CRISIS IN THE SKY ⟩ Latvian Authorities' Delayed Public Response and NATO's Perceived Passive Handling of Russian Attack Drone Crash Sparks Public Scrutiny in Latvia

A Million Dollar Question

One of the most debated questions surrounding the incident is why the drone, detected so early and equipped with a warhead, was allowed to crash-land, and why none of the five German Luftwaffe Eurofighter Typhoons stationed at Latvia’s Lielvarde Air Base for NATO's Baltic Air Policing mission were scrambled to neutralize the threat in the air.

The Latvian Ministry of Defense has maintained that the drone did not pose an immediate threat to Latvia and that a series of criteria must be met before any aerial object can be destroyed. Latvian Defense Chief Kalniņš has also pointed out that the drone’s movements did not suggest hostile intent toward Latvia and that it was assessed to be intended for Russian attacks on Ukraine, having strayed off course.

An air force officer from a NATO member state explained The Baltic Sentinel, that in peacetime there are three main scenarios for NATO Baltic Air Policing mission to use force and down a flying object: the need for self defense, hostile act or non compliance. The unlawful entrance of a military drone, once visually identified, can be shot down as a matter of self defense. Visual identification is not required during war time, when airspace is closed and electronic identification via radar is sufficient for action. Visual identification is needed in peacetime to ensure that a hobby aircraft is not mistaken for a drone.

Local inhabitants from the Rezekne area have challenged that notion through media, asking how was it possible for the Latvian Armed Forces to establish immediately that the Russian drone didn’t have hostile intent and even if no hostility was detected, the Armed Forces could not be certain about where it was going to be landing.

The Latvian Ministry of Defense said in a comment to The Baltic Sentinel, that the Latvian Armed Forces conducted surveillance of the progress of the Russian Shahed drone and the incident was reported to the responsible government officials, law enforcement and NATO partners and commands.

"After the incident, the Armed Forces conducted a site survey, deactivated the drone and collected the debris," the Ministry of Defense said.

The commander also cited the technical challenges of tracking and identifying low-flying drones, particularly small UAVs like the Shahed. The Latvian Air Force faces difficulties in spotting such aircraft, especially when they fly at low altitudes. While electronic warfare tools could potentially be used to disrupt a drone’s flight, Latvia’s capabilities in this area are still developing, Kalniņš noted.

Colonel Viesturs Masulis, commander of the Latvian Air Force, confirmed to LETA news agency that additional air defense units had been deployed to the eastern border in response to the incident.

However, the incident has raised questions about country's readiness or willingness to respond to similar threats in the future, with some experts - including former Latvian former Secretary General of the Ministry of Defense Janis Garisons arguing that the drone should have been shot down, if only to send a strategic message to Russia and reassure the Latvian public. Garisons also voiced criticism of the government’s handling of the incident, particularly its communication strategy.

Locals Felt Threatened

The Russian drone crashed early on Saturday morning, yet the first public official announcement came on Sunday afternoon and the press conference was held two days after the incident, on Monday.

Locals in the Rezekne region have expressed anxiety over the incident. The absence of clear communication about the drone’s intentions and the delay in official public announcements left many feeling vulnerable.

As Latvia continues its investigation into the drone crash, questions have arisen about whether the country should invoke Article 4 of the NATO treaty, which calls for consultations when a member state’s security is threatened.

Latvian Ministry of Defense told The Baltic Sentinel on September 11, that Latvia has initiated consultations with its NATO allies, including a meeting on September 11 with NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Admiral Sir Keith Blount, and NATO Air Command Commander General James Hecker.

The Ministry of Defense has not yet sought formal Article 4 consultations, as did Turkey in 2015 to ask allied assistance in face of air threats from Syrian airspace.  Defense Minister Andris Sprūds has, however, advocated for strengthening NATO’s air defense presence in Latvia and exploring collective solutions among the alliance.

Latvian President Edgars Rinkevičs has also called for a reassessment of NATO air policing procedures, particularly in response to hybrid threats like rogue drones, which fall into a "gray zone" of conflict.

In response to the question why NATO fighter jets were not taken into the air, the President Edgars Rinkevics explained that they fall under the command of NATO and neither the commander of the Latvian Armed Forces nor any other public official can give direct orders to the German Luftwaffe unit based in Lielvarde airbase near Riga.

The command line for NATO air policing goes through the regional air operations control center in Uedem, Germany, so there is a time lag between identifying the object and making a decision to shoot it down. However, with a slow-moving drone like the Shahed, this should not be problem.

While Latvia has made progress in acquiring advanced air defense systems, the country’s military leaders have acknowledged that there is still work to be done.

The maximum flight altitude of a Shahed drone is 4000m, which is in the reach of portable short range air defense system Piorun, that Latvia recently acquired.

Thus, in theory, Latvia could respond to a Shahed scenario without the help of allies, but in practice, there are limitations. Drones flying on lower attitudes could be successfully also intercepted with machine guns. But as Latvia does not have permanently deployed ground-based air defense units, there is no alternative to using NATO air policing fighters for fighting such a sudden threat in peacetime.

The apparent passivity of NATO air policing fighters, both in Latvia’s case and in a recent incident (September 8) where a Russian attack drone entered Romanian airspace and remained there for tens of minutes without being intercepted, raises questions about whether NATO air policing missions have been directed not to engage with Russian military assets that are perceived to have strayed off course.

Investigation and Future Steps

The Latvian Ministry of Defense has promised a thorough investigation into the incident, with the first report expected within 20 days. While officials have refrained from disclosing information about the drone’s payload or exact flight path, Defense Minister Andris Sprūds has confirmed that Latvia will strengthen its air and anti-drone defense capabilities. The Latvian National Security Council has agreed to update procedures for responding to aerial threats and to improve coordination between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior.

A military source from a NATO member state told The Baltic Sentinel that a logical response to such incidents would be to grant pre-authorization to NATO Baltic Air Policing pilots to shoot down objects posing a lethal threat to the inhabitants of a NATO nation. 'Pre-authorizing pilots to make engagement decisions independently is typically reserved for situations involving early warning signals. However, provocations are often unpredictable. If such incidents were to recur, pre-authorization would likely be in place,' the source explained.

The Latvian Ministry of Defense said, that the September 7 crash of the Shahed drone is the first known instance of an attack drone violating Latvian airspace, but it is not the first time Latvia has encountered incursions by Russian military aircraft. In November 2023, a Russian plane briefly crossed into Latvian airspace before returning to Russian territory.

In September 2005 a Russian Su-27 fighter bomber crashed in Lithuania near capital Vilnius, after violating the NATO airspace.

While such incidents are not uncommon, they underscore the persistent challenges Baltic states face in safeguarding their airspace against Russian harassment. The Baltic Air Policing Mission, conducted by rotating NATO allies, has played a vital role in monitoring and intercepting unauthorized Russian incursions, yet the recent drone incident has exposed the limitations of the current Baltic air defense framework.

Baltic News Service reports, that on September 11 Lithuanian Minister of Defense Laurynas Kasciunas urged NATO to change its air policing algorithm: "Air defense should not only be a patrol but, if necessary and possible, and when time allows, it should shorten NATO's decision-making chain so that they can immediately take off and destroy drones," he said speaking to journalists.

"If radars detect a drone that could enter the territory of an allied country, this information must be quickly relayed to NATO headquarters," Kasciunas added.

According to him, NATO headquarters assesses the situation to see if there is enough evidence that it is a hostile drone and not something else, such as a lost aircraft, and then makes a quick decision to send out air defense fighters. "This is a specific algorithm, and it needs to be sped up," said Kasciunas.

When asked what Vilnius' reaction would be if an aggressor violated Lithuanian airspace, the minister replied that it must be a collective NATO decision.