Trump's Intelligence Cut Gave A Significant Momentum For Russian Troops in Kursk

'They planned everything meticulously and executed it perfectly to cut off our supply lines,' admitted one Ukrainian commander.

After the destruction of the logistical routes, the Russians received what felt like a jackpot: the early March decision by the Americans to halt the sharing of intelligence on Russian territory with Ukraine.

'HIMARS (multiple-launch rocket systems) were operating constantly before that, but the moment the intelligence flow stopped, their effectiveness ceased immediately,' explained another Ukrainian soldier. 'We no longer had targets, and that was a huge advantage for the Russians. They exploited it to the fullest. They outplayed us.'

In addition, the Russian Armed Forces concentrated a force in the Kursk region that outnumbered Ukrainian units by at least five to six times.

According to the Ukrainian military, Russia ultimately amassed a force of 70,000 to 75,000 soldiers in the Kursk region. Alongside these Russian troops, North Korean soldiers also took part in the offensive, with Ukrainian intelligence estimating their contingent at around 12,000 men. This brings the total number of combatants on the Russian side to between 82,000 and 87,000.

This is roughly the same-sized force that the Russian army deployed last spring for its ongoing offensive against the city of Pokrovsk in the Donetsk region. However, in Kursk, an equivalent number of troops were concentrated to attack an area about half the size of Hiiumaa Island.

Military experts estimate that Ukraine’s force in the Kursk region ranged between 10,000 and 15,000 fighters. However, it is important to note that the bulk of Ukraine's units remained stationed on the other side of the border in Sumy Oblast. Only specialized combat groups were deployed into Kursk, with these units being rotated in and out. Ukraine began gradually withdrawing its combat groups as early as February when Russian forces seized Sverdlikovo, making it clear that they could severely disrupt Ukrainian logistics.

Retired Colonel Viktor Kevlyuk, a former senior officer in the Ukrainian General Staff, provided a striking example of Russia's overwhelming numerical advantage in its assault near Sudzha. Russian and North Korean troops attacked the village of Kurilovka, which measures just 2.3 kilometers in length and 900 meters in width. Under normal military doctrine, a single battalion would have been sufficient for such an attack. 'In reality, they deployed a brigade and three regiments—twelve times the amount of force and resources that standard regulations require,' Kevlyuk explained. 'This illustrates the key factor behind Russia’s success—its colossal numerical superiority.'

A commander of a Ukrainian unit that withdrew from Sudzha earlier this week described the overwhelming use of drones by Russian forces. In that city alone, Russian units deployed between 1,300 and 1,500 FPV drones per day against Ukrainian positions. On top of that, Ukrainian forces had their own drones in the air. 'The sky was thick with buzzing drones. You couldn’t even hear the artillery,' the commander recounted.

In Sudzha, Ukrainian forces had established strong defensive positions. According to one Ukrainian commander, the city could have been held for a prolonged battle. However, in reality, Russian troops took control of it within just one or two days. Why?

'We fought. We gave battle,' the commander explained. 'But then, panic started creeping in, morale plummeted—because we had no logistics anymore.' Another Ukrainian commander pointed out that the final outcome was determined by the combination of all the factors previously mentioned. 'The Russians gained momentum,' he noted. 'Just like we gained momentum when we established a foothold in the Kursk region in five days, they did the same here. And the Americans helped them.'

Around Sudzha, Ukrainian forces had rigged all the bridges over the river of the same name with explosives. However, Russian drone pilots displayed remarkable skill, flying fiber-optic-controlled FPV drones beneath the bridges to locate the charges. (With fiber-optic drones, the image quality transmitted to the operator is exceptionally clear.) 

They then struck the explosives directly, detonating the bridges with their drones. As a result, some Ukrainian troops and their equipment became trapped on the far side of the Sudzha River, where they were subsequently destroyed by Russian drones.

These positions offer a favorable defensive advantage, as they are situated on elevated terrain relative to the Sudzha area, making it more difficult for Russian forces to dislodge Ukrainian troops.

If Russian units, despite their overwhelming numerical superiority, manage to push Ukrainian forces out of Russian territory, the next naturally advantageous defensive positions for Ukraine are located three to five kilometers from the border. The coming weeks will reveal whether the powerful Russian military grouping concentrated in the Kursk region will continue its advance toward the major city of Sumy with the same momentum.

Before the full-scale war, Sumy, the administrative center of the Ukrainian region, had a population of 250,000 and is located just 30 kilometers from the Russian-Ukrainian border in a straight line. In the first weeks of the full-scale invasion in March 2022, Russian forces reached the outskirts of Sumy but were unable to seize the city. By early April, they were forced to retreat entirely from Sumy Oblast.

Retired Colonel Viktor Kevlyuk assessed the likelihood of a renewed Russian offensive on Sumy as 'logical but unlikely.' 'It seems fairly logical and does not contradict the principles of military strategy,' Kevlyuk stated. 'However, it is unlikely to happen because the enemy has not yet achieved its military-political objectives, and all of those lie in other directions.'

Kevlyuk, who served as a senior officer in the Ukrainian Army’s operational headquarters in the region during the war in eastern Ukraine, suggested that Russia’s leadership likely prioritizes deploying its freed-up forces toward the complete capture of Donetsk Oblast. Ukraine still controls roughly one-third of Donetsk Oblast, and securing it remains one of Russia’s most significant objectives in the full-scale war, following the capture of Luhansk Oblast.