TESTIMONY OF A CLERGYMAN ⟩ How Moscow's Once Astute Patriarch Kirill Became the Ideological Architect of the "Russian World"

As his secretary, Kirill didn’t have the opportunity to study properly and had to catch up with others on the fly. That said, he held education in high regard. I came to him with a solid educational background, and he appreciated that.

We had a fairly trusting relationship back then. It was comfortable to be in his circle because I could say things that he didn’t like, and I could criticize his ideas.

Interviewer: How did such an astute person turn into someone he is today, a public figure justifying genocide and war of aggression?

Kirill Hovorun: The three years I spent in Moscow coincided with a pivotal period of transformation for Kirill. He was elected Patriarch of Moscow in 2009, and at that time, I still had direct access to him.

It was during this period that I began to observe a marked evolution in his ideological trajectory, one that eventually culminated in the "Russian World" doctrine. In the earlier stages of his career, Kirill had been a notably liberal bishop, viewing liberal ideas as a means to distinguish himself from the wider ranks of the clergy.

However, he soon realized that conservative ideals offered a more advantageous path for his ascent — and, as the saying goes, were more marketable. Kirill possessed an astute political instinct, and even then, he sensed the conservative wave that was beginning to surge in global politics. This trend, which would later bring figures like Donald Trump to power, was something Kirill perceived early on.

Recognizing this shift, he concluded that the future lay with extreme conservative ideologies, and he adjusted his stance accordingly. He became deeply engaged with the concept of Russian identity and was particularly captivated by Nikolai Gumilyov's theory of ethnogenesis, which posited the existence of a "Russian superethnos." This theory profoundly resonated with him.

Interviewer: Historian Timothy Snyder, in his book The Road to Unfreedom, described how Lev Gumilyov’s theories of ethnogenesis and Ivan Ilyin’s vision of an innocent Russian world in conflict with a corrupt West became mainstream. But who influenced whom—did Gundyaev craft this ideology for the security services, or was it the other way around?

Kirill Hovorun: These were Kirill’s ideas, which he passed on to the security establishment, the so-called "Chekists." As I began to see the trajectory of these developments, I started writing to him, warning that this ideology was dangerously misguided and would inevitably lead to catastrophe. By that point, however, he no longer heeded my counsel. It was still 2011, and at that time, no one had yet begun to raise alarms about the looming dangers of the "Russian World" ideology.

As I already mentioned, Kirill drew inspiration from Gumilyov, who advanced the notion that the Russian nation was a distinct civilization unto itself—the "Russian World." He also borrowed heavily from Samuel Huntington, who wrote about the clash of civilizations. Moreover, Kirill embraced Gumilyov’s concept of passionarnost (passionarity).

To clarify for readers, passionarnost in Gumilyov’s framework refers to extraordinary individuals brimming with excess energy, capable of channeling it toward either creation or destruction. It is these figures who disrupt the established order and drive society forward.

This idea held great significance for Kirill. He believed that for a civilization to endure and progress, it needed passionarnost — people who would act as its engine. I vividly recall Kirill lamenting that, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian people had lost their passionarnost. He made various efforts to rekindle it, focusing primarily on influencing politicians, as he holds a firm belief in elite-driven change.

Kirill is convinced that working directly with the populace is less effective; instead, one must engage with the elite, who will then shape the people. He initially concentrated on mid-level officials. At that time, he had no access to the Kremlin. During Putin’s first two terms, Kirill had a strained relationship with the president—there was no direct contact. It wasn’t until Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency that Kirill managed to cultivate a working relationship with the Kremlin.

It was during Medvedev’s tenure that Kirill was elected Patriarch—thanks in part to the involvement of Medvedev’s wife. This connection granted Kirill the access he needed to the Kremlin, and soon after, Vladimir Putin returned to power for his third term.

As I recall, this was around the time of the last major public protests. First, following the December 2011 State Duma elections, and then again in March 2012 after the presidential elections.

This led to a legitimacy crisis for Putin, who had just been re-elected for a third term. Interestingly, Kirill was quite outspoken at the time. In January 2012, he stated that the Church stood both with the protesters and the authorities, implying that the people had the right to protest.

Interviewing: Was he referring to the punk group Pussy Riot, who famously chanted in one of the churches "Mother of God, drive Putin away" in the fall of 2011?

Kirill Hovorun: Yes, that slogan deeply offended Putin, intensifying the legitimacy crisis he was already facing. Kirill, keenly aware of the moment's gravity, responded by orchestrating a vociferous campaign against Pussy Riot. The Church played a pivotal role in the high-profile trial, providing witnesses that ultimately led to the sentencing of the girls to two years in prison.

I believe this was a watershed moment in the relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Kremlin. The sacrifice of the girls further solidified the alliance between Putin and Kirill, allowing Kirill to captivate the Kremlin's interest in his ideological vision.

It's a long and complex story, and I won’t dwell on it too much here, but the crux of the matter is that initially, the Kremlin had little interest in this ideology.

However, by 2012, Putin found himself in need of additional sources of legitimacy, and Kirill was ready to deliver. What Kirill offered was a narrative of Russia’s unique civilizational mission. What significance do elections hold in comparison? What relevance do democratic processes have? They are mere trifles. Against the grandeur of Russia’s historic mission as a civilization, elections seem insignificant. Kirill presented something profound, and Putin was intrigued.

At first, the Kremlin cautiously adopted some of Kirill’s language, and soon after, the idea of traditional values was promoted. Kirill persistently pushed this narrative to the Kremlin, along with the notion of Russia’s traditional religions, arguing that Orthodoxy should be given special status. Gradually, Kirill succeeded in embedding the "Russian World" ideology, which has since engulfed the Russian political landscape.

Interviewer: Do the highest spiritual leaders, including Kirill, still truly believe in God?

Kirill Hovorun: For them, ideology has become intertwined with their faith. They genuinely believe that this is a divine mandate for Russia to rise as a global leader.

Interviewer: I had the impression that they had simply stopped believing, given their calls for violence and their blessing of missiles aimed at peaceful cities.

Kirill Hovorun: They believe in their own fashion. For them, war is not a sin but a means to achieve a higher goal: Russia’s dominance, and with it, their own dominance within Russia. It’s a kind of fanaticism—they are driven by a maniacal zeal.

Interviewer: Did you refuse to serve in the Russian Orthodox Church because of ideological differences?

Kirill Hovorun: Yes, I refused because I recognized that this ideology was disastrous. I could have had a promising career in the Russian Orthodox Church— I had risen to a fairly high position. But in the end, I made a deliberate choice in favor of scholarship, reason, and morality.

Interviewer: I found your article "Patriarch Kirill and His Church-State Emergency Committee" fascinating. It was published under a pseudonym, but your identity was revealed, sparking a scandal.

Kirill Hovorun: In truth, I wasn’t the sole author of that article, but that’s beside the point — I agreed with its conclusions. It addressed the effective removal of Metropolitan Volodymyr, the head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, from leadership. A new system of governance was put in place that stripped him of any meaningful influence over the church.

Interviewer: Was that a one-time tactic, or has it been applied in other local churches since then? You must be aware of the situation in Estonia - Metropolitan Yevgeny was last year denied residence permit because of his pro-Kremlin propagandist attitudes and he currently resides in Russia. Then Estonian native Father Daniel (Lepisk) was made a monk and elevated to bishop within just three days. Now, the only senior cleric with an Estonian passport has to regularly explain why part the Estonian Orthodox Church remains aligned with Moscow.

Kirill Hovorun: That was his decision, one I do not share and consider to be a mistake. He made his choice, and now it is his responsibility to justify it. These questions should be posed to him repeatedly. As for the Estonian Metropolitan Yevgeny, his situation is the opposite of Ukrainian Metropolitan Volodymyr's. While Moscow sought to sideline Volodymyr due to his waning loyalty, Yevgeny remains unwaveringly faithful to Moscow’s authority.

Interviewer: I assume that local spiritual leaders don’t actually decide much. Am I mistaken?

Kirill Hovorun: Even Metropolitan Yevgeny was not independent.

Interviewer: So, in reality, is the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate controlled by Kirill from Moscow?

Kirill Hovorun: Indeed, Kirill effectively holds the reins. The Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate  has always held special significance for Kirill. First, because Alexius (the former Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia) was born in Estonia. Kirill sought to earn favor with Alexius and aimed to resolve the so-called Estonian issue. He pursued this actively and assertively, in his characteristic style.

This is precisely why Yevgeny Reshetnikov was appointed here. They called it an election, but it was no real election. It was a simple procedure for appointing the purportedly independent head of a purportedly independent church. Yevgeny was chosen because he was loyal, reliable, and obedient.

Interviewer: You mentioned that you know Yevgeny Reshetnikov personally.

Kirill Hovorun: Yes. At the time, I was the head of the Department of External Church Relations for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and we were moving towards independence and autocephaly. We were close to realizing this plan when Moscow realized things had gone too far. I was recalled from Kyiv and reassigned to work on educational matters.

At that point, I worked directly with the current Metropolitan of the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, Yevgeny, who was my immediate superior. However, I had direct access to the Patriarch, allowing me to push forward initiatives I deemed necessary, and Yevgeny would sign off on them. Even then, he was entirely dependent.

Interviewer: There’s always been much discussion about the Russian Orthodox Church’s ties to the KGB, and now to the FSB. What can you say about this?

Kirill Hovorun: It's certainly true. Almost every hierarch who became a bishop during the Soviet era had connections with the KGB. At that time, one could only become a bishop with the approval of the KGB. The forms of cooperation varied. Some bishops came directly from the KGB, and some were even officers.

Interviewer: Did such individuals even need to believe in God?

Kirill Hovorun: No, it wasn’t required. Some deeply religious bishops were also ardent admirers of the KGB, while others cooperated reluctantly, believing it was necessary to save the church. As far as I knew him, Kirill initially had a non-conformist streak. For example, when I joined his department in Moscow, he had just purged all the minor KGB agents from his office.

Later, when the Russian Orthodox Church outlined its "Foundations of the Social Concept," Kirill, who was essentially the author of this document, included a dangerous clause suggesting that if the state acted unjustly, the people had the right to disobey.

This caused significant anxiety in the Kremlin, and Kirill was reprimanded, but at that time, he believed in it. Incidentally, this was one of the reasons his relationship with Putin didn’t thrive during Putin’s first two terms. Putin knew that Kirill didn’t like the security services, which didn’t sit well with him. Likewise, Kirill had no fondness for Putin, just as he disliked any Chekist. Even now, there are no real personal bonds between them—it’s more of a "marriage of convenience." They cooperate because it serves both of their interests.

Interviewer: Putin likely doesn’t appeal to many people on a personal level.

Kirill Hovorun: True. After all, his KGB nickname was “Koni” — a reflection of his dull, unimaginative persona. Without vision, he was never capable of thinking on a grand scale. In fact, Kirill played a key role in shaping Putin’s worldview, as it was Kirill who introduced the vision of Russia’s global mission. Putin’s messianism, which has since come to light, stems from the influence of the clergy.

I’ll say something paradoxical now, but in my view, things would be better if Kirill simply followed the KGB-FSB line and did whatever the Chekists told him. In other words, it would be easier if Patriarch Kirill were more like Metropolitan Yevgeny. The real issue is that, currently, the Chekists are following Kirill’s directives. The church leadership possesses far more creativity and vision.

Interviewer: You have raised the issue of the abduction of Ukrainian children at various international conferences. The Russian Orthodox Church is involved in these mass kidnappings and in the reeducation of these children to become soldiers of the Russian World. How does a church charity organization turn into a state mafia, and how do seemingly respectable figures, like Bishop Panteleimon Shatov, become criminals?

Kirill Hovorun: It happens gradually. Child abduction is a significant problem, and we are working with many civil society figures and journalists to address it. The problem has been recognized at the International Criminal Court level. Arrest warrants have been issued for Putin and the so-called children's ombudsman, Maria Lvova-Belova, who, by the way, is the wife of a priest.

Interviewer: Is Russia raising its own version of Janissaries, the monk-soldiers in the Ottoman Empire?

Kirill Hovorun: It’s essentially the same practice. I recently drew the same parallel in a speech in Canada. However, even among the Turks, this inhumane system required the parents' consent — they voluntarily handed over their children for reeducation and received money in return. Here, not only is consent not sought, but the very fact of these abductions is denied at the state level.

But the ultimate goal is the same: to reeducate the children and turn them into loyal servants of the “Sultan.” According to my sources, who have access to these children, they are being forced to adopt a Russian identity; failure to comply results in severe punishment.

Kadyrovites and the church are involved in the reeducation of these children. They are the ones who commit the most brutal acts: no Ukrainian language, no memories of Ukraine are allowed. Any violations are harshly punished. These facts have been confirmed and verified.

Sadly, the World Council of Churches, which works closely with the Estonian Lutheran Church, conceals these facts. Estonia plays a significant role in supporting this organization. These global ecumenical bodies unknowingly become complicit in these crimes by supporting what appear to be charitable efforts by the Russian Orthodox Church. Estonia should certainly pay attention to this.