China's Influence Operations Aim to Shift U.S. Policy in the Long Term

China leverages its access to its vast and enticing domestic market as a means of influence. Additionally, China has adopted a more restrained tone in its narratives towards Europe compared to the United States, creating a lulling effect on European audiences.

Interviewer: China has established media and social media channels in many countries as part of a long-term communication strategy, delivering pro-China viewpoints in the local language. Such channels have been active for some time in Finland and Sweden. What to make of it?

Tauno Tõhk: China Radio International’s website is available in over 50 languages. In many cases, China’s media outlets operating in languages like French or Spanish are aimed not at European audiences but rather at influencing the information environments of other regions, such as Africa and Latin America, where those languages are widely spoken. There, messages often include narratives that discredit human rights, democracy, the West, and NATO. Many countries in the so-called Global South are notably more receptive to Chinese propaganda.

In certain countries or with specific target audiences, establishing new media or social media channels may not be the most effective strategy for China. Associations with China can sometimes reduce the impact of the message. To circumvent this, China has begun employing foreign influencers who appear to independently relay China’s talking points.

China also maintains systematic efforts directed at the West, even when its messages have limited effectiveness in Europe. As noted, China’s pressure campaigns aren’t always aimed at enhancing its appeal but rather at discouraging criticism of China.

Interviewer: Many nations seek to improve their image globally and promote narratives that align with their interests, which is understandable. However, China is among the few countries that not only strive to cultivate a positive image but also actively spread disinformation—such as conspiracy theories. Why?

Tauno Tõhk: Successfully silencing critical voices or discrediting independent sources with disinformation creates more space for propaganda.

For instance, Chinese state propaganda has spread conspiracy theories originating in Russia, such as the claim that secret U.S. labs in Ukraine conduct biological experiments. China circulated this theory initially to deflect responsibility for the COVID-19 pandemic.

Later, following the outbreak of the full-scale war in Ukraine, China resurrected this theory, indirectly justifying Russia’s invasion. Chinese state-led propaganda has also spread narratives portraying Ukrainians as Nazis or alleging that Nazis fight within Ukraine’s defense forces.

China’s propaganda differs from Russian disinformation in that it rarely employs blatant falsehoods, which are easily debunked. Instead, Chinese messaging is often subtly biased, aiming to erode trust in the West among global audiences, with messages questioning the legality of sanctions against Russia, for instance. China’s long-term goal is to systematically reduce global support for Western nations, democratic values, and fundamental rights.

In addition to propaganda, China systematically suppresses messages it finds unfavorable, creating more space to expand its own narrative. Therefore, when combined with other information manipulation techniques, China’s propaganda cannot be dismissed as benign.

Interviewer: How does this intimidation and pressure manifest?

Tauno Tõhk: China’s methods in the realm of information manipulation vary widely, from intimidating individuals and harassing them to pressuring companies and organizations using both negative and positive economic incentives. For example, individual activists, journalists, or researchers in Europe who raise or investigate critical topics related to China have received personal threats.

Foreign companies and organizations are also dissuaded from addressing certain topics. For businesses, this can mean threats of withdrawing financial support or limiting access to the Chinese market. In extreme cases, diplomatic sanctions have been applied—such as those imposed on the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), a think tank in Berlin that specializes in Chinese studies.

An illustrative case is the consumer boycott against H&M in China, triggered by the company’s references to human rights abuses in Xinjiang’s cotton production. Social media channels affiliated with the Communist Party were instrumental in this campaign.

Such state-supported consumer boycotts have previously targeted Western companies in China, with estimates suggesting state involvement in at least a third of these cases. Experiences like these mean that H&M and other Western companies “learning from” H&M’s ordeal may hesitate to raise human rights issues in the future, resulting in less honest information about China reaching the public.

This situation shows that beyond direct silencing, China’s broader goal is to foster self-censorship in the West. If a company reliant on the Chinese market or a university collaborating with China knows it’s better not to raise sensitive issues or invite a critical academic to a panel discussion—fearing China’s displeasure and potential threats to end cooperation—then China’s objective has been achieved without its involvement being explicit.

In all cases, whether through direct pressure or cultivating self-censorship, these efforts represent a direct attempt to restrict freedom of expression on critical China-related topics, even in democratic countries.

I’ve personally encountered Chinese individuals living in Europe and the U.S. who are genuinely concerned for their safety. For individuals of Chinese origin living in Europe or the United States, publicly criticizing China often entails a serious risk: threats directed at family members back in China, casting a powerful silencing shadow over their voices.

In 2022, thanks to a report by Safeguard Defenders, it became widely known that China has quietly established over a hundred so-called police stations in foreign countries, including in Europe. On one hand, these centers assist Chinese nationals abroad with administrative issues, like renewing driver’s licenses. On the other, they serve as instruments of control and pressure on Chinese citizens living overseas, with one aim being to monitor and pressure dissidents.

Interviewer: During thee U.S. presidential elections, Russian disinformation campaigns were supporting Donald Trump. Could it be argued that China preferred to act against Trump, given his threats to initiate a full-scale trade war against Chinese imports?

Tauno Tõhk: Observers generally suggest that it’s been hard to discern a strong preference by China for either candidate. The U.S. trade policy stance towards China does not vary significantly between the presidential candidates and is likely to remain unfavorable to China regardless of the election outcome. China undoubtedly favors maximum stability and predictability, even in a negative trajectory for bilateral relations, and would prefer a more isolationist U.S. policy.

When discussing China’s pre-election information operations and influence campaigns, one trend stands out: instead of focusing on presidential candidates, China appears to be shifting its efforts towards congressional and local-level candidates. This approach, noted in Washington amid prevailing negative sentiments toward China, aims to shape a more favorable political environment for China over the long term. Given the relatively lower visibility of these races, information operations can more easily go unnoticed, potentially yielding a greater impact through targeted disinformation efforts.

In China’s social media influence campaigns, there is also an increasing use of Russian-style tactics to stoke societal conflict and destabilize communities—an element that has only recently appeared in China’s information operations. Ahead of the presidential election, China has already attempted to manipulate Americans and incite street protests.

For instance, in 2023, a Chinese communications agency hired American activists via a U.S. freelance platform to organize protests—one instance involving protests against a U.S. government ban on products made in Xinjiang—without the activists realizing they were acting on behalf of China.

However, in terms of social media manipulation, Russia has been far more effective within Western societies than China. The prevailing view has been that China’s information operations have generally struggled to break through to Western audiences. Yet this view is changing as China’s digital influence operations become more sophisticated, particularly with tactics like “information laundering,” where the origin of the message is obscured. This includes hiring foreign influencers, using podcast formats, or creating news sites that appear unrelated to China.

Interviewer: In November, the European Union will impose tariffs on Chinese-made electric vehicles, likely followed by protective tariffs on additional Chinese products. How is China likely to respond in its propaganda to the escalating trade tensions with the EU?

Tauno Tõhk: One of China’s primary arguments recently has been that the EU’s concerns about China’s overcapacity and subsidies to electric vehicle manufacturers are false and based on erroneous information. China has made similar claims in response to prior EU actions, such as sanctions over human rights abuses or laws against economic coercion.

Generally, we’ve observed that China’s messaging towards the EU in recent years has been considerably more restrained than its rhetoric towards the U.S.

When China has criticized EU sanctions against Russia, it often frames these actions as decisions made under U.S. pressure, aiming to create a rift between allies and separate Europe from the U.S. The EU’s discussions on “strategic autonomy” are interpreted by Chinese propaganda not as a move to protect Europe’s strategic interests, but as a step away from the U.S. and a less critical stance towards China. As long as there’s hope of reversing tariffs, China’s message is likely to remain relatively soft. A common tactic is amplifying voices within Europe that align with Chinese perspectives, such as European car manufacturers who have spoken out against the tariffs.

Interviewer: Has there been a shift in public communication within the EU regarding China, presenting it not just as an important trading partner, but as a political and economic rival?

Tauno Tõhk: This shift began in 2019, when EU countries adopted the EU-China relationship framework, which defines China in three dimensions: as a partner on global issues like climate change and conflict resolution, as an economic competitor, and as a “systemic rival.” This last label highlights that China promotes alternative values, governance practices, and a different vision of international order.

Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the EU’s mindset and rhetoric have significantly tilted towards viewing China as a systemic rival. As a result, EU leaders like European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen have adopted more critical language toward China, initiating measures in response to China’s actions, from monitoring foreign investments to mitigating dependency risks in areas where the EU has grown reliant on Chinese imports.

Perspectives still vary among member states. Each country’s relationship with China is motivated by different factors, such as economic development and job preservation, which sometimes lead to bilateral actions that clash with the EU’s unified policy. Hungary, for example, stands out for its distinct stance toward both China and Russia. Yet, overall, the EU’s position has become more critical, with member states displaying unity on several key issues.

Interviewer: Could it be said that China’s attempts to intimidate other countries through aggressive tactics—such as “wolf warrior” diplomacy—may have had some success in the Global South but proved counterproductive in European societies?

Tauno Tõhk: Indeed, it seems that awareness of the risks associated with China has notably increased in Western societies largely due to China’s own actions. European perceptions of China have become more negative, and China’s image has deteriorated.

This shift started around 2019 with the Hong Kong protests, but it intensified during COVID-19, when Chinese diplomats aggressively engaged on social media and spread various conspiracy theories. China’s underlying message was that non-compliance with its interests would lead to a forceful response from China.

A concept known as “authoritarian inflation” comes into play here. This theory posits that narratives about an authoritarian state’s power eventually take on a life of their own, functioning as a form of self-perpetuating deterrence. In practice, this means that, despite growing criticism of China, we occasionally still encounter a mindset that questions whether certain actions are worth taking due to the risk of upsetting China and provoking retaliation. This attitude demonstrates that China’s aggressive posture has, in part, achieved its objective by normalizing such cautionary thinking.