NATO Should Look to Newest Member Sweden as a Model for Responding to Russia's Upcoming Major Military Exercise Zapad

It's difficult to determine precisely when politicians' warnings are sincere and when they merely constitute "strategic communication." Ukraine has long maintained the refrain, "The Baltics could be next," a narrative echoed by Estonian politicians, primarily directed toward Western counterparts and international media . Within Estonia, however, such rhetoric has traditionally been expressed with greater caution—at least until recently.

At a press conference on March 21, Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur announced that "since the inauguration of the new U.S. administration, various scenarios aimed at pausing or ending the war have accelerated," adding that Russia's current military strength is now approximately two -and-a-half times greater than before the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Major General Andrus Merilo , commander of the Estonian Defense Forces, has noted publicly that relocating Russian military units freed from operations in Ukraine to the Baltic borders would not require a particularly long period . Nevertheless, he emphasized that such troop movements would neither go unnoticed nor happen instantaneously.

The Baltic intelligence reports have consistently highlighted that all previous Zapad exercises—though presented by Russia as counterterrorism maneuvers—were actually preparations for potential aggression against NATO. In its analysis of the Zapad 2017 exercise, Estonia’s Foreign Intelligence Service explicitly stated that Russian forces rehearsed every phase of a full-scale war scenario—from suppressing a so-called "color revolution" in Belarus , all the way through to concluding the conflict by "de-escalation" via nuclear weapon deployment.

Already in the 2009 exercise, Poland was treated explicitly as a "potential aggressor." Although the drill was officially presented as a defensive maneuver, it clearly included offensive scenarios, notably an airborne assault along Kaliningrad's coastline simulating the seizure of a "Polish beach." These actions clearly pointed to preparations for a scenario in which the Baltic states' land routes to the rest of NATO would be severed.

Prior to 2021—when approximately 200,000 troops participated—the largest -ever Zapad exercise had taken place during Leonid Brezhnev's era. Zapad 1981 remains historically the largest military drill ever held by the Soviet Union , involving every branch of its armed forces and up to 150,000 personnel.

Such a display of military might was partly Brezhnev's response to the assertive rhetoric of Ronald Reagan, who had assumed the U.S. presidency in January of that same year. At the same time , it served as internal propaganda to reassure Soviet citizens that the increasingly unpopular war in Afghanistan , bogged down by fierce mujahideen resistance, was part of a broader and crucial ideological struggle. Even then , Exercise Zapad ("West") served as much—perhaps even more —as a psychological operation as it did a genuine strategic military rehearsal.

“Zapad has been happening for years. I remember the first major post–Cold War Zapad exercise, when Estonia, together with the other Baltic states and Poland , felt like lonely voices in the wilderness drawing attention to it . Now , every NATO nation is aware and accustomed to this reality . We are absolutely confident in our ability to anticipate potential threats and respond appropriately,” asserted Jonatan Vseviov, Permanent Secretary of the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in an interview published in the Estonian daily Postimees on March 28.

Lithuania’s Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys echoed this sentiment of preparedness and adequate response on April 9, telling Lithuania’s national broadcaster that NATO must be ready to react decisively, deploying additional forces if needed.

Lithuania’s assertiveness on this issue is understandable, given its proximity to Belarus , which is expected to serve as the focal point for this year’s exercises. Additionally, the vulnerability and complexity of defending the Suwałki Gap have been a longstanding concern. 

In April 2024, Poland and Lithuania conducted joint exercises titled Brave Griffin 24/II, specifically aimed at testing the defense of the Suwałki Corridor. These maneuvers took place on Lithuanian territory. Also in April 2024, U.S. and Polish forces participated in Saber Strike 24, a multinational exercise similarly focused on training and coordination around the Suwałki Corridor.

Such heightened deployments of Western forces along NATO’s eastern flank , paired with exercises mirroring Russia’s Zapad 2025, are not unprecedented. In previous years, NATO allies have regularly staged parallel drills in response to Russian exercises. For instance, during Zapad 2017, Poland simultaneously conducted Dragon 17, its largest military exercise of that year, incorporating both Polish forces and allied NATO contingents.

At that time , Sweden—still officially committed to a policy of neutrality—conducted its largest military exercise in 23 years, Aurora, deliberately synchronized with Russia's Zapad 2017. Aurora primarily focused on the defense of Gotland Island, involving over 20,000 military personnel , including units from the United States and various NATO European nations , even though Sweden was not yet a NATO member. Naturally, Finnish forces also took part in the simulated Gotland defense operation.

Sweden has periodically elevated its defense readiness during Russia's large-scale military exercises, publicly signaling its increased vigilance. Estonia considered similar measures during Zapad 2021; however, since no immediate threat emerged, the government opted instead for a tabletop exercise.

Since 2009, the Baltic states, Poland , and Nordic countries have consistently viewed Zapad exercises as potential instruments of military intimidation, with the main risk perceived as the accidental escalation of aggressive Russian provocations into outright armed conflict. Typically, intelligence gathering is intensified both before and during the drills , along with preventive tabletop exercises aimed at crisis management and de-escalation.

Throughout Russia’s war against Ukraine , NATO has maintained a deliberately restrained stance to minimize escalation risks . Recently, Ukraine 's former Commander-in -Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi even sarcastically criticized the Alliance, highlighting incidents in which Russian attack drones penetrated Romanian , Polish , or Latvian airspace and flew unchallenged for tens of minutes—sometimes even accompanied by NATO fighter jets reluctant to shoot them down.

In response to Zaluzhnyi's remarks , Estonian Foreign Ministry Secretary General Vseviov was notably critical during his previously mentioned interview, attributing the general’s comments to his limited diplomatic experience. Nonetheless, NATO’s restrained approach toward airspace incursions has drawn considerable media attention in eastern flank countries, with Latvian President Edgars Rinkēvičs and Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski among those publicly voicing concern.

In certain respects, Zapad 2025 is already inherently less dangerous than Zapad 2021, which occurred during an extremely tense period marked by Russia's military buildup along Ukraine 's border in spring 2021 and Belarus 's orchestrated migrant crisis against Poland , Lithuania, and Latvia that summer. Russian forces are now heavily engaged in Ukraine , and opening a new front elsewhere would expose the Kremlin to retaliatory actions from Ukraine , potentially even within Russia's own territory. Given how heavily Moscow has invested in its efforts to subdue Ukraine , it is unlikely to risk casually forfeiting hard-won ground there.

In the meantime , NATO has significantly strengthened its northeastern flank , particularly through the accession of Finland and Sweden. This year will also mark the first deployment of a British reinforcement brigade to Estonia as part of the springtime exercise Siil ("Hedgehog"). Additionally, within a few years, the completion of the so-called Baltic defensive line modeled in part after Russia’s "Surovikin Line" in Ukraine —could substantially alter the regional security landscape.

Yet not everyone perceives the warnings issued by Baltic politicians and military officials as entirely genuine. In a recent episode of his podcast In Moscow’s Shadows, prominent Russia expert Mark Galeotti expressed renewed skepticism toward the frequent war warnings emanating from this region . Specifically, he critiqued theories suggesting that Russia might, in coming years, attack NATO’s eastern flank solely to demonstrate the alliance’s supposed irrelevance. According to Galeotti , the risks of such a military gamble aimed at "proving a point" would simply be too high for Russia. Nevertheless, he conceded that he could be mistaken and acknowledged the necessity of frontline states to prepare for worst-case scenarios.

“One significant question the Kremlin might ask itself is : why give Europe time to rearm , replenish supplies, and reorganize its defenses?” Raimond Kaljulaid, a member of Estonia’s parliamentary National Defense Committee (SDE ), recently remarked in an interview with the British newspaper The Telegraph.

“We need to be prepared so that we remain one step ahead of developments,” Major General Andrus Merilo , Commander of the Estonian Defense Forces, emphasized in March.

Following the same principle—if the Zapad 2025 exercises do not remain confined to paper as they did in 2023, and Russia finds time amidst the war in Ukraine to carry out demonstrative maneuvers on Belarusian territory—then NATO would do well to follow the example set by its newest ally , Sweden, and stage a robust counter-exercise that simultaneously serves as a reinforcement operation. Failure to conduct such maneuvers would represent a clear departure from NATO's previously cautious approach and could allow Russia to use military intimidation to sow panic throughout the region . Moreover, any potential panic could be further amplified by the rumored intentions—still unconfirmed—of the new U.S. administration to withdraw some military forces from Europe.