Finnish Info War Expert: Russian Intelligence Is Undermining the U.S. and Aims to Dominate

Interviewer: This whole trolling thing started with Yevgeny Prigozhin’s troll factory near St. Petersburg. What happened to it? How has it evolved?

Jessikka Aro: Now there are many more troll factories than in the beginning. What’s interesting is that they’re being established in various countries. For example, before I wrote Putin’s World War, I reported a story about a troll factory in Ghana that was trying to influence the U.S. elections. CNN and a local Ghanaian investigative journalist, Manasseh Azure Awuni, exposed it back in 2020.

The operation involved someone who spoke Russian and had ties to the St. Petersburg troll factory. He claimed to be South African, but he was actually Ghanaian—he likely received training in Russia.

It’s easier to recruit Ghanaians for anti-American campaigns because there’s a lingering strain of anti-Western sentiment rooted in the history of the slave trade. Russia isn’t associated with colonialism, so it gets a free pass. There was a similar troll factory operating in Nigeria as well.

These troll factories have been replicated in other countries, and now they're increasingly using artificial intelligence. And one thing I think hasn’t been talked about enough is the role of social media influencers. We see influencers promoting products like cosmetics, right? But there are also influencers promoting Russian propaganda. They’re paid—through intermediaries—to spread that content.

Interviewer: Where does the funding for all of this come from?

Jessikka Aro: Mainly from Russian oligarchs—it’s like a kleptocracy tax. And Russian energy companies serve as “ATMs,” setting aside funds for this kind of activity. These companies are controlled by the FSB and Vladimir Putin’s inner circle.

One thing I think hasn’t been talked about enough is social media influencers. Some promote cosmetics—but others promote Russian propaganda.

Interviewer: Okay, I can fully believe that troll factories played a role in the last U.S. elections. But it’s harder to believe that they’re actually pushing a specific agenda onto the U.S. administration. Isn’t it more like those figures who got into power—seemingly to the Kremlin’s delight—end up confused afterward and don’t actually follow any direct orders?

Jessikka Aro: After the U.S. elections in November 2024, Nikolai Patrushev made a statement through the Russian press (Kommersant, November 11, 2024), telling the world that now that Trump had won, people needed to understand he had relied on “certain forces” and that it was time to pay them back. He talked about changes that would benefit Russia.

I’ve been following Trump’s actions, and they certainly indicate that he is paying back. You can see it in everything related to Ukraine. He’s pushing for peace on Russia’s terms. That’s exactly what Putin and the Kremlin want. And then there are the people around him—several of whom have proven ties to Russia.

Elon Musk, for instance, has been in regular contact with Putin. And it’s pretty remarkable that Musk is spreading the exact same content on social media as Russian trolls. He’s also trying to influence elections—in the case of Germany, for example, he openly supported the AfD, just like Russian troll accounts have done.

Interviewer: Well, that support for the AfD was very public and not limited to Musk. It was expressed directly by Vice President J.D. Vance.

Jessikka Aro: Exactly. And there are more examples. But the most thoroughly investigated case is still the 2016 U.S. election—that’s the one we know the most about. Back then, it wasn’t just troll farms or cyber operations or military intelligence. There was a lot of direct influence—agents who surrounded Trump’s campaign team.

There was, for instance, a figure who pushed the idea that the U.S. and Russia should align their policies—especially when it came to Ukraine. It’s also documented that attempts were made to establish an unofficial backchannel between Trump’s team and the Russian leadership—something without any official bureaucracy getting in the way.

And when I look at Trump’s behavior now, I can’t help but wonder whether that backchannel has finally been activated. That’s been a long-standing ambition.

Interviewer: At one point, it seemed like that backchannel might have been running through Trump’s special envoy on all negotiations, Steve Witkoff?

Jessikka Aro: Exactly!

Interviewer: But what we’re seeing unfold is an important political drama—and at times, Trump even seems angry with Putin. There’s hope that tough sanctions will follow, and that reasonable Republicans in Congress are preparing to take action. What happens next?

Jessikka Aro: I don’t know what will happen, but I’m worried—deeply worried. When Trump first became president, one of his very first moves was to try to end all sanctions against Russia. Now the situation is different, but the key question remains: how long will the sanctions hold? If anything is rolled back, the playing field will be Russia’s—and I’m afraid that could trigger a massive domino effect. So far, the sanctions have held, but it’s something that must be watched extremely closely.

What’s really troubling is that, at the end of 2024, the U.S. shut down the agency responsible for exposing Russian disinformation and educating the public and officials about it—the Global Engagement Center. It was simply shut down. On top of that, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth gave the Cyber Command an order to halt counter-operations against Russia in cyberspace. So essentially, the agencies responsible for security are being weakened and dismantled. That is genuinely dangerous.

Interviewer: Why did the big tech billionaires—not just Musk—start supporting Trump in the last election? Is it just about expecting no restrictions and total freedom to operate?

Jessikka Aro: It’s not real freedom. They’re using their platforms to push their own propaganda—and giving space to Russian trolls as well. The main interest is money.

And it’s quite interesting that Elon Musk is sharing content on social media that’s almost identical to what Russian trolls are posting. He’s also trying to influence elections in much the same way.

Interviewer: Musk wants money? He might have more of it than Russia’s entire state budget.

Jessikka Aro: Those are two different things. The state budget doesn’t include the personal wealth of Putin’s inner circle and the oligarchs. The way I see it, Musk wants to do business with them.

And regarding Musk stepping away from the administration, I still wonder what to make of it. It could also be a way to cut off official ties in order to quiet criticism or deflect scrutiny. I try to focus on what these actors are actually doing—that’s what matters.

One mistake we in the West keep making is constantly watching what Putin says or does. But all that information is filtered through newsrooms controlled by Putin. The people presenting themselves as journalists are, in many cases, actually intelligence operatives.

Interviewer: Let’s return to elections. In many countries, they’re now turning into a contest between Western and Russian influence. But there hasn’t been election interference in Finland — or has it just not succeeded?

Jessikka Aro: I’d turn that around and ask: do we really know how much political influence Russia has managed to exert in Finland? I’ve thought for a while now that we actually lack solid knowledge on this.

We also can’t say they’ve had no success. Even getting an article published that partially justifies or reflects the Kremlin’s position is a win for them. Not long ago, we saw a news headline quoting anonymous official sources saying that Russia wants peace in Ukraine. It originated from a Reuters story, but it was translated and amplified. In any case, it was a successful Russian information operation—and we helped spread it.

Another political success was in 2014–2015, when Russia managed to recruit people from Finland to fight against Ukraine. Officially, it’s said there were about twenty of them. And of course, in 2022, we saw social media campaigns inciting hatred against Ukrainian refugees here.

Interviewer: To what extent does social media contribute to influence operations?

Jessikka Aro: Primarily, it makes access to people easier. In the case of the United States, this has been studied more thoroughly—and what it shows is that Russian intelligence uses social media to reach people on an industrial scale. They contact well-meaning U.S. citizens and try to recruit them. It’s not like someone says, “Hi, I’m a Russian intelligence agent—let’s work against your country.” They pose as Americans: “Hey, I’m so-and-so, we’re organizing a great cause here, would you help out—maybe join a protest?”

Social media allows them to specifically target carefully selected groups of people. The regular internet didn’t enable that in the same way. I remember a Finnish security expert said more than ten years ago that trolls are like precision shooters in information warfare—they’re snipers who take aim at individuals, often ordinary people, by messaging them directly, for example via Messenger. And these messages can be sent out in batches of 1,000 or even 3,000 at once. Many people respond and engage.

That’s how you get situations where a protest seems to be organized by Americans, but behind it is actually Russian intelligence.

Interviewer: I sometimes follow channels where academic figures—often affiliated with universities—are spreading Russian narratives. It raises the question: have they also been recruited in some way, or is this just the age-old phenomenon of so-called “useful idiots”?

Jessikka Aro: “Useful idiots” have always existed—that’s a universal truth. But surprisingly much of the discourse surrounding Russia and Ukraine is also directly orchestrated by Russian intelligence. Soviet intelligence already had a strong playbook for recruiting and using people to take part in operations.

That continues today. Russian intelligence knows exactly whom to approach and how. Often, they target individuals who are somewhat anti-social or oppositional toward the prevailing system. Spreading Russian propaganda gives them a sense of validation. For example, researchers have looked into leaders of extremist and neo-Nazi movements. It turns out they’re often anti-social people who are actively seeking conflict. So that rebelliousness and rejection of their own system is immediately exploited.