WAR AND SOCIOLOGY ⟩ Ukraine's Struggles Are Only Beginning After a Truce with Russia

Increasing criticism of the government does not indicate that most Ukrainians have changed their views on the war or victory.

The majority of Ukrainians still believe in victory, even though neither the government nor society has a clear vision of how to end the war. There are also no indications that the Ukrainian army currently has the capability to reclaim occupied territories.

Perhaps most importantly, an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians remain willing to endure as much as necessary for the sake of that victory—at least according to survey responses. Neither Russia’s missile and drone attacks nor its information warfare campaigns have managed to shake this belief.

However, polls also show that most Ukrainians are open to negotiations. Depending on the survey, 50–55 percent of respondents support negotiations. Another 15–20 percent still advocate fighting until Ukraine’s ultimate victory—likely meaning the restoration of the country’s 1991 borders (a point we’ll revisit later). However, the number of those in favor of fighting to total victory has declined significantly over the past year.

Supporting negotiations does not mean that Ukrainians believe peace should be made with Russia at any cost. No one is calling for peace at any price.

There is a broad understanding that a ceasefire or peace agreement should only be signed if Ukraine secures concrete security guarantees against Russia and continued support from the West.

Defining both victory and peace remains a complicated issue.

One of Ukraine’s most well-known sociologists, Aleksei Antipovych, noted that when they conduct in-person surveys and ask Ukrainians what victory should look like, most still respond that it means restoring the 1991 borders—including Crimea and the entire Donbas region. However, when pressed further, nearly no one actually believes that outcome is realistic.

This leaves two main scenarios for peace: either the de facto borders that existed at the start of the full-scale invasion or the current frontline (or whatever the frontline is at the time a peace deal is reached). In reality, the latter seems far more likely.

At the end of 2022, only about 5–8 percent of Ukrainians were willing to accept the loss of occupied territories. Now, surveys indicate that nearly a third of respondents would immediately agree to such terms—and that number is steadily rising.

Almost no one considers these two scenarios a true victory. Rather, they are seen as the price of ending the war—or merely freezing the conflict. Many fear that, in any case, such an outcome would only be temporary, and that a renewed war would be just a matter of time, especially if Ukraine fails to secure strong security guarantees. After all, Russia is not going anywhere. Few believe that Russia will ever truly and permanently abandon its ambition to conquer or subjugate Ukraine.

It is not exhaustion from war or missile attacks that drives many to support negotiations with Russia—it is exhaustion from uncertainty.

Ukrainians long for even a semblance of stability, a sense of predictability that would allow them to plan their lives and live as they wish. They want to know that they won’t have to go to war now—or in the future. What terrifies many is the prospect of still being called to fight in another year, two, three, or even five years. The idea that today’s children might one day be sent to the front is a quiet but deeply felt fear—one that is widespread, tangible, and entirely understandable. Yes, people are still willing to endure hardship, but they also want to know: for how much longer?

Many Ukrainians see the responsibility for peace negotiations and a potential settlement as falling squarely on President Zelensky and his administration. It is the duty of the current leadership to take responsibility for deciding how to end the war.

At the same time, there is also a broad understanding in Ukraine that as soon as a ceasefire or peace deal with Russia is signed, the blame game will begin—something all too familiar in Ukrainian politics. Accusations of betraying the country's and the people’s interests will emerge: Was this what our men and sons fought for? And so, the cycle continues.

Regardless of how negotiations unfold—if they happen at all—the outcome is more likely to divide Ukrainians than to unite them. This is evident from the fact that an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians still aspire to restore the country’s 1991 borders.

This imminent societal division is closely tied to the growing public dissatisfaction with Zelensky’s government, as I mentioned at the beginning of this article.

Surveys indicate that the main source of discontent is not unfulfilled military expectations but rather an old and persistent adversary of Ukraine—corruption. During wartime, corruption is perceived as far more egregious than in peacetime. This frustration cuts across all segments of society, uniting Ukrainians in their anger. For many, corruption is seen as little more than war profiteering—something that, historically, carried only one punishment in times of war: execution on the spot.

Curiously, Zelensky himself remains, in the eyes of many Ukrainians, above the rampant corruption and governmental ineffectiveness that fuels public frustration. According to various polls, between 45% and 55% of Ukrainians still trust him as president—though this marks a sharp decline from late 2023, when a survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology put his approval at 77%.

Public dissatisfaction is primarily directed at the government and parliament. However, it is worth noting that Ukrainians have distrusted both institutions for the past 30 years. A common sentiment is: “Zelensky is more or less fine, but his team and those executing policies are the problem.”

Yet, the number of people who view Zelensky himself as the primary issue is steadily growing. More and more Ukrainians believe his inability to effectively manage his government and inner circle—his failure to appoint competent leaders to run the country (and, in the eyes of many, the military)—is the root cause of Ukraine’s problems.

Ukrainians have a strong desire to hold presidential and parliamentary elections as soon as the fighting stops.

Elections have always been highly stressful for Ukrainian society, as they tend to provoke sharp divisions and intense confrontations—including physical ones. This time, the stakes will be even higher, with the added fuel of whatever outcome emerges from negotiations—if they take place at all.

There is a real risk that emotions will boil over during the elections, especially in the wake of any agreement with Russia. This could become a serious stress test for both the state and its leadership.

It is entirely possible that the Kremlin is counting on this—banking on the idea that, no matter what kind of deal is reached, emotions within Ukrainian society will spiral out of control in its aftermath.