Professor of Russian Politics: Elite Will Strive to Preserve Putin’s Legacy After His Death

Interviewer: How likely is Russia to fragment into smaller states after Putin's death?

Gulnaz Sharafutdinova: The possibility of Russia breaking into smaller pieces after Putin’s death cannot be entirely ruled out, but statistically, its likelihood is estimated to be less than five percent.

If we imagine a scenario where [Yevgeny] Prigozhin's march on Moscow had succeeded—where he breached Moscow’s defenses and seized power—we could also imagine regional elites refusing to submit to Prigozhin and deciding they would be better off as independent states. Prigozhin’s case suggests that certain forms of civil war or power struggles could arise in Russia under particular circumstances.

However, I do not currently foresee the rise of widespread separatist movements following the collapse of Putin’s regime, for several reasons. First, it’s challenging to envision how such fragmentation would unfold. Would Russia splinter into 85 separate states? That seems unlikely. If not, what would fragmentation look like?

The number of decisions and conflicts involved in such a process would generate significant resistance. Even among ethnic minorities, there is little desire for war within their regions, though this does not mean there are no activists who speak of Russian imperialism and lost sovereignty. Most of these activists, however, live outside Russia.

What I can imagine is a consensus emerging where local governments gain more autonomy and all ethnic groups within Russia are protected, valued, and represented. This would fall short of full fragmentation but could lead to a more decentralized and inclusive governance structure.

Interviewer: Why do Russian mothers still send their sons to die for Putin?

Gulnaz Sharafutdinova: The key question is: what is different compared to the Chechen wars of the 1990s, when Russian mothers mobilized to protect their sons?

One major difference is that Russian society has become extremely fractured and unequal. There is a wealthy elite, a middle class, and a marginalized population living in poverty. The lower one goes in this hierarchy, the less capacity people have to focus on anything beyond mere survival.

The 2022 mobilization for the Russian army primarily affected the most marginalized groups in society. These are mothers living in poor material conditions, struggling to find or keep jobs, single mothers, or those in dysfunctional families—women who are barely managing their own lives.

Had the mobilization impacted families in cities like Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kazan, or Samara, mothers would likely have been more vocal. The wealthier the people, the more they perceive their ability to influence outcomes.

Another factor is that over the past two decades, the Kremlin has systematically shattered Russian society into tiny fragments. For mothers to unite and take collective action, there needs to be some level of cohesion, yet the disparity in status and opportunity in Russia is immense.

Since 2014, all collective initiatives have been crushed, and activist groups have faced severe repression. Individuals who might have led a protest movement among mothers have been exiled or silenced.

In the early 1990s, during the perestroika era, there was a sense of optimism and a very different societal mindset. Public events and activism were widespread. Today, we are witnessing the results of deliberate propaganda, a politics of fear, and the systematic fragmentation of society.

Interviewer: Will we never again see soldier’s mothers opposing the Kremlin?

Gulnaz Sharafutdinova: Some level of a mothers' movement still exists in Russia, and we can observe it primarily through social media, especially on Telegram.

While their actions are not highly effective, their presence is still noticeable. Occasionally, they protest by sending appeals to the government, demanding the return of their sons and husbands from the front. Many mobilized and contract soldiers were promised to serve for a set period, but they are being held in the war longer and not allowed to leave.

Russian mothers do protest, but it is not yet a broad movement. The Kremlin faces challenges in dealing with them, as it cannot label them as traitors or enemies. The regime’s only viable strategy is to suppress these expressions of dissent as much as possible by cutting off their access to public platforms and silencing their voices.

Russia's news is tightly controlled. In this highly restricted environment, activists lack the tools to spread their message or call for collective action. The result is a muted movement struggling to gain broader traction under heavy censorship and repression.

Interviewer: Who, besides the relatives of soldiers directly affected by the Ukraine war, could oppose the regime in today’s Russia?

Gulnaz Sharafutdinova: Society is like an iceberg—only the visible portion above water can be seen. For instance, on Telegram, messages from soldiers’ relatives are prominent.

In January, however, a protest took place in Bashkortostan, where people braved harsh winter weather to show support for Bashkir environmental activist Fail Alsynov, who was on trial for defending national identity.

These protests were suppressed; those who participated were arrested, and Alsynov was imprisoned. Yet this shows what issues and events can trigger resistance and bring people into the streets.

In the iceberg's submerged portion, there is significant discontent, anxiety, dissatisfaction, and a longing for stability and peace. To suppress these feelings, various strategies are employed.

On the one hand, Kremlin propaganda resonates throughout society, leading many to rationalize that hardships must be endured because Russia is at war, surrounded by enemies, and must be patriotic and strong.

Others avert their gaze, convincing themselves they must prioritize their children or elderly parents, who would suffer if they were imprisoned for protesting. Out of fear, they avoid confronting the situation, telling themselves they cannot change anything and that the government must know what it’s doing.

Some families, previously living in poverty, now have secure jobs and increased incomes due to mobilization. These individuals focus on enjoying their unexpected better circumstances and perhaps contend more with neighbors’ envy than with politics.

The war in Ukraine has created entirely new social dynamics in Russia.

Interviewer: So whose war is it, is it just Putin’s war, or a war of the Russian people?

Gulnaz Sharafutdinova: The reality is this: the war and the deaths caused by Russian leaders and Russian people continue because the majority of the population does not oppose it.

What do we achieve by saying this is the Russian people’s war? What do we gain by labeling all Russians as evil?

I don’t believe in acting out of anger or fear, although, to some extent, it is natural. For instance, I struggle to visit Russia to see my father because I’m afraid of being arrested. I have children; I worry, and even I am acting out of fear right now.

Russia has power structures, institutions, and a culture. Russian culture has an imperialist mindset, and this ideology is absorbed even by marginalized and discriminated minorities.

I am Tatar and studied history in Kazan in the 1990s. When I was encouraged to focus on Tatarstan’s history back then, I didn’t value it—it reflected colonial influence. Now, I love speaking my native language, but unfortunately, I no longer have time to reclaim everything I’ve lost.

I don’t want to be a Tatar who says all Russians are evil. I don’t believe there are societies of only evil people. I cannot agree with lumping everyone together. In the end, we are all human beings.

I discover traces of imperialism in myself and work to address them.

Interviewer: Do you believe imperialism can be eradicated from Russia?

Gulnaz Sharafutdinova: Russians must do this themselves. It is possible.

Western Europeans and Americans are going through similar processes. The USA, a capitalist free-market economy admired by many, still struggles with racism. When Barack Obama was elected president in 2008, it was celebrated as a significant milestone.

Germany has changed. Japan has managed to change.

Ultimately, this is a matter of societal transformation. For such changes to occur, specific conditions must be met: democracy, democratic institutions, pluralism, civil rights, human rights, and a stable economic and social environment.

I understand that, considering Russia’s current state, such talk may make us even more pessimistic.

However, societal transformation remains one possible trajectory for Russia. Ultimately, it depends on the Russian elite—those who have retained a degree of autonomy through economic activity and profit.

Interviewer: What kind of future awaits the Russian diaspora?

Gulnaz Sharafutdinova: The sooner Putin’s regime ends, the greater the likelihood that many who left Russia will return.

Russia’s future remains highly uncertain, but it must be acknowledged that the current power system may persist for years. Those who left Russia four or five years ago have had the opportunity to rebuild their lives abroad. Their return becomes increasingly unlikely.