900 DAYS OF ATROCITIES ⟩ Prominent Ukrainian Historian Says Ukraine Is Being Nudged Toward a Ceasefire Scenario

Against this backdrop, we’re seeing a growing trend of more Ukrainians wanting a ceasefire, but on Ukraine’s terms. No one knows exactly what those terms would be, and there are significant disagreements on this. The society is clearly tired and wants to know, even approximately, how much longer the war will last. But it’s clear that Ukrainians are not willing to accept peace at any cost.

Another important trend is the significant decline in trust in the government and personally in Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. [At the start of the full-scale war, Zelensky's trust rating soared to nearly 90 percent, but recent polls show it has fallen below 60 percent.]

The enthusiasm and trust that characterized 2022 and 2023 have faded. People have become skeptical of the country's leadership, but at the same time, they don't want to change the government during the war. The society is searching for a new leader, and it seems that this new leader may already exist, but Ukrainians don’t want to risk changes or elections during the war because they understand the associated risks.

Interviewer: To clarify, who do you see as this new leader?

Yaroslav Hrytsak: General Valeriy Zaluzhny’s figure stands out very clearly. As Zelensky's popularity declines, Zaluzhny’s rises. If there were presidential elections today and Zaluzhny participated, he would win by a significant margin.

The same would be true for parliamentary elections. If they were held now, a hypothetical Zaluzhny party—though none currently exists—would win convincingly. All polls indicate a clear trend in the growth of Zaluzhny’s popularity.

Unfortunately, a large portion of the Ukrainian media is afraid to publish such polls because they fear the consequences. Zaluzhny’s popularity is high because he is associated with success and the belief that he can bring about change.

It’s a similar story to Viktor Yushchenko [Ukraine's third president, 2005-2010]. He became Ukraine’s leader because he was associated with a success story—implementing currency reform.

Ukraine desperately needs a success story, and Zaluzhny has that from the successful resistance and offensives in Kharkiv and Kherson regions in 2022.

Interviewer: What other significant events have occurred in Ukraine over the past three months that have affected society's mood?

Yaroslav Hrytsak: A broader mobilization under a new law began, which was passed after long and painful debate and contains significant shortcomings, including many populist elements. But at least it has started.

Our military leadership—and I tend to believe them—claims that the mobilization is already yielding results. Ukraine is currently able to mobilize 30,000 men per month, which should be enough to maintain defense. [Over four million Ukrainian men subject to conscription updated their data within two months].

Another significant event was the killing of our Ukrainian nationalist Iryna Farion in Lviv.

It’s a very strange case. The alleged killer is a young man from Dnipro who is reportedly even more nationalist than Farion. His next intended victim was supposedly a very pro-Russian MP known for his scandalous statements in support of Russia, but we don't know if this is true. [Hrytsak refers to Maksym Buzhansky, who is part of the Servant of the People faction in Ukraine’s parliament and is indeed known in Ukraine as a pro-Russian politician.]

There is a noticeable intensification of social tensions. I can’t predict where this might lead, but the trend is evident.

Overall, I don’t expect any significant changes in mood in Ukraine before winter. The most important thing, once again, is to survive the winter. Physically, we will endure the power outages because we are all prepared for it, and everyone already knows how to cope without electricity. But it will cause depression, especially with no end to the war in sight.

I would even say the crucial issue is that there are no clear scenarios for how this war might end or what a Ukrainian victory would even look like. Moreover, the West doesn't have a clear stance on how the war should end. Even if the Democrats win the U.S. elections, there’s no guarantee that their strategy will change for the better for Ukraine.

Interviewer: What do you mean by that?

Yaroslav Hrytsak: That there’s no guarantee the U.S. will help Ukraine end the war more quickly.

Interviewer: When I last visited Ukraine in late July, most of my acquaintances said that new elections, especially presidential ones, were necessary. No one knew how to hold them, but the desire was widespread among my social circle. What are your thoughts on this topic? And how would it be done?

Yaroslav Hrytsak: I don’t know how elections could be held in Ukraine right now. First, it's technically impossible, and second, it’s a significant risk during wartime. However, polls clearly show that Ukrainians want change and a new leader, but not during the war. The war must somehow end first, and then a new leader can be elected.

Interviewer: Another important change is reflected in the polls. In 2022 and even until the spring of 2023, 8-10 percent of people consistently supported ending the war quickly by ceding Ukrainian territories. Since then, the number of supporters for this idea has steadily grown, reaching 30-32 percent by the end of May. Similar results were shown by surveys conducted by two different sociological groups. This increase has been particularly rapid this year. Why has the percentage of those willing to cede territory grown so quickly?

Yaroslav Hrytsak: People are tired, and this has a significant impact. There is a strong sense of anxiety, concern, and uncertainty. This psychologically weighs heavily.

At the same time, I recently visited Dnipro and Odesa [both cities are targets of constant Russian missile and drone attacks], and there’s no sense that the war is close by anywhere. [Dnipro is 120 kilometers from the nearest front line, Odesa even closer, but there’s the sea in between]. People everywhere have adapted to life during the war, but they are very anxious and fear the worst-case scenario.

The responses to [polls] reflect people’s desire to avoid that worst-case scenario—giving up certain territories to achieve peace, even if it's a bad peace. I’m sure most Ukrainians understand that this wouldn’t be a lasting peace but a temporary one, a brief respite before the next war. Rumors are circulating that peace is imminent, possibly this fall, and it's tied to Donald Trump’s return to power.

I also want to emphasize the noticeable gap between this attitude and the more active part of our military. Many soldiers and officers are convinced that peace is neither possible nor necessary, as it would only benefit [Russian President Vladimir] Putin and eventually lead to an even broader war.

Interviewer: What does this shift in mood mean? Will Ukrainian society start pressuring to stop the war at the cost of the occupied territories?

Yaroslav Hrytsak: The enormous solidarity and trust in the authorities that existed in 2022 is gradually unraveling. It hasn't disappeared, but it has decreased as two new realizations have taken hold—first, that the war will last a long time, and second, that there’s no visible end to the war with a good outcome.

There is no longer a unified understanding of what a Ukrainian victory would be. Even if we were to reach the 1991 borders, would that be a victory if Putin’s regime remains in power, and we would likely have to fight again at some point?

Moreover, notice that no one talks about reaching the 1991 borders anymore, not even Zelensky. The mood has changed.

People are now willing to consider giving up Crimea and Donbas, understanding that retaking them would come at a great cost. The price of reclaiming Crimea and Donbas would be too high. But they are not willing to give up Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.

There’s been a split in thinking. Now, the territories captured in 2014 and those taken in 2022 are viewed separately. The current stance is that some Ukrainians believe Crimea and Donbas could be on the negotiating table, but not the newly occupied territories.

Many analysts, myself included, don’t see Putin as wanting to negotiate at all. This is wishful thinking. Putin believes that time is on his side, that the situation is favorable for him. I don’t think he is ready for serious negotiations until he achieves something in the war that he can sell as a victory to the Russian people.

Interviewer: You mentioned the growing gap between the military and society. If it widens further, where could it lead?

Yaroslav Hrytsak: To radicalization. I can’t say what form it might take. The killing of Farion was a very disturbing event for me.

Interviewer: Why?

Yaroslav Hrytsak: It was the first time during the war that a public figure was killed for their views. Moreover, this was a settling of scores within the pro-Ukrainian camp, not between pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian factions. Someone believed their views were more correct, and they had weapons at their disposal.

However, I think the possibility of a military coup is minimal. Ukrainian society simply doesn’t want military rule, that’s clear.

Interviewer: Polls clearly show that Ukrainians' political views have shifted significantly to the right. Especially during the war years, Ukrainians have quickly become more right-wing. Does this mean that Ukrainians are also becoming more radical?

Yaroslav Hrytsak: Every war always radicalizes society. Ukraine is currently more influenced by the lack of success stories. Pessimism is a fertile ground for the spread of radical sentiments.

Interviewer: The last big news was the arrival of F-16 fighter jets. Finally. Obviously, there are too few of them to make a decisive impact on the war, but what is their symbolic significance, if they have any at all?

Yaroslav Hrytsak: This news got lost among other news stories. It’s certainly good news, but it’s not of such a scale that it could break the overall negative news cycle for Ukrainians.

The consensus opinion is that the F-16s are indeed good, but they arrived too late and in insufficient numbers. If the jets had arrived during the counteroffensive, it might have made a difference. These planes can no longer change the nature of the war. Ukraine needs something that can change the course of the war to boost public morale.

Interviewer: As it stands, the situation with Western aid remains dire. President Zelensky has already made two public pleas to allies, saying we have 14 new brigades, but no weapons—please help! I spoke to a general commanding a large sector of the front, who said he doesn’t see the West providing more shells. What do you think is the problem?

Yaroslav Hrytsak: It became clear that NATO countries’ armies don’t have enough reserves, except perhaps the Americans. NATO wasn’t prepared for such an escalation by Russia, a war in Ukraine. At the same time, there was an article in Foreign Affairs two weeks ago that claimed there are [munition] reserves; the most important thing is political will.

The West still lacks a strategy for how to defeat Russia. This means that Ukraine is being pushed either towards a ceasefire or a very long and grueling process of attrition, which could lead to Ukraine’s defeat. Ukraine’s resources are incomparably smaller than Russia’s, and they are simply being exhausted, which is inevitable. The fear among Western countries of Russia's defeat also plays a role.

Interviewer: Ukrainian Brigadier General Serhiy Baranov suggested in a recent interview that the Americans control and manage the intensity of the war by regulating how many shells they give Ukraine. He emphasized that this is his personal opinion. What do you think of his statement?

Yaroslav Hrytsak: A general at the front has a better view of these things than I do. Even if he is mistaken, it’s a positive mistake. The main U.S. strategy in this war is de-escalation and restraint. This means keeping the war within certain limits. The main goal is to prevent it from spreading beyond Ukraine's borders and becoming an international conflict.

Second, there’s the fear of Putin's reaction if he sees Ukraine starting to win. This is the main reason why some of the necessary weapons are not being provided to us. If we were given the latest technology and allowed to use it to strike Russia, the situation in the war would change quickly, and so would public sentiment in Ukraine.

Right now, we are being pushed towards a ceasefire scenario. This only means freezing the conflict, not eliminating the threat of war. In that case, Ukraine faces two important questions: what territories we must give up and whether we can strengthen our forces in time to be ready for the next war.

Interviewer: The Russian army is advancing in eastern Ukraine, and several experts believe they will soon be near Pokrovsk, essentially reaching the Donetsk region’s border. As one Ukrainian officer at the front told me, "they crawl like cockroaches, and we don’t have enough slippers." How do ordinary people perceive the situation at the front, and how big of a catastrophe do they consider this continuous retreat?

Yaroslav Hrytsak: It’s not seen as a catastrophe, but there is significant dissatisfaction. A recent study highlighted the main reasons why people don’t want to go to fight. The primary reason is the lack of success. Many believe that mobilization is a one-way ticket.

The second main reason is that they see no point in mobilization because nothing changes at the front. If you read Ukrainians' thoughts on social networks, you’ll see that there’s a storm brewing. There are very sharp judgments, dissatisfaction, and a lot of social conflict. I don’t believe this will escalate into a real conflict.

My thesis on the causes of this is still that there are no longer any success stories. But despite all this, the most important thing is that Ukraine continues to fight, and our civil society functions. Other countries would have likely given up or signed a ceasefire long ago.

Interviewer: Have you started to feel, even a small doubt, that Ukraine might lose the war?

Yaroslav Hrytsak: No. I don’t feel that Ukraine could lose the war or that we could face a collapse. The current situation is quite stable. The future depends heavily on Western strategy.