DAWN OF AN ERA ⟩ Meet the New Generation of Homegrown Generals at the Helm of the Baltic States' Militaries

General Vaikšnoras is thus far the first and only NATO military commander to publicly acknowledge and appreciate maintaining contacts with his nation's volunteer fighters in Ukraine. "This allows me to gain insights into the atmosphere, the soldiers' thoughts at the grassroots level, as well as tactical and technical procedures," he told Baltic News Service immediately after his appointment last summer. "My door is always open to those who wish to share their experiences from Ukraine, and together we seek ways to move forward."

Vaikšnoras also noted that the situation in Ukraine offers new ideas for enhancing military capabilities, particularly in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles, and pledged, following Ukraine’s example, to integrate drones into every Lithuanian military unit down to the company level. In contrast, the Latvian and Estonian military leadership have maintained a low public profile regarding their fellow citizens participating in Ukraine.

Among the current Baltic defense chiefs, General Vaikšnoras has the closest recent experience with NATO's strategic command operations, having served in the leadership of the Brunssum Joint Force Command from 2022 to 2023. This background made his bluntness all the more striking when, in one of his first interviews as the Lithuanian Chief of Defense, he stated clearly that it would be mistaken to assume allies would protect Lithuania without significant effort from Lithuania itself.

“To expect Americans or Germans to defend us is a misguided notion”—these harsh words reflect the mindset of Lithuania's political leadership rather than the actual reality. On April 1 this year, Germany activated its 45th Armored Brigade stationed in Lithuania, and a tragic incident on March 25 involving four American tank crew members drowning in a swamp during training at the Pabradė training area highlighted the presence of the largest U.S. military contingent in Lithuania, approximately battalion-sized.

General Vaikšnoras's directness is comparable to that of Estonia's former defense chief, General Martin Herem. The title of the most outspoken Baltic defense chief has thus shifted to Lithuania. Meanwhile, Estonia's media have found it rather difficult to secure interviews with Estonia’s current Chief of Defense, Major General Andrus Merilo, who has been in office for less than a year. While this rarity has made his occasional statements highly anticipated, it has also generated dissatisfaction among journalists.

Latvia's previous Chief of Defense, Lieutenant General Leonīds Kalniņš, was regarded as a calm, disciplined leader who maintained a reserved approach toward media interactions. The current chief, Major General Pudāns, unlike his counterparts, also possesses a civilian higher education background (a bachelor's degree in law and a master's in quality management), which might suggest he favors systematic thinking and restraint in communication as well.

Nevertheless, it was precisely Latvia's top soldier who stated to the national broadcaster on February 25 — just one month after taking office—that "it would be unacceptable for Latvian soldiers to be positioned between Ukrainian troops and their occupied territories." By making this statement, he sent a strong signal to policymakers urging them to carefully consider their political mandate for any potential peacekeeping mission in Ukraine.

In late January, Lithuania's General Vaikšnoras commented in Lithuanian media that Lithuania "should take responsibility for Europe's stability." Estonia's Major General Merilo, adhering to traditions of democratic civilian leadership, adopted a more conventional stance, indicating that such decisions fall within the domain of politicians.

Annual meetings between the Baltic states' defense ministers and military commanders have become customary, aiming at harmonizing military decisions and messages that affect the Baltic operational area. Despite their close allied relationships, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania remain sovereign states. Consequently, it's logical that military leaders' positions on certain significant issues will differ.

Baltic military leaders have also not been entirely aligned on whether their countries should withdraw from the Ottawa Convention. On January 3, Lithuania’s Chief of Defense recommended stepping away from the treaty that bans anti-personnel landmines, arguing that since adversaries do not impose such restrictions upon themselves, adhering to the treaty would only heighten Lithuania’s risk of defeat and unnecessarily constrain its military forces.

Estonian Chief of Defense Merilo has provided military advice to Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur not to employ landmines prohibited by the convention. "The Chief of Defense has assured me that he prefers other options," the minister told ERR on March 18.

Latvia has generally supported maintaining restrictions on landmine usage. Estonia originally joined the convention largely out of political solidarity, prompting an opposition politician to call this decision "blindly foolish."

There has also been some divergence among the Baltic states regarding the urgency of establishing the Baltic Defensive Line, a joint project with Poland aimed at fortifying their eastern borders against a Russian mechanized assault. 

Last November, General Vaikšnoras criticized the project, stating that the Baltic countries' approach to establishing a defense belt has been inconsistent. "No one is digging trenches—not in Latvia, Estonia, or Poland. We have ideas and plans, but they need to be executed," the Lithuanian military leader remarked, pointing out the stalled progress.

Estonia’s military had not previously prioritized this project. It was first explicitly cited as a priority by Major General Merilo only following a media scandal in March, when former Ministry of Defense Secretary-General Kusti Salm publicly pressured Defense Minister Pevkur, accusing him of delays in ammunition procurement and the development of the Baltic defense belt.

There have been notable differences between Estonian and Latvian military self-assessments regarding their capabilities to protect underwater infrastructure. The Estonian defense forces faced sharp criticism last year over perceived passivity and lack of initiative in protecting undersea infrastructure. In two consecutive years (2023 and 2024), multiple vital connections for Estonia were damaged by vessels navigating the Baltic Sea. Reactions to this criticism have tended to be defensive.

Following suspected sabotage of Latvia’s public broadcasting undersea cable in January, Latvia’s Major General Pudāns admitted that too much focus was currently placed on investigating incidents rather than on proactive deterrence and prevention. He also acknowledged that there was significant room for improvement, both in domestic activities and international cooperation.

Unlike his Estonian and Lithuanian counterparts, Major General Pudāns has publicly emphasized military readiness against hybrid threats, insisting that every Latvian military unit must be prepared for hybrid warfare scenarios in addition to conventional conflicts. At Latvia's largest annual military exercise, Namejs (which, unlike Estonia’s Spring Storm exercise, takes place in autumn), the new defense chief has directed units to practice hybrid defense tactics.

Indeed, Latvia’s military leader has stressed the significance of asymmetric warfare and air defense. Influencing the adversary within its own territory aligns more closely with the concept of maneuver warfare—a tactic that Pudāns, whose background is rooted in territorial defense, seems to place less emphasis on compared to Merilo and Vaikšnoras, both of whom come from armored forces backgrounds.

The concept of increasing long-range firepower, originating from the Polish military leadership, first gained traction in Estonia and Lithuania, while Latvia has remained more reserved. In 2021, Pudāns published an article in the Journal on Baltic Security, suggesting that NATO enhance its deterrence capabilities with asymmetric and "out-of-the-box" solutions.

Although Pudāns wrote his article before Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine, he has continued as Latvia’s defense chief to advocate for asymmetric thinking, whereas Lithuanian and Estonian generals openly discuss the necessity of expanding conventional firepower capabilities.

"We must use every means available to convince our adversary not to attempt an attack. Therefore, our arsenal must include the ability to deliver an immediate counterattack the moment a soldier crosses our border or a tank moves within one meter of our territory—we must start defending ourselves immediately," stated Lithuania's Chief of Defense in an interview with the public broadcaster on December 23 of last year.

He further emphasized that Lithuania must simultaneously maintain the capability to deliver powerful strikes against the aggressor’s territory, troop assembly areas, command centers, railway junctions, supply depots, and perhaps even military facilities within enemy capitals.

Estonia’s Chief of Defense, Major General Merilo, has similarly continued to actively promote this strategy to the Estonian public, following the approach of his predecessor, General Herem.

Given that the Baltic operational area is effectively a single strategic zone for both a potential adversary and NATO, Latvia’s and Lithuania’s defense capabilities and strategies directly impact Estonia’s security, and vice versa.

No significant military development would affect just one Baltic nation alone. A conventional attack on Latvia would inevitably trigger wartime conditions in Estonia and Lithuania as well. The fall of the Suwałki Gap to an adversary, though formally appearing to be primarily Lithuania's problem, would actually have equally severe implications for Latvia’s and Estonia’s security, economies, and populations.

Speaking of the latter issue—at the end of March, in an interview with Estonian daily Postimees, Major General Merilo explicitly ruled out mandatory military conscription for women. Meanwhile, Lithuania's Chief of Defense Vaikšnoras, tasked with doubling the number of conscripts in the near future, expressed support for the idea, stating it should be implemented in phases to give the armed forces sufficient time to adapt. All three new defense chiefs have publicly acknowledged the increasing severity of personnel shortages.

Despite these differences, Baltic defense chiefs have far more commonalities than divergences. There is consensus among the military leadership of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania regarding the Russian military threat to the region and how to counter it. Major General Merilo has spoken about the necessity for robust military deterrence against adversaries within the next two to five years. 

Latvian Major General Pudāns, in a recent interview, noted that if a ceasefire were established now, "Russia would undoubtedly have the opportunity to reorganize itself and would certainly have learned many lessons." Pudāns believes that under a prolonged ceasefire, many Russian soldiers would be discharged, though some would inevitably remain in Ukraine to maintain Russia’s perception of stable peace. The remainder, he suggests, would return to their units, likely increasing Russian forces along the Baltic states' borders compared to 2022.

"This raises the question of what happens next—perhaps the desire emerges to maintain a sense of success, to continue believing that the West is weak, to continually demonstrate their belief that they are stronger and can inflict damage upon the West, undermine NATO unity, and move forward. Looking geographically, there are only a few possible directions—the Caucasus and the west," the Latvian Chief of Defense emphasized to LETA on April 14.

According to the Latvian military leader, the proximity of the Baltic borders allows Russia to experiment and test scenarios to gauge NATO's reaction to limited and unexpected incursions. Meanwhile, both Lithuanian and Latvian commanders acknowledge that a large-scale conventional attack is currently unlikely. Russia "has the willingness but not the capability," as most Russian units—including those previously stationed near the Baltic borders—are deeply engaged in Ukraine, have suffered losses there, and require substantial recovery.

General Vaikšnoras has affirmed that movements of Russian or Belarusian troops are closely monitored and that military presence in the region would be adjusted accordingly if needed. Andrus Merilo, however, remarked in his Estonian Independence Day speech that we have entered "a dangerous time," where swiftly finding common ground and coordinating approaches and messages has become increasingly vital.