to absorb additional troops is significant, demonstrated by the presence of the American 5th Corps headquarters here. We also manage numerous rotations, which can be challenging, but there's a strong expectation for a permanent presence.

A prime example of the effectiveness of the US approach was the rapid establishment of a logistic hub near the Ukrainian border at the start of the full scale war in Ukraine. The US quickly deployed Global Response Forces, which relied on our infrastructure to support the immediate arrival of one of the brigades of the 82nd Airborne Division across the Atlantic. The 82nd Airborne was the division I served also in Afghanistan. The entire logistic operation was a success. We are now prepared to absorb such forces within a matter of hours.

Interviewer: This is called Host Nation Support in NATO military terminology.

Rajmund Andrzejczak: Correct, and we should be thinking more about its infrastructure. That’s why there is a big discussion in Poland about the central communication airport, similar to Rammstein air base in Germany. It will be in the center of Poland, one of the biggest airports in the region. It’s for the economy, transportation, but also a of contribution to our security.

If we have a ‘Polish Rammstein’, it changes the geometry because it will empower deterrence in a crisis. We have to change our paradigm. Deterrence is not just about stationary allied troops on your territory but about the ability to quickly absorb more. The investments in infrastructure in Estonia and other Baltic States are critical, not only for permanent troops but for the ability to absorb more.

Interviewer: Estonians are currently discussing whether the Rail Baltic project has any defense value. How does it look from Poland?

Rajmund Andrzejczak: This project is of tremendous value and was always a focal point in my discussions with General Herem. Although it remains primarily a political and economic initiative, its military significance is immense. Highways alone are insufficient. The rapid deployment of heavy troops from Poland, or any NATO reinforcements arriving in Poland, to the Baltic States, especially Estonia, is critical for the speed and effectiveness of our operations.

Interviewer: Is the Suwalki corridor, through which Rail Baltic passes, better defended or more defensible than it was five years ago?

Rajmund Andrzejczak: During my tenure as Chief of Defense, General Herem and I had extensive discussions about the need to change our approach to the Suwalki corridor. We shouldn't be thinking about fighting when the Russians finally cross Polish or Lithuanian territory to link up with Kaliningrad. Instead, we should prevent the enemy from launching such an operation altogether.

One of my first visits as Chief of Defense was to Estonia. I wanted to understand your nation firsthand, to connect with people, not just through VTC, but soldier to soldier. We agreed that for future exercises, I would send my naval strike unit to Tallinn. They maneuvered in the Gulf of Finland, and it was an amazing exercise. We realized that a direct link between Poland and Estonia is crucial because the first point of any maritime operation starts in the Finnish Bay.

I agree with Estonia’s approach to quickly enhancing maritime capabilities—not by building new ships, which takes time and money, but by investing in maritime anti-access components like mines and missile systems. This strategy also inspired Latvia and Lithuania. I fully support direct, close cooperation between Polish naval strike units and Estonian units to expedite integration.

Similarly, with HIMARS, we launched a special Polish-Estonian project to exchange experiences. Estonia and Poland exemplify what it means to be brothers in arms. There should be more fairness among allies, particularly regarding burden sharing. Most of the Baltic Sea countries are striving to improve their militaries, although the largest and wealthiest among us is still struggling.

Interviewer: You mentioned earlier that the US still has 110,000 troops in Germany. Isn't this massive presence a relic of the Cold War? Shouldn't we be advocating for relocating these forces closer to the Russian border or to the eastern parts of Europe?

Rajmund Andrzejczak: There are several reasons for this. First, there's a residual effect from the Cold War—existing infrastructure, bases, and locations. Secondly, if you look at it from the US perspective as a global nuclear superpower, being stationed in Germany or Poland is nearly equivalent due to their broader strategic optics. They focus on preparing infrastructure and ensuring interoperability for times of need.

Advocating for the US for a moment, they might say, "What about you?" If we want to be serious, Poland and Estonia should lead by example, preparing airfields, establishing new units, and investing money. Personally, I am more interested in US investment in ammunition production lines in Europe rather than new brigades and divisions.

Building such production facilities takes years and significant financial investment. Ammunition, though it ‘doesn't vote’, is a strong deterrent. If the Russians know we have 800 long-range missiles to affect them, it matters.

For the US, it’s also about managing escalation. From Rammstein, they can influence the strategic situation without heightening tension. We must constantly remember that they are also dealing with critical areas like Taiwan, Iran, and Yemen. Managing so many critical centers of gravity is a significant challenge for them.

Interviewer: What else are we overlooking when criticizing our biggest ally?

Rajmund Andrzejczak: One key aspect missing from the discussion is the US's new approach to waging war, specifically the multi-domain concept that Ukraine lacks. The US has established two multi-domain task forces, one assigned to the Pacific and one in Europe. This enables the use of effectors like HIMARS with a much shorter decision-making process, enhanced by artificial intelligence. The composition of these forces is noteworthy.

In Ukraine, we have gathered many lessons, but I'm concerned that we may be drawing some incorrect conclusions. The focus on traditional large-scale artillery and ground operations, reminiscent of World War II, doesn't reflect the full spectrum of modern warfare. We don't see 5th generation aircraft or autonomous robotic platforms in Ukraine, yet these are the directions in which we are developing.

We need to be more patient and pragmatic in interpreting the lessons from Ukraine. The war there is not necessarily indicative of what we should expect if NATO were to confront Russia.

Interviewer: You mentioned escalation management. Many Eastern Europeans wonder if escalation management in an Article 5 situation would mirror what we see with Ukraine. Would there be the same hesitance to target Russian assets deep within their territory?

Rajmund Andrzejczak: It's difficult to say. I hope there will be no hesitation. It’s a matter of political narratives and communication. Deterrence relies on two key elements: military capability—such as armies, missiles, artillery, and aircraft—and political will.

Political will depends on politicians and legal regulations. While we focus heavily on the number of missiles, divisions, and troops, we must also consider political awareness, appetite, and willingness to use those elements. Ignoring the political aspect is a huge mistake.

I appreciate what I see in Estonia—social acceptance, awareness, resilience, and a strong voluntary reserve component like the Defense League. These factors are hard to measure physically but are crucial for effective defense. Estonia exemplifies dedication to national defense and a deep understanding of the current geopolitical situation.

Interviewer: You’ve mentioned several times the importance of communicating with politicians so they understand military matters. Are you willing to comment on why you resigned from your post as Chief of Defense in 2023?

Rajmund Andrzejczak: That was my decision. Everything has a beginning and an end. I served for two rotations, more than expected, and there were only five months remaining. I’m pleased that my successor is continuing with my ideas and concepts. That’s all I want to say on the matter.

Interviewer: Will we see you entering Polish politics in near future?

Rajmund Andrzejczak: No, I'm a soldier. One of the journalists asked me during the last presidential elections whether I would be running, which caused some public noise. When I went home, my wife was standing at the door and said, "Don't even think about it."

Interviewer: In 2008 I had a Polish co-student in the Baltic Defense College who mentioned that there was a political purge going on amongst Polish military elite. Now that a liberal government has taken over, is there a risk of another purge?

Rajmund Andrzejczak: There will always be some natural political interference. Ideally, the Chief of Defense would have direct responsibility and authority over military posting decisions, but we are in a period of transformation.

Poland still needs some internal changes, some distancing from old-fashioned practices that date back to the Warsaw Pact era. While we've achieved a lot, there are still echoes from the past that influence current practices. However, I don't see any major changes or purge mechanisms at play right now.

Interviewer: Your successor, General Wiesław Kukuła, the new Chief of Defense, comes from the Territorial Defense Forces. For Estonians, territorial defense is a deeply cherished concept. Could you explain how Poland came to establish its Territorial Defense Forces as late as 2017?

Rajmund Andrzejczak: It stemmed from a Cold War paradigm. We inherited a civilian defense system that was outdated and inadequate. After the Russian invasion of Crimea, we began extensive discussions on how to modernize the operational components of our military and address other issues.

Observing various crises, such as the pandemic, floods, and major disasters, we realized the need for a specialized territorial defense force. This force would be more suitable for peacetime and crisis situations, transitioning to wartime roles as needed. Thus, the concept was initiated in 2017.

We quickly discovered that our recruitment strategy needed adjustment. Many people preferred not to be full-time soldiers but were willing to serve two to four weeks while maintaining their civilian professions. Territorial defense is about winning hearts and minds, not just carrying rifles.

Every territorial defense soldier acts as a transmitter, a teacher in civilian life, donning a uniform for a few weeks to promote patriotism. Today, we have 35,000 troops and face numerous challenges.

During the pandemic, territorial defense forces were heavily engaged, proving their value while operational troops were less involved. Territorial defense was also crucial during the weaponized illegal migration crisis at the Polish-Belarusian border.

When I took my post in 2018, the program was just beginning, with many legal, cultural, and logistical hurdles. The large reserve component in the army has both advantages and disadvantages.

Interviewer: Could you elaborate on the disadvantages of having a large reserve force?

Rajmund Andrzejczak: Countries with a small standing army and a large reserve component face challenges in mobilizing reserves from civilian life for extended exercises. Wartime mobilization by Estonia’s Prime Minister and President has significant economic implications, because soldiers need to leave their peace time work posts.

I’ve advised political leaders to simulate the impact of mobilizing a large component of the army from civilian life. Israel’s recent situation in Gaza illustrates this point— Israel’s mobilization had immediate economic impacts. The reserve component is not a panacea; it has both benefits and drawbacks.

Polish approach is to maintain a substantial full-time operational force as a deterrent, supplemented by reserves for wartime, while considering the economic implications of mobilizing large numbers of soldiers from civilian life.

Interviewer: Can't you also reverse this logic of economic impact of having a large reserve? If you have a large standing army and have taken thousands of people away from the civilian labor market, wouldn’t that also have a long-term effect on the national economy?

Rajmund Andrzejczak: I'm not saying reserves are unnecessary. Reserves are very important, especially for prolonged conflicts like the one in Ukraine. However, I’m also skeptical when someone claims that relying primarily on a large reserve force is the solution to all challenges.

Interviewer: Poland's defense expenditure is set to reach 5% of GDP, up from just over 2% in 2021. How did your political and military elite achieve such miraculous growth?

Rajmund Andrzejczak: I would not call it a miracle; it has been a costly and painful decision. Every billion spent on the military means less funding for medical care, education, and infrastructure. That said, the reason we are buying F35, four figures of tanks, etc. is our economic transformation of the last three decades. Funding defense is not a challenge for Poland due to our strong economy and widespread social acceptance of defense expenditures.

We do not want to lose the economic and national prosperity we have achieved. To that end, we need to show Russia that our level of determination is adequate, that we are strong enough to deter them.

As a recent retiree, I spend time engaging with different sectors of society, including the younger generation, business, and science communities. Poland's biggest challenges in the next decade will be innovation and demographics. Innovation requires maintaining the pace of technological advancement and developing our own capabilities rather than just purchasing equipment. This involves significant investment in science and development.

The second challenge, demographics, remains largely unaddressed. This is a critical concern not only for Poland but also for Ukraine, Russia and the rest of the Europe alike. Governmental statistics reveal how many 18-year-olds will be available in eight years. This number will not suffice for both a 300,000-strong army and sustained economic growth.

The key question is how to approach immigration, which remains a sensitive issue. Automation, robotics, and autonomous platforms are also potential solutions to this demographic challenge.

Besides resources, we also need to discuss ideas, grand strategy, and Poland's interests. I was surprised, during my time in Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius, by how Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania perceive Poland. We must remember that our responsibilities extend beyond deploying F-16s with JASSM missiles for air policing in the Baltic States.

Throughout my tenure, I emphasized that the defense of Poland and our values begins in Tallinn. Stronger Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are in Poland’s interest. This requires a shift in perspective, which takes time. We are still too self-focused and need to think more as a regional leader, leveraging our strategic potential.

Interviewer: Once Poland's transformation into a regional military superpower is complete, will you be strong enough to face Russia one-on-one, if necessary, as Ukraine does?

Rajmund Andrzejczak: What is important is that the Russians see how strong and effective we are militarily, and that this knowledge influences their calculations. Building up our military isn't about national pride; it’s a responsible approach for the safety of everyone.

Sometimes my messages have been misunderstood. I’m not calling for a fight with Russia; I’m calling for avoiding military confrontation by demonstrating our strength. My mental approach has not been looking for an opportunity to confront Russia and then finally to destroy it. It would be a remarkably stupid concept.

My concept has been building a strong country with national magnetism, meaning that Poland is nation everybody would like to cooperate with, integrate with. That has been the wider philosophy behind the concept of a strong Polish military.

Interviewer: Could you summarize for our readers the major decisions you've made as Poland’s Chief of Defense, your legacy?

Rajmund Andrzejczak: Certainly. My tenure as Chief of Defense was focused on transforming our military. Think of it like steering a large ship across the Atlantic; you need to carefully plan and adjust your course. I relied heavily on my advisors and professional simulations to make decisions. The changes I initiated are now beginning to take effect, but it will take time for the ship to turn, it is therefore too early fully assess their impact.

My strategic projects centered around three key areas: leadership, communication, and the strategic environment.

For leadership, I recognized the need for a new kind of leader who understands modern challenges like digital transformation and social change. I spent a lot of time at military academies and emphasized the importance of developing our NCOs.

The goal was to cultivate leaders who are both grounded in tradition and open-minded about new technologies and global changes. You can't use old-fashioned language with young commanders today. They need to understand algorithms, biotechnology, and climate change.

It’s about creating soldiers who embody traditional values while being open to new ideas and technologies.

In terms of communication, it wasn't just about internal military communication but also about how we interact with politicians and society. We needed to modernize our communication methods, balancing the old-fashioned bureaucracy with new digital tools.

For example, secure mobile communication can streamline operations, but we still need traditional methods for certain contexts, like writing letters to soldiers' families. Changing the culture of communication within the army was a huge challenge, but it was necessary.

We introduced digitalization, updated the common operational picture, and shifted away from a paper-centric bureaucracy. This change was crucial for internal efficiency and for how we communicate with external entities, including politicians and the public.

When our F-16s intercept Russian aircraft over the Baltics, we use secure mobile apps, similar to WhatsApp, for immediate communication.

The third area was understanding the strategic environment, which involves looking at broader issues like climate change, demographics, and energy. As soldiers, we need to grasp these factors to make informed decisions about military investments and strategy.

For instance, an LNG terminal is not just an energy resource but a critical security asset in peacetime, crisis, and war. Understanding these interconnected aspects helps in making strategic decisions. This involves analyzing global trends and their implications for security. We had to integrate considerations such as energy security, the impact of climate change, and demographic shifts into our military planning.

Polish defense forces managed the COVID-19 pandemic effectively, we evacuated more people from Afghanistan than expected, and supported operations during the Polish-Belarusian border crisis. The war in Ukraine posed a significant challenge as we sent a lot of our equipment there, but we adapted and continued to maintain our readiness.

As you already said, one of my key projects was the integration of long-range fires capabilities. There were many other decisions. For example, today Polish military is integrating the new Abrams tanks into our systems. It is a tricky process.

A few days ago we had a symbolic moment, one of the new Abrams tanks was named in honor of our fallen soldier - Mateusz Sitek - killed on the border with Belarus, showing our commitment to tradition and remembrance.

Interviewer: We were arguing here in Estonia in 2021 about whether Belarus’s use of immigration as a weapon was launched against Poland and Lithuania by Belarus only, or if Belarus was acting as Russia's proxy. What's your take on it, was it a Russian-Belarusian joint operation?

Rajmund Andrzejczak: Our intelligence, although I can't disclose all the details, has no doubts about it being a Russian design. We could track the entire process of motivating people in Afghanistan and other countries, transporting them to certain European countries, and then moving them to Belarus. This is a new generation of warfare, a relatively low-cost instrument. Poland is forced to spend money on building fences and investing in the border policing mission. There is no question that it was a Russian design, with the Belarusians acting merely as instruments in Russia's hands.

Interviewer: I've saved the most important topic for last. What trajectory is the war in Ukraine on? Can we say that the West has already accepted the notion of a long, protracted, half-frozen conflict in Ukraine?

Rajmund Andrzejczak: When you turn on the TV today, there's likely little about Ukraine; instead, it's about the Olympic Games in Paris. This shift signifies that people are growing tired, and other issues are taking precedence. Additionally, the escalating situation in Lebanon and the potential for conflict involving Israel and Iran are drawing significant attention. Iran's recent announcements and responses have heightened tensions.

The upcoming US elections will be crucial. The next President will heavily influence the speed and scale of investments in Ukraine and the motivation for the European Union to increase its contributions. I don't foresee any significant counteroffensive from Ukraine despite the arrival of F-16s. There's no such thing as a miracle weapon; historical victories were never solely about advanced technology but about resources.

Ukraine is in a precarious position, having lost about 10 million people who have fled to places like Poland, Germany, and Canada. This demographic shift severely impacts Ukraine's potential to bounce back, regardless of financial aid. There's also noticeable strategic social fatigue, and while Russia is not entirely on its knees, our determination could potentially impact its economy and society within a year or two.

However, we must consider China's role. If Russia falls, the US could redirect its resources to Taiwan, which is not in China's interest. Thus, China benefits from a prolonged conflict. The key question is how to deter China from supporting Russia, whether directly or indirectly through North Korea or dual-use technologies.

As things stand, the situation is dire. If Russia regains the initiative and rebuilds its potential, our region could be the next target. Not necessarily a military target, but still a target of aggression. The dynamics of this conflict are complex, and the global political landscape will significantly influence the trajectory of the war in Ukraine.

Interviewer: Why would Russia take on a NATO member state?

Rajmund Andrzejczak: The Russian threat does not necessarily mean Russia crazily attacking Warsaw or Tallinn. It's about proxies, crossing borders, looking for opportunities to disrupt NATO's cohesion and create noise. Moscow observes the conflicting viewpoints of France, Turkey, and Hungary, which provides a perfect environment for Russia to play its game. If something happens in Taiwan, Israel, Lebanon, or Iran, the United States might face challenges in these regions as well. We have to change our perception; it's not about simple scenarios like Russia attacking Tallinn. It doesn't work that way.

Interviewer: So, attacking Poland or Estonia would not just be about those countries but about affecting the US's global position and forcing it into predicaments?

Rajmund Andrzejczak: Absolutely. It's about energy, critical infrastructure, gas issues, media, and minorities in our countries, like Russian minorities. It's also about Belarus, which is often missing from discussions because we don't know if it's an opportunity or a threat. Additionally, it's about Ukraine after the war—whether Ukraine will be secure enough to sustain itself as a country or if it will have to allocate 50% of its GDP to defense, leaving Poland with a failed state on its border.

Even if Russia stops military operations, a failed state next to our borders could take years to rebuild. For Poland, security is also a pragmatic question because we don't want to lose what we've built over 35 years. Estonians share this perspective. We have to invest more to secure our achievements and send a message to Russia that we are strong and determined. Poland has strong relations with our neighbors, so we have a solid base to build on.