2024 IN HINDSIGHT ⟩ Key Defense Developments in the Baltic Region

Baltic Defense Line Project Takes Off

As part of the updated NATO Baltic defense plans and the new deterrence by denial concept, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland are embarking on extensive efforts to physically bolster their border defenses. Lithuania is set to spend €380 million on a military defense zone along its borders with Belarus and Russia. This proactive approach mirrors Poland's ambitious "Eastern Shield" project, also known as the "Tusk Line" in Polish media, which includes a €2.4 billion investment to bolster Poland's eastern border.

Latvia has approved a €303 million military anti-mobility plan for the Latvian-Russian border to be executed within five years. Confidential details of the plan include converting cross-border roads with Russia into tank barriers and creating tank traps from drainage ditches. Rapid fortification measures also involve storing explosives and obstacles at the border for quick deployment and preparing to disable key transport routes to hinder enemy advances.

For Estonia, the defense zone is planned to extend up to 40 kilometers deep from the eastern border and cover about 100 kilometers in length. The zone will span the entire land border with Russia.

Trouble in the Air

In the spring of 2024, navigation problems began affecting civilian aircraft in the Baltic States. The number of flights encountering issues due to Russia's electronic warfare systems reached into the hundreds.

Russian interference had previously caused disruptions in air traffic between Helsinki and Tartu, until Estonia upgraded its airport navigation systems.

In June, GPS satellite navigation disruptions had prevented a Finnair plane from landing in North Karelia. Similar problems were observed in the same region of Finland in August.

Poland publicly debated with NATO over whether it should shoot down Russian missiles and drones entering its airspace. The debate intensified after a Russian drone allegedly crossed into Polish territory during an attack on Ukraine on August 26.

On August 30, a U.S. RQ-4B Global Hawk reconnaissance drone encountered signal interference in Estonian airspace. The drone landed safely despite the disruption. This interference, attributed to Russian electronic warfare, has impacted both military and civilian aviation across Northeastern Europe, particularly in the Baltic region.

On September 7, 2024, a Russian Shahed attack drone crash-landed in the Gaigalava municipality of the Rezekne region, Latvia. The drone entered Latvian airspace from Belarus and continued uninterrupted until it ran out of fuel, raising concerns about the readiness of Baltic air defenses to protect civilians from sudden aerial threats.

On November 25, one crew member was killed after a DHL cargo plane crashed on the outskirts of Vilnius Airport in Lithuania, skidded into a house and burst into flames. Investigators told press on December 20, that they found no indication of “unauthorized interference” or sabotage, as was previously suspected.

New Spark in Defense Industry

In July, the Lithuanian government granted emergency project status to a €180 million artillery ammunition factory to be established by the German defense contractor Rheinmetall in the Radviliškis district. The construction works started in November. Lithuania also established strategic partnership with Northrop Grumman, a U.S. defense technology company, allowing it to share technologies and advanced manufacturing expertise with Lithuanian industry.

In December, Estonian defense industry start-up Frankenburg Technologies announced it will begin testing its self-developed air defense missiles in Ukraine next year. Bloomberg, the world’s leading financial publication, highlighted Frankenburg as one of Europe’s top four high-tech defense industry startups. The Estonian company with straightforward motto “Technology to Win Wars,” plans to mass produce cost-effective missiles designed to shoot down drones using artificial intelligence to hit targets.

If Russia were to send hundreds of Shahed drones to the Baltic states over a few months to attack infrastructure, there wouldn’t be much left in the long run. These drones would quickly deplete the current expensive air defense missile stockpiles. At the moment, there’s nothing affordable available to shoot them down.

Baltic Military Strategy Shifts towards Long-Range Fires

In September, the Estonian government decided to invest an additional 800 million euros between 2025 and 2028 to replenish ammunition stocks, with a particular focus on long-range fires (such as ATACMS and similar capabilities). The strategy, proposed by the Chief of Defense, Major General Andrus Merilo, to hit the aggressor on its soil, was the subject of heated public debate, which ultimately led to the government's decision to support the military strategy shift.

Former Chief of Defense of Poland, General Rajmund T. Andrzejczak, stated during an exclusive in-depth interview with The Baltic Sentinel, that it was Poland that initiated the shift in Baltic military thinking to include long-range capabilities, that would allow Poland and Baltic nations to target aggressor on its own territory. "We need to send a clear message to Russia that any concentration of forces near the Polish or Estonian border will be met with swift military response, targeting their logistics and critical infrastructure," General Andrzejczak asserted.

The Finnish Ministry of Defense announced in a press release on December 30 that Defense Minister Antti Häkkänen has approved the Defense Forces' proposal to procure GMLRS rockets from the United States (with the range of 70+ km). Additional GMLRS (Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System) Unitary and GMLRS AW (Alternative Warhead) rockets will be acquired for the Army's heavy rocket launcher system.

The procurement ensures the availability of sufficient munitions for the heavy rocket launcher system. Finland previously acquired similar GMLRS rockets in 2016 and 2017.

Historic Regional Highs in Defense Spending

In 2024, the combined defense expenditure of the three Baltic States—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—is projected to be approximately $4.8 billion. This represents a significant increase from their combined defense spending in 2021, which was around $2.5 billion, so the Baltic States have done something that the incoming U.S. President Donald Trump insisted during his first presidency. The growth of the Baltic defense spending has had little to do with Trump's return to power and more to do with the colossal attrition war going on in Europe and the seismic changes in regional threat perception. Estonia and Lithuania already spend more than 3% of GDP on defense and Latvia is expected to do it in 2027.

The most staggering growth has been made by Poland from 15 billion dollars in 2021 to almost 32 billion dollars in 2024. This year Poland spends over 4% of GDP to defense.

In May, Baltic Defense Ministers jointly proposed raising expected minimum defense spending for a NATO ally from 2% of GDP minimum to that of 2,5%. This proposal did not get much traction during the Anniversary Summit in Washington D.C., neither in December in Tallinn, where Baltic and Nordic countries and the U.K. leaders met for Joint Expeditionary Force Summit.

Baltic States Secure Key EU Security Roles

In the new European Commission led by Ursula von der Leyen, Andrius Kubilius from Lithuania serves as the Commissioner for Defense and Space, already drafting the European Defense Policy White Paper; Valdis Dombrovskis from Latvia is the Commissioner for Economy and Productivity; and Kaja Kallas from Estonia, as the Vice President of the European Commission, holds the position of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

At first glance, it may seem that Kallas's mandate will be smaller than that of her predecessor, Josep Borrell. After all, the Commission includes, for the first time, separate commissioners for defense and the Mediterranean. The defense portfolio has been elevated to the commissioner level, understandably due to Ukraine's full-scale war, while the Mediterranean commissioner will handle issues such as migrants crossing the Mediterranean as well as broader regional concerns. But as Vice President, she will coordinate her broader area of responsibility.

Finnish former President Sauli Niinistö has also played an important role in 2024, having issued an EU defense report, where he concluded that the EU "needs to take more strategic responsibility for security in Europe" in face of an evident military threat posed by Russia.

Sweden joins NATO

Sweden's accession to NATO brings a significant strategic advantage for the Baltic nations, as NATO gains an important base in the middle of the Baltic Sea in the form of Gotland Island.

Additionally, NATO member states benefit from Sweden's military as a valuable addition in terms of forces and equipment. While the Swedish army is not particularly large, it is a very modern force. Sweden’s air force, built domestically, is also extremely advanced. Sweden, with its long-standing maritime traditions, boasts highly modern submarines.

Swedish military personnel have ample combat experience, having participated in various NATO military missions, including operations in Afghanistan. As on of the first steps after accession, Stockholm sent a military contingent to Latvia to serve as part the Canadian-led multinational forward presence force.

Donald Trump Set To Return to the White House

Although Trump presented himself during his campaign as a peace advocate promising eternal peace—contrary to Democrats, who he claimed were steering the world toward a major war—there remains uncertainty about how he plans to compel Russia to negotiate on Ukraine and reach an agreement. As long as Putin does not fear U.S. military intervention, he has no reason to accept terms that fall short of Ukraine's complete capitulation.

It is suggested that Trump may want to quickly remove the Ukraine issue from his agenda, seeing it as a distraction. At the same time, European and NATO leaders must make it clear to Trump that losing Ukraine would be a defeat for the entire democratic Western world, including Trump himself. Europe and NATO must persuade and motivate Trump to work collectively to ensure peace in Ukraine on terms favorable to Ukraine and the West, not Russia.

While public perceptions of the Trump's last presidency were shaped by moments like the infamous NATO cafeteria sketch on Saturday Night Live, the reality in NATO corridors was different. Under Trump, U.S. security investments in the Baltics nearly doubled, and the U.S. military presence in Poland, crucial for Baltic security, significantly increased.

Trump’s administration also launched the NATO Readiness Initiative (NRI), aimed at improving military readiness and ensuring more allied units were available for immediate deployment in a potential Article 5 scenario. Although the NRI stalled due to European hesitation and COVID-19, it exposed critical capability gaps and laid the groundwork for NATO's enhanced military posture after 2022.

This past experience does not necessarily predict a similar trajectory for the new Trump administration, where tech mogul Elon Musk and other extravagant nominees have gained significant influence. Isolationist tendencies have gained ground in the Republican Party. As a result, the cautious optimism of Baltic leaders towards Trump's next presidency may well prove to be utterly misplaced.

Russia-West Hybrid War Escalates to Baltic Sea Cable Conflict

In the early hours of December 26, two helicopters took off from Vantaa Airport—one belonging to the Finnish Defense Forces and the other to the Border Guard. Onboard were members of the Helsinki Police Department’s rapid response unit, Karu, and the Gulf of Finland Coast Guard rescue team. The helicopters headed toward Porkkala, where the Finnish Border Guard had ordered the detention of the oil tanker Eagle S in connection with the damage to the EstLink 2 electricity cable and communication cables.

Finnish police and border guard officers were armed and prepared for resistance, none was encountered, and the vessel was quickly brought under Finnish authorities’ control.

Through their swift and decisive action, the Finnish authorities prevented damage to the Balticconnector gas pipeline (once already succesfully sabotaged in October 2023) and another major subsea electric cable, EstLink 1. Estonian Navy started a maritime operation in order to guard the cable.

In November 2024, two significant submarine cable disruptions occurred in the Baltic Sea. This form of kinetic indirect warfare is just one of the modes of hybrid conflict that Russia and its allies are currently pursuing. However, it is among the most likely developments to prompt a new collective military operation in NATO's Northeast in 2025.