Finnish Researcher: The Baltics and Nordic Nations Should Discuss Acquiring Their Own Nuclear Deterrent with Poland

The struggle for Ukraine, therefore, is about far more than self-determination, democracy, or cultural identity. At stake is nothing less than the technological and economic future of Europe itself.

As for Trump, his concerns do not extend to whether Ukraine remains a democratic nation. His primary interest lies in securing access to its resources while crafting an image of himself as a peacemaker for the American public.

Interviewer: You have previously said that Russia does not export gas or oil, but fear. Do Finns feel afraid right now?

Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen: No one openly admits to feeling fear, but there is certainly a heightened sense of unease, especially since Trump’s return to the political stage. That said, everything happening now was already in the air.

However, there is another side to this. The war in Ukraine has also strengthened Finland’s resilience—the sense that we will manage, no matter what.

Finns have a remarkably strong will to defend their country. In international comparisons, Finland stands out: 80 percent of Finns are ready to defend their nation, which is an exceptionally high figure.

Compared to other European countries, Finland has a strong military, including one of the largest artillery forces in Europe—second only to Ukraine and Russia.

Interviewer: How is the issue of loyalty among Russians living in Finland being discussed right now?

Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen: My sense is that the majority of Russians in Finland see through Putin’s propaganda. They are not particularly vocal, but they are not aligned with the Kremlin’s narratives.

Finland is home to around 100,000 people of Russian origin—not an overwhelming number, but still the largest minority after Swedish-speaking Finns.

In the 1990s, many Ingrian Finns—who have Finnish roots but are ethnically Russian—migrated to Finland. Then, in the 2000s, more Russians arrived, seeking better opportunities—and for the most part, they have found them here.

One notable exception is the Alexander League, which actively promotes Kremlin propaganda. However, it is a marginal group, numbering only a few hundred individuals within the broader Russian-speaking community.

When it comes to strategic sectors, citizenship is, of course, taken into account. For instance, holding both Russian and Finnish citizenship could pose an obstacle to serving in Finland’s defense forces.

Interviewer: You have been notably critical of Finland’s local governments and their willingness to engage with Russia, you have even used the term referring to concubinage in this context. What concerns you most?

Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen: I've described how Russian and Chinese companies take advantage of Finland’s small municipalities by offering them lucrative economic deals under various agreements.

In Finland, some municipalities have as few as 1,000 or 2,000 residents. Naturally, when they are presented with an investment promising jobs and a significant boost to the local budget, they are inclined to accept.

A company representative reaches out to the municipal leadership, and when they announce to the public that a multi-million-euro deal is on the horizon—one that will bring jobs and prosperity—it becomes difficult for the government to intervene.

My recommendation, in this context, was that the state should exert stronger control over large-scale foreign investments, ensuring that Finland does not accept deals that pose strategic risks.

The term “concubine municipalities” actually dates back to the economic crisis of the 1990s, when local governments fiercely competed for jobs, offering increasingly favorable conditions to businesses.

In a way, they were selling themselves cheaply. And to some extent, that trend persists today.

Interviewer: Now that trade with Russia has come to a halt and the border is closed, are Chinese businesses stepping in to take over Russian operations in your municipalities?

Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen: That is difficult to say.

Chinese interest in investing in Finland is not new—it has a long history. If you recall, even the proposed tunnel between Helsinki and Tallinn was on China’s radar. Large-scale projects that require additional investments can create dangerous dependencies.

In Finland, municipalities have considerable autonomy. However, it is crucial to ensure that local governments do not make decisions that could compromise national security.

The current economic downturn is not directly caused by the closure of the Russian border. Some municipalities in Eastern Finland have certainly suffered financial losses due to the decline in Russian tourism and reduced trade.

That said, Finland’s economic situation today is in no way comparable to the crisis of the 1990s, when the collapse of the Soviet Union sent shockwaves through the country.

Interviewer: Would I be mistaken in saying that in your latest book [How Europe Got Russia Wrong: Energy, Violence, and the Environment], you use Germany’s Ostpolitik and Finlandization as synonymous concepts? Why?

Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen: These concepts are far from being identical.

Ostpolitik—West Germany’s Eastern policy—emerged in the 1960s as a strategic approach aimed at German reunification. The idea was to engage the Soviet Union through diplomacy and economic cooperation, speaking in conciliatory tones while attempting to drive change through trade.

When faced with Soviet aggression, the response was often to offer economic and institutional incentives rather than confrontation. This policy was also shaped by Germany’s lingering guilt over World War II.

When Germany finally reunified, it created the illusion that this approach had been a success.

Finland, however, has had a very different historical relationship with Russia.

The pressure of Finlandization in the 1970s stemmed from the fact that, under Soviet influence, Finland made compromises at the expense of its democracy to avoid provoking its powerful neighbor.

West Germany never made such concessions. Geographically, it was further from Russia, and, of course, Finland was a much smaller player on the global stage than Germany.

However, during the Cold War, Finland did adopt one aspect of Ostpolitik: a carefully controlled narrative about the Soviet Union. Even after the world changed in the 1990s, Finland continued speaking about Russia in overly optimistic terms. Alternative perspectives on Russia were often ridiculed or dismissed.

Right up until the eve of the Ukraine war, Finland was developing nuclear energy projects in collaboration with Russian partners, while Germany, at the same time, doubled its reliance on Russian gas.

Then, on the night of February 24, 2022, that entire worldview collapsed in an instant.

Interviewer: How did Finland manage to maintain its defense policy under the shadow of Finlandization? Despite the political constraints, the country continued to strengthen itself against its neighbor.

Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen: In the 1990s, Germany decided that it no longer needed a deterrent against Russia. However, West Germany had been a NATO member from the alliance’s very inception. Finland, on the other hand, remained outside NATO, which meant that in the event of a threat, it had to be prepared to stand alone against Russia.

It took a full-scale war in the heart of Europe for Finns to realize that our defense capabilities were not sufficient. We had overestimated our strength relative to Russia, largely because we assumed that Russia was no longer the aggressive empire it once was.

From a historical perspective, this assumption was utterly irrational. For 600 years, Russia has pursued the same objective—expanding its borders through conquest.

Interviewer: Can you recall specific undemocratic decisions Finland made in order to avoid provoking Russia?

Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen: In many ways, the Soviet Union coerced Finland into compromising its democratic system.

From the late 1950s to the 1980s, every Finnish government required implicit approval from Moscow. This reality also shaped voter behavior, as people understood the political landscape was influenced by Soviet interests.

As a result, President Urho Kekkonen, who remained in power for decades, was able to interfere in domestic politics far beyond his official mandate, which should have been primarily focused on foreign affairs.

During the Cold War, Finland’s National Coalition Party was kept out of government for over 20 years because its stance was deemed too hostile toward the Soviet Union. It was only in the 1970s that the party softened its rhetoric—becoming more "salon-friendly," as it was called—adopting a more conciliatory approach toward Moscow to regain political viability.

Interviewer: How dependent is Finland’s energy sector on Russia today? In your book, you mention long-term contracts for uranium and LNG purchases that extend until 2030.

Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen: In 2023–2024, some LNG still came from Russia, but that has now ended. However, the agreement to purchase uranium remains in place because the Loviisa nuclear reactors, owned by Fortum, have traditionally relied on Rosatom’s uranium. Fortum is currently seeking alternative suppliers on the global market.

Interviewer: Where are they looking for alternatives?

Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen: As far as I understand, negotiations are ongoing with Westinghouse in the United States.

Globally, Rosatom holds far greater influence in the uranium market than Russia’s own production capacity would suggest. While Russia itself produces less than 10% of the world’s uranium, Rosatom controls mines and supply chains in several countries, including in North America.

This is one of the reasons why uranium has been excluded from Western sanctions against Russia.

Interviewer: At the end of your book, you propose a future model for dealing with Russia—a so-called carrot-and-stick approach. What does that entail?

Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen: For now, Russia and Russian influence must be isolated.

However, Europe also needs a long-term Russia strategy—a framework for determining if and under what conditions economic relations with Russia could ever be restored.

Right now, discussing this is understandably difficult, especially if Trump presents Russia with the image of a victorious tsar. But ultimately, shaping Europe's future remains in Europe’s own hands.

A key question is: If we trade with Russia again in the future, how do we ensure that this does not indirectly support the kind of violence Russia has used in Ukraine and elsewhere?

My fundamental idea is simple: never return to the Ostpolitik model—never repeat past mistakes.

The real danger is that if Europe’s liberal parties fail to formulate a unified Russia strategy, the door will be left open for populists to define it instead. If we do nothing, parties like Alternative for Germany (AfD) and others of similar ideology will take the lead in shaping how Europe re-engages with Russia.

A well-defined European strategy on Russia’s future would also offer a glimmer of hope to Russian democrats living in exile. It would send a message that if Russia changes course, there is an alternative to remaining merely a resource warehouse for China and the United States.

Neither China nor the U.S. has any real interest in seeing Russia develop technologically.