HYBRID ALLIANCE ⟩ Norwegian and Irish Fishermen Successfully Challenged Russia’s Military Moves in High North

Photo: Raigo Pajula

3rd October 2024, 11:47

NATO's counterpressure on Russia in the Arctic has been bolstered by Irish and Norwegian fishermen, who, as an act of civil disobedience, have refused to vacate areas claimed by Russia for military exercises.

In the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the High North has undergone profound changes, becoming a critical focal point in the broader strategic competition between NATO and Russia. The once predominantly symbolic and politically charged military exercises conducted by Russia have now evolved into a more defensive posture, aimed at bolstering its bastion defense strategy in the Barents Sea.

A recent study published by Norwegian experts Kristian Åtland, Thomas Nilsen, and Torbjørn Pedersen in the Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies maps the changing pattern of Russia’s military exercises in the High North, offering a detailed examination of this shift and the factors driving it.

From Political Signaling to Defensive Posturing

The three Norwegian defense academics have established that before 2022, Russia’s military activity in the High North was characterized by politically motivated signaling aimed at NATO, often timed to coincide with Western military exercises.

This was particularly evident during large-scale NATO exercises such as Trident Juncture 2018, where Russia issued a significant NOTAM (Notice to Airmen) event to coincide with NATO’s largest military drill since the Cold War. A NOTAM is a notice to pilots about important changes or hazards that could affect a flight, such as airspace restrictions, runway closures, or weather issues. It is also used during maritime military exercises and Russia has been witnessed to abuse the measure for restricting freedom of movement of other vessels or air planes in certain areas.

During Trident Juncture, Russia declared an expansive NOTAM area off the coast of Norway, which was interpreted as a form of geopolitical messaging, designed to disrupt the exercise and assert its influence in the region.

Spanish soldiers in an Pizarro tank during an exercise to defend an airfield as part of the Trident Juncture 2018, a NATO-led military exercise, on November 1, 2018 near the town of Oppdal, Norway. Photo: JONATHAN NACKSTRAND/AFP

Similarly, during NATO’s Cold Response 2022 exercise, which involved over 30,000 troops from NATO countries and was staged far north of the Arctic Circle, Russia responded by announcing a live-fire missile exercise in the central Norwegian Sea. This exercise, much smaller in scale, was aimed at countering NATO’s message of unity and strength but demonstrated Russia’s diminished ability to directly challenge NATO’s growing presence.

However, after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the focus of Russian military activities shifted away from symbolic actions toward a more strategic emphasis on the Barents Sea. Russia’s previously prominent exercises in the Norwegian Sea and the Arctic Ocean, aimed at deterring NATO operations, have given way to more focused bastion defense operations intended to protect its core strategic assets, including its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) of the Northern Fleet.

Data from 2015 to 2023 shows a marked increase in the frequency, size, and duration of Russian military exercises in the High North, especially after the invasion of Ukraine. In 2015, Russia conducted only one NOTAM event in the High North, but by 2022, this number had surged to 17, with 14 of these occurring after February 24, 2022. The number of NOTAM events remained high in 2023, with 16 exercises.

In this photo released by Russian Defense Ministry Press Service on Wednesday, Sept. 11, 2024, the Guided Missile Destroyer Warship Admiral Levchenko of the Russian Northern Fleet forces fires missiles while searching for submarines of a simulated enemy and practice the use of anti-submarine weapons in the Barents Sea during a large scale naval exercise as the Ocean-2024 drills. Photo: Russian Defense Ministry

The scope of these exercises also expanded significantly. In May 2022, during a massive exercise in the southern Barents Sea, Russia issued a NOTAM warning covering an area of 138,419 square kilometers—an area more than three times the size of Denmark. This level of activity marked a significant escalation, particularly in terms of geographical spread and operational complexity.

The Strategic Shift Northward

The geographical focus of Russia’s exercises has shifted decisively since 2022. Whereas earlier exercises often took place in the Norwegian Sea, some close to NATO’s airspace and Norway’s fishing grounds, the post-2022 exercises are concentrated almost entirely in the Barents Sea. Data analysis shows that since February 2022, all but one Russian NOTAM event has taken place in or near the Barents Sea, reinforcing Russia’s emphasis on protecting its critical Northern Fleet assets.

This geographic shift is linked to Russia’s bastion defense strategy, which seeks to secure the Barents Sea as a strategic stronghold for its submarines, vital for maintaining its nuclear deterrent. The Barents Sea offers both proximity to Russia’s Kola Peninsula naval bases and a relatively isolated maritime zone, reducing the chances of interference or observation by NATO forces.

For instance, the Grom (Thunder) strategic nuclear drill, held in October 2023, was a critical part of Russia's shift towards bolstering its nuclear capabilities. The drill involved the launch of a ballistic missile from a Delta IV submarine stationed in the Barents Sea and demonstrated the Russian military’s renewed focus on ensuring the readiness of its nuclear forces.

NATO’s Increasing Counterpressure

Simultaneously, NATO has dramatically increased its military presence in the High North. Following the invasion of Ukraine and Sweden and Finland's subsequent applications for NATO membership, NATO forces have extended their operational reach into the northern maritime zones. This increased activity includes major naval deployments, such as the participation of the U.S. Navy’s USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier in June 2023, which operated in the Norwegian Sea, showcasing NATO’s resolve to maintain a robust presence in the region.

USS Gerald Ford has extended its patrol area to the Arctic Sea to counter Russia's aggressive signalling. Photo: Steve Earley/The Virginian-Pilot via AP, File/scanpix

Russia’s pivot toward the Barents Sea can also be explained by the depletion of its conventional forces due to heavy losses in Ukraine. Since February 2022, Russia’s military capacity has been severely diminished, particularly its land forces, which have suffered extensive casualties. By early 2023, Russian land forces on the Kola Peninsula were operating at only 20% of their pre-war capacity, according to Norwegian intelligence.

The shift to conducting exercises closer to home waters, such as the Barents Sea, reduces the strain on Russia’s stretched resources and allows the Russian military to focus on securing its nuclear assets. Despite the depletion of its ground forces, Russia’s Northern Fleet has continued to operate, but with a notable reduction in long-range deployments. Some Northern Fleet ships, including the Marshal Ustinov and Vice Admiral Kulakov, have been deployed to the Mediterranean, further stretching Russian naval resources.

Civilian Pushback

Russia’s military activities in the High North have also faced growing resistance from civilian actors. The Norwegian fishing industry, in particular, has been increasingly vocal in its opposition to large Russian military exercises in prime fishing areas.

In August 2023, when Russia announced missile tests near Bear Island, Norwegian fishermen refused to leave the area, arguing that the Russian military exercises were disrupting their livelihood. This pushback, coupled with diplomatic pressure from Norway, has likely contributed to Russia’s decision to concentrate more exercises in the Barents Sea, where civilian interference is less likely.

Russia’s decision to relocate exercises may also have been influenced by international incidents, such as the 2022 Irish fishermen’s protest against Russian military drills off the coast of Cork. In that case, Russia ultimately moved its exercise to a less disruptive location after pressure from the Irish government.

A key driver behind Russia’s increased focus on the Barents Sea is the strategic importance of its nuclear deterrence. Following the invasion of Ukraine, Russia has emphasized the importance of its strategic nuclear forces, suspending its participation in the New START Treaty and canceling other arms control agreements.

This focus is evident in the cancellation of Russia’s Zapad 2023 exercise, traditionally one of its largest, in favor of conducting the annual Grom nuclear forces drill. The 2023 Grom exercise, held in October, featured the launch of both intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), underscoring Russia's priority to maintain and demonstrate its nuclear strike capabilities.

Russia’s shift in its military exercise strategy—moving from symbolic gestures in the Norwegian Sea to concentrated defensive postures in the Barents Sea—reflects both internal capacity constraints and a new strategic focus on nuclear deterrence. As tensions between NATO and Russia continue to evolve, the High North remains a critical region where military power and geopolitical interests converge. This evolving situation will continue to shape the military and political landscape of the Arctic, as both NATO and Russia adapt to the post-2022 realities.

Civilian Fishing Ships in Maritime Disputes

Throughout history, civilian fishing ships have played a surprising yet critical role in maritime conflicts, blocking routes, asserting territorial claims, and serving national interests. These non-military vessels, often overlooked in geopolitical discussions, have been deployed in strategic ways to disrupt adversary operations and protect fishing grounds or territorial sovereignty.

One of the most well-known cases is China’s "maritime militia" in the South China Sea. Chinese fishing boats, often operating under government direction, have repeatedly blocked foreign vessels, asserted control over disputed reefs, and harassed neighboring nations’ ships.

While Irish and Norwegian fishing companies have defied Russia's military navigation restrictions as an act of civil disobedience, China and Russia are known to use civilian vessels as "shadow navies" to further their strategic interests.

In the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff with the Philippines, Chinese fishing vessels played a key role by blocking access to the contested area, preventing Filipino ships from entering the shoal and effectively establishing de facto Chinese control. These operations demonstrate how civilian vessels can act as an extension of state power, blending into the civilian landscape while executing strategic objectives.

Similarly, Vietnam has utilized its fishing fleet to reinforce its claims in the South China Sea. In 2014, Vietnamese fishing boats actively engaged in a confrontation with Chinese vessels around the Paracel Islands, ramming Chinese ships in an effort to block the installation of an oil rig. This incident highlighted how civilian boats can take on a quasi-military role in territorial disputes, serving as a frontline of defense and assertion.

In Europe, Spanish fishermen have engaged in maritime blockades in the waters around Gibraltar, part of an ongoing territorial dispute with the UK. In 2013, Spanish fishing vessels protested the construction of an artificial reef by Gibraltar authorities, claiming it hindered their fishing activities. The fishermen blockaded parts of the waters, disrupting maritime routes and escalating the diplomatic tension between Spain and the UK.

Japan, too, has seen its fishermen take action in territorial disputes, particularly around the Kuril Islands, claimed by both Japan and Russia. Japanese fishing vessels have frequently entered contested waters as part of their assertion of sovereignty. Though these actions have not led to direct naval conflict, they have resulted in the detention of Japanese fishermen by Russian authorities, bringing international attention to Japan’s claims.

A historic example of civilian fishing ships blocking maritime routes comes from the "Cod Wars" between Iceland and the UK in the mid-20th century. Icelandic fishing vessels, supported by their coast guard, actively disrupted British fishing operations by cutting nets and blocking access to rich fishing grounds within Iceland's expanding exclusive economic zone. These fishing boat actions were instrumental in Iceland’s eventual victory, forcing the UK to recognize Iceland’s control over the waters.

In the Philippines, fishing boats have become symbols of resistance. Despite the overwhelming presence of Chinese forces in the South China Sea, Filipino fishermen continue to enter disputed areas like Scarborough Shoal, challenging China’s claims by simply maintaining a presence. These small, unarmed boats serve not just as fishing vessels but as powerful symbols of the Philippines' right to the waters.

Civilian fishing ships are not just tools for economic survival but strategic assets in geopolitical conflicts. Whether by blocking maritime routes, asserting territorial claims, or engaging in direct confrontations, these vessels show that even non-military actors can have a significant impact in maritime disputes. Their actions demonstrate the complex interplay of civilians and state power in contested waters, often shaping the outcomes of broader geopolitical struggles.

Terms

Hybrid Warfare