STEFANO BRAGHIROLI ⟩ North Korea Has Less to Lose by Supporting Russia Than China Does

Interviewer: Is this a test to see if the West will respond or not?

Stefano Braghiroli: Right now, it’s not even necessarily a test but simply the next step. I don’t think the potential deployment of 10,000 North Koreans to Ukraine is any more of a strategic test than, say, the drones increasingly flying into NATO airspace, for which we’ve done nothing to prevent. This is part of a broader strategy to push boundaries, and so far, it hasn’t met with much reaction.

The bigger issue, however, is that if the West continues de-escalating while Russia escalates, two things will happen. First, the conclusion that Russia may draw from this—which goes beyond Ukraine—could be quite dangerous. Second, China could become increasingly involved in the war in Ukraine, potentially moving toward direct support for Russia.

So far, China’s support for Russia has been mainly economic, and while we know that some [military] supplies have reached Russia, they haven’t been particularly decisive. The amount has been small, there’s been little evidence of it, and China is reluctant to openly show military support for Russia.

If the West continues to do nothing, China may become increasingly willing to take steps in support of Russia. It’s also worth remembering that the alliance between China and Russia is, technically speaking, defined as “borderless” by the two top leaders.

Moreover, if China sees that stronger support for Russia does not elicit a reaction from the West and that the West continues to soften its stance, we should keep in mind that if we want to send China a message about Taiwan, it should be done in Ukraine.

The United States is very concerned about Taiwan, but they fail to understand that if we do not teach Russia a lesson in Ukraine, China will receive the signal that it can act in Taiwan as it pleases, with relatively limited consequences.

Interviewer: Is the military cooperation between Russia and North Korea the same in nature as that between Russia and Iran, or are there differences?

Stefano Braghiroli: There is one difference: while both Iran and North Korea have long been seen by the West as pariah states, Russia has had relatively strong relations with Iran for at least the last decade, if not longer. Historical context plays a role here, but these ties were further solidified through developments in Syria.

In contrast, Russia has viewed North Korea as a problematic state in recent years, one whose association would damage its own reputation. Whereas Iran has been a natural supporter of Russia, North Korea was driven toward Russia by the latter’s need for cheap military supplies. North Korea has a plentiful supply, and Russia is less concerned with quality than with quantity. Meanwhile, North Korea sought relief from international isolation.

While we previously discussed Iran, North Korea, and to some extent China as countries enabling Russia to continue its actions, it’s important to remember that China and North Korea have very rarely spoken the same language.

China has long regarded North Korea as a country to keep an eye on, but also as a problematic partner. Therefore, one should not assume that North Korea’s actions are coordinated with or approved by China to any significant extent. North Korea plays its own game, and China plays its own.

The issue is that if one of them escapes sanctions for certain actions, the other may assume it can do the same. North Korea has less to lose by supporting Russia than China does. It is already a pariah state, and since it is a nuclear power, there isn’t much the West can do beyond further international isolation, which hardly affects North Korea anymore.

China, however, is different. The cost to the West of opposing China would be enormous. Diplomatic measures are, of course, an option, but if the West truly wanted to confront China, it would, at best, devastate our economies for the next decade.

Interviewer: Before the military cooperation agreement between Russia and North Korea, China was the one trying to manage North Korea like a parent with a troublesome child. Now, North Korea has moved more decisively toward Russia. Have these developments shifted the balance of power between Russia and China?

Stefano Braghiroli: No, Russia remains the junior partner. Russia has grown weaker and now relies on North Korea. However, for economic survival, Russia depends on China. Therefore, the unequal relationship endures. We see this not only in the relations between the two countries but also, for example, in Central Asia and within BRICS.

Interviewer: Could the partnership between Russia and North Korea continue even after the end of the war in Ukraine, and could this have broader geopolitical implications?

Stefano Braghiroli: This largely depends on two factors. First, the outcome of the war. If we consider the most likely scenario—an armistice with perhaps some territories returned to Ukraine, ambiguous borders, and the potential for a low-intensity conflict to persist for a while, along with Russia's continued isolation by the West—then Russia would still need North Korea in the long term. North Korea might begin receiving more from Russia, including military technology it needs.

The second factor is whether Russia finds other suppliers. Currently, the main suppliers are Iran and North Korea. If China were to become more open to publicly supporting Russia, Russia would undoubtedly prioritize China.

China is more reliable, less of a pariah state, and its involvement could enable Russia to bring other BRICS countries on board. This would allow Russia to leverage parts of the Global South against the West, which would be the worst-case scenario for us.

Interviewer: Regarding the possible post-war situation, what should the West do to gain a stronger hand?

Stefano Braghiroli: The best way to secure a strong position after the war is to address the current situation, as it’s difficult to say what the West should do post-war without knowing how the war will end.

I don’t necessarily believe that, in the worst-case scenario—if Ukraine were to fall or if a pro-Russian government came to power in Kyiv, with all occupied territories remaining under Russia—the threat would immediately reach our doorstep. However, the security situation would be incomparable to the present.

The best way for the West to prevent this scenario is to act now. This action shouldn’t be solely military, although military support is, of course, crucial.

As an analyst, I find it puzzling that the West has the comfortable option to provide Ukraine with the necessary support to at least repel Russia. I’m not talking about liberating the entire territory up to the 1991 borders, but about making a decisive shift in the war. And this at a relatively low cost. This is no secret; we all know it. So the question is, why isn’t it being done?

Of course, there are questions about how to sell this to the public. In Eastern Europe, it’s easy to talk about increasing military support and perhaps rearmament, but in Western Europe, it’s more challenging. In my view, there are two major issues that are real and go beyond just convincing voters.

One issue is that both sides—broadly speaking, Eastern and Central Europe on one hand, and Western Europe and North America on the other—want to avoid the outbreak of a large-scale conflict in Europe. From Tallinn to Lisbon, everyone agrees on this. The problem is that they cannot agree on how to achieve it.

This primarily stems from historical understanding of Russia. Here, Russia is better understood than elsewhere. The prevailing view is that to prevent escalation and contain the conflict within Ukraine, a clear lesson must be taught to Russia in Ukraine.

Many in Washington, Berlin, Paris, and London fear that if an attempt is made to teach Russia a lesson in Ukraine, Russia might act unpredictably—potentially starting something as catastrophic as a third world war.

Because each side perceives the situation so differently, it's evident they cannot agree on supporting Ukraine. This also means there is no clear, long-term objective for what they hope to achieve by supporting Ukraine.

Secondly, there are more short-term issues. For example, Germany’s firm opposition to providing certain weapons to Ukraine or to offering a path to NATO membership. Or when the United States advised allies not to shoot down drones that violate NATO airspace, the issue is no longer so much about the risk of escalation but about domestic considerations.

In the United States, for example, minimizing talk of the war has been beneficial for Joe Biden in keeping his election campaign afloat. In other words, nothing should happen before the election that could shake potential support for the Democrats. In Germany, however, the focus is on the potential for a future pragmatic relationship with Russia.

Thus, the fear is not of escalation—that certain actions might lead to war. The fear is that a future might arise where it is no longer possible to reestablish pragmatic, mutually beneficial relations with Russia. Many in Western Europe keep this calculation in mind.