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Estonia considers acquiring Patriot-level missile defense systems to address the existing shortfall in allied ballistic missile defense capabilities in the Baltics.
On March 18, the Estonian government decided to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP starting from 2026. This represents an approximately 1% increase over previously planned defense expenditures. Estonian Minister of Defense Hanno Pevkur was tasked with presenting proposals to the government in April, coordinated with Chief of Defense Major General Andrus Merilo, outlining how the additional funds should be allocated. Potential investment areas under discussion include extra ammunition, artillery, and new naval vessels.
Part of the ongoing internal discussion has made its way to journalists. Estonian Public Broadcasting (ERR) reported on April 3 that Estonia is also considering acquiring ballistic missile defense systems, such as the Patriot and the European-made SAMP/T, equipped with Aster missiles. According to Colonel Mati Tikerpuu from the Estonian Defense Procurement Agency, who spoke to ERR, the Israeli system known as David's Sling is also being evaluated.
This comes as a bit of a surprise, as due to the high cost involved, Estonian military circles have not publicly expressed much interest in acquiring such a capability previously. Instead, emphasis has typically been placed on developing long-range strike capabilities to halt enemy actions on hostile territory—fighting the "archers" (missile launching units) rather than the "arrows" (missiles). Ukraine, due to long-standing Western-imposed restrictions, has for a long time been forced precisely into the latter role.
Discussions about acquiring ballistic missile defense were initiated by the political party Eesti 200 (Estonia 200), which, as part of its campaign in the 2023 parliamentary elections, promised to establish an air defense dome over Estonia similar to Israel's Iron Dome, capable of protecting against ballistic missiles. Eesti 200 politicians branded this capability as "Kalevipoeg's Dome," after the mythical Estonian hero Kalevipoeg.
However, according to statistics released by Ukraine last autumn, their air defenses have managed to intercept only a small fraction of Russian ballistic missiles. Ukrainian media reported that Russian Iskander-M and North Korean KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles have been intercepted in just five percent of cases.
Ukraine has seen greater success against some other types of missiles, but on average, only one out of every ten ballistic missiles is intercepted. However, according to renowned missile warfare expert Fabian Hoffmann — who commented on the low interception rate to the Baltic Sentinel — these statistics must be viewed in context: short-range ballistic missiles are often used near frontline areas, where Ukraine lacks Patriot and SAMP/T systems.
The costs associated with acquiring, maintaining, and—crucially—replenishing missile stocks for a ballistic missile defense system are very significant. The acquisition cost of a minimally practical system (two batteries, each with 4–8 launchers) is approximately one billion euros. This is further increased by maintenance and ammunition reserves, as the initial missile supply typically falls short of total requirements.
Even with such a system, Estonia could defend only a limited number of key locations (for example, capital Tallinn, its surroundings, and the main arrival point for allied reinforcements), though this is certainly not insignificant. In its 2018 report on Baltic air defense, the International Center for Defense and Security concluded that establishing a comprehensive layered air defense would be prohibitively expensive for the Baltic states. Since then, defense budgets have increased significantly, but new capability gaps have also emerged amid Russia's prolonged war of attrition in Ukraine—particularly shortcomings in firepower and range.
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Russian low-altitude cruise missiles and drones are easier to deal with — these can be intercepted by Estonian Defense Forces using shoulder-launched air defense missiles like Mistral and Piorun. According to experts, this approach requires at least a minute's advance warning for the operator, and the weapon must be positioned less than 1.5 kilometers from the cruise missile's path. Therefore, the Estonian Air Force has recently developed methods for alerting the population about airborne threats via their personal smart phones.
Combating ballistic missiles, however, is in an entirely different league in terms of resources. Consequently, NATO announced a rotational solution for Baltic air defense at its 2023 Vilnius summit. Last July, a Dutch Patriot unit participated in exercises in Lithuania, integrating with Lithuania's NASAMS medium-range air defense system.
A Spanish NASAMS medium-range system has been deployed to Ämari Air Base, and several capable naval vessels have visited the Baltic Sea. Nonetheless, the Baltic states currently lack an operational, permanent ballistic missile defense capability, which is essential, among other things, for securing the safe arrival of allied reinforcement forces.
Currently, NATO allies' primary effort is focused on air defense for Ukraine and Poland. Ukraine has already received four batteries (each consisting of 4–8 launchers) of Patriot and its European equivalent, the SAMP/T system.
Estonian politicians have used the Israeli example for developing a credible missile defense, but the U.S. has supported Israel’s Arrow-3 ballistic missile defense program with slightly under one billion dollars, and since 2011, has allocated $2.6 billion to the medium-range air-defense system Iron Dome. If a similar funding model were accessible to the Baltic states, acquiring such capabilities might become even more feasible.
In Estonia’s case, the rationale for investing in ballistic missile defense largely depends on assumptions about the nature of a potential attack. If the assumption is that Estonia might face only limited missile strikes, an affordable defensive system—with allied support—could intercept these attacks at selected strategic locations, possibly protecting the capital city from the worst outcomes.
However, if an adversary were to launch a massive, prolonged, or wave-based nationwide barrage of missiles and drones, defensive systems would quickly become saturated, leaving the system itself highly vulnerable.