Estonian Top Diplomat: NATO SecGen Mark Rutte Assured Us He Was Misunderstood on Normalizing Relations with Russia

They trap negotiation partners by keeping alive the hope of a diplomatic breakthrough, making alternative policies—like tightening sanctions—less attractive. We’ve seen this repeatedly, and they're doing it again now.

We've consistently warned our allies about this trap, and we continue to do so. We see no evidence that Putin’s goals toward Ukraine or Europe have changed. He’s therefore using these talks tactically, not to negotiate any genuine strategic shift.

Interviewer: Is there any underlying complication or hidden condition tied to continued U.S. military aid and intelligence-sharing with Ukraine, or is the cooperation proceeding without friction?

Jonatan Vseviov: It seems there aren’t any hidden catches. But there's an important strategic lesson for us in what's happened over the past month: Europe inevitably needs to step up. Even if the U.S. hasn't yet stepped back, we clearly received a signal indicating that it could. 

This shouldn't be limited just to military aid or sanctions; it involves the broader European security architecture. The message is clear: Europe must be capable of doing more and must show greater confidence in defending its own interests. 

This goal simply cannot be reached without greater European investment in defense—and that understanding now seems widely shared. Looking at signals from Europe's major powers, including Germany, the continent's largest nation, we see encouraging momentum. Current political decisions reflect a positive trend from our viewpoint. Yet, the critical question remains whether the pace is sufficient. While nobody can predict the future, we'd rather risk moving too quickly than risk moving too slowly.

Interviewer: Trump promised early in his term to impose severe sanctions on Russia if they were not receptive to peace. Now that we've seen somewhat tentative efforts on energy infrastructure and the Black Sea ceasefire, when might we expect Trump to finally take tougher measures toward Russia?

Jonatan Vseviov: That's something you'll have to ask his representatives. We've consistently called for tougher sanctions. This isn't rocket science — anyone who's even slightly followed global events knows the main areas that would significantly raise the cost of aggression: primarily energy exports and banking. 

These two sectors can genuinely hurt the aggressor. We’ve already done a lot, and the impact is felt. It's important not to underestimate the effect of the EU’s 16 sanction packages—they're definitely not meaningless. But we all know there’s room to do considerably more, and our position remains that we should.

If others need to go through this diplomatic trial-and-error phase to realize that Putin's fundamental goals haven't changed — rooted in his inability to accept the dissolution of the Soviet Union and his desire to recreate conditions reminiscent of the USSR — so be it. But we must recognize that the time lost isn’t measured merely in minutes and seconds, but in human lives, for which Ukrainians pay the price. That makes it even more morally questionable when anyone casts doubt on who seeks peace and who desires the war to continue. We believe more should be done, and we’re trying to persuade the Americans to reach the same conclusion.

Interviewer: Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna had a chance to discuss this with Secretary of State Marco Rubio this week. Did he receive any indication about their plans?

Jonatan Vseviov: I don’t think they have a detailed, long-term tactical plan in place. The Americans are proceeding based on the principle that not trying guarantees 100% failure, so they're giving diplomacy a chance by engaging the Russians. It's impossible to persuade them otherwise on this point — they've clearly stated it and won’t retreat from it. 

Our role is to highlight different scenarios, including situations where Russians might request concessions from the Americans that might seem minor at first glance, but are actually critical for European security. Our goal is to ensure the Americans remain fully informed about what is essential and critical for our security.

It’s also important that core principles, such as both sides’ commitment to NATO's collective defense, were reaffirmed. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio assured us of this, and that's positive. However, a single meeting with the Secretary of State won't alter the course of history. These contacts need to continue. The Foreign Minister also had many meetings in Congress during his visit to Washington; this engagement, along with dialogue with the media, must carry on. We need to keep actively involving America in these discussions.

Interviewer: There’s also been talk about the Americans considering giving up the position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Is there more to this than just newspaper articles?

Jonatan Vseviov: We shouldn't dismiss news reports too lightly. Newspaper articles often reflect reality — or at least strive to. To our knowledge, there’s no official decision yet. Personally, I think such a decision would severely undermine NATO and the credibility of collective defense. 

As soon as rumors surfaced, many influential voices in U.S. foreign policy clearly stated they thought it would be a bad idea. Yet, if this topic has been raised publicly, it likely means it’s being discussed somewhere. It certainly doesn’t send a positive message. But again, it highlights the need for Europe to step up in case America steps back.

There's a certain paradox here that's even favorable for us: the actions Europe needs to take if America reduces its involvement are exactly the same as those required to keep America involved. Investing more in defense and confidently standing on our own two feet are precisely what would ensure continued American commitment. Even if the U.S. reduces its security presence, Europe would need to take those same measures anyway. Thus, we don’t face any complicated dilemmas here.

Interviewer: There have also been stories suggesting America might move forces from Germany to Eastern Europe. While positive in principle, the Eastern European country mentioned is Hungary.

Jonatan Vseviov: I haven't heard anything concrete about this. Of course, the American military presence in Europe is crucial for the credibility of our collective defense, and we hope the Americans recognize that. But again, I'll repeat my earlier point: if there's any reduction, Europe must fill the gap. And to prevent that reduction, Europe has to do more. Either way, Europe needs to step up.

Interviewer: Turning to Europe — what's the status of the proposed €800 billion European agreement (European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen's proposal: allowing member states to borrow up to €650 billion without fear of breaching budgetary rules, plus an additional €150 billion from the EU's own borrowing capacity)? There's been general agreement in principle, but disputes over details persist.

Jonatan Vseviov: The headline figure of €800 billion sounds very impressive, but one must examine what's actually behind it — this isn't truly a single package of €800 billion but rather a combination of different proposals. The most significant discussion at the EU level right now centers on debt ceilings and relaxing certain budget rules to increase defense spending. 

Another important discussion involves joint borrowing. It's crucial to underline here that borrowed money is still borrowed—funds must be repaid eventually. However, joint European borrowing might be more cost-effective collectively than individual countries borrowing separately. Ultimately, member states themselves must decide if they're willing to take loans and direct these funds toward defense.

The simplest and most logical measure here isn't to rely on press releases touting an €800 billion figure, but instead to look directly at how member states’ defense spending evolves as a percentage of GDP. Many point out—and correctly—that percentage of GDP is quite a blunt metric. It doesn't reveal whether the money is being spent effectively or if it genuinely boosts military capabilities rather than, say, being spent on pensions. That criticism has some validity, but frankly, there's no simpler or better metric currently available. 

Therefore, rather than getting lost in billion-euro headlines, let's look closely at the percentage each member state actually allocates to defense. And here, we shouldn't rely merely on declarations; instead, we need to look at actual decisions and implemented spending. NATO gathers this information thoroughly, as it's the only institution with an agreed-upon—albeit general—definition of defense spending.

If I'm not mistaken, NATO annually publishes a comprehensive chart detailing each member state's defense expenditures. That's worth paying attention to. Whether this money comes from loans, reprioritizing existing budgets, or other sources is entirely up to the member states. But the only way to truly know if the money materialized is by seeing whether the percentage has increased.

Interviewer: Among the bigger European nations, Germany and Poland seem fairly reassuring. France, however, is so deeply indebted that it's becoming problematic. As for the United Kingdom, there were reports Thursday suggesting they might not even manage to staff the brigade promised for Estonia.

Jonatan Vseviov: Well, I believe they'll manage. Recently, we've seen the UK making decisions to boost their defense spending, so the trend is positive. You correctly mentioned Germany, whose new government is making some of Europe's most significant decisions, partly because they're Europe's largest country. 

All current signs are positive—even the decisions they’ve managed to make while still assembling their new government are very encouraging. I'm optimistic that Germany won't just keep pace but will take a leading role in shaping Europe's defense policy.

Another encouraging area worth highlighting is our own region—the Nordics and Baltics. When you look at how aligned our leaders, diplomats, and officials are in their perception of threats, their sense of urgency about necessary actions, and the significant decisions they've already made regarding Ukraine and regional security, this region deserves recognition. Individually, we’re small countries, but collectively, we have considerable weight in Europe.

Interviewer: And what about France? Allegedly, the reason the €800 billion package is dragging on is precisely because France is deeply indebted and expects Germany — either explicitly or implicitly — to fund some of their military development?

Jonatan Vseviov: We know France faces a very complicated domestic political situation. While the president holds considerable authority in foreign and security policy, moving money still requires government and parliamentary backing. Given the composition of their parliament, that arithmetic is challenging. But hope is the last thing to die. 

If European leaders genuinely mean their rhetoric — that this is a critical moment and Europe must step up—I’d hope they're also willing to stand before their parliaments and citizens to say it's time to put money behind these promises.

The worst thing Europe could do right now is to inflate itself with hollow messaging, only to realize a year or two down the line that all these promises were mere talk — like snow melting in spring — leaving no substantial military capability behind. That would undermine not just our credibility domestically, but also weaken our deterrence, because the Kremlin closely monitors what we actually do rather than what we say. 

They're observing how much genuine defense-industrial capacity we're developing, and how many combat-ready brigades or divisions we've formed. If no positive trend emerges here, we'd be severely undermining the credibility of our deterrence.

Interviewer: Yet exactly what you mentioned — the gap between words and actions — has characterized Emmanuel Macron during the war in Ukraine. Even now, he's taken the initiative within a coalition of the willing, but his own position seems shaky.

Jonatan Vseviov: We shouldn’t underestimate the value of Macron taking that initiative, because it genuinely matters, and it’s crucial for major countries to step up. We might have the right ideas and convincing arguments, but it’s difficult for smaller countries to lead such ad hoc efforts. 

It's particularly positive that the British, who left the European Union but understandably never left Europe, are now fully back in Europe for the first time regarding a real security issue. Together with the French, they are driving these discussions and processes.

Of course, we'd prefer fewer hastily arranged, ad hoc meetings involving constantly shifting groups of countries, and more structured, consistent, and planned cooperation—the kind usually characteristic of international organizations with agreed parameters. It’s understandable that initially these processes involve quickly assembled coalitions, but now it would be good to steer things toward more stable, planned frameworks. This is also the message that Estonia's Prime Minister conveyed in Paris this week. It would also prevent mistakes like accidentally leaving important countries out.

Interviewer: Could Estonia being excluded from some formats have something to do with the fact that our current Prime Minister Kristen Michal is less focused on foreign policy than her predecessor?

Jonatan Vseviov: No, that's not the reason. In fact, we haven't fundamentally been excluded from anything. If you’re referring to that particular incident [when the Baltic countries weren’t invited to the like-minded countries’ meeting in London in early March – ed.], it was indeed unfortunate, and even the British prime minister publicly apologized before Parliament for leaving the Baltics out. 

Right now, there's a meeting in Paris where Estonia is represented. Besides, discussions take place continuously at various levels—not just among leaders. Military leaders meet regularly, diplomats collaborate, and we're fully involved everywhere. I don't feel we've been left out of any significant EU-related processes.

Interviewer: Coming back briefly to von der Leyen’s €800 billion proposal—what was Estonia’s input or proposal exactly? I assume it was somewhat more sophisticated than simply trying to secure the largest possible figure.

Jonatan Vseviov: Ultimately, defense spending inevitably depends on individual member states' efforts. Even if the entire EU common budget were directed towards defense, it still wouldn't get us where we want to be. The size of that common purse relative to the total GDP of Europe's economy is simply too small. 

Of course, actions at the European level can help, as demonstrated by handling the COVID crisis. When the crisis is significant enough, rapid and decisive steps can be taken. But I think the most positive contribution Europe can make is expanding its own fiscal rules and enabling joint borrowing, should it become clear that acting together makes it easier to raise resources from the markets.

But I do worry that excessive talk of what could be done at the European level provides member states with an easy way out from their responsibilities — by pointing to discussions in Brussels, claiming work is already ongoing there. In reality, the real work must take place in national capitals, within the states themselves. Brussels can support this effort, can assist, but defense expenditures cannot rise from two percent to five percent without national decisions.

Interviewer: The same argument can be brought down to Estonia’s level. Last autumn, when I asked Estonian politicians about defense spending, they repeatedly pointed to waiting for Kaja Kallas and European Commission Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius to complete Europe's security white paper.

Jonatan Vseviov: I can only repeat what I've already said — each state must make its own decisions about what kind of military it builds, what capabilities it develops, and how much money it allocates for this purpose. Clearly, it's impossible to build military capability for free. Even the United States isn't able to acquire all the military capabilities it might deem necessary. 

Choices must be made, certain risks must be accepted—and this is everyday work for the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces. They do it professionally, and ultimately decisions have to be made, taking into account both risks and opportunities. An ideal situation, where security and defense could be considered complete, simply does not exist.

With some concern, I observe the public discourse which seems to imply that somewhere there exists a nirvana that we could reach if only we put in one final effort. My worry is not because no such nirvana exists, nor because there's no need to put in an effort. My worry is that we're creating a false expectation for the public, suggesting that there’s a point after which we could simply rest — that we do this one thing, and then it’s done. 

We've been telling Europe and Estonia for all these years that history didn’t end when the Berlin Wall fell or when the Baltic countries, along with other Eastern European states, joined NATO and the EU. There is no such thing as a final destination.

Interviewer: Speaking about clarity of messaging and post-war Europe, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte—again in the Oval Office—said that after the war, normalization of relations with Russia would inevitably take place. Now, it seems, he's walked back those comments?

Jonatan Vseviov: Mark Rutte assured us that he was misunderstood, which is good because, interpreted as you've presented it, his statement would obviously be inappropriate. We completely disagree with that viewpoint. Russia will remain a security challenge—putting it politely—permanently, or at least for the foreseeable future. Believing that another “reset” would produce a different outcome than the previous resets is simply naive.

Interviewer: The EU's High Representative Kaja Kallas has received considerable criticism. At the same time, given the nature of the job, criticism and challenges seemed predictable. Is some of the criticism justified?

Jonatan Vseviov: It’s windy at the top. It’s natural that when someone reaches the absolute pinnacle at the European level—a position no Estonian has reached before—that windiness extends across all of Europe. Praise and criticism come not just from home, but from across this colorful continent. I don’t see anything dramatic here. This is normal in a democracy. Leaders get criticized. 

Look at how Ursula von der Leyen, who’s long led the Commission, has been criticized. This will characterize the entire tenure. That’s simply how democracy works. What matters is whether our leaders can remain focused on what's truly important, namely the ongoing war. It seems to me that EU leaders have managed to maintain that focus very well. Now the question is whether they can unite member states, build consensus, and move from words to actions.

Unfortunately, we increasingly see that building consensus among member states isn't just the typical issue of “many states and finding common ground.” We have a very specific problem called Hungary, where one member state is fundamentally working in the exact opposite direction from the others in the most critical strategic areas. 

This can't be solved through clever political maneuvering, persuasion, or documents that the Commission can put on the table. It's a problem the member states themselves must address. Neither von der Leyen nor Kallas alone can resolve this issue.

Interviewer: Are member states then actively dealing with Hungary?

Jonatan Vseviov: They are, and in our view, they need to do so even faster and with greater focus.

Interviewer: But we don't see any results yet? Coalitions forming to suspend Hungary’s voting rights, for example?

Jonatan Vseviov: This is the kind of issue where results only appear when they've actually happened. Clearly, today there aren’t any. But the problem is real and growing—Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó was just in Moscow, and we've seen the statements coming out of that meeting. I hope the Hungarians themselves understand that it's not wise to oppose or sabotage all our collective solutions, but unfortunately, today this problem remains unresolved.

Interviewer: Speaking of finding common ground among EU countries, sometimes parallels are drawn to the refugee crisis and whether we showed enough solidarity toward Southern European states at that time. How do you see this dynamic?

Jonatan Vseviov: Somewhat differently. Back then, you could argue there were certain threats or challenges coming from the south, and others coming from the east. But the current discussion in Europe no longer suggests that the threat from Russia competes with challenges from the south. 

On the contrary, Southern European states themselves point out that Russia’s threat is also evident in their region—such as the activities of the Wagner Group in Africa, Russian actions in the Mediterranean, or what they’re doing—or perhaps we can now say, what they did—in Syria, Libya, and elsewhere. We no longer need to debate which threat is more significant, whether it comes from Russia or elsewhere. They now accept Russia as a threat that is, by nature, a 360-degree issue.

Asking for solidarity isn't a challenge for us anymore. This is understood because the threat is felt in southern regions as well. Of course, there are other threats, such as uncontrolled migration. But I feel there's considerably less of the previous arguments about “who gets more attention,” thanks to Russia becoming a genuinely 360-degree threat. I don't sense a lack of solidarity. 

Yes, Hungary is an issue, but regarding countries geographically further away—I don’t sense that they fail to recognize Russia’s threat as their own. They certainly do.

Interviewer: Although sometimes, for instance in statements by Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, some doubts seem to surface?

Jonatan Vseviov: Certainly, the intensity with which one perceives a problem depends on how directly it impacts you personally. Geography inevitably still matters. If you're farther away, you might feel you have more room for mistakes, time, or flexibility. For us, inevitably, we're intensely focused on what Russia is doing and the threat it represents, so our assessments naturally tend to be sharper. But this no longer translates into a cultural conflict like it did a few years ago.

Interviewer: Russia and Belarus are holding the Zapad exercise this fall. Could NATO somehow preemptively respond together? The German newspaper Bild has already speculated that they might even cross Lithuania’s border.

Jonatan Vseviov: No, at this moment we don't see any immediate threat of a military attack against any NATO country. Of course, during Zapad there's always reason to be more vigilant than usual, since classical threats consist of two components: intent and capability. Right now, Russia doesn't have the units that could threaten us and that are simultaneously available near our borders, simply because they’re all tied down in Ukraine. 

You can speculate, predict, or assess that during major exercises, some resources may be freed up and concentrated, potentially raising their capabilities temporarily. But this isn't any surprise to us. Zapad has been going on for years. I remember the first major Zapad exercise after the Cold War, when Estonia, the other Baltic states, and Poland were voices in the wilderness highlighting this threat. Now all NATO countries are aware and accustomed to it. We’re absolutely confident in our ability to foresee potential threats and respond adequately.

Interviewer: Former Ukrainian Chief of Defense, now ambassador to London, Valerii Zaluzhnyi said on Wednesday that the Baltic states and Poland know that Article 5 doesn't work. What should we make of his statement?

Jonatan Vseviov: It's always most appropriate for representatives of a country to stick to statements and opinions reflecting the position of their own country and to avoid speaking on behalf of others. I personally try to follow that principle and would recommend everyone else do the same. 

Zaluzhnyi does not know what the Baltic states think or don't think. That’s something the Baltic states know. The Baltic states can comment themselves if they choose to express their views. Just as Zaluzhnyi, as Ukraine's ambassador to the UK, is competent to describe Ukraine’s perspective.

No, Estonia certainly doesn't hold such a dramatic viewpoint or assessment, nor has it ever. Quite the opposite: we’re actively working to ensure Article 5 remains credible. We're doing everything we can ourselves and urging our allies to do the same. There's no trembling, no hiding behind bushes. 

If we have concerns about the credibility of collective defense, we'll address them openly and directly. Historically, we’ve done exactly that — for instance, when we pushed for more credible defense plans. That’s not to say that collective defense is complete or perfect. But to claim it’s nonexistent or that we don’t believe in it — no Estonian official has said such a thing, and for good reason.