NORDIC ARMS MANUFACTURER PUZZLED ⟩ Why Have the Baltic States Armed Themselves Separately Against a Shared Threat?

Why does this matter? Because without ballistic data, accuracy drops. The result: additional shots are needed to correct aim, which not only wastes precious ammunition but also reveals the weapon system’s location to the enemy. And even if the weapon itself survives, the cost in terms of resources and exposure can be high.

“European 155 mm shells—whether produced by Nammo, Rheinmetall, or KNDS (a European defense consortium formed by the merger of Germany’s Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and France’s Nexter)—are significantly more accurate than Russia’s 152 mm rounds,” Voutilainen explained. “If we have the right data and work together, we can fire farther and with greater precision. Accuracy saves both time and resources. We can’t match Russia in sheer volume of ammunition, but we can offset that quantitative gap through quality.”

At the same time, defense companies are also businesses. They only activate production lines when they have confirmed orders—and that’s another problem. “There’s talk of long-term contracts, yet many European countries still lack medium- or long-term procurement agreements. Interestingly, it’s the smaller nations that have been more proactive in signing such deals. The farther a country is from Russia’s border, the less political will there seems to be to commit,” Voutilainen noted.

He explained that if politicians expect a company to invest €100 million in production, the company must have at least €1 billion in contracts on the table to justify that investment—and even then, it’s no guarantee of profit.

Meanwhile, there’s an ongoing debate over how much support should go to Ukraine versus how much should be reserved to prepare for the next war. “War always comes back,” the retired lieutenant commander said grimly. “We need to restock our warehouses, but right now our production capacity doesn’t even reach two million shells per year. Donating a million shells to Ukraine while replenishing our own stockpiles? That’s just not realistic at the moment.”

Nammo's Finnish branch is set to increase its production capacity more than fivefold over the coming years—from 40,000 shells annually to 250,000 by 2027. The company is working closely with Latvia, where a state-owned defense industry company has been established under the EU’s Ammunition Production Support Act (ASAP) program.

Currently, this cooperation involves Nammo building a gunpowder plant in Vihtavuori, Finland; expanding 155 mm shell production in Norway; and jointly constructing a modular charge manufacturing facility in Latvia in partnership with the Latvian government. According to Voutilainen, it is not sustainable for every country to try to produce everything on its own—which is why cross-border cooperation is essential.

When asked why Nammo didn’t consider building the modular charge facility in Estonia, Voutilainen replied that a key factor was the Latvian company’s status as a state-owned enterprise, with part of the funding coming directly from the government. “That means state support is guaranteed, and long-term contracts might not even be necessary. We haven’t been as active in Estonia yet—but that could change. We’re currently in talks with several countries about potential industrial cooperation,” he said.

According to Voutilainen, a major issue facing the Baltic states is the lack of defense cooperation — highlighted by the fact that the three small nations, who would have to fight shoulder to shoulder in the event of war, have not made any significant joint weapons procurements. While there are some justifications for this, it complicates defense planning and creates serious logistical challenges.

“Take self-propelled artillery, for example — Lithuania purchased the Panzerhaubitze 2000, Estonia chose the K9, and Latvia acquired the M109. These decisions were made around the same time, yet they resulted in three completely different platforms,” he noted.

That said, Estonia’s K9 acquisition was a positive example of Nordic cooperation, as Finland also selected the same system. “The same issue applies to infantry fighting vehicles: Estonia has CV90s, Latvia uses British-made CVR(T) armored vehicles, and Lithuania operates Boxers.”

This means three different platforms, weapons of varying calibers, and three distinct logistics chains—all chosen more or less simultaneously.

“Why wasn’t there any cooperation?” Voutilainen asked, clearly puzzled.