BERLIN'S CRISIS OF DIRECTION ⟩ Bundestag Member Explains Why the Spirit of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact Still Looms in Germany

They seek to establish a multipolar world where the United Nations' rules-based system becomes just one among several competing models, with the prevailing model being one that prioritizes force and power over law. Ukraine is on the front lines, defending this rules-based order on European soil.

The defeat of Ukraine would not merely alter this order; it would dismantle the entire framework we painstakingly built in the 1990s, such as the Charter of Paris.

Let us not forget that Ukraine, under international pressure, relinquished its nuclear arsenal to Russia, the Soviet Union's successor, in exchange for security guarantees that have proven worthless since 2014. For a decade now, Ukraine has been enduring war.

Interviewer: If you were to briefly summarize the past two and a half years, what would you say?

Roderich Kiesewetter: Let us return to 2014. At that time, I was the spokesperson for disarmament, confidence-building measures, and arms control. I held the belief that, in cooperation with Russia, we could forge a path towards enhanced trust-building and verification measures.

But then 2014 happened—the invasion and subsequent annexation of Crimea. Germany’s response was the Nord Stream 2 project. Together with France, Germany opposed arming Ukraine, defying the majority of NATO and EU member states. What was needed was a dual approach: negotiations and diplomacy on one hand, and arming, training, and equipping the Ukrainian army, alongside imposing stringent sanctions on Russia, on the other.

However, this approach was not approved due to resistance from Germany and France. This led to a double disappointment: firstly, that we failed to equip Ukraine, and secondly, that Germany attempted to appease Russia through Nord Stream 2.

The Zeitenwende of 2022 was not a surprise to me. As early as April 2021, our Defense Minister was already warning about Russian aggression and visible measures of Russian pressure along Ukraine’s borders. By October, Russian military exercises had intensified, and by January, I was predicting that we would see war by February.

When I voiced this, people accused me of warmongering. They asked, “Why are you saying this?” and I responded, “Look at the evidence: they have sent blood reserves to Russian field hospitals and mobile cemeteries to their troops. These are clear signs of impending war, and come February, it will begin.”

Even at the Munich Security Conference, Volodymyr Zelensky insisted there would be no war. I had discussions with Vitali Klitschko just days before, and while the Ukrainian political stance was not entirely unified, Klitschko too saw the signs of war.

I argued then, and still do, that it was not NATO's expansion that led to this war; it was Russia's imperialistic mindset. The Russian regime can only survive by exporting force, resources, weapons, and fear. We failed to recognize that this was a coordinated effort to bolster Russia's imperial power and to spread fear, threats, and terror.

Interviewer: How's the public support in Germany for further aid to Ukraine?

Roderich Kiesewetter: The German public is far more convinced of the need to increase support for Ukraine than our government is. We have taken in over a million refugees—70% of them women and children, with the rest being elderly or male. German society is willing to help, but the Chancellor has not provided clear leadership.

His Zeitenwende speech was his best, but it is now a thing of the past because it has not been implemented nor transformed into a tangible political program.

The German public is capable of handling the truth, but due to the lack of direction from the Chancellery and other leaders, public support is also waning. Across Germany, around 80% still favor supporting Ukraine, despite the lack of guidance from the government.

However, in the eastern parts of Germany, a majority—57% in both Saxony and Thuringia—supports the federal government reducing its support for Ukraine. Our society needs more straightforward and direct communication.

Figures like Anton Hofreiter from the Greens, Michael Roth from the SPD, myself from the CDU, and others like Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann from the FDP, have served as catalysts of internal public debate on Ukraine.

Interviewer: What is holding Olaf Scholz back? Is it poor advice? Is it a matter of his personality or past experience?

Roderich Kiesewetter: I believe several factors are at play. First, his own party is deeply divided, and he is highly reliant on the caucus leader, Rolf Mützenich, who is a true pacifist. Some factions within the party still hold an almost naive and romantic view of Russia, believing, in the tradition of Egon Bahr, that Russia is Germany’s most important neighbor...

Interviewer: In 2024, even after witnessing all these atrocities for over nine hundred days?

Roderich Kiesewetter: Yes, that old German narrative still persists—that the countries between Russia and Germany are mere objects of history, not subjects with self-determination.

It’s the long-standing belief that German engineering paired with Russian resources will bring peace to Europe, counterbalancing the influence of the United States. This aligns with Halford Mackinder’s “heartland theory,” Carl Schmitt's ideas on space and powers outside the Euro-Atlantic sphere, and Egon Bahr’s doctrine, who argued in 2014 that Ukraine should never fully align with the West or the East but remain a buffer zone.

Such thinking breeds mistrust in countries like the Baltic states—Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia—and especially in Poland, which suffered millions of casualties at Germany’s hands.

What is perplexing is why some believe that Ukraine's survival is less important than maintaining relations with Russia, particularly given Germany's historical responsibility for the deaths of over 8 million people on Ukrainian soil, more than 3 million in Belarus, and over a million through starvation in Leningrad. Those in Germany who do not fully support Ukraine, including Olaf Scholz, have failed to learn from history.

The second factor holding Olaf Scholz back is his dysfunctional strategy. Scholz claims that Ukraine must not lose, and Russia must not win.

As a former military officer, I find this neither an operational definition nor an ethically justifiable position, as it involves massive sacrifices by Ukraine. We must instead assert that we safeguard and protect the rule of law, which includes Ukraine's legal borders as defined in 1991. Thus, Ukraine must win. And Russia must learn to lose, which means relinquishing its imperial ambitions and recognizing the sovereignty of all its neighboring states.

When I challenged Scholz, he said, “Anyone who wants to liberate Crimea can do so, but without German participation.” This stance is ill-advised. I believe Scholz himself, having been a pacifist and anti-NATO, anti-USA advocate in the 1980s, has evolved somewhat. He now defends NATO and the EU, but he remains hesitant to open the EU and NATO to Ukraine, even as Ukraine defends our freedom and peace. This is not only unjust but also inappropriate.

The third factor behind Scholz’s reluctance to fully support Ukraine is his close ties to Russia during his tenure as Mayor of Hamburg and as Finance Minister. The Wirecard scandal involving a German financial enterprise was a Russian Secret Service operation designed to erode trust in the German population and financial markets while financing intelligence operations. As Finance Minister, Scholz shares responsibility for the Wirecard scandal, and this matter requires further investigation.

Interviewer: How do you explain the persistence of this romanticism towards Russia among SPD politicians, especially in light of the daily horrors we witness in Ukraine? How is this humanly possible?

Roderich Kiesewetter: I also struggle to comprehend the lack of empathy, but this phenomenon is not confined to the SPD; it also exists within my party, the CDU, and the CSU in Bavaria.

We should consider historical legacy: in 1812, military historian Clausewitz, whose work “On War” remains foundational in German military strategy, sided with the Tsar against Napoleon.

In 1917, the German Emperor’s Army facilitated Lenin’s journey through Russian lines, leading to the creation of the Soviet Union. As a sign of gratitude, the Soviet Union assisted Germany in circumventing the Versailles Treaty and sanctions, thereby aiding in the development of tank weapons during the 1920s. Today's T-90 Armata and the Leopard 2 share ancestry from that era.

Additionally, the Rapallo Treaty at the end of the 1920s, followed by the Hitler-Stalin Pact and the Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement in the 1930s, were forged by national conservative Germans who were Anti-American, Anti-West, and believed that German engineering paired with Russian resources could dominate the European continent.

The young officers and officials of the 1930s were in their 50s and 60s during the 1970s when the Mannesmann Pipeline business with the Soviet Union on natural gas was established. These individuals operated within the spirit of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement, which paved a short path to Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2.

The perceived reliability of Russian resources blinded us, leading Germany to embrace what I refer to as three "life lies." Both the SPD and CDU propagated these falsehoods after 1989, embedding them as a guiding narrative to justify their political decisions and actions.

The first lie is that Germany is surrounded by partners and friends, allowing us to focus solely on social cohesion, and define security mostly as social security. This narrative enabled us to underfund the Bundeswehr, using it as a financial reservoir. In reality, Germany was not surrounded by partners and friends, even in the late 1990s. This was the reason why countries like Estonia sought NATO membership.

The second lie was that Germany could build its economic prosperity on a self-imposed system of dependency, relying on cheap security from the United States, cheap energy from Russia, and cheap supply chains from China. This was a poor justification, as the Americans were spending around 4% of their GDP on security, while Germany only spent 1%, despite having spent 4% in the 1980s.

The final lie was the narrative of “change through trade,” the belief that by trading with Russia and China, they would evolve into democracies. They did not change; they became dictatorships and rogue states. Instead, Germany changed by becoming dependent. It is challenging for politicians like Olaf Scholz to overcome this false legacy narrative. The Zeitenwende moment was an opportunity to do so, but it faltered under the pressure from German industry and pacifists within our political realm.

Interviewer: What part of the industry is pressuring Scholz?

Roderich Kiesewetter: The energy sector, the pharmaceutical industry, and the automotive sector, particularly due to their dependence on China, as well as the IT sector.

The armaments industry underwent a positive shift in mindset about a decade ago. Most people in Germany are employed in the chemical, automotive, and IT industries. They prioritize profit margins in China over acknowledging the dependencies and risks inherent in close cooperation with an autocratic regime.

Interviewer: How closely are Joe Biden and Olaf Scholz coordinating their Ukraine policies? Their views appear to align significantly, don’t they?

Roderich Kiesewetter: Joe Biden has always been a committed transatlanticist. With advisors like Burns and Sullivan, he now has voices around him that are more inclined towards appeasement. Sullivan tried to pacify the Germans by stating that the United States would never deliver tanks to Ukraine, allowing Germany to say, “We would like to deliver tanks, but as long as the Americans don’t, we won’t either.”

This reluctance was a coordinated effort. The advisory levels between the U.S. and Germany’s Chancellery were in close communication. For instance, when it came to tank deliveries, Senator Chris Coons, along with Austin and Blinken, circumvented Sullivan. True leaders rise above poor advice when the challenges of the time demand it.

In January 2023, Biden funded the delivery of 31 M1 Abrams tanks from his own budget by the end of 2023, preventing Germany from hiding behind the excuse of American reluctance. Meanwhile, Europe saw the significant development of the so-called Tallinn Pledge.

The Tallinn initiative, along with the United Kingdom and ten other countries, recognized that Europe needed to be more innovative, defensive, transatlantic, agile, and supportive of Ukraine. This modern Europe did not want to be overruled by France and Germany.

Emmanuel Macron, who initially adopted a pacifist stance and frequently attempted to engage Putin, eventually realized that this new Europe would outflank France. Nearly a year ago, Macron mentally joined this Northern and Eastern European initiative. Germany, however, has since fallen behind but has crafted a new narrative: Germany is the strongest supporter of Ukraine.

I examined the official figures of German military support, this narrative is a misinterpretation, untrue. When compared to GDP, Germany ranks 13th or 14th in Europe. While the absolute figures may appear impressive, they are not larger than, for example, the UK or France—around €6 billion last year, €7 billion this year.

Compared to GDP, Germany lags behind Norway, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Finland, Sweden, Poland, Denmark, the Slovak Republic (prior to the change of government), the Czech Republic, and others. The narrative was further expanded to claim that Germany is the largest supporter in civilian terms.

This is true, but only because Germany is investing about 70% to 75% of its Ukrainian support into Ukrainian refugees within Germany, approximately €24 to €25 billion in social support for Ukrainian refugees. This year, around €7 billion goes towards military support, and €5 billion towards civilian support, medical care, and so on. While it’s true that Germany is the second-largest supporter, over 70% of the funds remain in Germany, so this doesn’t significantly impact the battlefield or help Ukraine secure a victory.

Interviewer: Before we continue with critical analysis of Germany’s Ukraine policy, could you highlight the correct decisions Germany has made in recent years under Scholz? What are the successes in handling the European defense crisis?

Roderich Kiesewetter: First and foremost, there is the Zeitenwende initiative as such, it has to some extent shifted the mindset of the population. However, it was not followed through by the government.

Secondly, taking in over a million refugees in Germany is commendable. The positive aspect is that we have provided shelter to more than a million people. On the downside, only 20% are employed, whereas in the Netherlands, it’s 70%, and in Poland, 80% are working. We are not empowering them by helping them secure regular employment or recognizing their educational or professional qualifications.

Thirdly, we are establishing a brigade in Lithuania, which, while not yet sufficiently funded, marks the first time in recent history that Germany is sending a brigade to a neighboring state to support this country from the outset of any potential armed conflict and thus help to deter the aggressor.

These are the three major positive developments. Nevertheless, there is clearly far more we could achieve for Ukraine and European defense, but the government's political will remains insufficient.

The German Parliament has made several agreements and demands of the government, but the government is not bound by them. In April 2022, 586 out of 733 German parliament members voted to increase weapons deliveries, provide more civilian support, improve public diplomacy, and so on. Nonetheless, it took a year of international pressure, including from the USA, before Germany finally committed to delivering tanks, yet still refuses to send long-range systems like Taurus.

Every little positive step is helpful, but it has been too slow and too late for the strongest economy in Europe and the third-strongest in the world.

Interviewer: Could you please remind our readers what was promised with the Zeitenwende?

Roderich Kiesewetter: The Chancellor promised a fully-fledged Bundeswehr capable of defending the country and our allies. The armed forces remain underfunded. The €100 billion special budget has already been exhausted, with about €20 billion lost due to inflation and delays. Of the €80 billion left, only €66 billion has been allocated to armament programs, with the remainder used for day-to-day operations and to supply Ukraine.

There is no money left. So while the promise was for strong armed forces, the reality is underfunded forces that are not able to defend the country, lacking stockpiles and personnel. The Zeitenwende was a good speech and an important sign, but there was no real turnaround, no implementation.

Interviewer: Has Germany set any long-term goals for defense spending?

Roderich Kiesewetter: The Chancellor has promised that by 2028, annual defense spending will increase from €52 billion to €80 billion. However, there is no money allocated in his current plans, and by 2028 there will be a new government and parliament.

Scholz has given a promise for the future when he may no longer be in office, and is hence not responsible for budgeting it. Nonetheless, there are long-term commitments Germany has made. We must provide NATO with three fully-equipped army divisions by 2031—the first by next year, the second by 2027, and the third by 2030. Moreover, we have pledged to contribute about 10% of NATO’s capabilities by 2030. These three divisions also need to be fully staffed.

To fulfill this commitment, we will need many additional brigades. Currently, we have only eight brigades, and three of them are combat-ready. This means we need significant investments in personnel, exercises, equipment, training, weapons, and ammunition.

Scholz has made these promises to our allies, but the armaments industry has yet to receive contracts, and the funds are not available. This process needs to be expedited, but the current budget debate suggests that the only way to meet these commitments is by cutting support for Ukraine, which is not a viable solution.

Interviewer: What is the latest status of Germany's alleged plans to cut aid to Ukraine in the coming years?

Roderich Kiesewetter: Due to mounting pressure, the Chancellor declared on August 20 that there would be no cuts, but in 2025 military support to Ukraine will be halved to €4 billion. He has promised that the shortfall will be covered by the interest on frozen Russian assets in Europe.

However, no procedures have been established or negotiated among EU states—what portion, what interest rate, how much for whom, and for what purpose. This is yet another promise without a solid foundation. And the funds belong to Ukraine; this is not a German effort. This initiative puts Germany's credibility to a real test.

I suspect there is a connection between the budget dispute, the cuts in support for Ukraine, and the upcoming elections in Brandenburg, Thuringia, and Saxony, where a majority of voters oppose support for Ukraine.

The government offers little guidance, allowing many people to fall prey to the populism and disinformation spread by two Russian-friendly parties, the Alliance Sarah Wagenknecht (BSW) and the AfD, which serve as loudspeakers for Putin, disseminating his narratives against the democratic West and promoting a guided democracy over a self-sustaining, motivated, and encouraged democracy.

In fear of the election outcomes, neither the SPD nor the CDU, of which I am a member, provides sufficient direction. They watch as Russian disinformation spreads, rather than articulating what is truly at stake: freedom and self-determination.

The only party consistently defending the rules-based international order in this context is the Green Party. However, the Minister for Economic Affairs and Vice-Chancellor has been blamed for the economic downturn, causing the Greens to lose credibility in parts of our society. Yet in terms of security policy, the Green Party remains the most outspoken.

Interviewer: You mentioned the upcoming German elections. What about the elections in the U.S.? Is there any discussion in German political circles about what will happen if Trump wins and how that might alter the course of history?

Roderich Kiesewetter: I have always argued that European investment in security is imperative, regardless of who wins the U.S. presidential election. The United States will reassess its approach to Europe. Seeing that their burden-sharing initiatives have failed, they will shift the burden onto us. Europe will have to take on much more responsibility in the Mediterranean, the Balkans, the Middle East, and Ukraine.

I believe that if Kamala Harris and his running mate Tim Walz win the election, the strong transatlantic attitude will prevail, maintaining a supportive stance among American voters towards Ukraine. Nevertheless, the challenge posed by China and the Indo-Pacific, as well as concerns from Pacific states, remains.

When I visited Taiwan and the Philippines in July, they expressed significant anxiety over the diminishing support for Ukraine. They believe that if Ukraine fails, it will serve as a model for China to isolate and potentially attack Taiwan.

We must strengthen those forces in the United States and demonstrate that Europe is willing to take on more responsibility for Ukraine, thereby allowing the Americans greater flexibility in the Pacific. This is the essence of burden-sharing: Europe takes on more of the burden for its own defense, enabling the U.S. to focus on South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan.

Therefore, I am not overly concerned about Trump being elected, but I do recognize the danger he poses to U.S. democracy and the uncertainty a Trump administration would bring.

My fear is that we do not fully grasp the necessity of keeping the U.S. engaged in Europe through fair burden-sharing or by taking on more of the burden ourselves. We must signal Washington that Europe is capable of supporting Ukraine and reorganizing its own security, ensuring that Europe remains an attractive partner for the U.S.

Interviewer: Are there any critical narratives towards Berlin from the past few years where you feel Germany has been misunderstood?

Roderich Kiesewetter: To be honest, I don’t see that. I believe Germany has failed to sufficiently explain its eastern policies and, in many instances, was simply wrong. Germany did not grasp the deep mistrust created by Nord Stream 2, nor did it acknowledge the threat perceptions of the Baltic States, Poland, and even Ukraine.

This mistrust has not been comprehended in Germany. Due to our history, the idea of becoming more pacifist was not well received by our neighbors, particularly in the East, who prefer to trust a Germany that is willing to take on a defensive responsibility.

One German government representative who does understand this is Defense Minister Boris Pistorius. His proposal to station a brigade in Lithuania marks a significant shift. He was also the first German minister to state that it is entirely legitimate for a country under attack to carry out operations on the aggressor’s territory. As early as April last year, he asserted that Ukraine has every right to target Russian installations on Russian soil.

These voices have been somewhat restrained in Germany, and I believe we should be listening much more to the Ukrainian Rada and to the parliaments in Eastern Europe. Our focus on France is important, but we also need to look eastward and better collaborate with Eastern European parliaments, much like Helmut Kohl did in the 1980s and early 1990s when he acted as an advocate for former Warsaw Pact countries aspiring to join the EU and NATO.

This approach made Germany strong and trustworthy at the time, but we lost it with Schröder and Merkel, who focused solely on larger countries instead of aligning with the smaller ones. And not just smaller, but more innovative countries. Look at what Estonia has achieved since 2007 after the massive cyberattack—you have become one of the most agile and modern countries in terms of cybersecurity. We have much to learn from you.

Ukraine has developed modern warfare capabilities. If we neglect Ukraine, this expertise will be lost. We should also take into account the lessons learned by Sweden and Finland in giving up their neutrality. Germany needs to become more modest, more thoughtful, more willing to learn, more agile, and innovative.

Interviewer: You mentioned that some German parties have become instruments for Putin. How would you describe Moscow's influence in Berlin, has it diminished since 2022, remained the same, or gone underground?

Roderich Kiesewetter: Russia has meticulously prepared the hybrid battlefield in Germany. In 2001, when Putin addressed the Bundestag, he asked close German allies to help craft his speech, flattering the Parliament.

Russia strategically made Germany dependent on its energy, effectively stalling our transition to renewable energy by offering the allure of cheap Russian fossil fuels.

Russia was instrumental in building up the AfD, planning for the long term.

Since 2019, they have also conducted assassinations on German soil. Every year, a few Russian embassy staff are expelled, one to three, as a signal to the espionage community. The 2019 Tiergarten murder was a clear act of state terrorism, as recognized by a German court.

Sabotage acts—such as arson attacks on factories, destruction of railroad infrastructure, cyberattacks, and more—are sowing unrest and insecurity in German society, especially among those who are unprepared.

The most recent incident involves Petr Bystron, a leading candidate for the AfD in the European election, who allegedly received money to cultivate his political environment, investing in people and organizations. Russia meticulously orchestrated this strategy, and now, through the AfD, the Left Party, and BSW, Moscow has powerful "loudspeakers" to rally those swayed by Russian media and disinformation.

The COVID-19 pandemic served as a catalyst, planting seeds of mistrust in Germany, and now Putin is reaping the benefits.

A longstanding trust in cooperation between Russia and Germany, and previously the Soviet Union, still persists. People often conflate the Soviet Union with Russia, forgetting that the Soviet Union was a status quo power, seeking to enhance its influence through imperial means. This blend of tradition, personal connections, and exploiting weaknesses is a potent tool for Moscow.

Interviewer: How well-prepared are German security services to counter Russian influence? Is it even recognized as a security threat?

Roderich Kiesewetter: In Germany, there are growing voices advocating for a comprehensive threat assessment that includes Iran, China, North Korea, and especially Russia and Belarus, and their activities on German soil. However, we remain in the minority. The majority does not perceive the hybrid threat adequately.

Instead, there is a strange counter-movement gaining traction. Some argue that instead of focusing on threat assessments, we should concentrate on stringent oversight of any encroachments on civil liberties by security authorities—such as the number of state security agents active, surveillance measures, state-owned Trojans on the internet, and so forth.

They believe the volume of surveillance activities should be reduced every year. In my view, this approach is fundamentally misguided.

That said, we are just beginning a campaign in Germany to raise awareness of these threats, and I believe we are making progress. People need to recognize the attacks on the SPD and CDU headquarters by Russia, the cyberattacks, the espionage, the money laundering, the Wirecard scandal.

We need to enhance the capabilities of our intelligence services and strengthen the rule of law so that our security institutions become more powerful and less dependent on foreign partners.

The weakness of our intelligence services lies in their dependency on foreign partners. It’s a vulnerability because our information inflow relies on trust in Germany, and if that trust diminishes, we won’t receive the necessary information.

Interviewer: Speaking of partners, how would you describe the dynamics of Polish-German relations in recent years, especially after the full-scale invasion?

Roderich Kiesewetter: Angela Merkel was committed to maintaining close relations with Poland, despite the challenges posed by the conservative PiS party. She kept the lines of communication open, and our party CDU maintained contact with the Polish liberal PO party, facilitating a smooth transition when the government in Poland changed.

I believe our current Chancellor sees an opportunity to revitalize the Weimar Triangle. It’s encouraging that France and Poland have strengthened their cooperation, and I hope they will also encourage Germany to enhance the trilateral effort.

Poland's attitude towards Germany has also evolved. We must improve this cooperation swiftly, and with figures like Radek Sikorski, who has a deep understanding of Germany, we have a strong foundation for moving forward.

Interviewer: You mentioned the German brigade in Lithuania as a positive and somewhat unexpected development. Germany is clearly a net contributor to Baltic security, but there are concerns about whether Berlin might manage escalation fears with Russia in an Article 5 scenario in the same hesitant manner it has with Ukraine. Why should be expect Berlin to behave more decisively in an Article 5 situation?

Roderich Kiesewetter: As a former officer who served several times at NATO headquarters in Brussels, I know that the NATO treaty is quite nuanced regarding what Article 5 truly entails. The response to an Article 5 scenario could range from a strong declaration to something more substantial. However, given Germany's commitment to being at the forefront in Lithuania, we cannot afford not to reinforce our troops.

It’s a matter of trust, built through joint exercises, that Germany will stand shoulder to shoulder with its allies in the first line of defense. We, as parliamentarians, must ensure that this is not a symbolic gesture but a genuine military commitment that needs to be adequately funded and fully operational within the next two years.

This is my perspective, though I am not sure if the Chancellor shares it. I suspect that even in an Article 5 situation, we might witness hesitation and a lack of credibility under the current government.

Scholz has repeatedly ruled out NATO becoming an official party in the ongoing war, despite the fact that Germany cannot make decisions about NATO alone. However, I am confident that the Bundestag would mandate the use of Germany's armed forces during an Article 5 scenario.

Interviewer: You’ve mentioned the underfunding of the German brigade in Lithuania. What percentage of additional funding is required to ensure it is truly combat-ready?

Roderich Kiesewetter: I don’t have precise figures for this particular brigade, there will likely be internal reallocations within the Bundeswehr to make this brigade combat-ready.

I can, however, provide an estimate for the whole Bundeswehr. Between now and 2030, we have an annual defense budget of €52 to €55 billion, whereas we need between €80 to €110 billion. This means we require an additional €300 billion for our armed forces by 2030.

This €300 billion must coincide with an additional €200 billion investment in infrastructure—railroads, cybersecurity, electricity lines from German ports to the borders, and to the Baltic States and Poland.

Altogether, we're facing a shortfall of half a trillion euros in Germany's defense budget. We need to reprioritize our budget, rethink our security, and revitalize our economy, bring more people into the labor market.

Currently, around 4 million people are part of the Citizen Money program, a social welfare initiative, and a significant number of them are capable of working. Particularly, 2 million people under 30 are benefiting from this social welfare. We need a cultural shift towards greater ambition and performance.

This requires a change in government in Germany because the current one has been paralyzed. As the head of the Green Party noted, there is a loss of trust, but we need to reinforce the positive forces in our society.

Interviewer: Given your military background, what is your understanding of Ukraine’s Kursk operation? Why did it occur, and how was it received in Berlin?

Roderich Kiesewetter: It was logical for Ukraine not to inform partners like Germany in advance, given the recent instances of espionage. The Ukrainian Armed Forces clearly capitalized on the element of surprise.

The Kursk operation was well-coordinated and, so far, has been effective. It was necessary and beneficial to carry the war onto Russian territory, which is legitimate under international law.

Additionally, as Western support, especially from France, Spain, Italy, and Germany, wanes, Ukraine needed a success to demonstrate its capability to both international partners and its own population.

This operation can also be seen as a response to the pressure Russia is exerting in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, serving as a relief effort to force Russia to redeploy its troops.

The German Chancellery seems intent on pressuring Ukraine into a "Minsk 3" type settlement to freeze the conflict. However, such a freeze would be disastrous, as Russia would continue its violence, rape, and torture along the armistice line and in the occupied territories.

Ukraine needed to send a signal to its supporters, its own population, and the United States that it remains worthwhile, even after the U.S. presidential election, to continue supporting Ukraine.

Putin, when under pressure, is more likely to negotiate. Ukraine can use this as leverage, provided the operation is successful in the long term. Consider the effect of Prigozhin’s mutiny last year. When Putin was subjected to pressure, he installed Lukashenko as a mediator and offered Prigozhin refuge in Belarus. Prigozhin ultimately paid with his life, but Putin still sought immediate relief.

The Kursk operation also sends a message to the Russian population that Putin is not invincible. He can be pressured, and he is not the flawless and unreachable dictator many believe him to be. Putin and his army cannot protect Russia, not even the Kursk region.

Interviewer: How has Scholz responded to the Kursk incident? His public reaction seems rather muted. What can we expect from him?

Roderich Kiesewetter: The Kursk incursion contradicts Scholz’s narrative of bringing Ukraine to the negotiation table. It goes against the mindset within parts of the SPD that war is decided through diplomacy, not on the battlefield. Some in the SPD are pushing to reduce support for Ukraine.

Scholz, in my opinion, still believes it is better to have Putin in power than to support a fully sovereign and independent Ukraine. This stance is at odds with the security agreement he signed on February 16th, in which he committed to supporting Ukraine as long as necessary within its 1991 borders.

However, he has made no public statements supporting Ukraine's actions, and it seems he was caught off guard by the Kursk operation. He was on leave and has been back in office since August 20th, but I have yet to hear any words of encouragement for Ukraine’s efforts to press Russia and reclaim its territory.

Interviewer: Are you saying Scholz is still married to the strategy of freezing the Ukraine situation, sweep it under the carpet, and then refocus on the economy and social welfare of Germany. Is this his guiding narrative?

Roderich Kiesewetter: You’ve captured it well. In the past, we had Chancellors like Helmut Kohl, Helmut Schmidt, and Konrad Adenauer who were credible leaders due to their firm stance and clear positions.

Helmut Schmidt lost his Chancellorship because of the double-track approach to NATO to counter the Russian missile threat.

Helmut Kohl was unwavering in his focus on German unification, even when a majority in Germany was skeptical.

Konrad Adenauer had to choose between neutrality under Stalin or aligning Germany with Western democratic traditions and overcoming the nationalist, Eastern-centric view.

With Scholz, we see a preference for disarmament and appeasement. He is pursuing a very soft approach, and I would urge our neighboring states to abandon their soft approach towards Germany. In my view, the current strategy of being overly accommodating and gentle with Olaf Scholz is ineffective.

I believe that stronger demands and more critical signals directed at Berlin would help stimulate the domestic debate and put pressure on the German government. Unity, strength, and clear language are essential in communicating the expectations of our Eastern neighbors.

It could also help highlight Germany's isolation within Europe. It is unacceptable for a country like Germany to behave like Chamberlain in 1938. We should make it clear that Europe expects more from Germany in terms of performance and burden-sharing, not selfish solo efforts.

You mentioned the United States and Germany. Germany has failed to take on a leadership role; it has always followed the U.S. in a posture of self-deterrence rather than formulating a new European approach. The most recent example was in February when Scholz traveled alone to the U.S. during the Ukraine aid package dispute and stated, “If the United States defaults on supporting Ukraine, we can't take over.” This is a declaration of bankruptcy, not the stance of a leading nation that stands up for transatlantic burden-sharing.

This was a terrible signal to Ukraine, a positive one for Putin to continue his aggression, and a signal to the U.S. that Germany does not take the war seriously. What we need is for Chancellor Scholz to visit Washington with Poland, France, and representatives from the Baltic States to show that we Europeans are willing to take on more responsibility and that we view this as a European war, not just a Ukrainian one.

We need American support, but we should not wait for American money and weapons. In the meantime, we should develop and produce the weapons needed and send them to Ukraine. This, I believe, is Scholz’s historical failure: that he has not built a European coalition against Russia. Countries with less economic power, like those in the Tallinn initiative, have sought solutions, but without the necessary support from Germany.

Interviewer: Where you think the war in Ukraine is currently heading? Realistically, what trajectory are we on for the next few years?

Roderich Kiesewetter: I see two main scenarios. Of course, there are many possible outcomes, but these are the two I consider most likely. I'll start with the worst-case scenario because I’m an optimist and would prefer to end on a more hopeful note.

The worst scenario is that the counteroffensive fails due to insufficient Western support. In this case, the Russian operation in Ukraine will succeed. Kyiv will fall, Zelensky will either flee or step down, and Ukraine will fragment.

Russia will seize Kyiv, Odessa, and Moldova, cutting Ukraine off from the Black Sea, and leaving western Ukraine to countries like Hungary, which is already eyeing the opportunity. Fifteen million people will flee Ukraine, overwhelming the social cohesion of Western European nations. Russia will then continue its aggression, possibly targeting the Baltic states and beyond. This is Russia's ultimate goal.

The positive scenario, which we must continue fighting for, is that Ukraine will pressure Putin to the negotiating table. Putin will withdraw from Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea.

Ukraine will join the European Union once it meets all the necessary requirements, and it will become a member of NATO. NATO will benefit from Ukraine’s expertise in modern warfare. This is the positive scenario. The reality may fall somewhere in between, but I hope it will lean more towards the positive outcome.

Interviewer: Before we conclude, I must ask about some recent rumors concerning Germany. One pertains to the Nord Stream investigation being pursued by the German prosecutor. There’s speculation that Berlin leaked information to the media along with hints about future cuts in German aid for Ukraine. Can this be seen as a an orchestrated power move towards Kyiv?

Roderich Kiesewetter: To be frank, I had the same suspicion last week because we witnessed something similar a year ago when reports about the Andromeda operation and Ukraine's involvement surfaced during the debate over Taurus deliveries.

Last week, German investigative journalists and the Wall Street Journal were seemingly informed indirectly by sources close to the government. This information was leaked on purpose during a week when budget cuts were being discussed, and in the wake of the Kursk operation, of which Germany was not informed.

I do not believe in coincidences. In Germany, there is a faction attempting to scapegoat Ukraine, seeking an excuse to reduce support and undermine trust in Ukraine. This group subtly pressures Ukraine to negotiate and reach a "Minsk 3" agreement.

However, we must wait for the General Prosecutor to complete his investigation. It could still be a false flag operation, a plot orchestrated by Russia, or perhaps Russia used collaborators. I would not rule out any possibilities.