KRZYSZTOF KROL ⟩ "Poland Is Not at War, but Russia Attacks It Hundreds of Times a Week"

We must always remember that we are not at war. We are simply defending ourselves and demonstrating our readiness to act, which is our sovereign right.

Interviewer: But if it's clear from the object's flight path that it’s aimed at Ukraine and will cause damage there, would shooting it down be legal during peacetime?

Krzysztof Król: If the object is only targeting Ukrainian territory, we do not have the legal right to shoot it down. That would be a violation of international law.

There is ongoing debate about whether we could engage objects flying over Ukraine that seem to be approaching NATO airspace. This is an extremely sensitive matter. First, it would require a high-level political decision, and second, it would demand a comprehensive agreement with the Ukrainian government. We must consider the potential impact on Ukrainian civilians, as any action could have significant consequences for them.

Looking at historical precedents, we’ve seen similar scenarios before—whether with NATO or the UN enforcing no-fly zones to safeguard conflict zones. However, the most crucial factor here is a political mandate and the willingness to bear responsibility for all possible outcomes.

Interviewer: Under what circumstances would the decision to shoot down a flying object reach the political level, and who would make that decision?

Krzysztof Król: There simply wouldn’t be time for politicians to make such a decision in the moment. The political framework must already be in place, granting the military the authority to act when necessary. Otherwise, the window of opportunity would close before action could be taken.

Let’s recall the missile incident that tragically killed two Polish citizens when it landed on Polish soil (referring to last September's incident in Przewodów, where a missile fired by Ukraine to intercept a Russian attack accidentally hit Poland). That missile was in our airspace for just a few seconds. Imagine trying to call the Prime Minister and asking whether we should take it down while he deliberates. The decision needs to be made instantly, and that can only happen if the authority has already been delegated.

There’s absolutely no way to act like that. Everything must remain within the framework of a clearly defined military operation, with a proper mandate, operational plans, coordinated resources, and so on.

Interviewer: How easy is it to distinguish whether Russian equipment simply malfunctioned or whether the Russians are testing Poland's reaction and readiness?

Krzysztof Król: It’s impossible to make that assessment immediately; it can only be determined after the incident. But in the moment, that doesn’t factor into the decision whether to shoot down the object.

The decision should always be to bring it down, but in a way that doesn’t endanger our people. For example, the missile might have a concrete warhead instead of explosives. The Russians have done this before—launching missiles carrying nothing but a few kilos of cement, simply as a test.

Interviewer: But afterward, when you investigate what happened, you...

Krzysztof Król: …of course. Each case is unique, and we have to thoroughly examine every element. The same applies to the Romanians and their territory, which has seen a significant number of different types of drones crashing. They are doing the same—investigating.

We have to assess what’s inside these objects and determine if the threat was real. This way, we can build proper knowledge and awareness for when we do need to shoot them down.

Interviewer: What are the next steps if you conclude it was scenario A, a technical malfunction, or scenario B, that the Russians were testing you rather than attacking Ukraine?

Krzysztof Król: It can be approached in much the same way as cyberattacks.

The most important step is to accurately identify who was responsible. In that region, there are missiles flying from Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. We need to determine whose missile it was.

If it’s a Russian missile, there will certainly be no immediate military response. Instead, the government, the foreign ministry, and diplomats must take action.

That’s the usual approach. The foreign minister will summon the ambassador of the respective country and hand over a formal letter expressing our position. The Russians need to know that we have these capabilities. There must be consequences; otherwise, they will continue in the same manner.

Interviewer: What does it mean for Poland's defense, having a war literally on the other side of your border?

Krzysztof Król: First, let me reiterate what I said at the beginning of the interview: we are not at war, but we are deeply affected by Russia’s hybrid warfare.

We are dealing with problems caused by the Russians to Poland’s railway infrastructure. We are under constant attack in cyberspace—hundreds of times a week. Our logistics hub, which supports Ukraine, is continuously monitored by the Russians; we are fully aware of this.

We are forced to deal with border situations, and instead of focusing on building up our capabilities, we have to defend our borders. Our soldiers, who should be training on the field, are instead supporting border security.

In the realm of hybrid warfare, the Russians are doing everything they can to degrade our ability to build up our armed forces. It’s important to understand that the issue extends far beyond the border areas—the war is everywhere now.

Secondly, it’s important to recognize that the Russians are also active in the cognitive domain. They are sending their messages to Polish society and the wider West. Even in Poland, there are marginal groups that are influenced by Russian narratives. This influence is even more extensive further west. For instance, in East Germany, Russian influence is considerable. The Russians are doing everything in their power to shift attitudes toward them and their policies, using every tool of power at their disposal—economics, information, military force, and diplomacy.

The use of the information space is quite simple yet has a huge impact. If you can convince people to vote for a certain party that immediately supports a peace agreement with Russia, without any preconditions, that plays right into Russia's hands.

Who is fueling this kind of sentiment? Naturally, it’s those whose aim is to shift the public mindset. Just take a look at recent election results in Central Germany, for example.

Interviewer: How much hybrid pressure does Poland feel?

Krzysztof Król: It’s immense, especially when you consider what’s happening at the border. I’ve spoken with Poland’s attaché in Estonia, who mentioned that the pressure on Estonia’s border is marginal. But in Poland, we’re talking about hundreds of people attempting to cross our border. We need to allocate significant resources to protect the EU’s and Schengen's external border.

You can already see the impact of this border pressure when you travel from Poland to Germany. They’ve reinstated border checks, which contradicts Schengen rules, and this was caused by Russian actions.

Another element, which we may not even realize, is how the Russians are influencing decision-making processes within our countries. It’s about more than just individual Russian soldiers on the battlefield. Their operations span various domains, highly organized and aligned with Moscow’s strategic goals and desired influence.

Interviewer: Has the pressure on Poland's border from Belarus been constant, or have there been moments of easing?

Krzysztof Król: I would say the pressure remains consistent, though it fluctuates with the seasons and [Belarusian leader Alexander] Lukashenko’s intentions. But the threat is undeniably persistent, and we don’t know who these people attempting to cross the border are. We’ve already lost a Polish soldier at the border (on June 6 of this year, a 21-year-old Polish soldier was fatally stabbed by a migrant attempting to illegally enter Poland from Belarus).

To protect EU citizens, we must defend these borders. If we allow everyone into the EU, including people with the knowledge to carry out terrorist attacks and handle explosives, we are putting ourselves at risk. Hello, we need to protect ourselves!

Interviewer: It’s both sad and shocking that Poland lost a soldier defending its border during peacetime.

Krzysztof Król: The Russians don’t care about these people. They’re just providing an easy route into Poland. This is state-sponsored crime by the Russian government because migrants are paying them for it. We’re talking about poor people coming from conflict zones around the world. Among them are highly suspicious individuals, but also families who, after crossing the border, end up in Polish hospitals.

Imagine, an ordinary Polish citizen is placed in the same hospital room as someone from an unknown part of the world, possibly carrying unknown diseases. Think about it from that perspective.

Interviewer: What are the key lessons the Polish military has learned from Ukraine’s experience fighting Russia?

Krzysztof Król: First, we’ve learned that we can no longer talk about balancing between a professional military and a mass army. We need to focus on both at the same time.

The Polish Armed Forces must build capabilities that meet the expectations of 21st-century warfare. We need to raise our standards—such as those for regular reservists—to the levels demanded by modern battlefields. We must acquire the most advanced equipment and have the ability to upgrade it as soon as necessary. A culture of adaptability and transformation needs to be ingrained in the Polish military.

Secondly, we must understand that future warfare will occur in a state where all our activities are visible to our enemies. In the past, we could hide our movements. Now we have to be extremely cautious because of observation technologies—satellites in space, aerial reconnaissance, and electromagnetic systems—that can easily detect where we are and what we’re doing.

We must learn to operate effectively in this highly specific environment.

We need to put greater effort into improving our tactical capabilities for fighting in urban areas, engaging in urban warfare. So far, our exercises have been conducted in rural areas, where there are no people or buildings—just trees.

In addition, it is crucial to understand that modern warfare occurs across multiple domains simultaneously. We must learn how to integrate air, sea, land, cyber, and information spaces in the most effective way. We cannot neglect the cognitive domain, either at the strategic or tactical level; we need to mislead our enemy, painting a false picture of our forces, plans, and intentions.

Interviewer: Is Poland considering conscription to increase the size of its military?

Krzysztof Król: This is also under discussion. With the Homeland Defense Act, which the Polish Parliament nearly unanimously passed in March 2022, we introduced the option for citizens to join the armed forces in a voluntary service format. So far, we haven’t faced any issues with recruitment; in fact, we have more volunteers than we can currently train.

However, we must seriously consider how to strengthen our reserve forces and improve their training. Some of our reservists were trained on equipment that we have since donated to Ukraine, so we have significant work ahead of us.

Since 2016, we have been building up national territorial defense forces, which local governments can call upon in the event of various threats, natural or man-made disasters. For example, during the recent floods, the Polish Armed Forces, including about 25,000 active-duty soldiers and representatives of the territorial defense forces, were involved in the relief efforts.

For border defense, we have plans for 16,000 soldiers. While they are not constantly deployed, they are ready to act whenever necessary to prevent any deterioration of the situation.