ELECTRIC SIEGE ⟩ Ukrainian Energy Expert: With Russia Failing on the Battlefield, the Energy Front Becomes Its Top Priority

The situation remains consistently dire. We saw this even during the summer months when planned power outages and restrictions were implemented across Ukraine. During winter, energy consumption typically rises by 35 percent, which means the power outage schedules will be even more severe. Additionally, there is the persistent threat of continued attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure. With insufficient air defense systems in place, our power plants remain inadequately protected.

Interviewer: What lies ahead for Ukraine’s energy sector in the coming months?

Volodymyr Omelchenko: Should Russia escalate its attacks on hydroelectric power plants and Ukrenerho's high-voltage transmission and substation facilities, the situation will deteriorate further (this interview was conducted before Russia’s strikes in August and September, which primarily targeted transmission and substation stations).

My pessimistic outlook is that, unless our air defense capabilities improve and we can restore energy facilities, the situation will become critical. We might manage to recover two gigawatts of the nine gigawatts recently lost, but this will only be beneficial if these facilities are properly protected by air defense systems. Without protection, all our efforts and financial resources could be undone in mere minutes. Unprotected, it's easy to destroy these installations.

I believe the so-called "energy front" has become the most crucial battlefield. While the situation on the actual front lines has somewhat stabilized and become clearer, Russian authorities now realize that they cannot achieve anything against Ukraine’s military forces. As a result, they have shifted their focus to breaking Ukraine by targeting civilian infrastructure, especially the energy sector. In my view, the fate of this war hinges on Ukraine's ability to withstand on the energy front.

Energy facilities are struck daily, but it’s difficult to predict what the situation will be like in winter. I wouldn’t rule out Russia launching even more massive attacks on our energy infrastructure before winter. In that case, Europe could face another wave of refugees, and Ukraine may experience economic collapse, as the country simply cannot function without electricity. While survival might still be possible under such conditions, the shutdown of factories will leave people without work or prospects, forcing many to leave the country.

Russia’s plan is clear: to destroy Ukraine's energy sector and sow instability. In other words, they aim to turn Ukraine into a kind of Afghanistan, using it to continuously blackmail the European Union alongside Belarus. If this plan succeeds, nearly all of Eastern Europe will live under constant threat. It would create a situation similar to the perpetual conflict in the Middle East, with ongoing dangers, skirmishes, and wars destabilizing both Eastern and Central Europe. In my estimation, this is precisely Russia’s intent.

"If Ukraine fails to save its energy sector, even if it manages to hold the front lines, chaos will be unleashed within the country, with the potential to spread across Eastern and Central Europe."

Interviewer: How should Estonia and other European countries respond to this situation?

Volodymyr Omelchenko: Estonia, along with other European nations, should take this matter seriously. If Ukraine, despite holding the front lines, fails to protect its energy sector, chaos will ensue within the country, potentially spreading to Eastern and Central Europe.

Interviewer: Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is quite outdated. Is it even worth repairing the old facilities, or would it be more sensible to build new, smaller ones?

Volodymyr Omelchenko: From a strategic standpoint, if the war were to end tomorrow, it would be more sensible to build new facilities rather than restore the old ones. This means investing in wind and solar parks, bioenergy plants, and expanding hydroelectric power. However, such projects require considerable time—at least ten years for reconstruction—not necessarily money. Tens of billions of euros will be needed, but in the grand scheme of things, one billion is a relatively small amount for a country like Ukraine.

"For example, a hundred small gas-powered power plants are much harder to destroy than a single large one. So there’s definitely some logic to this approach, but it will still take time to implement."

It’s clear that no one will invest in new energy infrastructure projects during wartime, as they could easily be destroyed. However, decentralized energy systems are inherently harder to eliminate. For instance, a hundred small gas-powered power plants are more difficult to destroy than a single large one. There’s certainly some logic in this approach, but it will still require time.

In the meantime, the focus should be on restoring whatever can be salvaged, including older-generation coal-fired power plants. Right now, the question is one of survival. It's about ensuring people can physically survive, especially during our cold winters. The same applies to Estonia: if temperatures drop to -15 or -20 degrees and a major city loses heat and power, it's impossible to cope. The issue at hand is survival, not urgent investments.

All our attention is now on how to get through the coming winter. And this winter is going to be extremely challenging.

Interviewer: How likely do you think it is that Ukraine could face a total blackout this winter?

Volodymyr Omelchenko: A total blackout is absolutely possible, as Ukraine's energy situation is already on the brink. Practically all thermal and hydroelectric capacity has been destroyed, leaving us reliant on nuclear power plants. While it's more difficult to strike nuclear plants themselves—though not impossible—the substations nearby are vulnerable. If those are hit, the nuclear plant must be shut down because it can't feed energy into the grid. This scenario cannot be ruled out.

However, nuclear power alone cannot meet all of Ukraine's energy needs. Nuclear plants currently provide about half of our energy consumption, around 8 gigawatts, but in winter, consumption can rise to 17–18 gigawatts. They can only provide this much if there are maneuverable capacities like hydroelectric power and some thermal energy to balance the load.

Nuclear power works on a fixed schedule and cannot respond to fluctuations in demand, which is why we need these maneuverable capacities. If those capacities are destroyed, nuclear plants can't function properly, as they need to constantly adjust to maintain frequency in the system. This is a major issue.

Interviewer: What is the Ukrainian government's plan in the worst-case scenario?

Volodymyr Omelchenko: There is definitely a plan, but the most critical goal right now is to maintain the integrity of the energy system. Even in the event of widespread destruction, some minimal energy supply will be maintained, though this will come at the expense of consumers.

This means people could be without power for 18–20 hours a day. The hope is that electricity will still be provided to critical infrastructure such as water, sewage, and heating. Yes, heating facilities can also be destroyed, but I don't see many immediate options for Russia in this regard, especially since alternative heating plants are being built in Kyiv, though their total capacity is still small. The situation is particularly difficult in Kharkiv, a city of over a million people, where the heating system has been almost entirely destroyed. It's hard to imagine how people will survive the winter there.

We continue to witness Russia's deliberate destruction of civilian infrastructure. Unfortunately, our Western partners still hesitate to close the skies. They could have done it long ago. In the end, this is about preventing the destruction of infrastructure. Air defense missiles and attack aircraft could close the skies, yet our allies are still reluctant to make this political decision.

I firmly believe that as long as the war continues, Ukraine's energy sector will eventually be destroyed. This is undeniable. Russia has enough missiles and weapons, its arms production is progressing, and sanctions are being circumvented. We’ve seen much more precise missiles recently, as evidenced by our military discovering Intel microchips of American origin in rockets over the past six months. Basic components in these rockets also come from Switzerland, Germany, and other Western countries. This means Russia is still able to acquire almost everything it needs, often through Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and other channels.

If the war continues for an extended period, we lack the air defense capabilities needed to protect our vast territory. Even Israel, with its robust air defenses and much smaller size, cannot fully protect its infrastructure from air attacks. Sufficient air defense might delay the complete destruction of our energy infrastructure by a few years, but it won’t prevent it entirely.

Even if we were to regain the 1991 borders during the war, this wouldn't stop Russia from launching missile attacks and destroying our infrastructure in the future. They don’t need to defeat us on the battlefield; they only need to cripple our infrastructure to make the country non-functional.

Interviewer: What lessons can other countries learn from this, and what steps should it take now?

Volodymyr Omelchenko: First and foremost, decentralization. You should focus on building not large but numerous small power plants that can operate autonomously in every city. 

In the event of a concentrated ballistic missile attack, the only viable strategy for protecting energy infrastructure is maximum decentralization. Every settlement must be able to sustain its own electricity supply. Whether through solar, wind, gas turbines, or other sources, it is crucial that energy parks be established everywhere—not just offshore, but on land as well.

These efforts could even extend to neutral zones, such as the economic areas of Sweden, Denmark, or other nations. Estonia also has a vital connection with Finland through the sea cable link, which should be leveraged.

"In the event of a concentrated ballistic missile attack, Estonia would find it difficult to defend itself, even with adequate air defense systems. However, the only effective strategy for protecting energy infrastructure remains maximum decentralization."

Interviewer: Why has Ukraine decided to invest in building new nuclear reactors?

Volodymyr Omelchenko: Ukraine plans to build four reactors now and ten more later. The reasoning behind this decision is unclear to me. Ukraine needs to survive and get through the winter right now, focusing on decentralized energy solutions, as I’ve mentioned.

Spending money on such projects while people face freezing conditions and lack critical infrastructure and sanitation in the winter seems pointless, as these nuclear plants won’t be operational for another decade or more. Although this decision hasn’t been passed in parliament, it is under discussion at the Ministry of Energy.

Interviewer: How does the government support individuals with energy solutions for their homes? Do such subsidies exist?

Volodymyr Omelchenko: Yes, such subsidies exist. The government offers compensation for building personal solar power stations. These support mechanisms are available but limited. If everyone started building solar stations, there wouldn’t be enough funds to support all. Besides, solar power alone won’t solve our winter energy problems. People can’t build gas power stations at home either, as they are prohibitively expensive, costing millions of dollars. Perhaps an oligarch could build one, but an ordinary person certainly cannot.

In rural areas, the situation may be somewhat better since households can buy gas boilers to manage through the winter. In urban environments, however, it’s practically impossible, as water, sewage, and heating systems are all dependent on electricity. Without it, nothing works.

Interviewer: How prepared are you for a potential power outage in Kyiv?

Volodymyr Omelchenko: I live in an apartment building, and the only preparation I’ve made is buying a power storage unit or battery, which can charge my phone or run the router, ensuring I maintain communication. So, I'm not at all ready for a complete blackout, and in that scenario, I’d have to leave the city. It would be very difficult for me in such conditions.

I estimate the likelihood of a total blackout at about five to ten percent, but I consider it possible. As far as I understand, the government hasn’t fully planned for a complete blackout either; they believe we’ll be able to keep the energy system running.