Estonia’s Security Elite Deals with Trump Anxiety Amid Disillusionment in Biden’s Foreign Policy

Photo: Mourad ALLILI/SIPA
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A snapshot of sentiment among Estonia’s security policymakers reveals a surprisingly measured outlook on the prospect of Donald Trump’s return to power.

"We can and must live with both [Harris and Trump], and each brings their own strengths and flaws," remarked a prominent figure in Estonian foreign policy when asked on the U.S. Presidential election day how Estonians and other Eastern Europeans should brace for a Trump victory. “The idea that one outcome warrants champagne and the other demands we leap out of a window is simply incorrect,” he added.

This cautiously optimistic stance finds echoes among two other senior Estonian security policy officials. Their tempered views stem, in part, from a growing fatigue with Joe Biden’s perceived detachment from the geopolitical realities of Europe. Skepticism toward U.S. policies—particularly on Russia, which many see as Biden’s greatest policy failure, and Ukraine—has become increasingly vocal across the region.

Yet, despite its flaws, Biden’s approach to Ukraine has delivered some notable successes. Ukraine remains in the fight, albeit at a staggering human cost and amidst a monumental humanitarian crisis that stronger Western intervention could have alleviated.

Under Biden, the U.S. has sustained Ukraine’s defense, inflicted substantial damage on Russia’s military at relatively low cost (spending annually in Ukraine roughly what it allocated to Afghanistan for two decades), and crucially, prevented the conflict from spilling into NATO territories.

Biden’s Ukraine strategy is further credited with a decisive, albeit delayed, pivot. By February 2022, the U.S. seemed resigned to a scenario in which Kyiv fell to Moscow. However, Ukraine’s fierce resolve prompted Washington to shift course dramatically. Subsequent hesitance to escalate could partly be traced to overgenerous stability guarantees given to Russia during the 2021 Stability Pact negotiations.

The Kremlin, however, quickly grasped Biden’s vulnerabilities, while Biden struggled to read Putin. Early in Biden’s presidency, Russia tested the new administration with a dramatic military buildup along Ukraine’s borders and in Crimea. Viewing Ukraine as secondary to strategic priorities like China, Biden initially dismissed the buildup as an expensive bluff, offering Putin conciliatory invitations to international summits.

Instead of bolstering deterrence, Washington repeatedly assured Moscow that, in the event of an invasion, U.S. military intervention was off the table—opting instead for economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation. To Estonia and its Eastern European allies, this approach seemed alarmingly complacent.

Washington’s strategy of publicly predicting Russia’s invasion, though refraining from militarily deterring the Kremlin, inadvertently signaled that Ukraine’s fate would be decided bilaterally between Kyiv and Moscow. Putin could hardly resist such a historic opportunity.

Estonian security elites were further dismayed by the opaque nature of U.S. diplomacy. Key details of the Stability Pact talks in 2021 were withheld from Eastern European allies. "The Biden administration pays lip service to the value of alliances, but in practice, it prefers consulting Berlin and Paris," noted a senior Estonian diplomat. “In Washington, smaller allies like us are often taken for granted as automatic supporters of U.S. policy.”

Adding to their frustration is Biden’s apparent reluctance to make bold increases in defense spending, despite the protracted and brutal war of attrition in Europe. While Trump’s defense budgets saw more robust growth, Biden’s additional allocations have barely offset rampant inflation.

One senior diplomat warned that under continued Democratic idealistic leadership, “the world would continue to fall apart piece by piece.” The not-so-gradual erosion of U.S. military deterrence also undermines NATO’s credibility at its core.

Even as the U.S. has tried to mend fences with Eastern Europe, communication gaps persist. A recently revived US-Baltic-Nordic multilateral information-sharing mechanism has yielded little substance. NATO, too, remained sidelined on Ukraine until this summer’s Washington summit.

On October 18, Biden met in Berlin with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, French President Emmanuel Macron, and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer to discuss Ukraine’s future. Notably absent was Poland, the nation arguably most affected by the war. This exclusion reinforces the perception that Biden’s administration aligns more closely with Berlin’s cautious stance on Ukraine than with Eastern Europe’s more urgent perspective.

NATO’s support for Ukraine, as outgoing Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg acknowledged, has been less decisive than it could have been. U.S.-UK negotiations over the use of Storm Shadow missiles, for instance, are still shrouded in secrecy. “Uncle Joe” appears to micromanage behind closed doors, yet NATO has officially refrained from discussing even limited military missions to protect civilians in western Ukraine.

As for a potential second Donald Trump presidency, seasoned Estonian diplomats anticipate increased turbulence in hotspots like Ukraine, China, and the Middle East. “The risks of sudden crises will rise, but paradoxically, Trump’s penchant for high-stakes brinkmanship and his obsession with appearing victorious might serve as a stabilizing force,” suggested one source.

Another high-ranking security official strikes a more cautious note, arguing that Trump’s fabled decisiveness is too mercurial to be relied upon. While his unpredictability may keep adversaries wary, it also fosters uncertainty about whether he will act decisively or pivot to seeking deals with traditional foes. They cite Trump’s erratic behavior toward North Korea during his first term as a prime example. “Ultimately, how one assesses Trump depends on their faith in the resilience of American democracy,” the official concluded.

A former minister with intimate experience in security policy suggests Trump could compel Europe to confront uncomfortable truths. “This is precisely what we need for security—less wishful thinking that someone else will defend us, and more realism about our own responsibilities,” he argues. According to him, Estonia’s mainstream security discourse has been overly slogan-driven and naively optimistic. “I believe that era is over, both in Estonia and across the West. Tough times lie ahead,” he warned.

Trump’s victory will undoubtedly prompt rigorous political analysis in the coming months. For now, one can only speculate that his stance on immigration played a role in his return to the White House. Biden’s perceived mishandling of the southern border, amid global instability, has heightened Americans’ sense of vulnerability—a potent fertilizer for populism.

If Trump returns, his focus is expected to pivot inward, prioritizing domestic security. His campaign promises a sweeping immigrant deportation operation, potentially involving the National Guard, and the resumption of border wall construction at staggering costs. Such moves likely deepen domestic turbulence, diverting attention and resources away from foreign engagements, including Ukraine.

Europe, not just Ukraine, has only a brief window—mere months—to convince a future Trump administration that sustained international engagement is essential to advancing his domestic priorities.

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