Russian Military Intelligence Linked to Sabotage Attack on Estonian Interior Minister's Vehicle

Allan Hantsom organised the vandalising of the Ministry of the Interior's car at the request of GRU. Photo: Erik Prozes
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In May this year, an Estonian court found Kremlin-aligned activist Allan Hantsom guilty of organizing an attack on the vehicles belonging to the Estonian Minister of Interior and an Estonian journalist. He acted under the orders and guidance of Russian military intelligence (GRU), according to evidence recently published by the Estonia's Internal Security Service.

In a criminal investigation launched last year, Estonia's Internal Security Service (Kaitsepolitseiamet), under the direction of the Prosecutor General's Office, identified 11 individuals linked to the vandalism of vehicles belonging to the Minister of the Interior and a journalist.

According to the charges, at least nine people were involved in damaging the vehicles. Of these, the court convicted seven individuals, while two others are currently in Russia and have been declared internationally wanted.

Evidence presented in court revealed that Allan Hantsom had established connections with operatives working under the orders and in the interests of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU). Starting in October 2023, Hantsom planned and prepared property-related attacks in Estonia.

In the summer of 2016, Allan Hantsom organized an anti-NATO "Peace March" in Tallinn's Old Town. In the background, Hantsom is seen holding balloons, while in the foreground are Sergei Tšaulin and, behind him, Aleksandr Esakov—both of whom have since been deported to Russia by the Internal Security Service (Kaitsepolitsei) for security reasons.
In the summer of 2016, Allan Hantsom organized an anti-NATO "Peace March" in Tallinn's Old Town. In the background, Hantsom is seen holding balloons, while in the foreground are Sergei Tšaulin and, behind him, Aleksandr Esakov—both of whom have since been deported to Russia by the Internal Security Service (Kaitsepolitsei) for security reasons. Photo: Erik Prozes

To organize the vehicle attacks, Hantsom approached Andrei Kolomainen, who in turn recruited someone to identify further participants in the chain. This chain eventually included two additional individuals who found the perpetrator responsible for carrying out the attacks.

Multiple sabotage attacks were planned against the property of Estonia's public figures. At a press conference on December 5, Director of the Estonian Internal Security Service Margo Palloson explained that the planning of the attacks was carried out in stages, targeting the vehicles of four individuals. "We can assume that if these attacks had been successful and gone undetected, the perpetrators would have moved on to new targets. However, the arrest of the organizer halted the attacks," Palloson stated.

In addition to the car belonging to Estonian Minister of Interior, Lauri Läänemets, the vehicle of an Estonian journalist was vandalized in Tallinn in December 2023.

No attacks were planned directly against the individuals themselves.

Following the attacks, Allan Hantsom planned to relocate to Russia and had already disposed of his assets in Estonia. According to Oleg Ivanov, a leader of the Koos party currently residing in Russia, Hantsom intended to move to Russia shortly before his arrest.

According to Margo Palloson, in 2023, such attacks were primarily concentrated in the Baltic states and Poland, but they have now spread across Europe. "This is essentially state-sponsored vandalism and terrorism," stated Palloson.

Despite these efforts, such attacks fail to achieve their objectives. “The will to support Ukraine only grows stronger,” Palloson emphasized.

Following the recent attacks, new recruitment attempts by the GRU have been observed. "We should not harbor any illusions that Russia will stop. The attacks are likely to continue and become increasingly sophisticated," the Director of the Estonian Internal Security Agency warned.

While current attacks have focused on property, the possibility of direct attacks on individuals cannot be ruled out. “We are doing our utmost to thwart these attempts,” Palloson assured.

Prosecutor Triinu Olev-Aas stated at the press conference that some of those convicted were unaware of the identity of the mastermind behind the attacks, although they had prior encounters with law enforcement. "They are men living near the capital, Tallinn, aged up to 40," Olev-Aas explained. They were in debt, and some were drug addicts.

On December 5, 2024, a press conference was held at the Office of the Prosecutor General in Tallinn regarding the vandalism of Interior Minister Lauri Läänemets's car, featuring State Prosecutor Triinu Olev-Aas and Director General of the Internal Security Service, Margo Palloson.
On December 5, 2024, a press conference was held at the Office of the Prosecutor General in Tallinn regarding the vandalism of Interior Minister Lauri Läänemets's car, featuring State Prosecutor Triinu Olev-Aas and Director General of the Internal Security Service, Margo Palloson. Photo: Tairo Lutter/Postimees/Scanpix Baltics

The court convicted Hantsom, Kolomainen, and Roman Lantsov of espionage and activities supporting espionage against the Republic of Estonia. Four others were found guilty of property-related crimes.

According to Prosecutor Triinu Olev-Aas, the organization and execution of the attacks involved a lengthy chain of participants, many of whom were unaware of the crime’s ultimate purpose.

"For state-level offenses, charges were brought against those who knew the goal of the crime and the identity of its true instigator. Other participants in the attacks were simply given vehicle registration numbers, makes, and addresses and promised payment for the vandalism. Evidence suggests they were unaware of whose vehicles they were targeting," said Olev-Aas. Payments for the crimes, approximately 10 000 euros, originating from Russia, never reached Estonia.

According to Margo Palloson, Russian intelligence services are finding it increasingly difficult to recruit individuals directly due to current restrictions. "Borders are closed, making it challenging for cadre officers or agents of Russian intelligence services to enter Estonia, and fewer Estonian residents are traveling to Russia," he noted. Consequently, these services have turned to social media platforms to reach potential recruits. In this particular case, the Russian intelligence service utilized social media for recruitment.

Allan Hantsom, 46, has frequently appeared in the annual reports of the Internal Security Service. In its report covering 2021–2022, a chapter detailed how the Kremlin exploits far-right extremists to advance its interests.

Anti-NATO "Peace March" in Tallinn's Old Town, September 2016.
Anti-NATO "Peace March" in Tallinn's Old Town, September 2016. Photo: Erik Prozes

"In February 2021, Russian-speaking skinheads from Estonia were seen in Tallinn's Old Town participating in a protest in support of the Immortal Regiment and defaming opposition leader Alexei Navalny in front of the Russian Embassy. These activities were orchestrated by Allan Hantsom, previously convicted of inciting ethnic and racial hatred in connection with far-right Barkašovist groups. Hantsom now operates in the interest of Russian propaganda outlets," the report stated.

Kaitsepolitsei highlighted that exploiting various forms of extremism aligns with Russia’s military doctrine, which integrates military, political, economic, informational, and other non-military methods, leveraging societal unrest and protest potential.

Allan Hantsom, a member of the Estonian political party Koos, was found guilty of espionage against Estonia during a court hearing in May 2024.
Allan Hantsom, a member of the Estonian political party Koos, was found guilty of espionage against Estonia during a court hearing in May 2024. Photo: Estonian Security Police

Hantsom first appeared in Kaitsepolitsei’s annual report in 2002, in connection with the Russian National Unity (RNU) organization, founded by Russian extremist Aleksandr Barkašov.

The report described a major setback for the RNU’s operations in Estonia when a criminal case was launched in 2001 against its local leaders, resulting in convictions. In April 2002, three individuals—Allan Hantsom, Sergei Vassetškin, and Sergei Seleznjov—were convicted under charges related to inciting hatred, violence, or discrimination based on nationality, race, religion, or political affiliation.

During the pre-trial investigation, it was established and documented that activists of the Russian National Unity (VRÜ) distributed the bulletin "Kolovrat," which contained content inciting national and racial hatred.

On December 9, 2002, at the request of the Minister of the Interior, the Tallinn City Court forcibly dissolved the non-profit organization Kolovrat, which had united VRÜ members, as its activities were contrary to law and good morals. Under the name of this non-profit, VRÜ published the "Kolovrat" bulletin, which incited national and political hatred. Allan Hantsom has organized pro-Kremlin propaganda events in Estonia alongside Sergei Tšaulin and Aleksandr Esakov, both of whom have since been deported to Russia for security reasons

In September 2016, Hantsom organized an anti-NATO "Peace March" in Tallinn, which included participation from Esakov and Tšaulin. Tšaulin was escorted to the border by police in February of this year, and Esakov in May of last year.

According to Margo Palloson, several individuals remain under surveillance, but such incidents cannot be entirely ruled out in the future.

“If we look at how Russia involves these individuals—partly through social media—there is always the possibility of more lone actors,” Palloson stated. The goal of various attacks and violations is to sow chaos and fear in Estonia.

“These attacks are part of Russia’s hybrid operations aimed at destabilizing Estonian society and spreading fear. They should be viewed in conjunction with other simultaneous activities, such as propaganda and cyberattacks. One of the central ideas behind Russia’s so-called hybrid activity is to create chaos,” Palloson explained.

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