Lithuanian Foreign Minister Landsbergis Urges Incoming Government to Deliberate Deployment of Soldiers to Ukraine

Gabrielius Landsbergis: This is a hypothetical possibility. What I said is that under certain circumstances, triggering Article 5 is one option.

Article 5 has been invoked only once, following the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. That provides a sense of how Article 5 can be applied.

It doesn’t necessarily mean tanks have to roll across borders. It can mean a wide range of responses.

It’s important to clarify this, so not only our friends understand, but also our adversaries recognize that there are boundaries—if those are crossed, there will be a response.

We need to have discussions with our allies about what that response might look like to be very specific. Whether this particular incident crosses the red lines is something I cannot discuss at this moment.

Interviewer: Speaking hypothetically, what do you think NATO’s response to such an incident could be?

Gabrielius Landsbergis: There are various options, and I’m not only referring to military ones.

Sanctions, in certain cases, are also a form of countermeasure. Russia still manages to procure many goods from Europe. I’m sure you see this on your borders. In Lithuania, it’s clear that sanctions have not stopped trade across the Lithuanian-Belarusian border, which ultimately makes its way east to Russia. This remains a privilege that Russia continues to enjoy.

They are also still diplomatically active in Europe. Russian diplomats have the privilege of traveling freely. They continue to enjoy numerous privileges and seem to believe this is simply the natural order of things.

Interviewer: In mid-November, the communication cable between Lithuania and Sweden was damaged in the Baltic Sea. What conclusions have you drawn from this?

Gabrielius Landsbergis: Regarding the communication cable, I can only say that I find it very interesting that once again we are talking about a Chinese ship, an anchor, and a cable. I am referring to the incident near your coastline a year ago. Once again, it happened in the Baltic Sea, and once again, it involved a communication cable. It’s a strange coincidence. The investigation is ongoing. Perhaps odd accidents do happen—I don’t know.

But I trust the institutions. Whatever they uncover, they are ready to say it. If it was an accident, and a strange one at that, they will say so. If it was sabotage, they will say that too. We are not afraid to state the facts as they are, and that is the most important thing.

When it comes to accidents and incidents, we tend to focus intently on each individual case, which is understandable. But rather than talking about cables or any other single incident, I would prefer to focus on the need for clear red lines and the responses that follow when those lines are crossed.

It is possible that Russia has nothing to do with the plane or the cable. Anything is possible. But that should not stop us from discussing how to respond to such situations.

History provides clear examples. In this decade, the United States has faced unprecedented cyberattacks. Hybrid attacks have hit key infrastructure, including a couple of oil pipelines. A major meat processing company had to halt operations after its computers and e-systems were hacked.

At the time, President Joe Biden and President Vladimir Putin discussed this directly. As far as we know from public sources, Biden made it very clear to Putin that there are red lines, and if those are crossed, the U.S. would retaliate.

Since we are part of the same alliance, this means Washington defends Vilnius and Tallinn just as it defends itself. This also means we can send a similar message. Just as the U.S. has red lines, so do Estonia and Lithuania.

This needs to be stated. We must focus on it. It’s not acceptable to freely hijack, hack, and so on. No. We are NATO.

Interviewer: You mentioned sanctions as one potential response if Russia crosses red lines. Since 2022, you’ve been involved in drafting EU sanctions. Why haven’t the sanctions been as effective as we hoped?

Gabrielius Landsbergis: Broadly speaking, I would say it’s a lack of political will. In my view, it’s regrettable.

We announce sanctions on 30 ships in Russia’s shadow fleet, or slightly more in a new sanctions package. These are uninsured ghost ships, enabling tens of billions of euros to flow into the Russian economy. They form a significant part of Russia’s economic operations and move freely in the Baltic Sea.

Reports indicate that Russia’s shadow fleet consists of nearly 800 ghost ships. Yet we sanction only 30 of them. It’s embarrassing. What kind of agreement is this? Over 770 ships remain untouched. This is not a sanction.

Interviewer: Whose will needs to change, and how?

Gabrielius Landsbergis: I won’t name specific countries. However, it seems to me that Europe is losing the will to exist. This is a question of our security. If we cannot find consensus among 27 nations, do we truly understand that Russia uses every euro it receives against us? That is the core issue. While one might try to persuade Hungary, the problem is that it is not the only obstacle.

Interviewer: You’ve have also stated that Estonia and Lithuania should be prepared to send their soldiers to Ukraine. How many Lithuanian soldiers would need to be sent to make a difference?

Gabrielius Landsbergis: A new Lithuanian government is about to take office [Landsbergis has announced a break from politics], so I can currently offer only personal advice.

When [French] President [Emmanuel] Macron suggested this possibility [of sending soldiers], I supported it because I believe we need to explore strategic ways to change the situation in Ukraine. The same applies to security guarantees—we must ensure that during the next attack, Ukraine will not stand alone. We need to do things differently.

Deploying troops to Ukraine is one such way. For instance, several countries—ideally NATO members—could station forces in Ukraine, similar to the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) NATO battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This could form a new eFP, possibly on the scale of a brigade.

In practice, this could be organized by quotas, where larger nations contribute more soldiers than smaller ones. Alternatively, it could also be voluntary—those willing could send more troops.

The incoming government should take this issue very seriously and with full dedication. Lithuania could go beyond what our quota might require. For example, if, based on Germany’s size, Lithuania were expected to send seven soldiers, I would recommend sending significantly more.

Interviewer: Looking ahead, what will change in Lithuanian foreign policy over the next two years?

Gabrielius Landsbergis: I can only express hope that many things will remain unchanged.

The new government, led by the Social Democrats, has a strong mandate. This provides freedom, but with it comes responsibility. A great number of people have entrusted them with their votes, and the public expects them to act in a way that aligns with what the majority of Lithuanians believe is right.

I continue to believe that Lithuanian foreign policy is built on a strong foundation. We have demonstrated that a small country can have a powerful voice. A small country can present strong arguments when others hesitate to do so. We must fight for what is right.

I have fought for a values-based foreign policy. I firmly believe that no foreign policy is more pragmatic than one rooted in values. Our very existence depends on the commitment of others to these values. If we lose these values ourselves—if we stop supporting freedoms, democracy, free speech, and human rights—then who will defend us? If we want to be protected, we must defend those values.

If this foundation remains intact, we will be on the right path.