FROM SABOTAGE TO SUBTERFUGE ⟩ China’s Mock Report Presented to Estonian Authorities Clouds the Balticconnector Incident Investigation

A broader perspective reveals a troubling pattern in China’s maritime activities. Chinese civilian vessels have been implicated in similar anchor-dragging incidents that damaged communication cables off Taiwan’s Matsu Islands almost 20 times in recent years, inflicting long-lasting economic consequences. Recent report from the Estonian Academy of Internal Security Sciences indicates that the Euro-Atlantic region has witnessed a surge in suspicious cable disruptions since 2021, along with over 70 cases of Russian vessels behaving unpredictably near critical maritime assets.

This method of seabed interference is not new; it dates back to World War I, when British forces severed German undersea telegraph cables in 1914. Protecting underwater infrastructure has been a focus since 1884, when the first international convention on the subject was established.

The real question from a security standpoint is how well-prepared the Baltic Sea nations are to detect and respond to such threats. Are NATO’s surveillance and maritime intelligence systems up to the task? In the Newnew Polar Bear incident, reports suggest that a Russian research vessel exhibited erratic maneuvers near the gas pipeline shortly before the sabotage. Estonia's Defense Ministry’s comments indicate a reactive stance rather than a proactive posture in monitoring potential hybrid threats on sea, revealing a potential gap in early-warning capabilities.

While no nation can predict every contingency with definite certainty, the fundamental issue is whether the Baltic Sea states are doing enough establishing robust mechanisms for early detection and response. If the anomalous movements of the Russian research vessel had raised red flags, it might have catalyzed faster, more coordinated efforts from Estonian and Finnish naval forces to mitigate the damage. Yet, the coordination was evidently lacking; Estonia’s public learned about the communication cable damage not from its own officials but from Sweden's civil defense minister, and the sabotage suspicions regarding the gas pipeline were confirmed by Finland, even as Estonia downplayed it as a mere technical issue.

The prolonged presence of the Chinese vessel in the Baltic raises another critical question: could it have been detained for investigation? Maritime law expert Alexander Lott has contested the assertion made by Estonian officials that international maritime laws would have precluded detaining the vessel. Given the substantial environmental damage resulting from the pipeline breach, Lott argues that legal justification might have existed to board the ship and collect evidence.

Now that the Newnew Polar Bear has left the Baltic and its crew likely scattered across China, the window of opportunity for direct accountability seems closed. Even if detained, it is improbable that the crew would confess to deliberate wrongdoing. The cautious approach taken by Finnish and Estonian authorities is somewhat understandable, given the unprecedented nature of the incident in this region. However, had a similar disaster involved an oil tanker, one wonders whether the response would have been as measured.

This isn’t about arresting sailors but rather asserting state presence, gathering evidence, and establishing a documented case as events unfold. Estonia's prosecutorial efforts now hinge on legal cooperation from China—a notoriously unreliable partner in such matters, whose conduct is more akin to that of North Korea or Russia. Expecting genuine assistance from Beijing, especially if the incident aligns with state-directed hybrid operations using a civilian vessel, is a formidable challenge.

The use of civilian vessels for state-directed maritime operations is a widespread practice in the South China Sea. To date, China has responded to Estonia with a hollow mock report while framing the incident in its media as an accident.

This mock report, which the Estonian Minister of Defense has described as a feat of "popular science," enables Chinese authorities to assert claims of cooperation while, in reality, they are merely simulating compliance.

Hybrid warfare's defining characteristic is its inherent ambiguity. These operations are meticulously designed to blur the lines between state and non-state actors, masking intentional acts as seemingly random or isolated incidents. Although these actions might appear chaotic, they are frequently guided by strategic objectives that serve national interests. The true impact of hybrid warfare, though obscured, can destabilize societies and shake the foundations of nations.

If investigations are limited to visible and conventional lines of inquiry, there’s a risk that insufficient evidence will lead to cases being closed prematurely. To fully grasp the scope of these threats, political-level investigations must accompany legal probes, supported by intelligence analysis to interpret the broader security implications.

Estonian MP Raimond Kaljulaid has called for a parliamentary inquiry into the October 8 incident, arguing it would underscore the geopolitical weight of the event. Even absent a formal commission, Estonia and Finland could still produce a security report to raise awareness about the growing threat to underwater infrastructure within the EU and NATO. Such a document would highlight the urgent need for a coordinated defense strategy against these sophisticated assaults.

The Balticconnector incident's insurance implications add complexity. If the operator's policy excludes sabotage, consumers might face the financial burden, estimated at over 30 million euros. This would be a tactical win for the attacker, especially if proving sabotage shifts the economic pain to the victims instead of the perpetrators.

Hybrid warfare’s ambiguity offers state actors the luxury of plausible deniability while compelling their adversaries to confront the limitations of their defenses. Estonia and Finland could have acted more swiftly and in greater unison to manage the aftermath. Each incident of this nature should be seen as an opportunity for critical reassessment and strategic adaptation, rather than a moment to defend past shortcomings. Otherwise, narratives of inaction might be bolstered by citing legal limitations on navigational freedom, undermining more assertive responses.

Estonia’s navy recently assumed responsibility for maritime border surveillance from the Police and Border Guard Board, a transition that naturally comes with growing pains. The pivotal question remains: can the Baltic Sea navies rise to the challenges posed by the evolving landscape of hybrid maritime conflict in the Baltic Sea?