BRIDGING THE COMMAND GAP ⟩ Ukrainian Officers Call for Structural Reforms to Strengthen Frontline Leadership

Photo: Martin Pedaja

6th October 2024, 10:24

To effectively wage war, Ukraine needs changes in the structure and management of its army, which would mean forming divisions and corps instead of the current brigades.

In informal discussions, a growing number of Ukrainian officers and military experts are voicing a similar view. Their central argument is that, beyond the tactical level—specifically above the brigade level, at the operational command level—Ukraine’s military leadership is currently lagging, which significantly impacts the dynamics on the front lines.

"I believe the time has come," Roman Kostenko, secretary of the Ukrainian Parliament's National Security, Defense, and Intelligence Committee, said to Estonian newspaper Postimees. "This is a necessary step. It will enhance the command structure of our army."

Historically, the Ukrainian army's organizational structure followed the model of regiments/brigades, divisions, and corps. However, after the onset of the war in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, the military found it more effective to operate with independent brigades, primarily composed of professional contract soldiers.

Today, the structure of Ukraine's armed forces in the field can be described as follows: around 100 brigades from various military branches, along with numerous smaller independent units, are engaged in combat, operating under the command of three strategic-operational force groups. These are further subdivided into 12 tactical-operational force groups, each responsible for a specific section of the front. The war is directed on the ground by the headquarters of these force groups.

Experts argue that the core issue is the lack of permanence in these force group headquarters, where staff officers typically rotate every three to four months. "It’s difficult to stay fully informed about all the details of a specific frontline sector when the officers are constantly changing," said one high-ranking Ukrainian officer, who, due to his service, cannot publicly share his opinion. According to him, these headquarters often struggle to fully grasp the frontline situation, which contributes to losses.

Officers and experts advocating for change argue that divisions and corps would have permanent headquarters, significantly improving their situational awareness on the front and enabling them to make faster and better decisions.

Roman Kostenko noted that the current command system—brigades under force group headquarters—worked well at the beginning of the war and into the second year, but it is now starting to fall behind the evolving situation.

"Now that our army is increasingly composed of mobilized troops, this kind of command structure (regiments-divisions-corps) would provide more advantages, particularly in terms of improving the quality of leadership," Kostenko asserted.

Roman Kostenko, the secretary of the Ukrainian Parliament's Defense Committee, is himself a military officer. At the onset of the full-scale war, he took part in Ukraine's defense, weapon in hand. He holds the rank of colonel and is a former member of the anti-terrorism unit Alfa. Photo: Martin Pedaja

A classic division typically consists of three regiments (slightly smaller equivalent to what NATO calls "brigades") or two brigades, along with a tank regiment, a rocket regiment, a communications regiment, a reconnaissance battalion, and other smaller units.

“When you’re a division commander, you know what your three regiments are, what your reserves are, and what their weaponry and capabilities are,” explained Kostenko, describing why a division commander would have a better understanding of their forces than the current force group headquarters. “He knows the attitude towards the soldiers and the soldiers' morale. He knows how to fight with them. These are his soldiers—not like now, where a brigade gets smashed and then moves off that section of the front.”

Kostenko confirmed that members of the Parliamentary Defense Committee have discussed the need for changes in the army’s command structure. “Experts support this idea,” he said. “We’ve spoken with the Ministry of Defense about it, and they’ve expressed verbal support for some of the ideas. I’m not sure of the General Staff’s position. In any case, as we can see, they haven’t yet implemented these changes.”

Soldiers from the Ukrainian Army's 43rd Artillery Brigade are moving into position with a self-propelled howitzer in the Donetsk region. Photo: AP/Jevhen Maloletka

The Ukrainian Ground Forces currently have two corps, but they are significantly larger than traditional army corps. For example, the 10th Corps, which was formed specifically for last summer’s counteroffensive, officially includes six mechanized brigades, one tank brigade, one tank battalion, one artillery brigade, and one reconnaissance battalion. However, the 10th Corps lacks unified command, as all these units are scattered along a frontline over 1,000 kilometers wide and are directly subordinated to various force group headquarters.

The Russian army in Ukraine operates under a structure of regiments/brigades, divisions, and corps.

"They are forming new units based on this division-corps structure and its requirements," said Roman Kostenko. "It’s true that we can see in these divisions that, where there should be a tank regiment, they have a tank battalion. Where there should be a rocket regiment, there’s a rocket battalion. This is a good indication that they no longer have enough equipment to form full-scale divisions."

Terms

command