Estonian Military Intelligence Chief: Current Threat to NATO Is Low, but Russian Military Reforms Are Underway and Western Armies Lack Experience

Interviewer: What traits are you looking for in recruits to the Intelligence Center?

Colonel Ants Kiviselg: As our organization deals with a wide range of information-gathering methods and a very broad collection scope, it’s hard to pinpoint a single type of person. The individual should be curious, interested in global events, and keen to understand the processes behind them. They must also be prepared to handle routine tasks. Language skills are an advantage, as they bring cultural understanding and awareness. Above all, they should be good communicators and open-minded.

Interviewer: How significant is the role of human intelligence (HUMINT) in the Intelligence Center’s work compared to radar and other technologies today?

Colonel Ants Kiviselg: We collect information through various intelligence disciplines: signals intelligence (SIGINT), cyber intelligence, open-source intelligence (OSINT), and human intelligence (HUMINT). HUMINT has its specific characteristics—as it involves human interaction, it requires that people can travel. Accessing individuals, establishing rapport, and building trust takes a great deal of time.

HUMINT is certainly an active discipline for us, but today’s environment makes it somewhat more challenging, given that Russian military personnel no longer travel as much. Likewise, other persons of interest across the border are no longer traveling to certain countries. Approaching them may pose an elevated risk to our staff.

Interviewer: Some time ago, it was reported that Russian GPS jamming disrupted Tartu-Helsinki air traffic. How much impact have Russian activities had on the work of the Military Intelligence? Have they been able to obscure your operations or anything similar?

Colonel Ants Kiviselg: Many GPS disruptions in our region have been related to the Russian Federation’s own defensive measures.

There hasn’t been any disruptive activity directly targeting us, such as radar jamming. However, the broader environment in Europe and our region—sabotage attacks and so on—indirectly affects our work. When we talk about GPS disruptions, it is also our interest to understand why they occur, what causes them, and what capabilities the party responsible for them has.

Not all cases involve malicious or targeted jamming. Many GPS disruptions in our region have been related to the Russian Federation’s own defensive measures. We know that there have been several drone attacks on various military and logistical infrastructure in Russia recently. In connection with this, at least some GPS jamming has occurred as part of efforts to protect critical infrastructure.

Interviewer: When the Ust-Luga terminal was attacked recently, how quickly did the information reach your organization? Such an event happened very close to our borders.

Colonel Ants Kiviselg: I can’t go into too much detail, but specifically regarding the Ust-Luga attack, we had a few hours of advance warning that something was happening. Clearly, we didn’t know 100% the nature or target of the attack. But we did have prior information.

Interviewer: Did this warning come directly from the Ukrainians?

Colonel Ants Kiviselg: I won’t go into detail on that.

Interviewer: Does such advance information influence your immediate actions? After all, if a drone is so close to Estonia, there’s a chance it could reach our territory. Something similar happened in Latvia.

Colonel Ants Kiviselg: These scenarios have been discussed at the Defense Forces level—what the possibilities and countermeasures could be in such cases. Work is ongoing in this area. When such incidents occur, we strive to be as prepared as possible. However, it’s worth noting that the altitude at which drones fly and the radar cross-section reflected back to the radar are so small that it makes detection challenging.

As a result, these types of attacks have been successful even in Russia, as air defenses find it difficult to detect and identify such targets. We cannot rule out that a similar incident could occur someday, as happened in Latvia, where an attack drone ended up in a location it wasn’t supposed to. The Defense Forces have conducted war games and tabletop exercises in this direction.

Interviewer: How is Ukraine faring?

Colonel Ants Kiviselg: Considering the course of the war and the available resources—both human and material—Ukraine is not doing poorly, but it is certainly not doing well either. The war has entered a phase of attrition, with a relatively stationary frontline. The Russian Federation holds the initiative and advances westward in very marginal steps, suffering significant human losses in the process.

From Ukraine's perspective, I see nothing catastrophic. Neither side has the strength to achieve a significant strategic breakthrough. Tactical breakthroughs and movements are possible, as seen near Kursk, where Ukrainians carried out a successful attack on January 5. Such smaller attacks and advances can happen on both sides, but I do not currently see forces concentrated enough to penetrate deeply into the other side's territory.

Interviewer: Why is Ukraine not doing well?

Colonel Ants Kiviselg: In the summer and autumn of 2022, Ukraine managed to retake the city of Kherson and the Kharkiv region. It might have been expected that with increased Western military aid, Ukraine’s military capability would improve over time on the battlefield. Conversely, sanctions would start to impact Russia and so forth.

The operations in Kharkiv and Kherson were very successful, and I believe the Ukrainians realistically assessed their military capabilities at that moment and in that area. When we talk about whether it was possible to move further south from Kharkiv and liberate more territory, logistical support comes into play. This is where the Russian military leadership, at least at the beginning of the war, made mistakes: logistical support and the ability to secure units and supply chains. Ukrainians likely considered that the rapid pace of their advance meant that logistics, securing supply routes, and having rested units ready for further attacks were insufficient at the time.

Looking forward, the Russian Federation changed its tactics by building defensive lines, colloquially called the "Surovikin Line." Since then, the frontline has remained relatively static: both sides have constructed defensive fortifications and are holding positions. We must also consider that modern drone usage by both sides has increased to the point where the concentration of mechanized units is quickly detected and can be targeted with long-range artillery or attack drones.

This has altered the course of the war. Additionally, when we look at population sizes—40 million versus 140 million—it is unfortunately in Russia's favor. However, Russia’s recruitment pace and the types of people being recruited—prisoners, socially and economically disadvantaged individuals—indicate that this resource is becoming depleted. Russia has also been continually increasing recruitment bonuses, suggesting that recruitment is not easy. A Russian soldier can earn about €50,000 a year, which is a substantial sum, especially in Russia’s poorer regions.

We saw that in November and December, their attack tempo slowed. When we consider that North Korean fighters are participating on the Russian side, and North Korea is supplying them with ammunition and indirect fire systems, it’s clear that the Russian Federation is not in a strong position if such solutions are necessary. We also see the ruble hitting new lows, interest rates rising, and a likely avalanche of small business bankruptcies.

Russia spends 6–8% of its GDP monthly on supporting the war, with additional hidden costs likely included. Nearly 30% of the state budget is allocated to the military, and with internal security added, it’s close to 50%. There is little for Russia to celebrate, and the effects of sanctions are evident.

The effects of sanctions are long-term, but Russia’s autocratic system allows resources to be reallocated relatively easily. Since last year, they have started using reserves intended for welfare, and these are steadily diminishing. Russia is also bypassing sanctions through third countries that enable sanctioned goods to reach Russia. A shadow fleet is used to transport oil products from Russia abroad.

I believe sanctions are being felt in Russia, but an autocratic state can reallocate resources and pressure its population to endure. Moreover, media suppression makes it difficult to get an accurate picture of the situation. The exact amounts allocated to support the war are likely known to very few in the Kremlin.

Interviewer: Does Russia’s economy being dependent on the war industry—the so-called Dutch Disease—mean that Vladimir Putin has no intention of ending the war, as it keeps his regime and economy afloat?

Colonel Ants Kiviselg: Only Putin likely knows what he wants. However, I can say that his interest lies in reshaping the security architecture of Europe. If he loses in Ukraine, the number of cards in his hand will significantly decrease. Thus, he is highly interested in ensuring that the Russian Federation at least appears to win the war in Ukraine. Losing the war could significantly undermine Putin’s position in Russia, as history shows that failed czars are not beloved and rarely last long.

For Putin personally, ending the war with an appearance of victory is crucial. In recent years, this conviction has only grown—Russia is willing to use military means to achieve political goals.

They are prepared to accept significant human losses and reduce the standard of living to achieve a short-term military victory. Putin certainly faces no easy solutions, particularly as new and stricter sanctions are being introduced. These measures will eventually reach the average Russian citizen, potentially increasing dissatisfaction with the war in Ukraine. However, we currently see no such tendencies within Russian society. Those dissatisfied with the war have mostly left Russia.

Although a clear black-and-white victory or defeat for either side is not in sight, the situation seems to be heading toward an ambiguous peace agreement. Even if the West were to step up its efforts, looking at Russia’s pace of ammunition production compared to Europe, it seems unlikely that a decisive shift in Ukraine’s favor can be achieved.

True, but we must also note that the attacking side always suffers greater losses than the defending side. As mentioned earlier, Russia cannot conduct motorized and mechanized attacks; it relies on mass infantry assaults, which result in very high casualties. While Russia has a large pool of manpower to send to the front, Ukrainians have prepared defensive positions and have resisted the Russian Federation’s pressure effectively. Continued provision of air defense systems and F-16 aircraft to Ukraine will likely make Russian glide bomb attacks less accurate or prevent them from reaching beyond the frontline. These are objectives Ukraine’s air force could set to level the playing field in the air.

Interviewer: There has been attention on the case of the 155th Mechanized Brigade trained in France, which faced issues with numerous deserters and complaints about inadequate training. Does this indicate that Western Europe doesn’t fully grasp the realities of modern warfare as exemplified in Ukraine?

Colonel Ants Kiviselg: I can’t comment on the quality of training in France. I haven’t spoken to the 155th Brigade or their French trainers. However, I can provide examples: Ukrainians themselves have said that if a drone specialist is taken from the frontlines to teach at a military school, and then sent back to the front after 1.5 months, their knowledge may already be outdated. Integrating identified lessons into training cycles takes time. I am confident that the French conduct training to the best of their ability and knowledge.

For the Estonian Defense Forces, a key dilemma is how to prepare for future wars without being overly tied to developments in the Ukraine war.

We closely observe how the Russian Federation’s armed forces operate, whether in Africa, Syria, or Ukraine. I believe our understanding is quite solid, and we pass this knowledge on to the Defense Forces, who use it to decide on weapons procurement, and how to adjust training for conscripts and professional soldiers. This battlefield knowledge is constantly evolving, improving day by day.

However, as we know, weapons procurement can take years depending on the system, and it’s a continuous cat-and-mouse game: when a new weapons system is introduced to the battlefield, it is initially very successful until countermeasures are developed to diminish its effectiveness.

We have seen this throughout the war in Ukraine. Whether it’s technological tools, electronic warfare, or changes in tactical and technical procedures, such as moving bases further from the frontline or shifting logistics chains, the battlefield is in constant flux. Similarly, in the drone industry, early drones operated on one or two frequencies. Today, drones have significantly more frequencies, allowing them to switch if jamming occurs. Fiber-optic cables are also being used for drone operations, making electronic interference impossible—although extreme cold can hinder their use.

Interviewer: Isn't it logistically cumbersome to have a cable between the drone and its operator?

Colonel Ants Kiviselg: It certainly is cumbersome. However, in some combat environments, it's a reliable option. Both sides in the conflict are using this method at the frontline.

Interviewer: What are the main changes in Russian warfare, or the key lessons learned by the Military Intelligence Center from the war in Ukraine?

Colonel Ants Kiviselg: In the early phase of the conflict in 2022, the Russian side attempted maneuvers to capture territories using armored vehicles and inter-branch cooperation. However, we saw that even in the first year of the war, they failed in these efforts. We all remember the 50-60 kilometer-long convoy north of Kyiv, which they were unable to secure or supply.

There were cases where tires simply deflated in the cold due to poor quality, among other issues. Following that, the Russian Federation adjusted its approach, reverting to trench warfare reminiscent of World War II, where defensive strongholds are encircled and destroyed using long-range artillery and aerial bombing. There are no quick solutions or rapid advances anymore.

The Russian Federation has undoubtedly realized that air superiority is critical for achieving success on the battlefield. Logistical supply is equally important, and Ukrainians have been very effective in targeting Russian ammunition depots and command posts. Consequently, Russians are constantly changing their tactical behavior, moving command posts further from the front, which complicates command and control of frontline units.

There has been speculation about the possible removal of Chief of the General Staff [Army General] Valery Gerasimov. However, it seems that loyalty to the regime outweighs military competence or leadership quality, and this is evident on the battlefield. Maneuver warfare likely requires military commanders to have a clear understanding of their mission and a degree of autonomy.

In the Russian Federation, there is no operational freedom. A specific objective is given, and soldiers are sent on frontal assaults with mechanical persistence. For instance, in Donetsk Oblast, near the city of Pokrovsk, they are attempting to encircle the city rather than capture it directly.

Interviewer: The war has also claimed many top officers. How much has this impacted the intellectual capacity of Russian warfare?

Colonel Ants Kiviselg: When looking at senior officers in the Russian Federation, many are relatively old. However, at the tactical level, officers who survive the battles and gain experience are likely to see relatively quick career advancement in the coming years. They have combat experience that officers in Western armies generally lack. Our recent conflicts have been in crisis zones where the enemy’s capabilities were entirely different—they didn’t possess air, land, or naval capabilities comparable to those of a modern state. Thus, we cannot underestimate Russian military personnel.

The question remains: how many lessons are actually being implemented into their peacetime training systems? Most of their officer corps and military personnel are tied up in the conflict in Ukraine, so it is unclear how much these lessons are being integrated. However, we can expect that this will eventually lead to an improvement in officer quality.

Interviewer: In the case of the Hostomel airport operation, Estonia’s Military intelligence played an important role in warning the Ukrainians. Can you share other examples where the Intelligence Center has supported Ukraine?

Colonel Ants Kiviselg: We collaborate with Ukraine’s military and intelligence services, exchanging information daily. We have also supported their training efforts. But I’d prefer not to go into further details.

Interviewer: What is happening in the Russian military bases near Estonia’s borders?

Colonel Ants Kiviselg: There are mixed movements near our borders. Since the war began, we have seen equipment and personnel withdrawn from units near our borders. This has continued throughout the war. Russia tells its domestic audience that they fear a NATO attack and that some NATO countries may be preparing an offensive against Russia. However, the reality is that about one-third of their units near our borders are manned, with the rest of the personnel in Ukraine. If they genuinely feared a NATO attack, they wouldn’t be able to withdraw so much personnel from this region. They’ve even withdrawn air defense units.

Former Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu unveiled a military reform plan that significantly increases the number of units near the Baltic States and Poland. As part of this reform, the Western Military District was divided into the Leningrad and Moscow Military Districts. New units were created, such as the 44th Army Corps near the Finnish border, while several brigades near Estonia’s border are being expanded into divisions.

If the reform is fully implemented, the number of personnel and equipment near our borders will significantly increase. For example, the 6th Army, the 76th Guards Air Assault Division, and the 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade had about 20,000 personnel before the war. This number could double after the reform. Similarly, tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery units near our borders will also increase.

This reform is underway: units are being formed and relocated to bases near our borders. However, most of these units are sent to Ukraine after formation. Currently, there are still fewer military units near our borders than before the war in Ukraine, and in the near future, there is no sharp military threat to the Baltic region or Finland.

Interviewer: If such a threat were to emerge, what would Estonia’s early warning time be?

Colonel Ants Kiviselg: It’s clear that the adversary may also read this interview, so I can’t provide precise details. However, our early warning system follows two key principles: to alert political leadership in time to begin necessary NATO-level discussions and to allow for local measures, such as declaring mobilization, training personnel, and deploying them. For now, as long as the war in Ukraine remains in its current phase, the Russian Federation is forced to maintain large forces there. It would take time for them to redeploy significant units back here. Moreover, Ukraine’s armed forces would not allow such large-scale redeployments, as they are still determined to reclaim their territory.

Interviewer: Recently, Finnish news paper Iltalehti reported that a Russian military exercise scenario envisioned Finland’s borders being redrawn to the 1743 Treaty of Åbo lines. How seriously should such scenarios be taken?

Colonel Ants Kiviselg: Military exercises should always be taken seriously. Armed forces in any country practice scenarios that align with their potential tasks and objectives. I believe these exercise scenarios reflect the Russian Federation’s ambitions. This is also something we consider when ensuring early warning—identifying indicators that Russia may have an interest in military action in our region. NATO and regional countries also incorporate such scenarios into their defense planning.

Interviewer: What conclusions have you drawn from events in Syria? The Russian regime doesn’t seem likely to collapse as abruptly.

Colonel Ants Kiviselg: It shows that autocratic regimes prioritize a narrow range of interests over those of the broader society. Most citizens are dissatisfied with the direction their country is heading. In Syria, for instance, the Sunni majority was oppressed under Bashar al-Assad, an Alawite, who ensured his clique’s well-being and protected their interests.

Dissatisfaction simmered beneath the surface since 2011. The regime’s collapse might have seemed sudden, but such a risk is always present with autocratic regimes. The surprise wasn’t that it happened, but how quickly it unfolded.

Interviewer: Was Assad poisoned in Moscow, as rumors suggest?

Colonel Ants Kiviselg: This is not our primary area of interest, so I have no information on that.

Interviewer: How much advance information did you have about the sabotage of the Estlink 2 subsea power cable?

Colonel Ants Kiviselg: Sabotage of critical infrastructure has been an urgent topic in Estonia and neighboring countries since 2023, and intelligence agencies have shared information on it. The Intelligence Center focuses primarily on what happens beyond the border. If we come across information indicating a potential threat inside Estonia or in territorial waters, we inform other security agencies. This information exchange works both ways. Other security agencies inform us when they receive relevant military information from across the border.

Interviewer: Does China feature on the Intelligence Center’s radar? Both foreign intelligence and the Internal Security Service talk about it often, but it doesn’t seem to pose a direct military threat.

Colonel Ants Kiviselg: Not directly, no. China’s significance in global politics is growing due to its economic, technological, and political capabilities, which it has leveraged for decades to assert its interests. Just as we discussed earlier about Russia’s interest in reshaping Europe’s security architecture, China has partially overlapping interests with Russia. As they themselves say, they want a multipolar world where they have a say in how global affairs are managed.

Russia has ambitions to dictate the terms in our region, and China has similar goals in its region. We see a convergence of interests and some cooperation between Russia and China. From a military perspective, we monitor whether Russia and China are exchanging military technology or knowledge. In that sense, China is within our scope of interest but not as prominently as Russia.