Russian Spies in Latvia Are Attracted to Everything from Train Routes to Soldiers' Underwear

According to the Constitutional Protection Bureau, authorities uncovered evidence that an individual had attempted to acquire and utilize intelligence related to NATO military infrastructure and certain political events—information that posed a direct threat to Latvia’s security.

In the years that followed, reports linking Russian embassy staff to espionage continued to surface. In 2018, the agency estimated that intelligence officers made up between 10% and 30% of diplomatic personnel in Latvia.

However, arrests related to espionage are a more recent phenomenon. While Estonia has been detaining high-level spies for years, Latvia’s first such case occurred in 2016, following amendments to its criminal code regarding intelligence activities.

Until then, Latvian law required proof that an individual knowingly collaborated with foreign intelligence agencies and was actively spying on their behalf. Yet, in practice, intelligence gathering and transmission do not always occur under direct orders from foreign agencies.

"Russian intelligence agencies frequently use other state institutions and even non-governmental organizations as cover," the VDD explained in a statement to Estonian newspaper Postimees. "Additionally, individuals may engage in espionage on their own initiative—without necessarily following specific orders."

Just months later, Aleksandrs Krasnopjorovs, a non-citizen employed by Latvian Railways, was charged with sending videos of NATO military supply trains to a contact in Moscow.

Krasnopjorovs denied the accusations, claiming he had simply shared the footage with a friend. However, an investigation by the Baltic investigative journalism center Re:Baltica revealed that he had also sent lists of unusual train routes. He later attempted to justify his actions by claiming he had misread the text on his phone screen due to its small font. In 2019, he was sentenced to three years in prison.

Since 2016, Latvian authorities have detained 32 individuals on suspicion of espionage or other activities threatening national security on behalf of Russia or Belarus. Of these, 18 were charged specifically with espionage, while 14 were suspected of providing various forms of assistance to foreign states in actions targeting Latvia.

This activity has surged dramatically in recent years—since 2023 alone, 22 individuals have been arrested, three of them this year.

To date, 14 individuals have been convicted of espionage in Latvia. In nine cases, the court rulings have been finalized, while five individuals are currently appealing their verdicts.

In 2018, Yuri Stilve was convicted of spying for Russia. He had photographed fuel storage facilities, a border communication tower, and NATO troop equipment. According to Re:Baltica, he had even gathered intelligence on the type of underwear worn by soldiers. Stilve ultimately admitted to working for Russian intelligence.

Another convicted spy, Oļegs Buraks, a former official at Latvia’s Ministry of the Interior Information Center, died last year at Riga Central Hospital while serving a 15-year prison sentence for mishandling classified state materials.

Some of the most prominent espionage cases have involved elected officials caught in recent years. In 2023, former Interior Minister and then-parliamentarian Jānis Ādamsons was convicted of spying for Russia. Additional charges against him included minor fraud, as well as illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.

Ādamsons was sentenced to eight years in prison for passing intelligence since 2015. In exchange for his services, he allegedly received payments deposited into his daughter’s bank account in Russia. He maintains that there is no evidence to support these claims.

However, the ties between European Parliament member Tatjana Ždanoka and Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) stretch back even further. Leaked emails indicate that Ždanoka regularly reported on her activities to FSB officers and received funding for event organization as early as 2004. According to Re:Baltica, she even managed to execute FSB operations using European taxpayers’ money.

Ždanoka did not deny the authenticity of the leaked emails but declined to comment on matters involving hacked personal information.

The VDD confirmed to Postimees that the investigation into Ždanoka is ongoing. According to the agency, she has challenged the legality of the search conducted at her Brussels residence last year. A Belgian court has yet to issue a ruling on the case, which has limited the VDD’s ability to proceed with its criminal investigation against her.

In its annual public security report, the VDD continued to identify Russia as the greatest threat to Latvia’s national security.

"Beyond traditional intelligence operations, the aggressor state has also engaged in malicious activities aimed at intimidating and dividing Latvian society," said VDD Director Normunds Mežviets.

According to the VDD, Russian intelligence agencies are increasingly recruiting individuals through online messaging platforms like Telegram, without the need to leave Russian territory. In addition to targeting critical infrastructure, Russia has orchestrated acts of sabotage in Latvia, including attacks on memorial sites. In one such incident, a Molotov cocktail was thrown through the window of the Latvian Occupation Museum in February last year.

Recently, the VDD detained an individual who had posted TikTok videos expressing support for Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine. Additionally, a long-time pro-Kremlin activist was arrested for statements made during a public discussion in Moscow that were deemed a threat to Latvia’s national security.

The VDD also questioned Aleksejs Rosļikovs, leader of the political party Stability! and a member of the Latvian Parliament, regarding his social media posts in which he referred to Riga as a "Russian city" and urged Latvians to “pack their bags.”

In March, the VDD also alerted the Prosecutor’s Office to initiate a criminal investigation against four individuals involved in acquiring and delivering portable satellite internet systems to the Russian military.