INTERVIEW WITH THE INSIDER ⟩ "Putin Personally Directs, GRU and FSB Execute" - Who is Behind Sabotage Acts Committed in the EU?

Interviewer: Do Russia's intelligence services compete with each other in carrying out sabotage abroad?

Roman Dobrokhotov: I wouldn’t say that Russian intelligence agencies compete in the number of sabotage operations they conduct abroad, but both the GRU and FSB are involved in carrying out these activities.

Interviewer: Who decides whom to kill and whose windows to smash?

Roman Dobrokhotov: Putin decides who to kill. As for breaking windows, such decisions can be made at the level of specific generals if it aligns with the strategy agreed upon with Putin.

Interviewer: Regarding Zelimkhan Khangoshvili (a former rebel commander who fought against Russian forces during the Second Chechen War and was assassinated on August 23, 2019, in Berlin, Germany), was Putin personally aware of this hit?

Roman Dobrokhotov: Former combatants are eliminated based on lists, and there were dozens of them. The murder of Khangoshvili in the center of Berlin was a demonstrative act.

Interviewer: Estonian intelligence services announced in early December court punishments for those who smashed the windows of the Minister of the Interior’s and journalists’ cars. The main organizer was Ilya Bocharov. He was not in Estonia. What do you know about this person? Is he an officer or a middleman?

Roman Dobrokhotov: We checked Bocharov and found no connection to the GRU. It is highly unlikely he was ever a commissioned officer. He is registered as the owner of many companies. Most likely, he is a middleman. However, orders for such individuals come from the intelligence services. We have never seen sabotage operations originate from anywhere else.

Interviewer: How do Russian intelligence services assist the families of agents who are caught? Are those arrested in Estonia expendable for Moscow?

Roman Dobrokhotov: For high-profile assassins who know Putin personally, like Krasikov, state support is always guaranteed. For smaller operatives, there is no protection.

Interviewer: Do Russian Federation diplomats in EU countries know about these activities?

Roman Dobrokhotov: Ordinary diplomats usually know nothing. However, around a third of diplomats are members of intelligence services and may themselves be involved in certain operations. Even within these ranks, the left hand doesn’t always know what the right hand is doing.

Interviewer: Which information about Russian intelligence operations in the EU is easier or harder to obtain?

Roman Dobrokhotov: GRU operatives are usually slightly easier to identify than those from the FSB, though the difference isn’t significant.

Interviewer: Has anything changed in GRU operations after sanctions were imposed on their most prominent military unit, according to your research?

Roman Dobrokhotov: There has been a shift toward more civilian, rather than military, provocations. This is where we started the discussion.

Interviewer: Which types of operations are more frequent: digital ones, such as data theft, or physical ones, like the Interior Minister’s driver’s car or the Czech ammunition depot explosion?

Roman Dobrokhotov: There’s no precise statistic, but both types of operations have become noticeably more frequent.

Interviewer: How can this ominous trend be countered?

Roman Dobrokhotov: In addition to the usual work of identifying and preventing such actions, we believe investigative journalists should play a more active role. In today’s world, much of the work related to these problems is analytical. That’s what we do. I am confident that Estonia has excellent journalists capable of this work. We don’t ask much from state agencies—just hints about the right direction to dig. In this sense, we have good contacts with specific EU countries, though not all.

Interviewer: Your colleagues at Dossier Center [a Russian voluntary anti-corruption project] reported after the gas pipeline rupture between Estonia and Finland a year ago that FSB special units might be behind it. Do you have any information about who could be responsible for such sabotage?

Roman Dobrokhotov: We consider these claims very likely and credible.

Interviewer: What determines the dynamics of underwater sabotage activities in the Baltic Sea? What can we expect in February, for instance, when the Baltic States disconnect from the shared energy system with Russia?

Roman Dobrokhotov: At least until peace talks in Ukraine begin, Russia will continue its sabotage activities as actively as possible. The only way to stop this is through countermeasures—mass ship seizures and public disclosures. Putin perceives impunity as encouragement to act.

Interviewer: Since 2021, there have been massive attacks involving migrants at the borders of Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia. Who is responsible for this in Moscow?

Roman Dobrokhotov: We know for certain that the FSB assisted in both bringing migrants to the region and directing them to the border. We also know that the GRU developed plans for provocations involving migrants. It is entirely plausible that they are cooperating in this effort.

Interviewer: Could similar migrant attacks occur in Estonia after Finland's experiences in 2023?

Roman Dobrokhotov: Of course, it’s possible. However, at the moment, most resources are being directed toward sending those same migrants to the front lines in Ukraine.

Interviewer: The head of German intelligence mentioned that Russia might incite Estonia’s Russian-speaking population, concentrated in the country’s eastern regions. Do you think this is possible, given the current personnel and methods of Putin’s intelligence services? Are they capable of orchestrating such efforts?

Roman Dobrokhotov: They might attempt to organize something, but this wouldn’t resemble the situation in Donbas. Russia will avoid bringing troops onto NATO territory. However, to provoke a political crisis, Russia could stir up the situation to create tensions.