THE INVISIBLE BATTLE ⟩ Estonian Authorities Take Action Against Moscow's Orthodox Church in Estonia for Being a Tool of the 'Russian World'

In later years, Metropolitan Cornelius was largely remembered positively for his role during the Bronze Soldier controversy, though discontent arose over the construction of the Russian church in Lasnamäe, a district of Tallinn built by the Soviet authorities to host immigrants from other parts of thee USSR, financed with Russian money and backed by Edgar Savisaar, then-mayor of Tallinn. Despite these controversies, the church receded into the background in Estonia's broader struggle against Russian influence.

It took time to fully grasp the essence of the Russkiy Mir (Russian World) concept. Alar Kilp, a political scientist at the University of Tartu who specializes in the intersection of religion and politics, highlights "Russia and Europe", a 19th-century work by the pan-Slavist ideologue Nikolai Danilevsky, as a foundational text for imperialist Russian thought. Before 2014, this book was often seen as a narrative of Russia’s cultural history, despite the conflicts in Georgia, Moldova, and other regions where Russia had inserted itself.

"After 2014, the book could be read as an attempt to understand Russia’s behavior. And since February 2022, it has become deeply uncomfortable to read, as it lays out, quite explicitly, the doctrine underpinning Russia’s policies in Ukraine, Belarus, and other countries under the so-called Russian World," Kilp noted.

Identity creation and reinforcement have always been central to the project. Danilevsky’s vision, combined with contemporary political applications of Russkiy Mir, underscores the ideological continuity in Russia’s imperial ambitions. The evolution from a cultural narrative to an overt geopolitical doctrine mirrors the growing assertiveness—and aggressiveness—of Russian influence in the post-Soviet space, particularly after landmark moments like 2014 and 2022.

The Orthodox Church serves as one of the key instruments of this doctrine. The dissemination of the Russkiy Mir and the construction of a Russian identity are not overnight processes, which makes identifying and countering these threats both complex and time-consuming.

"Identity building, which underpins the current 'Russian World' concept, has been a long-standing process within the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate," notes church historian Priit Rohtmets.

Among the many written works tied to this effort, Rohtmets highlights Patriarch Alexy II's Orthodoxy in Estonia, a text brimming with Russian narratives. The book was published with the support of the Russkiy Mir Foundation, and its list of supporters includes notable figures like Edgar Savisaar, Kalev Kallo, and descendants of Soviet foreign ministers Andrei Gromyko and Vyacheslav Molotov—Aleksei Gromyko and Vyacheslav Nikonov.

"On one hand, the aim is to promote Orthodoxy, but the primary objective is Russian culture, language, and ties to the Russian state," explains a long-time internal security official regarding EOCMP’s role in Estonia. "The Russian Orthodox Church is more of a facade or franchise. The main goal is to keep young people within their sphere of influence and to recruit new talent. This is the essence of the Russkiy Mir idea. The church itself should not be viewed in isolation—it is one element of Russia’s hybrid warfare strategy."

This insight underscores how the Orthodox Church serves as a multi-layered tool—spiritual on the surface but deeply entwined with Russia’s geopolitical ambitions, blending religion with cultural and political influence.

In a broader context, the Russian narrative emphasizes the long-standing traditions of Orthodoxy in Estonia, justifying Russification and glorifying the close ties between the Russian Empire and the Orthodox Church. On a narrower scale, it revolves around the interpretation and commemoration of World War II and its outcomes—topics that have little to do with spiritual life.

“If the same rhetoric had been repeated in May 2022, it likely would have led to the revocation of his residence permit,” notes Ringo Ringvee, advisor in the Ministry of the Interior’s Department of Religious Affairs, referring to Metropolitan Eugene’s speech on May 9, 2021, at the Defense Forces Cemetery.

However, fast forward 12 months, and the May 2022 issue of the EOCMP publication Pravoslavny Sobesednik still contained claims such as: “Soldiers who died liberating Estonia saved our country from planned destruction,” and, “Historical amnesia always leads to new tragedies.” Despite these statements, the decision not to extend Metropolitan Eugene’s residence permit was made only in early 2024.

This timeline illustrates the slow and deliberate nature of state responses to religious narratives intertwined with political propaganda. It also highlights how rhetoric around historical events like World War II can serve as a tool for advancing geopolitical agendas under the guise of religious or cultural discourse.

Listening to Metropolitan Eugene’s earlier speeches, one can sometimes sense an attempt to remain cautious and maintain a semblance of respectability for audiences who do not view the Soviet Union's victory in World War II as Estonia’s liberation. For instance, during the summer of 2020, when yet another Soviet-era monument—a memorial chapel for fallen soldiers—was unveiled in Maardu, a satellite town of Tallinn inhabited mostly by Russian speaking inhabitants, both the Russian and Belarusian ambassadors extolled the "victory" and Estonia's "liberation."

Maardu’s mayor, Vladimir Arhipov, took a somewhat more measured tone, while Eugene, avoiding the terms "victory" and "liberation," focused on the construction of the chapel and the 1,200 soldiers buried there. "This memory must be preserved. Especially in today’s politics, where everything is so uncertain, this is important," he remarked, striking an ambivalent note.

Yet even if there were moments in those years when attempts were made to tread carefully in rhetoric, such restraint seemed to dissipate around the time the Kremlin decided Ukraine could be conquered in three days—a plan, as we now know, that failed. "In sync with other Russian propaganda outlets, branches of the Russian Orthodox Church disseminated anti-Ukrainian propaganda in sermons and publications, even in the weeks leading up to Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022," Estonia's Foreign Intelligence Service has concluded.

By January 2022, the EOCMP in Estonia had already released a special edition of its newspaper, presenting a detailed critique of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church’s departure from Moscow’s control. It also explored Orthodoxy’s ties to, and dependence on, Russia—a narrative filled with anti-Estonian sentiment, according to experts who spoke with Postimees.

"What occurred in Estonia on a relatively small scale in the 1990s manifested in full force in Ukraine two years ago, revealing the full extent of a problem we stubbornly refuse to acknowledge even today," Eugene commented in the publication.

Historically, Orthodoxy in Estonia has often been tied to a justification for its existence within a larger Russian cultural and religious framework. This association reinforces the connection between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russkiy Mir concept, placing Estonia within that ideological sphere.

In early 2023, tensions rose in Estonian society over the Kremlin-friendly KOOS party’s attempt to organize a joint prayer service with the Russian Church. Metropolitan Eugene even appeared in a video with KOOS leaders Aivo Peterson and Oleg Ivanov. However, the church eventually withdrew from the planned event, claiming it had been the victim of a political provocation.

This sequence of events highlights the precarious balancing act the EOCMP has attempted in Estonia, navigating between overt political alignment with Kremlin narratives and the need to appear palatable to broader society—a balance that has increasingly tilted toward the former in recent years.

In 2023, when the EOCMP, like other religious groups, expressed opposition to same-sex marriage, one of its arguments was that the war in Ukraine had already placed Estonia’s internal peace and security under significant strain, and marriage equality would only exacerbate these tensions.

At the onset of the war, Metropolitan Eugene spoke of uncertainty, stating that it was unclear who had initiated the conflict and why it had begun. "This ambiguity, in a wartime situation where it is impossible to maintain a neutral stance, continues to define this church," notes church historian Priit Rohtmets. "Even though certain statements have been condemned in recent times, the church remains shadowed by the messages it has conveyed over a longer period."

This does not mean that Sunday services are necessarily filled with curses against Ukraine and praise for Putin. Marju Lauristin, a scholar who has extensively analyzed policies affecting the Russian-speaking population in Estonia, emphasizes that matters of faith and the church are deeply emotional topics for much of the local Russian-speaking community. For this reason, the government must tread carefully.

"Simply declaring the church's influence based on its administrative ties is insufficient. Understanding its true impact requires dedicated research and concrete evidence," Lauristin argues.

This highlights the complex and nuanced role of the EOCMP in Estonian society—balancing religious leadership, political undertones, and its influence over a community deeply tied to both faith and cultural identity. The lingering ambiguity and sensitivity surrounding its statements and actions demand a careful, evidence-based approach to fully understand its societal impact.

Marju Lauristin suggests that some individuals possess a pro-Putin worldview independent of their church affiliation. "If someone in a family supports Putin and attends church, it's clear they will pray for the [Russian] soldiers fighting in Ukraine. Conversely, if they support Ukraine in their hearts, they will pray for the Ukrainians. Even if the MPEÕK were placed under the Apostolic Church, they would still pray for the same soldiers. The state cannot interfere in this. The key question is whether EOCMP clergy use their services to propagate Russia's views as articulated by Patriarch Kirill. EOCMP’s leading clergy have denied that they follow principles declared by the Moscow Patriarch. Whether this is truly the case can, of course, be verified.

Obtaining a clear picture of what happens during services is inherently difficult. The general understanding is that political messages are kept to a minimum, as noted by EOCMP representative Bishop Daniel of Tartu. However, as Postimees highlights, it is telling that services often begin with a special prayer in honor of Patriarch Kirill, who regards the war in Ukraine as a holy war.

Bishop Daniel explains that praying for the patriarch is merely an acknowledgment of his position as the head of the church, similar to recognizing a president as the head of state. He emphasizes that this act of remembrance has no bearing on whether the patriarch is personally admired or not. Drawing an analogy, he points to prison chaplains who pray for convicted prisoners: "What conclusion should we draw from that? Should we lock them away for three, four, or five years and prohibit any interaction with them?"

While Estonian media provides numerous examples of EOCMP’s soft influence in various forms, the structural ties to Moscow sustain a hypothetical risk that such influence could become significantly more overt and aggressive in the future. "Russia will activate this network when they need to," warns Minister of the Interior Lauri Läänemets (Social Democratic Party). He references Moldova's recent election cycle, where local religious leaders were summoned to Moscow, provided with funds, and tasked with concrete assignments.

This scenario underscores the latent potential of the EOCMP’s connections to Moscow as a geopolitical lever. While the immediate manifestations of influence remain subtle, the infrastructure exists for rapid mobilization, should it be required by Russia’s strategic interests. The ambiguity surrounding church practices, coupled with its enduring ties to Moscow, creates a complex challenge for Estonia in balancing religious freedom with national security concerns.

The evolving tension between the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Estonian government has brought to light concerns about influence, historical ties to Moscow, and the delicate balance between religious autonomy and national security. The interplay of soft power, structural dependencies, and individual actors within the church provides insight into how influence campaigns might escalate and adapt.

Interior Minister Lauri Läänemets emphasizes that the government is focused on preventing, not predicting, potential influence activities. However, the structural ties between the EOCMP and Moscow make it a tool for influence both at the institutional and individual levels. The tomos (a document outlining the church's autonomy) clearly stipulates that the EOCMP cannot make significant decisions without approval from the mother church in Moscow. This dependence underscores its vulnerability to external pressure.

Bishop Daniel, with a hint of irony, has argued that this dependency is merely procedural, stating, "Moscow doesn’t influence us; we just need to get approvals." However, clergy with Russian citizenship or familial ties in Russia could be particularly susceptible to external influence.

Metropolitan Eugene, whose residence permit was not renewed in January 2024, remains a pivotal figure in the church's leadership. Despite his absence from Estonia, Eugene continues to serve as the church's formal leader and participated in the church’s synod remotely. Bishop Daniel has defended Eugene, stating there is no canonical reason to dismiss him and noting that Eugene is challenging the residence permit decision in court.

The church’s ranks include diverse figures, such as Vadim Godunov, a former KGB operative now serving as a priest, and Grigori-Kazimir Seliverstov, a municipal politician linked to pro-Russian propaganda activities. These profiles illustrate the varied and sometimes controversial backgrounds of EOCMP clergy, highlighting the organization's complexity.

One notable strategy in the influence campaign has been the focus on the Kuremäe (Pühtitsa) convent. Sources describe how the convent has been positioned as the "frontline" in the struggle, portraying the Estonian state as persecuting peaceful nuns, thereby deflecting attention from the EOCMP itself. This narrative aims to garner public sympathy for the convent while minimizing scrutiny of the broader church's ties to Moscow.

Läänemets points out that the convent actively disseminates Russian narratives, exemplifying soft power influence. Even if individuals are unaware of their role in these campaigns, their participation contributes to Moscow's strategic objectives.

In response to the perceived threats, the Ministry of the Interior has introduced legislation requiring the EOCMP to sever its ties with Moscow. The proposed changes address both realized and hypothetical risks associated with the church’s structural dependencies and influence activities. However, negotiations with the EOCMP have been protracted, and Russian propaganda outlets have largely remained passive, potentially indicating an expectation that the legislation might falter.

As tensions escalate, Bishop Daniel convened a conference titled "The Orthodox Church in Estonia – Independence: Development Opportunities, Risks, Consequences," inviting figures such as MP Varro Vooglaid and MEP Jana Toom. The discussion also featured lawyers and addressed the crisis in church-state relations, with Metropolitan Eugene participating remotely. Daniel has challenged the state’s right to intervene in canonical matters, questioning whether a secular state without an established church has the authority to do so.

The EOCMP’s dual role as a religious institution and a potential vector for Russian influence underscores the challenges Estonia faces in balancing religious freedom with national security. The church's structural ties to Moscow, diverse leadership profiles, and strategic use of sympathetic figures like the nuns at Kuremäe highlight the multifaceted nature of the issue. As legislative measures progress, the interplay of state action, public perception, and church resistance will likely define the next chapter in this complex relationship.

In November 2024, following a conference on the status of the Orthodox Church in Estonia, the Russian publication Nezavisimaya Gazeta erroneously reported that Metropolitan Stephanos of the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church (EAOC) attended the event. The article further misattributed statements from the conference's concluding document to him. In reality, Metropolitan Stephanos declined the invitation from the EOCMP to participate in the conference, a fact accurately reflected on EOCMP's official website.

This incident exemplifies how different narratives are tailored for distinct audiences. In Russia, such misinformation suggests a unified front between the EAOC and EOCMP against the Estonian state, while in Estonia, it portrays the Constantinople-affiliated church as unwilling to cooperate. This strategy manipulates perceptions to serve specific agendas, highlighting the complexities in the relationship between religious institutions and state politics in the region.

Representatives of the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate  have expressed concerns that the Ministry of the Interior's proposed legislation constitutes state interference in religious freedom. However, church historian Priit Rohtmets challenges this perspective by questioning whether actions such as Patriarch Kirill's promotion of war and justification of aggression can be classified as religious activities.

Rohtmets argues that such actions fall outside the realm of religious practice. He interprets the explanatory memorandum of the draft law as distinguishing between the religious activities of congregations and other actions that do not pertain to religious freedom. According to Rohtmets, when churches engage in non-religious activities, these cannot be justified under the guise of religious freedom.

Ringo Ringvee, an advisor at the Ministry of the Interior's Department of Religious Affairs, highlights a paradox: while churches are generally perceived as authoritative voices in society, when it comes to potential influence activities by the EOCMP, a common retort is, "Who listens to them anyway?" Ringvee emphasizes that historical narratives remain significant and continue to play a role in this context.