Lithuania commits to buying German Leopard 2 tanks. So far, Baltic defense strategies have emphasized asymmetry, long-range fires, and interoperability with NATO forward land forces over maneuver counter-attack capabilities.
Lithuaniahasformallycommitted to purchasing German Leopard tanks, with Defense Minister DovileSakalienesigningtheagreementduringherfirstofficialvisit to Berlin on December 16.
IgnasGrinevicius, theminister’sspokesperson, confirmed to BNS thatLithuaniaplans to acquire 44 tanks - enough to equip a battalion - as part of itsdefensemodernizationefforts.
Withdefensespending on therise, discussions are underway to secure an earlierdeliverytimeline. “In our meeting with the head of [the tank manufacturer] KNDS, we addressedtheindustry’sproductioncapacity and thefeasibility of deliveringthetanks by 2030. Furthertalkswillcontinue in Lithuania soon,” Sakaliene said in a statement to BNS.
Thedefense minister previouslydescribedthepurchase as “a significantstep in modernizingtheLithuanianArmedForces, strengtheningnationaldefensecapabilities, and enhancingintegration and interoperability with the German ArmedForces.”
Thedecision to procure German-made Leopard tankswas made earlierthisyear as part of Lithuania’sbroaderstrategy to develop a nationaldivision. Theacquisition is expected to occur in phases, with theinitialfocus on speeding up theprocurement of airdefensesystems to complementthetanks.
According to thecurrentagreement, thefirst tank company is slated to arrive in Lithuania by 2029, with theformation of a fullbattalionprojectedfor 2034. However, Lithuania is seeking to acceleratethistimeline, aimingfor a fullyoperationalnationaldivision by 2030.
Defenseofficialscaution, however, that meeting thistargetunderexistingfundinglevelswouldlikely push completion to between 2036 and 2040.
Lithuaniahasnowbecomethefirst Baltic nation to purchasemainbattletanks. Baltic defense strategies have emphasized mobility, asymmetry, and interoperability with NATO forces, making IFVs and anti-tank systems more critical than heavy tanks.
In Estonia, the tank debatehaslastedfordecades. Criticsarguethattanks are essentialforcounterattacks, as even a defensiveforce must counterattack to respond to enemybreakthroughs of defensivelines. Estonian defenseofficialshaverespondedthatNATO’sforwardlandforcebattaliongroups in theBalticalreadyincludetankswithintheirunits. Sincethesebattalions are amongNATO’squickreactionforces, theirtankswould be availablefor Baltic defense in theveryfirstmoments of a potentialdefensiveoperation.
Estonia, and, to some extent, other Baltic nationshavebegun to shift theirmilitarystrategies, prioritizinglong-range firecapabilities. The aim of this shift is to neutralizetheenemy’sability to projectmilitary power beyonditsborders, ratherthandealing with theconsequences of such an attack and conductingcounter-offensives with heavywesterntanks on theswampy East Baltic soil. Tanks are, however, "a text-book capability" for the maneuver force, so the choice of not purchasing tanks is a question of a timid purchasing power of small Baltic economies, one Estonian defense official commented to The Baltic Sentinel.
Poland is, in contrast, significantly modernizing its armored forces with large-scale purchases of advanced main battle tanks from the United States and South Korea, replacing Soviet era tanks. From the U.S., Poland is acquiring 366 Abrams tanks in two configurations: the M1A1 and the state-of-the-art M1A2 SEPv3, enhancing its firepower.
Poland has also partnered with South Korea to procure 1,000 K2 Black Panther tanks, including a localized variant, the K2PL, to be produced domestically.
Last time the Baltic States had their own battle tanks in the military inventory was prior to WWII.
Whythe Leopard 2 is PopularAmongEuropean NATO Members
The Leopard 2 mainbattle tank, developed by Germany’sKrauss-MaffeiWegmann, is oftenregarded as one of themostbalanced and capabletanks in modern armoredwarfare. Itswidespreadadoption by NATO and othermilitarieshighlightsitsfunctionaladvantages in keyareas: mobility, firepower, protection, and logisticalsupport.
One of thetank'sprimarystrengths is itsengine. The Leopard 2 is powered by theMTU MB 873 Ka-501 V12 twin-turbochargeddieselengine, whichprovides a top speed of 70 km/h (43 mph) and reliableaccelerationacrossvariousterrains. Compared to thegasturbineengine of the U.S. M1 Abrams, the Leopard 2’s dieselengine is morefuel-efficient, enablinglongeroperationalendurance and reducinglogisticaldemandsforfuelresupply.
Thetank’sease of maintenance is anotheradvantage. Itsdieselengine, whilepowerful, is simpler to repair and maintainthantheAbrams’ turbineengine. Additionally, the Leopard 2 benefitsfrombeingwidelyusedacrossEuropean NATO countries, creating a sharedsupplychainfor parts and a broadbase of maintenanceexpertise. Thislogisticalcompatibilitymakes it cost-effective and operationallypractical, particularly in alliedoperations. Lithuania is alreadyrunning a tank maintenancecentrefor Leopard 2 tanksserving in Ukrraine.
The Leopard 2’s protectionsystems are designed to meet modern battlefieldthreats. Itscompositearmorintegratesmultiplematerials, includingsteel and ceramics, to providerobustdefenseagainstbothkinetic and chemicalenergyweapons. Themodularnature of thearmorallowsfordamagedsections to be replacedefficiently, ensuringthe tank can be quicklyrepaired and returned to thebattlefield.
Firepower is anotherkeystrength of the Leopard 2. It is equipped with theRheinmetall 120mm L/55 smoothboregun, providinggreater range and penetrationthantherifledgunused on theBritishChallenger 2. The Leopard 2 canalsofireadvancedammunitiontypes, such as the DM53 and DM63 APFSDSrounds, whichenhanceitseffectivenessagainstheavilyarmoredtargets.
In terms of situationalawareness and targeting, the Leopard 2 incorporatesadvanced sensor and firecontrolsystems. Thesesystemsincludethermalimaging and nightvisioncapabilities, allowing it to identify and engagetargetsundervariouslighting and weatherconditions. Thefirecontrolsystemensures a highfirst-hitprobability, evenwhenthe tank is in motion, which is criticalforengagingthreats in dynamiccombatscenarios.
The Leopard 2’s exportsuccessreflectsitsadaptability to differentoperationalrequirements. Variantssuch as the Leopard 2A4, A5, A6, and A7 providetailoredcapabilitiesforenvironmentsrangingfromurbancombat to open-fieldwarfare. Thisversatilityhas made it a commonchoiceamong NATO and non-NATO countries, ensuringinteroperabilitywithinalliedforces.
From a costperspective, the Leopard 2 offerscompetitiveadvantagesforEuropeanoperators. Itsreliance on dieselfuel and sharedmaintenanceinfrastructurereduceslong-term operatingcosts. Thetank’smodulardesignalsoallowsforupgradesovertime, extendingitsservicelife.
Leopard 2 hasbeendeployed in variousconflictssinceitsintroduction in 1979. Notableinstancesinclude Kosovo War (1998–1999), War in Afghanistan (2001–2014): Dutch, Danish, and Canadianforcesutilized Leopard 2 tanksduringtheirmissions with the International SecurityAssistanceForce (ISAF). In 2007, a Canadian Leopard 2 tank demonstrateditsresiliencewhen it withstood an improvisedexplosivedevice (IED) attack, resulting in no crewfatalities and allowingthe tank to be repaired and returned to service.
In SyrianCivilWar (2011–present), TurkishArmedForcesdeployed Leopard 2 tanksduringoperations in northernSyria. Thesetanksencounteredvariouschallenges, includingattacksfrom anti-tank guidedmissiles and improvisedexplosivedevices.
In Russo-UkrainianWar (2014–present), Ukrainianforceshavebeenoperating Leopard 2 tankssupplied by several NATO countries, includingGermany, Poland, and Canada, to bolstertheirdefenseagainstRussianaggression.