THE KURSK CONUNDRUM ⟩ "Ukraine Couldn't Wait and Continue Playing by Moscow's Rules," Says Analyst Mykola Bielieskov

Mykola Bielieskov: I think it was a combination of both Russian complacency and overconfidence, plus Ukrainian operational security measures. It wasn't only the Russians who were surprised but also the US.

Interviewer: Was the Kursk invasion an act of desperation by Ukraine in the face of upcoming negotiations? Is Ukraine trying to 'Trump-proof' its hand?

Mykola Bielieskov: We are in a situation where we can’t sit idly by and just play by Russian rules. We tried something unconventional. Whether it will work, I don't know, but I hope so. I can understand the innate drive of Ukrainian leadership for some bold, unconventional actions.

Interviewer: Who is currently winning the war in Ukraine, and what indicators should we be looking at?

Mykola Bielieskov: It’s a complicated issue. Russia still has the initiative, and Ukraine is on the defensive, but neither side is winning. Both have maximalist goals—Ukraine wants to liberate all its territories, and Russia wants to subjugate all of Ukraine—but neither has the military capability to achieve those goals.

This unique situation is likely to continue. Russia possesses the initiative in some areas, but not to the extent that it can quickly overwhelm Ukraine. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s challenge is to sustain international support and morale. Wars of attrition are hard to sell internationally, and that’s a major problem.

Interviewer: What are Russia's long-term war aims, in your opinion? What is Putin aiming for?

Mykola Bielieskov: There is ongoing debate about this. Some believe Russia’s ambitions aren’t as maximalist as they seem, but I subscribe to the view that Russia still aims to subjugate all of Ukraine.

This is tied to Russia’s identity as a great power, their psychology, and their ideological narrative that Ukrainian existence is incompatible with Russian security. Even though Russia currently lacks the capability to achieve these goals militarily, we shouldn’t mistake this inability for a change in their ambitions.

Interviewer: You work as an analyst in a think tank that is funded by the administration of the Ukrainian President. How independent are you in your analysis, and how much influence does your think tank have on the decisions of President Zelensky?

Mykola Bielieskov: We produce research, briefs, and reports that are sent to the Office of the President and the National Security and Defense Council. Some of these are published, but many are not, for obvious reasons.

Whether they take our work into account—like in any other country, having a think tank attached to the state doesn’t guarantee major influence. However, we do have some impact. We also try to influence people inside and outside Ukraine who are dealing with different stakeholders. We are doing typical work for government-related think tanks.

Interviewer: Have you witnessed any biases or false narratives among official Western analysts about Ukraine?

Mykola Bielieskov: Now, assessments of Russian and Ukrainian capabilities are more balanced than they were before February 21, 2022, when the analysis favored Russia, and Ukraine was written off. This had negative implications for policy making. We can debate at length what those implications were, but now the situation has improved. People no longer treat Russia as an unbeatable force, which is a significant change from the period before February 24, 2022.

Interviewer: Prominent Western analysts reported less than ten years ago that there was no use in setting up any conventional defense in the Baltics in case of a Russian attack, suggesting guerrilla warfare instead. Lately, these views were dismissed, and new NATO regional plans were composed, aiming at denying Russia the occupation of the Baltics. Have you seen any self-reflection in the West regarding the missed assessments on Ukraine before February 24, 2022? Has there been any revision in how the West comprehends Russia and Ukraine?

Mykola Bielieskov: Yes, I’ve seen these attempts, and I’ve even participated in them. There have been studies trying to understand why the assessment of the correlation of forces was so wrong before February 21, 2022. People are admitting their mistakes and trying to understand why they were wrong to improve analytical frameworks. However, no matter how much analysis is done, the consequences of those wrong assessments will persist, and that’s a terrible thing to live with.

Interviewer: Do you see discrepancies between Washington's and Kyiv's goals? How do they differ?

Mykola Bielieskov: Yes, there is a significant difference. Ukraine still nominally frames victory as liberating all its territories, whereas the US frames Ukrainian success as inflicting enough damage on Russian forces to make any settlement durable.

For the US, the priority is to prevent Russia from winning and to support Ukraine's self-defense, but not necessarily to push for the complete liberation of all Ukrainian territories. This minimalist approach creates constraints on Ukraine’s strategy because we depend on the resources provided by our partners.

Interviewer: What is the sentiment in Kyiv about NATO's involvement or non-involvement in supporting Ukraine? What message did the recent Washington summit convey to you personally?

Mykola Bielieskov: The Washington Summit made it clear long before it happened that there would be no progress on NATO membership for Ukraine. Ukraine was asked not to spoil the unity prearranged for the summit, and we accepted that. The problem is that Ukraine and our NATO partners have different expectations in terms of end goals.

NATO seems content to improve the partnership model, providing weapons, training, and intelligence, while Ukraine wants membership as soon as possible to share the risks of confronting Russia. I don’t see this conflict being resolved quickly.

Interviewer: Have you noticed any recent attempts from Berlin or Washington to push this conflict toward a frozen state? Do you see any efforts to move toward a ceasefire?

Mykola Bielieskov: I haven’t seen any public statements to that effect, but the way support is being provided—or not provided—could lead to such a situation. The level of aid and support is not putting Ukraine in a position to decisively change the dynamics of the war. If we are not able to liberate our territories, the pressure to seek a ceasefire at Ukraine’s expense will increase, which is a major problem for our strategy.

Interviewer: Zelensky recently mentioned that he might put the issue of peace or armistice to a referendum. Is there any truth to that?

Mykola Bielieskov: Zelensky simply cited the Ukrainian constitution, which states that issues of territorial integrity can only be settled by the population. When people talk about a "land for peace" formula, it's a foolish concept in the context of Ukraine and Russia. Zelensky was right to say that he can’t decide this on his own, as sovereignty lies with the population. That's why he raised this issue when asked about different political frameworks.

Interviewer: A US analyst recently compared the US government's handling of the Ukraine situation to how the Biden administration is handling the Middle East. The US supports the right for self-defense but doesn’t want the conflict to escalate. Have you thought of this comparison?

Mykola Bielieskov: I’ve heard about it, mainly from Biden’s political opponents on the right. However, the comparison does not hold up to scrutiny. In the case of Israel, the Biden administration faces different factions within the Democratic Party, some of which are not in favor of aiding Israel decisively.

This dynamic is not present in the Ukraine-Russia war. The US's major concern in Ukraine is Russia’s nuclear capability and the potential destabilization inside Russia if it starts to lose decisively.

Interviewer: There’s been a lot of talk about last year's counteroffensive that allegedly failed. What is your analysis of what happened, and have any corrections been made?

Mykola Bielieskov: I wouldn’t say the counteroffensive failed, as it involved people’s lives and sacrifices. I prefer to say it didn’t deliver the expected results. A proper after-action review is important to learn from the experience and prepare better for the future. The recent Royal United Services Institute report provided a somber, candid analysis of what went wrong. Timing was a significant factor.

Ukraine proposed attacking Melitopol during the summer of 2022, but our partners advised a less ambitious approach. By the time the plan was supported in January 2023, it was too late. Russia had fortified its defenses, and we lost the element of surprise. Timing and proper decisions are crucial, and that’s the key takeaway.

Interviewer: Have there been any contingency plans made in case the US changes its stance after the November elections? How would that affect Ukraine?

Mykola Bielieskov: I’m not that pessimistic. While some people treat a potential Trump administration as a disaster for Ukraine, I believe there’s a basis for continued support. Recent polls show that two-thirds of Americans support continued aid for Ukraine.

Ukrainian authorities have plans on how to deal with Trump, focusing on economic interests, particularly the military-industrial complex in red states that benefit from supporting Ukraine. I believe that with proper arguments, we can retain support even under a different administration.

Interviewer: One strategic target seems to be Ukraine’s electric grid and electricity service. How serious is this problem in the face of the upcoming winter?

Mykola Bielieskov: A very difficult situation, but not hopeless. Russians have managed to destroy a lot of electricity generation that connects to Kyiv, so we must prepare for a tough winter.

This is part of Russia’s total war approach—targeting critical and civilian infrastructure to make life in Ukraine untenable. We still have time to prepare, and if we can demonstrate that Russia’s strategy of forcing Ukrainians to plead for an armistice due to electricity shortages won’t work, it would be a significant psychological blow to them.

Interviewer: They’re trying to deny Ukraine to Ukrainians by making it unlivable, correct?

Mykola Bielieskov: Yes, that’s part of Russia’s strategy. They want to make life in Ukraine as difficult as possible while continuing their military operations. This approach is aimed at weakening morale and pushing for negotiations on their terms.

Interviewer: A few years ago, it was said that there was no need to support Ukraine with fighters, just equipment. Now there’s talk about a lack of fighters for the Ukrainian army. How serious is this problem, and why has it occurred?

Mykola Bielieskov: The issue stems from a broader societal problem. We have the requirements of combat, where people must face the threat of death, and at the same time, we have a post-modern liberal society that values individual security and comfort. Reconciling these two paradigms is a challenge for any military.

This is a problem not only for Ukraine but also for European and NATO countries. If we can’t engage enough people for even peacetime armies, imagine the difficulty during wartime. This problem was somewhat anticipated, as enthusiasm always decreases after the initial months of war. The only solution is better firepower, as our demographics don’t support total war as in the past.

Interviewer: Estonia has started asking for military paperwork from local Ukrainian residents, as Latvia and Lithuania have already done before. Do you think NATO countries should start sending Ukrainians back to Ukraine to be eligible for the war effort?

Mykola Bielieskov: This is a complicated issue that touches on different conflicting values. When people ask for refugee status, they should be protected, but there’s an obvious tension between that and the need for Ukraine to have more fighters. Some countries like Poland are already debating registering male Ukrainian residents of fighting age.

It’s a debate that’s ongoing, and there are different perspectives. If a choice has to be made between sending your own people to fight or engaging Ukrainians who left under dubious circumstances, the choice seems obvious.

Interviewer: Has the situation with corruption in Ukraine improved, stayed the same, or become more visible during the war?

Mykola Bielieskov: It’s a difficult question. Personally, I’ve never been asked for a bribe, but there are reports from investigative journalists about issues with public procurement. This has been a problem, and it’s also used as a pretext by some to argue against aiding Ukraine. That’s a concern because we need to improve transparency and avoid giving excuses to those who are looking for them.

However, I don’t like the narrative that Ukraine isn’t admitted to NATO or the EU because it’s too corrupt. It’s clear that this isn’t the primary reason for the hesitancy; it’s more about the risks involved. Corruption is a problem, but it shouldn’t be used as an excuse not to support Ukraine’s self-defense.

Interviewer: Has there been any change in public support for the war effort in Ukraine? Are there any trends in opinion polls suggesting a shift toward peace?

Mykola Bielieskov: Recent surveys suggest some Ukrainians are growing confused, with up to 40% ready for negotiations, though the majority still oppose compromises at the expense of Ukrainian interests. We should be careful with these surveys, as they often involve small samples, but they do reflect the strain on the consensus.

People see the restrained support from our partners and question whether it’s possible to liberate all territories quickly. However, you won’t find any surveys suggesting Ukrainians aren’t ready to continue fighting. This confusion signals that we need a new strategy to balance our goals and retain support.

Interviewer: What about the new Chief of Defense, Syrskyi? Has he fulfilled expectations, and how are his relationships with Zelensky?

Mykola Bielieskov: I always keep my expectations modest. Syrskyi inherited a very difficult situation. He’s known for visiting the frontline frequently, which differs from his predecessor Zaluzhnyi, who often sent deputies. This has led to some debate about whether he’s over-managing, but it’s his style.

The real issue is not the personalities but the structural constraints they face, such as limited resources and the challenges of balancing defense with expectations for offensive actions. We shouldn’t focus on the surnames but on the broader issues that need addressing.

Interviewer: Are you suggesting there might be more changes in the Chiefs of Defense during this war?

Mykola Bielieskov: There are always rumors, but the focus should be on the structural issues rather than on changing commanders. We need to address the real problems, like military supply and personnel engagement. Changing the commander-in-chief continuously won’t solve the underlying issues.

Interviewer: What about the technological aspect of warfare? Zaluzhnyi recently said that this war might be decided by drone engineers. Is this widely accepted among the Ukrainian defense elite?

Mykola Bielieskov: There are conflicting opinions on this. While unmanned systems are important, I believe that relying solely on them is a mistake. Modern warfare is increasingly complex, requiring coordination between multiple branches, not just drones.

The real challenge is synchronizing all these capabilities at scale. Neither we nor our opponent have fully solved this problem, so banking on a single capability like unmanned systems isn’t enough.

Interviewer: What about Ukraine’s recent targeting of Russia’s oil refinery infrastructure? Is this a new development, or just a continuation of an existing strategy?

Mykola Bielieskov: The scale of these strikes has definitely increased. We’ve developed up to ten different UAV strike systems with ranges of at least 800 kilometers. While we aim to create dilemmas for Russian air defenses, it’s still an ongoing effort. The strikes are part of our strategy to increase pressure on Russia, but it’s too early to say if they’ve produced a strategic effect.

Interviewer: What’s the most important military lesson NATO countries should learn from this war to potentially take on Russia in the future?

Mykola Bielieskov: There are several key lessons. First, how to balance a modest peacetime army with the ability to quickly swell ranks during war. Second, how to engage people in the military when the predominant societal values prioritize individual security and comfort? Third, defense spending of 2-3% of GDP is no longer enough; it needs to be increased. Finally, quantity matters—relying solely on sophisticated munitions is not enough. NATO countries need to prepare for a more complex and sustained conflict.

Interviewer: Kyiv has long signaled that the Baltics could be next. How do you see that from Kyiv? What is the reasoning for Russia taking on a NATO member country?

Mykola Bielieskov: Russia aims to demonstrate that NATO is weak and impotent, which would usher in the multipolar world they desire. This would discredit NATO. That’s why NATO has shifted from a strategy of deterrence by punishment to deterrence by denial. The biggest challenge in the Baltics, however, would be resupplying through the Baltic Sea, given the geographical differences compared to Ukraine.

Interviewer: French President Emmanuel Macron does not speak much about sending NATO instructors to Ukraine anymore. How useful would that have been for the Ukrainian cause?

Mykola Bielieskov: There’s added value in Macron's ideas because they broaden the scope of what’s possible. Sending troops in a training capacity is unconventional and expands the limits of what NATO countries might do for Ukraine. It would slowly push NATO in a direction that favors Ukraine. The message to Putin would be that NATO and Ukraine are becoming more closely aligned, even in ways he sought to prevent.

Interviewer: Have you calculated what it would take to militarily drive Russia out of Ukraine? Do you have a list of what’s needed?

Mykola Bielieskov: I would refer to the 2023 discussion paper by Estonia’s Ministry of Defense, which argues that NATO countries should spend an additional 0.25% of their GDP to support Ukraine. If converted into proper aid, this would allow Ukraine to sustain warfighting and regain strategic initiative. The paper highlights that the US’s latest aid package for Ukraine is equivalent to just one day of the US federal government’s operations. That shows how attainable this level of support is.

Interviewer: Are you saying this is irreversibly a war of attrition, and we shouldn’t talk about major counteroffensives in the East and South?

Mykola Bielieskov: Strategies evolve based on what’s possible under the circumstances. Right now, Ukraine is in a strategic defense phase, aiming to retain territory, preserve troops, and inflict damage on Russia. If we can create conditions for another offensive, that would be a success. But we have to be careful not to overextend ourselves. Another failed offensive could be disastrous, so we need to redefine what success looks like under the current conditions.

Interviewer: So, there’s no realistic basis for negotiations at this point, and military victory is the only option?

Mykola Bielieskov: The only way to disabuse Russia of its great power identity, which is tied to its distorted view of World War II history, is through a classic military defeat. We need to drive Russia to the conclusion that they can’t achieve their goals militarily, ensuring any settlement is sustainable. People mistakenly believe that a frozen frontline would reduce costs, but in reality, it would require continuous investment in Ukrainian defense. So, yes, a military victory is necessary, and negotiations would be futile if they don’t lead to a durable settlement.

Interviewer: What do you foresee in the next few months for Ukraine? Have we reached the bottom, or will it get darker?

Mykola Bielieskov: Ukraine has several goals: to exhaust Russia quicker than they can regenerate, to preserve our state and societal cohesion, and to sustain external support. If we can balance these goals, we can consider ourselves successful. Russia is trying to demoralize both Ukrainians and our external partners, but if we can endure this difficult period and maintain support, we will have a potent argument against Russia’s narrative of inevitable victory. The key is to get through this period with as much resilience as possible.

Interviewer: In Estonia, we’ve been wondering what a war would look like in the Baltics compared to Ukraine. What main differences would there be?

Mykola Bielieskov: One of the biggest differences would be resupply due to the geography. In Ukraine, we have a continuous landmass, whereas in the Baltics, you have limited land connections and more reliance on sea routes. Resupplying through the Baltic Sea would be a significant challenge, as Russia would likely target these sea lines of communication. Other than that, the land combat would likely be similar to what we’ve seen in Ukraine over the last 2.5 years.

Interviewer: Has the Russian military changed during this war? How do you perceive these changes?

Mykola Bielieskov: Russia has adjusted, particularly in defensive actions, which is why our offensive last year faced such difficulties. However, they still struggle with classic offensive actions and now rely more on manpower, UAVs, and artillery. They have a deficit of armor and issues with achieving air superiority. While they’ve adapted, they haven’t completely overcome their shortcomings, and they’re still degraded in some capabilities.

Interviewer: Besides mobilization and conscription, what other reforms is the Ukrainian military currently trying to implement?

Mykola Bielieskov: The major focus is on personnel policy—engaging the most talented people, developing their skills, and improving command and control at tactical and operational levels. This is crucial for regaining the asymmetric advantage we had early in the war. If we can address these issues, we can improve our strategic position and sustain our warfighting capability.

Interviewer: One last question. Regarding the Israeli-Gaza conflict, has it affected military aid to Ukraine in any significant way?

Mykola Bielieskov: The biggest impact has been the shift in attention, which has created challenges for keeping Ukraine in the spotlight. In terms of military capabilities, there hasn’t been a significant conflict, as Israel and Ukraine wage war differently. The real issue is ensuring that Ukraine remains a priority in the international community’s focus.