JAMES SHERR ⟩ Ukraine's Kursk Gains May Have Shifted Momentum, But Not the Narrative

Moreover, it exemplified operational maneuver at its finest—a decisive strike through the enemy’s weak point, deep into the rear of their deployment. The operation also achieved near-total surprise: although the enemy observed much of what was happening, they failed to grasp its significance. The last time these principles were applied with such success was during the Kharkiv counteroffensive in September 2022, also led by Syrskyi. In essence, the long cycle of attritional warfare has been disrupted.

The second overturned assumption is the belief that Putin has restored the Soviet "way of war," defined by overwhelming mass and resources, which led to victory in 1945. While Russia has certainly relied on this strategy to some extent, evident from its offensives in Bakhmut (which fell in May 2023), Avdiivka (February 2024), and the approaches to Pokrovsk, it’s clear that Russian advances have been characterized by sheer relentlessness, fueled by superior numbers in matériel and manpower, and marked by the wanton destruction of Ukrainian cities and infrastructure.

Additionally, like Stalin’s approach, Putin's strategy appears casualty-averse, though this is belied by reports from British Defense Intelligence, which estimate that Russia sustained nearly 1,200 casualties per day in August—comparable to the losses suffered by the Imperial Russian Army during World War I—with over 610,000 total casualties since the invasion began in February 2022.

However, serious students of World War II will recognize different lessons. Axis forces were not defeated through attrition and slow, grinding advances, but through bold offensives and encirclement operations—Stalingrad ("Operation Uranus"), Jassy-Kishinev, and the Vistula-Oder campaign, to name a few.

These were brilliant examples of combined arms warfare, mobility, and maneuver. In each case, the Red Army achieved situational dominance, concentrating overwhelming force on narrow breakthrough points before the enemy could redeploy, even though the overall balance of forces across the theater was less favorable. This success was largely due to a streamlined command structure that gave operational commanders full authority over all formations and units within their areas of responsibility.

This is the model that Syrskyi and his subordinates are striving to implement in Kursk and, under far less favorable conditions, in Pokrovsk. In contrast, it is the Russians who are burdened by a convoluted command structure—one characterized by overlapping zones of responsibility, conflicting lines of subordination, and a tangle of command authorities.

These shortcomings have plagued Russia since the outset of the war and largely explain why its significant numerical superiority has yielded such poor results. They also help clarify why the capture of the "strategically significant" cities of Bakhmut (a Wagner operation) and Avdiivka has not translated into meaningful operational success.

Even in Putin’s inner circles, it must be evident that 20,000 to 30,000 soldiers—comparable to Soviet losses in Afghanistan—were sacrificed for Bakhmut, and that losses in Avdiivka were similarly devastating. Yet, as of this writing, Chasiv Yar (17 km from Bakhmut) and Toretsk (35 km away) remain under Ukrainian control. Adding to these failures are several glaring miscalculations, such as the redeployment of the 80th Arctic Brigade from the Norwegian-Finnish border to the Dnipro estuary, where it was decimated because its specialized skills were entirely unsuited to the terrain and mission.

The crucial point is that the Russians no longer possess the operational superiority that their Soviet predecessors once wielded to such devastating effect. At no stage have they managed to convert tactical gains into operational-level success. But does Putin grasp the significance of this? It seems unlikely, given his boastful remarks in Tuva on September 2, according to which these grinding offensives are serving their intended purpose.

Why, then, has the Soviet Union’s once-vaunted expertise in operational art failed to pass down to its Russian successors? Of the many factors, the foremost is the nature of the state itself. Today, the FSB wields outsized influence, even in military affairs. It played a central role in planning the disastrous February 2022 invasion and has leveraged its privileged position to sideline the most talented and independent-minded officers within the General Staff.

Moreover, as the primary agency responsible for internal security, the FSB has been entrusted with command authority in Kursk, despite the fact that it is not facing a "terrorist provocation" but a full-scale war.

This is a direct result of Putin’s reliance on submissive loyalists rather than individuals with proven capability. Stalin’s system operated much the same way—until 1941. By the end of that year, generals with the same level of ineptitude as Gerasimov were purged, and those demonstrating real brilliance were promoted from distant outposts or even the GULAG to high command. Soviet leaders, even Stalin, understood that entrusting military authority to the NKVD or KGB was a grave mistake. Yet Putin has not absorbed this crucial lesson from history.

The salient fact is that the Russians no longer possess the operational-level superiority that their Soviet predecessors demonstrated to such telling effect.

It would be remiss not to highlight that, over the past year, Ukraine has driven much of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet to Novorossiysk and made occupied Crimea increasingly perilous for Russia’s air and ground forces, as well as the infrastructure supporting them. Ukraine has also blunted—though not entirely reversed—Russia’s spring offensive in Kharkiv.

Despite Western restrictions on how Ukraine can use its supplied weaponry, it has made Russian ammunition depots, oil facilities, command centers, and logistical hubs more vulnerable to attack. These very restrictions have, in fact, spurred Ukraine’s defense industry, fueling technological innovation that has been matched by tactical ingenuity on the battlefield.

The Inescapable Question of Donbas

Yet, despite these accomplishments, none have diminished the critical importance Putin places on the Donbas offensive. In this, he may not be entirely wrong. Russia’s most battle-hardened forces remain focused on the capture of Pokrovsk. If anyone in Kyiv was counting on these forces being redeployed to defend Russia’s borders, that has not materialized.

What has happened, however, is significant in its own right. Ukraine’s Kursk offensive has preemptively neutralized a planned Russian offensive toward Sumy. It has forced Russia to cobble together new units—many with mixed subordination and minimal training—to push back Ukrainian forces.

Moreover, Ukraine's incursion has necessitated a substantial redeployment of at least 30,000 Russian troops from Ukraine to Kursk. While this shift has not weakened the concentration of forces aimed at Pokrovsk, it has prevented their reinforcement, deprived them of fresh reserves, and allowed Ukraine to mount successful counterattacks in other parts of the front.

Whereas the pace of the Pokrovsk offensive accelerated in August, it has slowed in September. Moreover, according to one well-placed Ukrainian expert the Pokrovsk direction is recognised by Ukrainian command as secondary at the moment. To stabilise the situation, National Guard units have been transferred there, and the 25th Airmobile Brigade has been transferred directly to the strike direction at Pokrovsk near Novohrodivka. Logistics does not go through Pokrovsk for quite objective reasons. Stronger brigades are transferred to other parts of the front.

According to Ukraine’s Centre for Defence Strategies the enemy's command on the theater of operations must conduct strategic regrouping between operational zones and reinforce the ‘Tsentr (Center)’ Operational Grouping on the Toretsk direction with at least a corps.

Without the involvement of additional forces and resources, [Tsentr’s] 41st Army Command will soon have to either concentrate on narrower directions and sectors or abandon simultaneous offensive actions across the entire operational zone. By the end of this year, the enemy will not only fail to occupy Donetsk Oblast within its administrative borders but also will be unable to seize the ‘fortress belt’ of Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka-Kramatorsk-Slovyansk. 

For all that has been achieved, the entire sector south of Pokrovsk—critical to its defense—remains at serious risk of falling to the enemy. While the General Staff may currently consider Pokrovsk "secondary," this assessment could prove to be a miscalculation.

Although the operations in Pokrovsk and Kursk each follow their own distinct logic, they are closely interconnected, with fluid dynamics in both theaters. In each, the Ukrainian Armed Forces withdraw when necessary, but often yield territory intentionally to strengthen more strategic positions and trap advancing Russian units.

Russia’s counteroffensive in Kursk on September 10 received widespread coverage, but Ukraine’s second border incursion on September 12 and the subsequent gains went largely unnoticed in the West. These operations—advances and retreats, encirclements and breakouts—are hallmarks of maneuver warfare. As of now, nothing is settled, and any predictions would be premature.

A Turning Point or a Valiant Failure?

We should focus on three key realities.

First, regardless of battlefield outcomes, the political dimension will be decisive. A major objective of Ukraine’s Kursk operation is to reshape the international narrative, but so far, that narrative remains unchanged. Regardless of what unfolds, there will be no major shift in U.S. policy before its election. Vladimir Putin is confident that time is on Russia’s side and that Ukraine is heavily reliant on the West.

He believes that Western policy will ultimately be shaped by Washington and Berlin, not Warsaw, Tallinn—or London—despite the boldness and determination of those countries. Furthermore, Putin remains convinced that a limited, manageable Ukrainian incursion across Russia’s borders poses no significant threat to his system of power.

Second, Ukraine and the United States have fundamentally different views of the war, and this divergence is likely to persist. Ukrainians believe their struggle is sustainable if the West continues its support, and that a meaningful victory—crippling Russia’s offensive capabilities and reversing some territorial gains—is within reach.

In contrast, many in the U.S., Germany, and other nations are firmly entrenched in the belief that "Russia cannot be defeated," while simultaneously fearing that Russia’s defeat would be too destabilizing to manage. Where Ukrainians and their committed allies in Central and Eastern Europe see the war as proof that Russia is only emboldened by weakness, influential voices in the West, even some who support "imposing costs" on Russia, argue that NATO’s expansion and disregard for Russia’s "legitimate interests" provoked the conflict.

Finally, while the Biden administration acknowledges that the risk of nuclear escalation is low, it believes the danger is still too great to dismiss. For Washington, avoiding a broader conflict takes precedence over achieving the kind of victory Ukrainians envision. For Ukraine, however, defeating the enemy and ensuring national survival are inseparable. Reconciling these differing perspectives will be no easy task.

Ukraine and the United States view the war through different lenses and probably will continue to do so.

Third, as a result of these tensions, trust between Ukraine, the U.S., and Germany has markedly declined. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s request—issued during the suspension of U.S. military aid by Congress—that Ukraine refrain from striking Russia with its own weapons, was met with a fierce rejection from Zelensky and promptly ignored.

It’s no surprise that Kyiv chose to keep its plans for the Kursk operation concealed from Washington. Despite CIA Director William Burns warning that the transfer of Iranian missiles to Russia would constitute a "dramatic escalation," their deployment has not led to any shift in Washington’s restrictions on targeting. Against this backdrop, Putin’s claim that the West is willing to fight "to the last Ukrainian" has begun to take on a troubling resonance.

Adding to this, one prognosis is clear: Russia’s fundamental objectives will not change as long as Vladimir Putin and the pillars of his regime remain in power. In 2014, these objectives were summarized as either subjugating Ukraine or destroying it.

Today, Russia is doing everything in its power to make Ukraine uninhabitable and unsustainable. Yet, Washington continues to adhere to the belief that all wars ultimately end in negotiation.

Few in Ukraine share this optimism, believing that Russia will not make meaningful concessions until it faces the prospect of defeat. Zelensky’s claim that the Kursk operation is meant to gain "leverage" in negotiations may offer reassurance to Washington, but it does not align with his true convictions, nor does it reflect the realities in Moscow. The goal is not to negotiate with Russia, but to stop it.

Ukraine’s Kursk operation may have shifted the momentum, but the harsh reality is that this might not be enough to change the broader outcome.