Estonian Soldier in Ukraine Warns What Would Happen If Russian Drone Pilots Hit Baltic Troops

Picasso left the Legion to attend a drone school in Kyiv, becoming a certified drone pilot. Ukraine currently has dozens of drone schools, which have collectively trained more than 100,000 drone operators to date.

Last autumn, one of the Ukrainian National Guard brigades invited him to become a pilot in their newly formed drone unit. This unit is part of the assault brigades specifically established under Ukraine’s Interior Ministry for the 2023 counteroffensive. They were named accordingly: Gvardia Nastupu (Guard of the Offensive). These brigades are known for their high standards and rigorous training.

Picasso is the only foreigner in his drone unit. Within six months, he learned Ukrainian well enough to get by comfortably.

On November 4th of last year, he went on his first frontline combat mission with his unit—roughly to the same area where he had fought half a year earlier with the foreign legion.

Three weeks later, the first of his unit comrades—an FPV drone pilot (FPV, or "first-person view," is a method of piloting drones remotely using goggles, a phone, a computer, or another device, without direct visual contact)—was killed. A Russian FPV drone flew into their dugout and exploded, igniting explosives stored there for the Ukrainians' own drones. Everything blew up. It was miraculous that another man in the dugout survived, although he lost a leg.

"We all watched it live through our own drone," Picasso recalls. He refuses to discuss losses further—he is not permitted to.

"In war, it's simple: you're hunting them, and they're hunting you. Drone pilots on both sides are priority targets," notes the young Estonian volunteer soldier.

Picasso himself uses drones primarily for reconnaissance and bombing missions. His main tools are Chinese-made Mavic drones, and he mostly engages in aerial reconnaissance. They typically operate one to two kilometers behind "zero"—the frontline.

"In my opinion, reconnaissance demands even greater skill," says Picasso, "because you need to detect footprints, identify newly appeared trash in the forest, or notice branches that have been recently broken. These are all signs of Russian troop movements."

Picasso already has extensive frontline experience as a drone pilot, and that's why he believes Estonia's Defense Forces urgently need to develop their drone capabilities. "An army without strong drone capabilities is pretty useless," he argues. "On the frontline, drones are in the air 24/7. You must always assume you're being watched and targeted."

Recently, General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the former commander-in-chief of Ukraine's Armed Forces who led Ukrainian resistance during the first two years of the Russia-Ukraine war, criticized NATO countries for their insufficient readiness for drone warfare.

Believing in their own dominance, Western militaries have been asleep for far too long, General Zaluzhnyi wrote in his article "How Drones, Information, and AI Have Changed Our Military." Facing opponents who massively deploy inexpensive and autonomous weapons, Zaluzhnyi warned, Western forces could end up like the "victims of Germany’s Blitzkrieg in World War II."

"Fortunately, the West has received a gift of immeasurable value: Ukraine’s hard-won knowledge gained through a grueling struggle for survival. If the West wants to survive, it must quickly and fully absorb these lessons and apply them effectively," Zaluzhnyi stated.

It should be elementary for soldiers in any modern NATO army to at least know how to move in drone-threatened areas. This way of moving is fundamentally different from what Picasso was taught two years ago during his Estonian military service.

"The first rule is maintaining large intervals so fewer soldiers get hit in a drone attack. When we move, we always keep a 20–30-meter distance," Picasso explains.

There are many nuances about how to move and behave regarding drones—enough for lengthy discussion. "Operating in forests under drone threat requires its own specialized training course," Picasso argues. "So does building dugouts properly, making them invisible from drones, and knowing how to behave around them."

Russian drone pilots are extremely skilled and must never be underestimated, Picasso warns. "If they come against Estonia, I'm seriously afraid we're going to be screwed," he bluntly states.

Picasso believes it's better to face harsh truths than live with illusions. He remains in contact with soldiers from his former unit in the Estonian Defense Forces and knows that Estonia's drone capabilities aren't advancing nearly as quickly as he would expect, given his experience in Ukraine.

"In Estonia, some might think our forests will protect us from drones. But I see how the Russians use artillery to flatten entire forests," Picasso says. "They destroy forests to the point where everything becomes clearly visible to drones."

In January, I spoke to another Estonian volunteer fighting as a drone operator with Ukraine's powerful 3rd Assault Brigade, who goes by the call sign Ostriv. "We’re preparing too slowly and too little for drone warfare," Ostriv said. He believes that if Estonia wants to defend itself against Russia, every soldier and defense volunteer must be equipped with drone countermeasures and trained accordingly.

Ostriv insisted that no military exercise in Estonia should take place without using a significant number of drones. Picasso shares the same view.

Anders Puck Nielsen, an analyst at the Royal Danish Defense College, also emphasizes that, in light of experiences from the Ukraine war, NATO's European armies urgently need to train large numbers of drone pilots and electronic warfare specialists to effectively counter the Russian military.